tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-85857320929942599782024-03-13T13:43:11.033-05:00Lex ChristianorumA Commonplace Blog Dedicated to the Law of the Christian Peoples and the Natural LawAndrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.comBlogger883125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-75382433942989115692014-01-31T11:29:00.001-06:002020-09-08T10:34:59.862-05:00The Foundation of the Christian Moral Order<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">A</span>N INTERESTING DOCUMENT, from both a historical and doctrinal standpoint, is the schema "On the Christian Moral Order" drafted by the Preparatory Commission to the Second Vatican Council headed by Cardinal Ottaviani, the then-head of the Holy Office (which later became the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith). Some of these schemas have been translated from Latin into English by Fr. Joseph A. Komonchak of Marquette University. They were posted on the Unam Sanctam web page, accessible <a href="https://www.blogger.com/%3Ca%20href=%22http://unamsanctamcatholicam.com/history/historia-ecclesiae/79-history/421-original-vatican-ii-schemas.html%22%3E%3C/a%3E" target="_blank">here</a>.
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The schema "<a href="http://jakomonchak.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/on-the-christian-moral-order.pdf" target="_blank">On the Christian Moral Order</a>" gives a remarkable synopsis of the Church's teaching on the natural moral law, on its objective nature, on its reality, on its reliance upon God, on its role in informing the conscience, on the Church's Magisterium's competence over the natural moral law, on its role in salvation, and on its universal nature, among other things. It is a tightly-reasoned and balanced presentation of the natural law.<br />
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Much of the confusion in Catholic moral theology--which eventually led to Blessed John Paul II's promulgation of his encyclical on Christian morals and the natural moral law and moral theology, <i>Veritatis splendor</i>--could have been avoided had this sort of schema been adopted by the council fathers. Alas, hindsight is 20/20.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-23549799375339868962013-03-22T11:31:00.005-05:002020-09-08T10:36:29.712-05:00Pope Francis and the Natural Moral Law<div style="text-align: justify;"><div>IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE DIPLOMATIC Press Corps, Pope Francis obliquely mentioned the natural moral law--the law of truth and good based upon the reason that is found in created nature. In keeping with his namesake, Pope Francis, as all Christians, wants to strive for peace. But the peace he speaks of is not peace such as the world gives, which is a false peace. "Peace I leave with you; My peace I give to you; not as the world gives do I give to you." (John 14:27) Rather, befitting a Christian vision, peace has to be built upon the foundation of truth, truth regarding the good. That truth regarding the good is found in two sources or founts: nature and revelation. In this particular instance, Pope Francis reminded the Diplomatic Press Corps of the common foundation all men have in nature:</div><div><br /></div><div>But there is no true peace without truth! There cannot be true peace if everyone is his own criterion, if everyone can always claim exclusively his own rights, without at the same time caring for the good of others, of everyone, on the basis of the nature that unites every human being on this earth (a partire dalla natura che accomuna ogni essere umano su questa terra). </div><div><br /></div><div>You can find the entire address (translated into English) by clicking here.</div></div>Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-6893198530473145012012-12-17T04:11:00.000-06:002012-12-17T04:13:52.262-06:00Natural Law and Culture: The 'Explosive Problematic' in Gaudium et spes<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">T</span>HE WEAKNESS OF THE SECOND Vatican Council's treatment of modern culture in <i>Gaudium et spes</i> is perhaps attributable to its generally Maritanian trajectory. If Cardinal Garrone is to be believed, it was Maritain's thinking, of which <i>rapproachement </i>with the Liberal-humanist (modern) tradition (as contained, say, in his work <i>Integral Humanism</i>) is central, that the guided the Conciliar fathers.* This is unfortunate in Tracey Rowland's view, in that the deeper, more critical analyses of culture found in the works of Erich Przywara, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Romano Guardini, and (even earlier) in John Henry Newman, seem to have been overlooked. <br />
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In her book <i>Culture and the Thomist Tradition</i>, Professor Rowland gives a number of examples of the "explosive problematic" contained in <i>Gaudium et spes</i>. She points to <i>Gaudium et spes</i>, No. 56, where the following question is asked:<br />
<blockquote class="poemblue">
What is to be done to prevent the increased exchanges between cultures, which should lead to a true and fruitful dialogue between groups and nations, from disturbing the life of communities, from destroying the wisdom received from ancestors, or from placing in danger the character proper to each people?</blockquote>
This appears to be a reference to <i>Kultur</i>.** Taken at face value,*** what does this say to Christian missionaries who confront non-Christian cultures, some of which have anti-Christian or even anti-human elements? Is it disturbing the life of communities and destroying the wisdom of ancestors or placing in danger the character of African tribal communities by insisting in monogamy and in battling polygamy? Are all parts of all cultures to be preserved so as to avoid insult to "each people"? This suggests putting manacles on the Gospel, something entirely impossible to comprehend in a Church document.<br />
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As another example, Professor Rowland turns to <i>Gaudium et spes</i>, No. 57:<br />
<blockquote class="poemorange">
Furthermore, when man gives himself to the various disciplines of philosophy, history and of mathematical and natural science, and when he cultivates the arts, he can do very much to elevate the human family to a more sublime understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the formation of considered opinions which have universal value. Thus mankind may be more clearly enlightened by that marvelous Wisdom which was with God from all eternity, composing all things with him, rejoicing in the earth, delighting in the sons of men.</blockquote>
This is a reference to culture as <i>Bildung</i>.** This language, if understood within the "implied Trinitarian framework that draws attention to the relationship between spiritual formation and intellectual formation, and gives a specific Christian content to the concept of truth, beauty, and goodness," it can be construed in a manner perfectly compatible with Church Tradition. If understood in the sense that this section is promoting Maritain's "theocentric humanism," and not in the sense of "anthropocentric humanism," it can find a home in the Church. <br />
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Yet, if it is wrested from this implied context, "the section is more immediately evocative of the works of Wilhelm on Humboldt and Friederich Schiller on the self-development and the 'aesthetic education of man.'" Rowland, 24. In other words, this section can appear to advocate an "Arisocratic Liberal" conception of self-development, one that looks as "education" as the means for inculcating "virtue," and thus can appear to be plugging itself into the "subterranean link between the Encyclopaedist and Genealogical traditions." Surely the Church had no intent to listen to the voices of Voltaire or of Nietzsche? Did the Church really intend to promote the Kierkegaardian "aesthete"?<br />
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To put it bluntly: where is grace? Is the grace of Christianity irrelevant to culture in the sense of <i>Bildung</i>?<br />
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In this criticism, Professor Rowland is not alone. In what can only be categorized as blunt and strong criticism of this section, Rowland points to Joseph Ratzinger's early (1969) commentary on <i>Gaudium et spes</i>, where he described sections of it as containing "<i>eine geradezu pelagianische Terminlogie</i>," "a downright Pelagian terminology." As particular examples of this tendency, Ratzinger pointed to <i>Gaudium et spes</i>, Nos. 17, 41, where there seems to be an overemphasis on freedom and autonomy understood in a modern liberal manner, and not in a manner as freedom as "living in the presence of God." There appears to be a de-emphasis of grace and an over-emphasis of self-development, self-will, self-perfection. <br />
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As Rowland summarizes these various sections of <i>Gaudium et spes</i> dealing with <i>Bildung</i>: "The need for the personality to have a Christian form of development might therefore be implied [in <i>Gaudium et spes</i>], but the whole tone of the discourse remains suggestive of the Liberal-humanist tradition with its idea of self-perfection through education and exercise of will-power." Rowland, 25.<br />
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Another defect in <i>Gaudium et spes</i> seems to be in its rather uncritical handling of the problem of "mass culture" (see <i>Gaudium et spes</i>, No. 54). How does the <i>Kultur </i>in modernity's "mass-culture" affect the ability for authentic Christian <i>Bildung</i>? This fundamental question is largely overlooked. <br />
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As one final example, this time more in the area of <i>Geist </i>or <i>ethos</i>,** Professor Rowland points to Gaudium et spes No. 57, and the invocation of the "expert." The text speaks of the need to obtain "a clearer awareness of the responsibility of experts to aid and even to protect men . . . especially for those who are poor in culture or who are deprived of the opportunity to exercise responsibility." As Professor Rowland puts it, this section of Gadium et spes<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
immediately raises the question: What is the basis for the authority of these benevolent 'experts'? . . . . [T]he whole notion of 'government by experts' stands in tension with the tradition of Catholic social thought which emphasises the importance of the principle of subsidiarity, and the tradition of governance in Catholic institutions, which has favoured what in Weberian terms would be classified as 'charismatic authority' over 'bureaucratic authority.'</blockquote>
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Rowland, p. 26-27. Did the Church really intend to baptize the modern bureaucrat? Did it bless a modern peritocracy? That is rather dubious, but the text would give support to such a view.<br />
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Finally, one might point out that the suggestion that "experts" can solve the problems of the "cultural poor" or the "poor in culture" is rather shallow. Is the expert really the one that can provide, like a magician pulling a white rabbit out of the hat, technical solutions that will <i>ipso facto</i> aid the "culturally poor"? There is a little bit of elitism in the air here.<br />
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*Although unmentioned by Prof. Rowland, one might mention Maritain's less ebullient and more sober later work, <i>A Peasant of the Garrone,</i> where he appears to re-think some of his earlier optimism. One might also point out the accommodationism in Fr. John Courtney Murray, which, although focused more on the religious freedom issue, also seemed quite open to the Liberal-humanist tradition. It should be noted, in any event, that both Maritain and Fr. Murray were and would have been appalled at the "hermeneutic of discontinuity" that followed VII.<br />
**For Rowland's categorization of <i>Kultur</i>, <i>Bildung</i>, and <i>Geist</i>, see the posting <a href="http://www.lexchristianorum.blogspot.com/2012/12/natural-law-and-culture-towards-better.html">"Natural Law and Culture: Towards a Better Definition of Culture."</a><br />
***The language can be interpreted in a Herderian sense (i.e., in the manner of the German Romantic Johann Gottfried Herder). It can also be interpreted in other senses. Hence, in Rowland's view, the language "requires further clarification." Rowland, 23. There has to be some to distinguish between "a Christian conception of inculturation," which is entirely legitimate, and a "Herderian promotion of the preservation of <i>all </i>cultures that exhibit the Romantic qualities of individuality and originality," which seems relativistic and suffers from a cultural indifferentism. </div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-75234597477182016882012-12-13T04:14:00.000-06:002012-12-15T02:26:33.130-06:00Natural Law and Culture: Towards a Better Definition of Culture<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>ERHAPS THE MOST important Vatican II document as it relates to the Church's' relationship with the world at large, the Church's relationship ad extra, is <i>Gaudium et spes</i>. Unfortunately, there are some intrinsic weaknesses with the document arising from the fact that it was a compromise document (thereby often suffering from ambiguity or a lack of clarity), that the Conciliar fathers lacked a full understanding of modernity (particularly in its cultural manifestations), that the form of the document was innovative, indeed unprecedented (a "pastoral Constitution" as distinguished from a "dogmatic Constitution," and yet a "Constitution" without legal form, but instead a rather loose, hortatory and pastoral, form), its lack of definition of some essential and frequently used terms (e.g., "modern man" and "modern world"). Moreover, these problems, which are already present in the Latin text, seem to have been exacerbated in the vernacular translations. As Tracey Rowland summarizes it in her book <i>Culture and the Thomist Tradition</i>:<br />
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When taken together, the fact of compromise, the multiple contrasts, the unprecedented form, the absence of a clearly defined theological framework for its interpretation, the alternation between dogma and pastoral appeals and the terminological looseness all contributed to the complexity of the 'explosive problematic'.</blockquote>
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Rowland, 19.
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Then, as if to add insult to injury, the problems associated with the text were compounded by "the most commonly applied hermeneutical key to the interpretation of this document," a concept as banal and amorphous as <i>aggiornamento</i>.* It seems like "openness" became "accommodation" became "capitulation." It is no wonder the Church's message to the modern world--whatever it was in <i>Gaudium et spes</i>--was further muddled. Instead of fresh air out, it was foul air in.<br />
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The problems with <i>Gaudium et spes</i> generally also find themselves exhibited in its definition of "culture." The definition of culture in the Conciliar document is found in Paragraph 53. Culture, it states, "in the general sense refers to all those things which to to the refining and developing of man's diverse mental and physical endowments." As Rowland critiques it, "this definition is extremely broad in coverage, but shallow in analysis, and not explicitly related to the grace-nature problematic as one would expect in a theological document." Rowland, 20. <br />
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What Rowland suggests would have behooved the Conciliar Fathers is to have adopted a little more rigorous understanding of culture. She draws from T.S. Eliot (and the subtleties of the German language as exploited by the German <i>Kulturgeschichte </i>scholars) and the Greek concepts of <i>nomos</i>, <i>ethos</i>, and <i>logos</i>, to expand the notion of "culture" into three separate senses:<br />
<ol>
<li>Culture of the individual (a specific form of <i>Bildung</i>, or self-development; <i>nomos </i>is "the element that gives each conception of self-formation or <i>Bildung </i>its guiding principles or laws");</li>
<li>Culture of the group (the <i>Geist </i>or ethos of a specific civilization or institution = <i>ethos</i>)</li>
<li>Culture of society as a whole (the <i>Kultur </i>or civilization of a society; <i>logos</i> = "that which give a given civilisation or <i>Kultur </i>its overarching and particular form.")</li>
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Rowland, 20-21.**<br />
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Taking these concepts and knitting them together within the context of her "Augustinian Thomist conception of culture," Rowland comes up with this definition of culture, which seems superior at once to the rather one dimensional definition found in <i>Gaudium et spes</i>, 53.<br />
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<blockquote class="orange">
[A]n Augustinian Thomist conception of culture can be defined as one in which any given <i>ethos </i>is governed by the Christian virtues, the process of self-formation or <i>Bildung </i>is guided by the precepts of the Decalogue and revealed moral laws of the New Testament, and the logos or form is provided by the 'identities-in-relation' logic of the Trinitarian processions.</blockquote>
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Rowland, 21.
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*Even the term <i>aggiornamento</i>, the main "hermeneutical key," was ambiguous. As Rowland notes, instead of mere uncritical accommodation it probably was originally intended to "mean an updating or development of theological resources to provide a coherent critique of the culture of modernity, rather than a simple accommodation to it." Rowland, 19. Against the accomodators, it is this notion of <i>aggiornamento </i>that may be said to have been behind John Paul II and Benedict XVI's efforts to rectify this problem.<br />
**Rowland cites to the classic study of T.S Eliot, <i>Notes Towards the Definition of Culture</i> and to R. Geuss, <i>Morality, Culture, and History</i>.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-8800676283988781312012-12-09T05:01:00.001-06:002022-08-06T12:39:37.359-05:00Natural Law and Culture: Recognizing Modernity<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">R</span>ECOGNIZING THE ROLE THAT CULTURE, especially modern culture, plays in the formation of persons is important. There has been a tendency to view modernity as a separate superstructure with its own philosophical assumptions which, often, are in opposition to the natural moral law and the Faith. Charles Taylor, one scholar of modernity, its history, and its development, has defined culture as a "specific understanding of 'personhood, social relations, states of mind, and virtues and vices' or 'constellation of understandings of person, nature, society and the good.'" It includes, within this "constellation of understandings," the "relationship of the human person to 'God, the cosmos and other humans." (Rowland, 12) In short, it is a sort of an enfleshed or socially-institutionalized <i>Weltanschaung</i>. <br />
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Unfortunately, modern culture is not like a monastic habit. One cannot look at a society and call it "modern" or "Christian" or "Muslim" like one could call a friar a Dominican if he wears a white habit with black scapula and a Franciscan if he wears a brown one. Cultures blend, and, more often than not, especially in times of transition, one will have to struggle to determine what is what. For this reason, the concept of "modernity" as a culture is not simply contemporaneous culture. Contemporaneous culture in the West is the culture of modernity mixed in with the past culture of Christendom.<br />
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Modernity did not come upon us as a culture in one fell swoop. Rather, the dismantling of Christianity culture came through a process of change, addition, subtraction, reconstruction during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. While the Popes of this time attacked individual phenomena, one cannot say that they ever constructed an exhaustive or plenary critique of modernity. Rather, their attacks on the modernity as it evolved was more or less on an <i>ad hoc</i> basis.<br />
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Even during the Second Vatican Council, a council supposedly dedicated to the issue of the Church in modernity, seems to have failed to engage in a "<i>theological </i>examination of this culture phenomenon called 'modernity' or the 'modern world.'" (Rowland, 13) Its almost as if the Church fathers looked at the phenomenon of modernity as a social accident--sort of like a hurricane that causes damage--and not as a social substantive--like a plague that gets progressively worse without some sort of sustained effort at diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis. As Rowland in her book <i>Culture and the Thomist Tradition</i> puts it:<br />
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There was no consideration, at least not at a philosophical and/or theological level, of the question of what is, in essence, the culture of modernity, and how such a culture affects the spiritual and intellectual formation of persons and thier opportunites for evangelisation.
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Rowland, 13. There seems to be a time when the Gospel is preached without purse, shoes, or bag, but also a time when it needs a purse, and indeed, a sword. (Luke 22:35-36). In confronting modernity in the Second Vatican Council, the Church seems to have gone the former route, and so Catholics were rather vaguely enjoined to be "authentic," and "relevant," and "open" to "modernity" with joy and hope.<br />
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In the view of John O'Malley in <i>Tradition and Transition: Historical Perspectives on Vatican II</i>, this sort of <i>je ne sais quoi</i> attitude with respect to modernity contained an "explosive problematic" attached to it. It was like sending lambs to wolves, mice to serpents.<br />
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The Church was ill-prepared to address the issue of modernity, especially in its cultural aspects. As Rowland observes:<br /><blockquote class="orange"><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 14px;">[T]he notion of "modernity" as a "cultural formation" had not yet arrived within the theological frameworks of the Conciliar fathers in 1962. In this context Hervé Carrier has observed that "prior to the Council, the capacity for cultural analysis was almost whooly ignored in the theological formation provided at the time"--the word "culture" did not even appear as an entry in the </span><i style="font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 14px;">Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique</i><span style="background-color: white; font-family: Georgia, serif; font-size: 14px;">.</span>.
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Rowland, 14. It was sort of like believing one had to take care of a simple wart, when one was in reality confronting something as complex, as serious, as dangerous, and as alive as a cancerous tumor. <br />
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Not informed by a clear sense of modern culture, the Church--then guided by Pope John XXIII--seemed (certainly in retrospect) altogether naïve about what it confronted. In his opening address to the council fathers, Pope John XXIII spoke of modernity as something provided by God's Providence, something even that fulfilled "God's superior and inscrutable designs," something that was bound to lead "to the good of the Church." In short, there was a "belief in the latently Christian orientation of the social trends." (Rowland, 14). <br />
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This attitude was already seen in John XXIII's encyclical <i>Pacem in Terris</i>. In that encyclical, John XXIII naïvely assumed, without any analysis, that the "mutual acknowledgement of rights and duties in society" presented the Church with a "kind of <i>preparatio evangelii</i>" because it made humans open to values such as "truth, justice, charity, and freedom." <br />
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However, as Rowland sees it, this supposed link between modern "rights and duties" and an openness to the Gospel was simply presumed. Hobbesian rights, Beccarian justice, Rawlsian duties may not be the same as rights, justice, and duties from the perspective of the Gospel. There may be an entire closure to transcendent values.<br />
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"[W]hat is missing from <i>Pacem in Terris</i> and John XXIII's optimistic judgements about the directions of social values in the 1950s is precisely what Taylor calls a cultural analysis--an understanding of the clusters of values fit together into constellations that become embodied in the practices and beliefs of individuals and the institutions in which they work." (Rowland, 15). This incorrigible optimism, founded largely upon a failure to undertake a cultural analysis adequate to the task, was continued by John XXIII's successor Paul VI.<br />
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If culture has a role in thought, in other words, if culture has a role in influencing conceptions of justice, of rationality, and of virtue (as is argued by Alasdair MacIntyre and those of the Geneological tradition) then to ignore its role is a huge error. What are "universal values" to a Liberal may not be "universal values" to one of the children of Abraham. <br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-59469648807191844432012-12-05T04:44:00.004-06:002012-12-05T04:45:20.850-06:00Culture and Natural Law: Introduction<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">W</span>E ARE GENERALLY FAMILIAR with the maxim that grace builds upon nature. We might also extend that maxim out a bit and observe that grace may also build upon those aspects of human nature that extend beyond man's mere substance (a rational soul), but into that substance's external constructs: politics, family, history, in short, culture. We might say that grace builds upon nature, and nature builds upon culture, and so ultimately grace also builds upon culture.
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When culture was in the main Christian--as in the high Middle ages when St. Thomas Aquinas, in what may have been the height of Christendom, wrote his <i>Summa Theologiae</i>--the importance of culture seemed to have been overlooked somewhat. As Professor Tracey Rowland put it in her introduction to her book <i>Culture and the Thomist Tradition After Vatican II</i>,* the "given" nature of Christendom all about him resulted in the fact that the "rôle of culture in moral formation was not a problematic requiring his attention." (p. 2) Modernly, when our culture is so adverse to Christian morals and the Christian narrative (i.e., the Gospel), the importance of a <i>right culture</i> (like right reason) is increasingly recognized. In the West, of course, we live in a culture where moral liberalism and moral nihilism reign supreme, where that amorphous and highly malleable "rights talk" entirely unanchored from nature or objective value is the language of the day. <br />
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The modern culture is highly anti-Catholic and anti-Christian, and the few remaining remnants of Christendom--which already appear as the ruins of the monasteries, friaries, convents, and priories after the their dissolution by the tyrant King Henry VIII--are still being dismantled. Like the French Huguenots and Revolutionaries, modern barbarians are unhappy with the little of the Abbey of Cluny that remains in our culture: they want to continue taking the ashlar stones in place and haul them away for their own pet projects, their own homes and mills and stables and barns. In such hostile cultural environment, neither the natural moral law nor grace flourishes.<br />
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To state a truism: since the high middle ages to modernity, the cultural narrative as changed.<br />
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The role of culture, both its hindrance to and its support of, a life of human flourishing, is painfully apparent to anyone sensitive to Christendom's demise, "when Christendom is but a historical memory for a significant proportion of the population, and the Christian soul is forged within a complex matrix of institutions founded upon a mixture of theistic, quasi-theistic and anti-theistic traditions." (Rowland, p. 2) This is the culture of modernity. This is the culture we confront.<br />
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Additionally, culture has an effect even on reasoning. Someone steeped in the Thomist tradition reasons differently from someone steeped in Enlightenment-derived Liberal or Romantic Genealogical philosophies, say, Locke, or Hume, or Rousseau, or Nietzsche, or Marx. These divided ways of thinking is a reality we also confront.<br />
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To some extent, there has been a certain diffidence in approaching the issue of culture and its effect on moral formation and moral flourishing. The fear is that too much emphasis on culture in moral formation and moral flourishing seems to concede to much to the Genealogical school that, at root, all values are conventional, cultural. The desire to emphasize that there are objective moral values, that there is a universally applicable natural moral law that is not conventional or culturally grounded, to avoid yielding ground to historicism or relativism, has seemed to contribute to trepidation in engaging the issue. Fools rush in where angels fear to tread. Thomists appear to avoid being fools; and their courage has been less than that of angels. But according to Professor Rowland, this fear is unwarranted, and, in light of current circumstances, indefensible and irresponsible. She urges the "need for an account of the rôle of culture in moral formation which does not undermine other elements of the tradition." (Rowland, p. 7)<br />
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Professor Tracey Rowland</span></i></div>
<br />
How does a Christian, in particular a Catholic Christian, approach this world of dismantled Christendom, where there is this admixture of "theistic, quasi-theistic, and anti-theistic traditions," and where, moreover, the reigning spirit seems to be concerned with yet the further minimization of the "theistic" and "quasi-theistic" remnants, and maximization of the "anti-theistic" traditions?<br />
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There seems to be somewhat of a division among Catholic thinkers regarding how we should best approach the problem with modernity. Some believe that the "culture of modernity is neutral in relation to the flourishing of Christian practices, or even a second <i>praeparatio envangelii</i> in the manner of classical culture." (Rowland, p. 2) We might call these the naive optimists. This attitude appears to have been institutionalized in a manner in Vatican II's optimistic and perhaps somewhat naive (or perhaps now even dated) pastoral constitution <i>Gaudium et spes</i>.<br />
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Other scholars or authorities have the opinion that regards "the culture of modernity as the very solvent of Christian practices." The scholars that we might put in this group include Catherine Pickstock (who speaks of a "polity of death"), David Schindler (who regards modern culture akin to a grace-resistant machine), and Alasdair MacIntyre (who sees modern culture as "toxic to the flourishing of virtue and the precepts of the natural law," Rowland, p. 2). Even within the Church, the tocsin has been sounded. Blessed Pope John Paul II's "culture of death," and Pope Benedict XVI's "tyranny of relativism" appear somewhat less embracing of modernity than <i>Gaudium et spes</i>. We might call this view the realist view.<br />
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It seems that there is a disconnect between <i>Gaudium et spes</i> and reality, and so, to a certain extent, Catholics confront a sort of crisis. Is it the accommodation of <i>aggiornamento </i>or the challenge of the New Evangelization? <br />
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It seems that Catholic leadership has begun to ask the question, "Foundations once destroyed, what can the just man do?" as did the Psalmist. (Ps. 11:3 [10:4]) Ultimately, Professor Rowland, whom we categorize with the realists, addresses this question in her book <i>Culture and the Thomist Tradition After Vatican II</i>. Rowland's treatment is engaging and seems to bring forth out of the subtraditions of classical and analytical Thomism (in particular relying on Alasdair MacIntyre's work, but also on the work of David Schindler and Kenneth Schmitz, a sort of patchwork which she categorizes with the somewhat cumbersome term "postmodern Augustinian Thomism"), the <i>Nouvelle Théologie</i>, and Radical Orthodoxy We will spend our next series of postings on this highly-recommended work. <br />
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*Hereinafter in this in subsequent blog postings, identified as "Rowland."<br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-71190447193133333982012-11-27T04:21:00.004-06:002020-09-08T10:07:41.207-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Love is Virtue's Glue<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">I</span>N HIS TREATMENT OF THE VIRTUES in his <i>Summa de bono</i>, Philip the Chancellor asks the question whether one must have all the virtues or none at all. With respect to the infused virtues, Philip raises a possible objection to their unity. He notes that charity is often called the form of all the virtues, and this might be understood as being that "just as charity is one specific kind of virtue, so are the others." In other words, charity is one virtue just like justice, for example, is another. If virtue is defined as "a good quality of mind which God produces in us without our help," which is how Peter Lombard in his Sentences defined it (Sent. 2 d. 27.1.1,2:480), then there is no requirement that the virtues be united or connected.<br />
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Moreover, since charity, unlike justice of the other cardinal virtues, is strictly an infused virtue (there being no such thing as a natural or "political" charity), it does not seem that charity could be the glue that binds the virtues into one. "[C]harity as charity is not the cause why the virtues are connected, since it is not found in political virtue."<br />
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<div style="text-align: center;">
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Cardinal Virtues by Antonio Pollaiuolo </span></i><br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">at St. Peter's Basilica, Vatican City.</span></i></div>
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In addressing these objections to the unity of the virtues, Philip the Chancellor starts by distinguishing charity. He observes that charity may be taken to mean at least two things. First, it may be understood as a "specific virtue." It also may be taken not as a determinate virtue, but in the general sense of love, and so "the reason for and cause of every virtue."<br />
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If charity is understood as a specific virtue, then it divides the genus of virtue, and is one specific virtue among other specif virtues. "Since one species of virtue is not the reason for or cause for another, in this respect charity is not the cause the reason for the other virtues, nor is it the immediate cause of the connection among the virtues."<br />
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But charity should not be so narrowly construed. Rather, charity should be viewed not only as a specific virtue, but as "general love." It is understood broadly that charity is the "reason for and cause of every virtue." This is how St. Augustine understands it in his treatise on the morals of the Catholic Church, <i>De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae</i>. In that work, St. Augustine defines every other species of virtue by means of love. (This part of St. Augustine's work merits quotation in full:<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
As to virtue leading us to a happy life, I hold virtue to be nothing else than perfect love of God. For the fourfold division of virtue I regard as taken from four forms of love. For these four virtues (would that all felt their influence in their minds as they have their names in their mouths !), I should have no hesitation in defining them: that temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved; fortitude is love readily bearing all things for the sake of the loved object; justice is love serving only the loved object, and therefore ruling rightly; prudence is love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it. The object of this love is not anything, but only God, the chief good, the highest wisdom, the perfect harmony. So we may express the definition thus: that temperance is love keeping itself entire and incorrupt for God; fortitude is love bearing everything readily for the sake of God; justice is love serving God only, and therefore ruling well all else, as subject to man; prudence is love making a right distinction between what helps it towards God and what might hinder it.
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<i>De mor</i>., 15.25.)<br />
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The specific virtue of charity should be distinguished from general charity. Specific charity or love "has the same thing for its matter and its end, since it loves the highest good for its own sake." On the other hand, general charity, "has one thing for its matter and another for its end." General charity "has some good which is a way to God for its matter," but it has "God himself, who is the highest good, for its end." <br />
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Philip the Chancellor then outlines the scheme of grace, charity, and the virtues. The first thing we must keep in mind is grace. Grace is the first thing to keep in mind since it is grace which prompts charity and makes it grow. Grace is then the cause of both specific charity and general love. All the virtues are referable to charity:<br />
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<blockquote class="orange">
[W]ithout this love [of God engendered by grace] prudence would not be a virtue, nor would justice, nor anything else. Therefore [general love] is called the reason for and immediate cause of every [infused] virtue. For the same thing can be said of faith and hope. Charity, however, as love, agrees with general love, but it differs, however, as was said, because it has a different matter from general love, that is, God. They also agree in having the same end, namely, God, and because there would be no general love if there were no specific love, this union in their end comes from specific different matters for these virtues, and different acts, nevertheless they are immediately united in general love, and from this union it follows immediately that whoever has one virtue has all.
</blockquote>
For Philip the Chancellor, it is general love engendered by grace that is the glue which cements all infused virtues, not only the cardinal virtues, but also the theological virtues. These virtues are all connected by general love which has one end, the highest good, which is God. As additional support for his teaching that general love or charity binds all the virtues together, Philip cites to St. Paul's letter to the Colossians, where he admonishes Christians to "above all these put on love, which is the bond of perfection." That is also why the Gloss on this states that "Charity connects all the others [of the virtues], so they are not missing."<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
This is why whoever has one virtue, since he does not have it without charity, and love of every good follows on charity, as a consequence he has love of every good and so has every virtue. For the same reason, it follows that no vice, since if it has love of rendering to each what is his own, lacks it its opposite vice; and in the same way, however has love of moderation lacks the opposing vice. But whoever has one love, since he has it together with charity, has every love. Therefore, he must necessarily lack every opposed vice.
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If general love is sufficient to assure that one has all the infused theological virtues and cardinal virtues, the question naturally raises itself: is general charity alone enough to assure us salvation? Do all the infused theological virtues and cardinal virtues follow in the general love of God? <br />
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In answering that question, we will round up and complete Philip the Chancellor's treatment of virtues in his work <i>Summa de bono</i>.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-60255323382630649212012-11-20T04:15:00.001-06:002012-11-20T04:15:48.552-06:00Philip the Chancellor: Unity of the Infused Cardinal Virtues<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>HILIP THE CHANCELLOR explores those authorities and arguments which suggest the possibility that one can have one virtue without having all virtues. He begins with a saying attributed to St. Augustine (but whose source he has been unable to find). "As one can possess one virtue more than another, so one can possess one virtue but not another." To counter this authority, Philip suggests that the foundation of the argument is wrong in because it confuses <i>possessing more</i> of a virtue with making <i>more use</i> of a virtue. Therefore, the fact that one might make more use of a virtue (and therefore give the appearance of possessing more of that virtue) does not mean that one can possess one virtue, but not another.<br />
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In one of his letters to St. Jerome (Ep. 167:3.10), St. Augustine states that the opinion that "whoever has one has all" is only an opinion held by some men, albeit great men. This suggests that St. Augustine may have been implying that the argument was false. Philip rejects this implied negative. He interprets St. Augustine's reference to the opinions of men as an effort to distinguish between reason (which he describes as the "footprint of God") and faith (those things about which it is written "unless you believe you shall not understand"). By referring to men, St. Augustine was referring to reason, and not to revelation or faith. And so the upshot of his statement is that the unity of the virtues is something that is not only understood as being part of the faith, but is also something that is understood as true by the use of reason.<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Cardinal Virtues</span></i></div>
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The third seemingly contrary argument is again from authority attributed to St. Augustine (in a text, the source of which Philip was unable to locate). "As our body climbing out of a pit is not illuminated all at once," says St. Augustine, "so our soul climbing out of sin is not illuminated all at once." Since St. Augustine appears to be adopting a law of gradualism with respect to sin, one can infer that he would adopt a law of gradualism with respect to virtue. Philip observes that the implication is not necessary. First, one can interpret the image of gradually coming to light as not applying to different faculties, so that reason is illuminated first, and then only the affections, so that the gradual enlightening is not of a priority of nature (which is perfected by grace and therefore has all the infused virtues, if in a state of grace, and none if it is outside a state of grace), but not a priority in time. In other words, grace (and the infused virtues) take time to work in the nature of man; but that does not mean that the virtues are not there working to synthesize reason and affection. The other interpretation is that St. Augustine is referring not to the existence of virtues (which cannot be piecemeal), but to their use (which may be piecemeal).<br />
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Philip next draws from scriptural interpretations as found in the marginal glosses. For example, the gloss on Mark 8:24 (regarding the blind man who does not see all at once, but sees men at first as trees walking) is that the cure out of spiritual blindness does not occur all at once, but with "difficulty, as though step by step." If this is applied to virtues, then it suggests that one progressively acquires the infused virtues and therefore they are not "one in all and all in one." Here, there is a sort of a law of gradualism in the virtues, but not a gradualism of the law in virtues. "[W]hoever leaves darkness does not immediately see distinctly and fully, but with confusion. His spiritual cure is understood to be perfect, through infusion of the virtues, yet certain remnants of sin remain, for example, in our memory and such powers, and even certain impediments [to virtue] remain, for which reason he [the blind man in the Gospel story] is said not to see fully."<br />
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Another gloss, this one on Job 38:24 ("through what way is the light dispensed?") construes that scriptural verse as follows: "Say by the way, that is, by what order do I infuse justice, with now this and now that virtue I complete [it]." This suggests that virtues are not given all at once in the infused soul. But this is mistaken in Philip's view, because the gloss should be interpreted to refer to the use of virtue, and not to the infused virtues being present in the soul.<br />
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The next argument is based upon reason. It focuses on the cause of the infused virtues and their interconnectivity and comparison to vice and the interconnectivity of vice. But to this, Philip the Chancellor states as follows:<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
In reality it is true, as is said in the argument that whoever has one virtues has no vice, so likewise, whoever has one vice has no virtue, not because of a connection among the vices but because of a connection among the virtues. The connection among the virtues, as the objection says, is not owing to their efficient cause [i.e., God], nor is it owing to some common effect, like making us worthy of eternal life. Rather, it comes from an intrinsic cause existing in the virtues themselves, as will be shown.
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The final argument* is based upon reason. It argues that since each act performed under the influence of infused virtue merits eternal life, then, if one were to subtract out the other virtues unnecessary to that act which merits eternal life, one would still merit eternal life. This suggests that the infused virtues are not a "one in all and all in one" type of thing. To this argument, Philip observes that though one act of one virtue can merit eternal life, "yet based on one virtue along one cannot be worthy of eternal life [by God's grace], which one can achieve, even without any meritorious act, as in the case of [baptized] children." Likewise, "even though one actually can gain merit by one virtue without the rest, one cannot be worthy [by God's grace] of eternal life without being worthy [again by God's grace] of he other virtue." For this reason, "the connection of the virtues is not based on merit, but rather on worthiness [which is dependent upon God's grace]."<br />
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*Philip the Chancellor discusses the seventh objection at great length, and we shall treat it in our next blog posting separately.<br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-22803183132532612462012-11-16T03:58:00.001-06:002012-11-16T03:58:38.736-06:00Philip the Chancellor: On the Unity of the Infused Virtues<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>HILIP THE CHANCELLOR explores the issue of the unity of the cardinal virtues from he perspective of the infused virtues. While he seems to hold the traditional doctrine that the person who has one natural or acquired virtue must have them all, and the one who must be truly virtuous must have all the natural or acquired virtues, it does not follow that this is true for the infused virtues, even for those infused or supernatural virtues are those parallel to the natural or acquired cardinal virtues.
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There are a number of proof texts which Philip the Chancellor invokes as authority that the "one-in-all" theory. Drawing on St. Jerome's gloss on Ezekiel 1:11 ("And their faces, and their wings were stretched upward: two wings of every one were joined, and two covered their bodies"), Philip noted that St. Jerome stated as to Ezekiel: "He [Ezekiel] said the four virtues are joined to each other so that whoever lacks one lacks all." (<i>Glossa marg</i>., 4: 1076C).<br />
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Similarly, St. Jerome advocates this view in his commentary on Isaiah 16:11 ("Wherefore my bowels shall sound like a harp for Moab, and my inward parts for the brick wall."). "As a lyre does not emit its complex sound if one of its strings is broken, so if one string of the virtues is absent, it will not resonate sweetly." Later in the commentary, St. Jerome analogizes the infused virtues to acquired virtues by noting that the "philosophers" held that the acquired virtues "stick together." He also compares the infused virtues to the moral law and cites St. James' statement (James 2:10) in his epistle ("And whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all."), suggesting that the infused virtues are, like the law, something that must be "one-in-all." (<i>Glossa marg</i>., 4:181B)<br />
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Philip also turns to Pope St. Gregory the Great's Moralia in Job. Therein, St. Gregory notes: "None is truly a virtue if not mixed with the other virtues," and observes, further, that "to the extent that one virtue is joined to another are good deeds more enkindled."* St. Gregory, like St. Jerome, also interprets James 2:10 as providing evidence that failing "in one point destroys many good deeds," and puts one "outside charity and any other virtue." <br />
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In addition to these arguments from authority, St. Philip also brings forth some arguments from reason applied to the faith (in a sort of <i>analogia fidei</i>) that suggest that the infused virtues have an "all in one, one in all" character. One argument draws from Christ's redemption and its effect on the human soul: "[T]he Lord is a physician who heals no one in part, but wholly." Since healing comes from the infused virtues, it follows that "all the virtues are infused together."<br />
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In another of his arguments based upon <i>analogia fidei </i>(and implicitly drawing from St. Paul's second letter to the Corinthians), Philip the Chancellor looks at the notion of glory and of merit before God: "If grace makes a human worthy of glory," it is because the "human becomes grace before God through virtue given by grace." "But God is good to the highest degree," Philip notes, and this has implications: "Therefore, there will be no commerce with Belial in one and the same soul." The conclusion is that "a human will not be graced before God unless possessing the habits of all the virtues; otherwise, there would be commerce between Christ and Belial in one and the same soul."***<br />
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<span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>The Four Cardinal Virtues in the Paseo del Ayuntamiento, Xalapa, Veracruz, </i></span><br />
<span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>by Armando Zavaleta León and Enrrique Guerra
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Yet again, Philip argues that if grace makes us worthy of the light glory, and the light of glory (in heaven) "is remuneration and complete happiness," then it seems that "free will is infused with the virtues," and this suggests that one must be infused with all the virtues or none at all. "For how could desire by worthy of eternity if it did not have meritorious habit, and emotion, and reason as well." "From this it is clear," Philip concludes, "that whoever has one virtue has all."<br />
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In a similar argument, Philip notes that the only part of man that can be reformed by grace is that part within us that is made in the image of God. The "uncreated Trinity" reforms the "created trinity," and so the soul is measured by the Trinity when it is reformed. It is obviously unbecoming for the work of the Trinity in the human soul to be incomplete. "Therefore, in the trinity of powers [in the soul], nothing is left behind lacking reformation, something which happens only by receiving the fullness of all the virtues."<br />
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Finally, Philip argues from sin: a virtue without grace and a mortal sin exist together in the rational soul. "Nonetheless, a virtue of this sort and a mortal sin of this sort are not immediately present together." The reason for this is that "because if one does not possess the continence [an infused virtue] which comes from grace, it does not following that he possesses the opposing incontinence." Why this is so is that one can lose the infused virtue of continence "due to another vice, such as avarice." But if one vice tarnishes the whole, does that mean that there is a "connection among the vices"? No, there is no such connection among the vices because it is not true that "whoever has one vice has all the vices." The only explanation for why one vice vitiates all virtue, then, "must come from the connection of the virtues." This suggests that virtues are an "all in one, one in all" proposition.<br />
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Philip obviously is of the opinion that the infused virtues are an "all in one, one in all" proposition. But before concluding this, he also looks at various opposing authorities that suggest that perhaps the infused virtues are not "all in one, and one in all," but rather something different. He then disposes of these arguments We will address this pro-and-con part of Philip the Chancellor's <i>Summa de bono</i> next. Then our last posting on Philip the Chancellor will be on the issue of charity, and whether this one theological virtue, without any of the others, is sufficient to avail us eternal life. <br />
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*The first is a quote to Moralia 1.32.45. The second appears to be a paraphrase of Moralia 1.32.48. <br />
**This is a paraphrase of Moralia 6:1277B.<br />
***Compare: "What harmony is there between Christ and Belial? What does a believer have in common with an unbeliever?" (2 Cor. 6:15)<br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-42994036114354043062012-11-06T04:04:00.001-06:002012-11-06T04:04:13.280-06:00Philip the Chancellor: Looking at Virtue Analogically<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">T</span>O THE ARGUMENTS THAT THE CARDINAL VIRTUES enjoy a unity, so that they must be all for one and one for all, Philip the Chancellor throws out his <i>sed contra</i>s. He throws out two challenges to the traditional view.* The first is that each particular virtue may be said to be a species of of the genus virtue, and each particular vice a species of the genus vice, and so it can be envisioned how one may have a particular species of virtue along with a particular species of vice, and therefore it is not inconsistent to say that one may be specific virtues and specific vices in the same person. "Therefore," Philip the Chancellor concludes, "whoever has on virtue need not to have them all."<br />
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The next <i>sed contra</i> argument against the unity of virtues begins with the definition of virtue. If virtue is defined as "a habit making its deed good," and vice is defined as "a habit making its deed bad," then it would seem that good habits and bad habits can exist in the same person. This suggests that the cardinal virtues are not all unified, so that one need not have all the virtues or none.<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Four Cardinal Virtues</span></i></div>
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In order to respond to these counter-arguments, Philip identifies something he calls <i>political virtue</i>. Political virtues are those that govern particular deeds, and so, just like one human can do one good deed and another evil deed (the deeds being discrete), so also political virtue is discrete so that one can have both virtue and vice. Similarly, one can have one good sense (sight, for example) and yet have one sense fail (hearing, for example).<br />
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The cardinal virtues can be understood in two ways according to Philip. A cardinal virtue--whether it be justice, fortitude, temperance, or prudence--can be understood "according to the act of its proper power" and according to "the proper matter of that power." This is how Aristotle, for example, defines it in his Nicomachean Ethics, for he "descends to the special acts of the virtues." If viewed from this perspective, there can be situations where one can have one virtue, and not another. The reason for this is "because the act of a power . . . does not extend beyond its proper power or beyond its matter." Since each virtue has its proper power and matter, one virtue does not extend beyond that, and so one can have, say, justice, without, say chastity or temperance.<br />
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But the cardinal virtues can be viewed from another perspective. "It is also possible," Philip observes, "that the acts of these powers be taken analogically an be taken about their matter analogically." In this way, one does not descend to the special acts, but one ascends, so to speak, to a more abstract level. This allows us to expand the concept of virtue so that justice (looked at as something to be desired) can be the subject of temperance. Likewise, justice (looked at as something difficult) can be the subject of fortitude. Viewed analogically, therefore, there is a certain analogical relationship between the cardinal virtues, even though they may at with their own proper power and matter of that power. The borders between the virtues therefore begin to disappear.<br />
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Viewed analogically, the cardinal virtues are such that "it is true that whoever has one virtue has them all." And when one understands the virtues in such an analogical matter, one can see how it is possible for Seneca to say that "[a]ll that happens well happens justly and bravely and prudently and temperately." One can also see, how Cicero did, that the virtues are not like collecting Corinthian vases, but the loss of one virtue results in the loss of virtue. This analogical relationship between the virtues is also what St. Bernard of Clairvaux had in mind in his book dedicated to Pope Eugenius.**<br />
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In summary, if one views virtue from the perspective of its particular act or matter, then one is not wed to the idea that one must have all virtues or none at all. However, if one views virtues more broadly, that is analogically, it would appear that the loss of one virtue (viewed analogically) would mean one has lost the rest of them (viewed analogically).<br />
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*From the context, it is clear that Philip had two additional arguments, both based upon an analogy between the virtues and the senses. This is known because he responds to them further in the text. For some reason, the arguments themselves are not found in extant texts.<br />
**For these texts, see our last posting on this subject, <a href="http://www.lexchristianorum.blogspot.com/2012/11/philip-chancellor-on-unity-of-virtues.html">Philip the Chancellor: On the Unity of the Virtues</a>.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-33211878026635582512012-11-05T03:48:00.005-06:002012-11-05T03:49:00.897-06:00Philip the Chancellor: On the Unity of the Virtues<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">A</span>S WE OBSERVED IN OUR LAST POST, Philip the Chancellor advances the view that the cardinal virtues are acquired, which is to say they are the product of human effort and are natural in character. Thus they are of a different order than the theological virtues, which have been infused in the Christian upon baptism and so are supernatural in both origin and end. There is therefore in Philip's view virtues that com from grace and moral virtues that spring from nature.<br />
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Philip also addresses the question of the unity of the cardinal virtues. The cardinal virtues seem, at least at first blush, to be separate, and not really one. The position against the unity of the virtues is first seen through the eyes of Stoic authority. Seneca, in his Epistle 66, says: "All that happens well happens justly and bravely and prudently and temperately." This suggests separateness. Similarly, Cicero in his <i>Tusculan Disputations</i> (2.14.32) contrasts the virtues to Corinthian vases, so that they appear not to be distinct. "If you lose one of your Corinthians [vases], you can say that the rest of the vases are safe." But, in Cicero's view, this cannot be said of the virtues, for "if you lose one of your virtues, you must necessarily confess that you no longer have any virtue."<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Cardinal Virtues by Michele Schiavoni (1760) </span></i><br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">in the Major Sacristy of the Church of Saint Geremia and Lucia</span></i></div>
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The same view regarding the unity of virtues seems to be supported by Christian authority. So St. Bernard of Clairvaux advocates the unity of virtues in his book to Pope Eugenius, <i>De Consideratione</i>. Through a series of rhetorical questions, St. Bernard clearly takes the view that the cardinal virtues are one, so that they must be all had or none had:<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
What is temperance but holding to the mean in our actions by removing excess and deficiency? And what is courage but confronting the arduous and persevering amid difficulties? And what is justice but rendering to each what is his due? And what is prudence but in our choices distinguishing good from bad? . . . . The mean is where there is the whole internal power and the very core of all the virtues, and where all are so united that all seem one virtue. This is especially true since they do not communicate by somehow participating in the mean, but each of them wholly and integrally possesses it.*</blockquote>
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This all, then, would suggest that the natural, acquired virtues are one, so that "whoever has one virtue has all," and the demands of one virtue requires that the others all be present. Philip the Chancellor makes the argument from justice, showing how justice requires also prudence, fortitude, and temperance to operate, and "the same argument," he stats, "can be made for the other virtues."<br />
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Drawing from Aristotle, Philip the Chancellor also proposes the following argument in support of the unity of the virtues. In his <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> (1105a9), Aristotle observes that "virtue is the ultimate end of a potency for something." This suggests that "a virtue of the rational soul can be defined in terms of its ultimate end." If, ultimately, the end defines virtue, then it would seem that they all become unified by the common end.<br />
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Again turning to Aristotle, this time his <i>De caelo</i>, Philip starts from an alternative Aristotelian definition of virtue. Using Aristotle's alternative definition, "virtue is the disposition of a perfected [subject] in relation to its optimum state." (281a14-15) As an example, Aristotle compares imperfect circles with the "greatest circle" which is the standard or optimum circle. Just like a defect in the drawing of any circle ruins the entire circle, so does the failure of goodness in any manner ruin the goodness of the entire act. "The consequence is that goodness in h rational soul will b a virtue only when there is goodness in every act."<br />
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One final argument for the unity of the virtues is advanced by Philip the Chancellor. The soul, he observes, is a simple essence. In a simple essence, contraries cannot exist. Good or bad, "absent any further determination," that is in their most general sense, "are contraries." If that is so, then it is apparent that thy cannot exist in the soul at the same time. This suggests that the soul is either virtuous entirely, or not virtuous entirely, and therefore that there is a unity in the virtues.<br />
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*<i>De cons</i>., 1.8.9-11; 3:404-6.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-27460684484063432542012-10-25T04:39:00.001-05:002012-10-25T04:39:38.725-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Cardinal Virtues as Acquired<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">I</span>N THE FOURTH QUESTION DEALING WITH virtues in Philip the Chancellor's <i>Summa de bono</i>, we confront the question of whether the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are infused or not infused but instead acquired (or "political"). If infused, then Philip asks whether they might be called divine virtues.<br />
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In answering this question, Philip the Chancellor distinguishes between justice and the other three virtues. With respect to those virtues other than justice, Philip the Chancellor does not see these three of the four cardinal virtues as "divine." The reason for this position is that the description "divine" does not make reference to "the principle 'from which' something comes," but rather "to the term 'to which' something leads." In other words, "divine" as used in reference to virtue, speaks of the <i>terminus ad quem</i>, and not the <i>terminus a quo</i>.<br />
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"Since these cardinal virtues [of prudence, temperance, and fortitude] concern what leads up to our end (<i>ad finem</i>), but not into our end (<i>in finem</i>), namely God, they should not be called divine." In short, Philip the Chancellor appears to take the position that these three cardinal virtues are acquired, or human, virtues, and not infused.* (Houser, 50). <br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Justice surrounded by the other virtues, by Domenico Beccafumi</span></i></div>
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Justice, however, is different. "Justice . . . which orders things to our end holds a middle place [between the three other cardinal virtues and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity] and therefore can be called both human and divine, since it orders things to our end." <br />
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Another question that Philip addresses is this: if the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity--which are directly and intrinsically related to our end, the <i>finis ultimus</i>, God, then why aren't these three virtues called "cardinal," since it would appear that these three theological or divine virtues are the hinges upon which our destiny depends. <br />
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However, Philip responds to this last issue by observing that the virtues that are called cardinal are called cardinal not in relation to the theological virtues, but rather in relation to virtues other than the theological. <br />
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*This takes Philip out of what would become the majority or at least the Thomistic view, and that is that these virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are of two kinds: <i>acquired </i>(or human or political) and, in the Christian, also <i>infused</i>. There are then acquired cardinal virtues which are available to all men, and, in the baptized, <i>infused </i>cardinal virtues.<br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-69523821353943841212012-10-22T03:52:00.003-05:002012-10-22T03:53:25.061-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Cardinal Virtues--Why Four?<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">I</span>N HIS THIRD QUESTION dealing with the virtues in his <i>Summa de bono</i>, Philip the Chancellor asks the question why the four virtues identified as prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice--and not "other virtues" with "their own proper acts different from the acts of these virtues"--are called cardinal. <br />
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Philip offers three reasons why the four virtues are called cardinal virtues. The first reason is "taken from their conditions, the second from the meaning of the term, and the third from their acts."<br />
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The four virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice are called cardinal from their conditions. Drawing on St. Bernard's book On Consideration to Pope Eugenius (<i>De Consideratione ad Eugenium Papam Libri V</i>), Philip states the following:<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
For the existence (<i>esse</i>) of virtue four things are required: to now, to will, to persevere amid difficulties, and to attain the mean between excess and deficiency. But to now comes from prudence, to will from justice, to persevere from courage, and to attain the mean between excess and deficiency from temperance. Therefore, since some universal condition is touched upon there in each of these [virtues], they are rightly called cardinal, that is principal.</blockquote>
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But, Philip notes, this argument of St. Bernard seems to prove too much since these conditions are present in all virtues (and not only the cardinal virtues), and this supported by Aristotle in his <i>Ethics </i>(2.4 [1105a31 <i>ff</i>]). In response, however, Philip notes that this characteristic in the other virtues is shared with the cardinal virtues because the other virtues are in fact "reduced" to the cardinal virtues, "either as their parts or as their species or as their dispositions," and so these characteristics will be shared with the cardinal virtues of which these other virtues stem from. All other virtues are subsidiary to the cardinal virtues, as the cardinal virtues are the "principal or initiating virtues." Drawing from <i>On Rest for the Mind</i> by a certain unidentified Harold, the cardinal virtues (which are required for the health of the soul) are compared to the needs of the body, and that author concludes: "As there are four element for the health of the body, so are found four bases for the virtues of the soul."<br />
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The second reason why the identified virtues are called cardinal stems from the meaning of the term cardinal. As Philip summarizes this reason:<br />
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<blockquote class="orange">
For cardinal comes from <i>cardo</i>, the hinge on which a door turns. Now there are two things by means of which we enter into life: actions and passions. What is said in Matt. 19:17 concerns actions: "If you would enter life, keep the commandments," that is, act according to the commandments; and Acts 14:22 concerns passions: "through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God." Two virtues are taken based on actions: prudence with regard to actions as they concern us, justice with regard to actions as they concern our neighbor. Tow other virtues are taken based on passions, concerning passions in us and natural to us is temperance, concerning passions introduced by others is courage.
</blockquote>
The reason why there are four cardinal virtues "comes from their acts," Philip says. Again, we might simply quote Philip's treatment of this entire:<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
The acts of these virtues are principal because they are acts of the three primary motive powers in relation to those things which lead to our end (<i>ad finem</i>). For the act of reasoning is to distinguish between the good which leads to that end and the bad which leads away from that end, or between two goods, to distinguish which of them leads more to the end, or two bad things, which of them leads more away from that end. Also, the principal act of the power of desire in relation to those things which lead to our end is to will the changeable good to exist under the highest good, which pertains to temperance. Also the principal act of the power of emotion in relation to those things which lead to our end is to confront the arduous, which is frightening to confront and difficult to withstand, and this pertains to courage. But the act of justice is to order all these to our proximate end and this is an act in relation to all the powers, not just one. Therefore, for this reason they are called cardinal or principal, because they are the primary acts of the powers acting in those things which lead to our end, namely, God.
</blockquote>
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Philip the Chancellor interposes an objection to naming the four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice the cardinal virtues. Since pride is the primary vice (as Ecclesiastes 10:15 states, "Pride is the beginning of all sin") it would seem that humility is the primary virtue, and therefore there is but one cardinal virtue, and that is humility. <br />
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In answering this objection, Philip distinguishes between pride as a love of one's own <i>excellence </i>and pride as one's own <i>good</i>. The former is a power of the emotions and is not the beginning of sin; consequently, the humility opposed to it will not be a principal virtue. The latter, however, is the beginning of all sin since it is equivalent to contempt for the commandments. Therefore the love of one's self as one's own good is the source of all sin. Similarly, the love of the highest good (the <i>summum bonum</i>, God) is the beginning of every cardinal virtue. It seems, then, that Philip suggests that the cardinal virtues are all clothed with humility since both humility and the cardinal virtues have love of God in view. Humility and the cardinal virtues therefore have God as their final cause. <br />
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That humility and the four cardinal virtues have God as their final cause would seem to lead to another problem since that would make the cardinal virtues enter into the bailiwick of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which also have God as their end. But as Philip will later distinguish, the cardinal virtues "concern what leads up to our end, but not into our end, namely God." It is the theological virtues which take us all the way "into" God and heaven, whereas the cardinal virtues only "carry us along the road (<i>via</i>) toward God," though "they do have God in sight." Houser, 49.<br />
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Having God as the cardinal virtues' end, then raises another question: that being whether the cardinal virtues are acquired or infused. If acquired, it seems that perhaps God is something attained through human effort, which seems to suggest a Pelagianism. If infused, the cardinal virtues then seem to be synonymous with the divine or theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Accordingly, Philip the Chancellor focuses on the distinctions between the cardinal virtues and he theological virtues and their quality of being infused rather than acquired.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-48805595389849358162012-10-19T04:35:00.000-05:002012-10-19T04:35:05.893-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Ordering the Virtues<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">W</span>HAT IS THE ORDER BETWEEN the various virtues? Is there any virtue that is preeminent? Is there any hierarchy that orders them? How do they interrelate? These are the subjects of the second question on the virtues in the <i>Summa de bono</i> of Philip the Chancellor.
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Once again, before giving his answer, Philip the Chancellor reviews some authorities regarding this for possible answers. He notes that scriptural glosses on the second chapter of Genesis and on 15:38 of the Gospel of Matthew [Gloss. margin. 5:271B] provide that prudence is first, then temperance, then courage, and finally justice. Drawing on a cryptic numerology, for example, the gloss on the Gospel of Matthew (which addresses the miracle of Jesus and states that "those who ate were 4,000 men," meant by that number "the four virtues [each presumably being given the figure of 1,000] by which one lives correctly, prudence, temperance, courage, justice." That same mysterious reference is found in the four rivers of Genesis.*<br />
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A different ordering of the virtues is given by St. Augustine in his book on the <i>On the</i> <i>Customs of the Catholic Church</i>.** This order is followed by Isaac of Stella in his book <i>On the Spirit and Soul</i>. Therein, temperance is first, then courage, followed by justice and prudence. <br />
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Looking for guidance to the book of Wisdom (8:7), we find temperance listed first, then followed by prudence, justice, and courage. <br />
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In his Ethics, Philip the Chancellor notes, Aristotle appears to list courage first, then chastity (temperance), then prudence, then justice.*** Cicero in his <i>De Officiis</i> lists prudence first, then justice, then temperance, and finally courage.†<br />
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With all this controverting authority, Philip the Chancellor offers his own answer. To order the virtues, he finds that there is an underlying order "based on worth," a worth that is determined by reference to the powers of the <i>rational </i>soul. Those powers that relate to the rational soul have more dignity than those that relate to the powers of desire and emotion which we share with the brute animals. Viewed in this way, "prudence and justice, since they exist in the rational power, are prior by reason and the worth of their subject." Between prudence and justice, prudence may be said to precede. The reason for this, Philip states, is that prudence looks at the the good of the subject, whereas justice looks at the good of others. Yet there is a competing principle that also orders the virtues. Those virtues that deal with the subject (the actor) have more dignity than those that relate to others. From this perspective, prudence and temperance are more importance than courage and justice because they involve acts that relate to the subject while courage and justice relate to others. Between courage and justice, justice might be said to follow courage because "the other powers and their acts are like materials in relations to it." It appears, then, that Philip the Chancellor's opinion is that prudence is first, followed by temperance, followed by courage or fortitude, and finally, justice.<br />
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So we may summarize the various orders as follows:<br />
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<table border="3" cellpadding="10" cellspacing="1" style="height: 102px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: auto; text-align: center; width: 399px;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: left;" width="50%">Glosses</td><td style="font-style: italic; text-align: left;">prudence, temperance, courage, justice</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align: left;" width="50%">St. Augustine</td><td style="font-style: italic; text-align: left;">temperance, courage, justice, prudence</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align: left;" width="50%">Wisdom 8:7</td><td style="font-style: italic; text-align: left;">temperance, prudence, justice, courage</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align: left;" width="50%">Aristotle</td><td style="font-style: italic; text-align: left;">courage, temperance, prudence, justice</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align: left;" width="50%">Cicero</td><td style="font-style: italic; text-align: left;">prudence, justice, temperance, courage</td></tr>
<tr><td style="text-align: left;" width="50%">Philip the Chancellor</td><td style="font-style: italic; text-align: left;">prudence, temperance, courage, justice</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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Philip the Chancellor, then, seems to deviate from St. Augustine, Wisdom, Aristotle, and Cicero, and align himself with the Glosses, in adopting the prudence, temperance, courage, and justice ordering. <br />
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Philip the Chancellor justifies his deviation from St. Augustine by observing that St. Augustine views the virtues from the perspective of the pursuit of happiness, "the highest good," namely God. The ordering he gives the virtues is based upon "their motive cause," "their end," or what is the same thing, "their motive cause." Ultimately, love is what orders his virtues between themselves. Since desire or love is St. Augustine's perspective, that virtue that orders desire--temperance--is first. Courage must follow because the affective emotions relate to desire, which is the principle of love. Love is only said to be in the power of reason in a "secondary way," and for that reason, the rational virtues of prudence and justice follow those relating to desire. Since prudence is the most cognitive virtue, and that last tied to the "motive part of the soul," it follows that it should be ordered last when viewed from the order of love or desire, which is what St. Augustine does.<br />
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The ordering found in Wisdom is based upon the view that a sober soul (i.e., sobriety) is required for there to be a prudence soul (i.e., prudence). The Scriptural view, according to Philip is reflected in Daniel 1:16-17, where the abstinence of youth is a precursor to the wisdom or prudence of the elderly. Temperance, then, must precede prudence. The reason why justice follows prudence in the Scriptural ordering is that "since it is the function of justice to render to each what is his, one first has to know what is his." Courage is last because "justice concerns action in relation to neighbor, while courage concerns passions, and action is prior to passion."<br />
<br />
Philip justifies his departure from Aristotle's ordering because Aristotle's ordering is based upon a precedence to be given to communal virtues before personal virtues. Aristotle views courage as a civil or common virtue, and therefore puts it before chastity or temperance which is an individual virtue. Prudence is placed before justice because it is a prerequisite to the communal virtue of justice. Aristotle viewed that it was the "function of prudence to now what belongs to each, and the function of justice to render it so" "The act of discerning what belongs to each," which is a task of prudence, "is prior to rendering to each his own."<br />
<br />
Finally, Philip explains his departure from Cicero by observing that the Ciceronian order places prudence before justice (and those two before the other virtues) "because each is in the reasoning power." Between justice and prudence, prudence takes precedence in Cicero's view "because [prudence] concerns us, while justice concerns the other. Prudence is the reasoning power principally, and prudence knows what belongs to whom, which is the function of justice." Temperance is placed before courage by Cicero "because temperance concerns good we should make use of, while courage concerns evils we should withstand."<br />
<br />
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*See <a href="http://lexchristianorum.blogspot.com/2012/10/philip-chancellor-virtues-how-are-there.html">Philip the Chancellor: Virtues, How are They Four?</a><br />
**As discussed in prior postings, this work was erroneously attributed to St. Augustine.<br />
***<i>Nic. Eth</i>. 3.9, 13, 5.1, 6.5. <br />
†<i>De off</i>., 1.6-42, nn. 18-151.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-81154131686990615872012-10-15T03:54:00.000-05:002012-10-15T03:55:08.241-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Different Perspectives of Virtue<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>HILIP THE CHANCELLOR is not content with the description of virtues as a sort of reasoned love or loving reason, an insight obtained by synthesizing Isaac of Stella and St. Augustine's observations on virtues. He also looks at the virtues from other perspectives in distinguishing the cardinal virtues from each other.<br />
<br />
A distinction among the virtues can also be made by invoking the "three-fold law," the law of reason which leads to free choice, the law of "indigent" or unaided nature, and the "natural law of reason." The distinctions Philip the Chancellor makes in his "three-fold law" is between utilitarian, experiential, and relational.<br />
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"The law of reason is found in choosing what is useful," says Philip the Chancellor. It there is concerned with prudence. "The law of indigent nature is found in making use of good and evil." The use of temporal goods to sustain natural life brings in the virtue of temperance. Our confrontation with bad temporal goods, whether "for experience or to cure ourselves," will require the virtue of courage. Finally, the "natural law of reason," which concerns itself with distributing goods between ourselves and "our neighbor who is our confederate by nature," a law which invokes the Golden rule,* involves the virtue of justice. Again, we find confirmation in the writings of St. Augustine (<i>De spiritu et anima</i>, c. 20): "Prudence is found in choice, temperance in use, courage in endurance, and justice in distribution."**<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Cardinal Virtues, Fresco by Cherubino Alberti</span></i></div>
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An alternative way of distinguishing among the cardinal virtues is based on "principle and end," and this can be done because "every human virtue perfects the soul, either in its actions or passions." With respect to actions which have an end in vie, these can be viewed the perspective of self (in which case prudence is involved) or from the perspective of others (in which case justice is involved). When we look at passions, as distinguished from actions, then we confront those passions which come from us (and the control of these is handled by the virtue of temperance) or that which covers from others (which involves the virtue of courage). It is the control of the passions which is based upon the principle of action.<br />
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Yet another basis for distinguishing among the four cardinal virtues is to look at their opposite: vice. "The soul has four virtues," Philip says, "by which it is armed against vice and instructed bout its operations." <br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
In its operations, [the soul] is instructed either in relation to us, and then we have prudence, or in relation to neighbor, and then we have justice. And it is armed against vice, either in regard to prosperity, and then we have temperance, or in regard to adversity, and then we have courage.
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<i><br /></i>
<i>Summa de bono</i>, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.) Philip elaborates: virtue is perfection of the soul based upon reason, and that perfection arises "either in relation to neighbor or for some other reason." If the perfection arises for some other reason, "it will concern the <i>rational </i>motive power or the motive power of <i>desire </i>or the motive power of <i>emotion</i>." Prudence is concerned with the rational motive power, temperance with the motive power of desire, and courage with the motive power of emotion. If perfection is looked at from the perspective of relations with one's neighbor, then one needs the virtue of justice.***<br />
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The distinctions between the cardinal virtues may also be looked at from the perspective of <i>possibility.***</i><br />
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<blockquote class="orange">
The function of prudence is to now what is possible, that of courage is to do what is possible, that of temperance is not to presume to do what is not possible, and that of justice is to will has is possible. Now this division is based on what is necessary for virtue, namely, to know, which requires prudence, to will, which requires justice, to do, which requires courage, and the mode of acting which requires temperance.
</blockquote>
<br />
<i>Summa de bono</i>, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.).<br />
<br />
Finally, again drawing on <i>De spiritu et anima</i>,**/*** Philip the Chancellor gives another way of identifying the distinction between the four cardinal virtues. This way looks at the function of the virtue and focuses on "interior appetite, exterior deed, order to our end, and not letting stand an impediment on the way to our end." With this quadripartite division, one can divide the virtues into four. "The function of prudence," then, "is to desire nothing regretful, that of courage is to fear nothing but what is based, that of temperance is to repress earthly desires and completely to forget them, and that justice is to direct every motion in the soul to God alone." "Consequently," Philip summarizes, "the function of prudence is to rule the beginning we desire, that of temperance is to rule over the means which is the deed, that of courage is to remove impediments, and that of justice is to order us to our end." <i>Summa de bono</i>, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.).<br />
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Next in his treatment of the cardinal virtues, Philip the Chancellor asks about the ordering among and between the virtues, a matter he handles in Question 2 of this treatment on the virtues in his <i>Summa de bono</i>. We shall address his thinking on this matter in our next few postings.<br />
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*Philip the Chancellor cites to both negative and affirmative versions of the rule by quoting Tobit 4:16 ("Do to no one what you would not want done to you") and Matt. 7:12 and Luke 6:31 ("And as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them.")<br />
**This is a text wrongly attributed to St. Augustine.<br />
***As authority for this view, Philip draws from chapter 20 of the pseudo-Augustinian text of <i>De spiritu et anima</i>.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-40083132466615820832012-10-11T04:43:00.000-05:002012-10-11T04:44:13.603-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Virtues as Reasoned Love<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">W</span>HEN PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR asked himself the question in Q. 1 of his treatment of the cardinal virtues in the <i>Summa de bono </i>why the virtues are four in number, he identified the principal explanation: namely that the related to the acts of the soul (which are four: act of desire or concupiscence act of emotion or irascibility, the act of distinguishing good and bad towards ourselves, and the act of distinguishing good and bad as it relates to others), and not the powers of the soul (which are three: reason, desire, emotion).<br />
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Philip also noted that the cardinal virtues are related to temporal affairs, things we <i>use</i>; the theological virtues are related to eternal affairs, namely God, and are therefore things we <i>enjoy</i>. Thus, Philip distinguishes between the <i>uti </i>and the <i>frui</i>, the use and the enjoyment. Quoting St. Augustine, Philip observes that "all perverse human order consists in either enjoying what should be used and using what should be enjoyed; correct order, however, consists in enjoying what should be enjoyed and using what should be used."* <br />
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Philip also relied upon authority to buttress his conclusion that the cardinal virtues were four in number based upon the four human acts. These also gave him additional reasons to regard the cardinal virtues as four. We will briefly look at these.<br />
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First, Philip noted that, in regard to temporal goods which are used, there is temporal good and temporal evil. He further subdivided temporal good into two and temporal evil into two. Temporal goods are either <i>apparent </i>goods, "and in this respect deceptive," or they are <i>excessive </i>goods, "and in this way corruptive." Those apparent temporal goods which deceive are avoided by the virtue of prudence. The excessive goods which corrupt us are avoided by temperance.<br />
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<i><span style="color: #e69138;">Anonymous, Design for Four Virtues </span></i></div>
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Something similar can be done with temporal evils, which are either adverse or perverse. <i>Perverse </i>evil is called the "evil of guilt." <i>Adverse </i>evil is called the "evil of pain." <i>Perverse </i>evil perverts the soul, destroying its beauty, and rendering it ugly. Its contrary is the virtue of justice, as justice "introduces order in the would, which is beauty in the soul." <i>Adverse </i>evil, the evil which causes pain, saddens the soul. To overcome sadness of soul, we need the virtue of courage which allows us to endure it for the sake of love. He quotes St. Augustine: "Courage is love easily enduring everything for the sake of what is loved."**<br />
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Second, Philip relied on Isaac of Stella and his book <i>On Spirit and Soul</i>. This book, Philip notes, follows St. Augustine. In his book, Isaac of Stella identifies the three powers of the soul: reason (from which arises sensibility) and the affectations which arise from the power of desire (concupiscence) or the power of emotion (irascibility). There are four affections in man, depending upon whether (i) we presently enjoy or (ii) hope in the future to enjoy something, or whether (iii) we presently suffer something we hate or (iv) fear that we will suffer something in the future we will hate. The present enjoyment of something we love is called <i>joy</i>. The anticipation of a future enjoyment of something we love is what gives rise to <i>hope</i>. The present suffering of something we do not like is called <i>sorrow</i>. The future anticipation of having to suffer something we do not like gives rise to <i>fear</i>.<br />
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These four elements: joy, hope, sorrow, fear "are like the elements and common materials for all the vices and virtues." "Since virtue is a habit in a mind which has been correctly instructed," Philip observes, it follows that these four elements "should be instructed and combined and ordered by reason for the sake of that which is right and in the right manner, so that they can produce virtues." If they are not so rightly ordered, these four elements can "easily sink into vices." Quoting Isaac of Stella, Philip the Chancellor concludes: "Therefore, when love and hate are instructed prudently, modestly, bravely, and justly, they grow in to the virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice which are said to be like roots or hinges (<i>cardines</i>) for all the virtues." <br />
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The reason-based teaching of Isaac of Stella on virtues in his <i>On Spirit and Soul</i> therefore dovetails nicely with St. Augustine's love-based teaching on the virtues in his book <i>On the Customs of the Catholic Church</i>. There, St. Augustine encapsulates his teaching on the virtues succinctly: "that which is called four-fold virtue is formed from various affections of love . . . so that temperance is love giving itself wholly and incorruptibly to God, courage is love readily enduring all things for God, justice is love serving the beloved alone and for this reason rightly ruling all its subjects, and prudence is love rightly distinguishing what helps us get to God from those things which impeded us from him."***<br />
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Wrapping the notions of Isaac of Stella's ordering of reason into virtue with St. Augustine's notion of ordering in love into virtue, Philip the Chancellor synthesizes the insights of both into an understanding of the cardinal virtues that is more complete and merits quotation in full:<br />
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<blockquote class="blue">
There is either good which we desire or evil which we hate (hate is used rather than detest, for hate belongs to the power of desire, as does love, while detesting belongs to the emotions.) If something is good, either it is present, and then we feel joy about it, or it is not present but expected, and then we feel hope about it. Or the thing is bad, and then if present we feel sorrow about it, and if not present we feel fear. Now these sorts of affections, that is, those belonging to desire or emotion, should be ruled by reason, and then they are worthy of praise. Otherwise, if they are disordered, they are contemptible; and this is why the affection puts its name on the deed, whether for good or evil. Now love, when ordered, mounts up to virtue; for when ordered, it loves what should be loved and how it should be loved. Therefore, it loves prudently, so that no appearances of seeming good deceives it. And this is why Augustine says: "Prudence is love wisely preferring what aids, etc." as was said above. It loves sweetly and pleasantly, so that it is not abducted from its delight by anything illicit, and this is what Augustine says: "Temperance is love giving itself wholly to what is loved." It loves resolutely, so that it is not averted from the beloved by any adversity, and this is also what Augustine says: "Courage is love readily enduring everything for what is loved." And love is for the sake of the right end, and this too is what Augustine says: "Justice is love serving the beloved alone, and ruling rightly for the sake of the beloved."
</blockquote>
<br />
So virtues, then, may be said to be reason-based and love-based, and they are the possession of a man who is governed by reason and governed by love. <br />
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*Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti. <i>De div. quaest</i>. <i>lxxxiii</i>, 30.<br />
**[F]ortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur. <i>De mor. ecc</i>., 1:15.<br />
***As Houser notes, this is an "extremely free rendering of Augustine's <i>De mor. ecc</i>., 2.15. "Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu . . . ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. . . . Quare definire etiam sic licet, ut temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem, fortitudinem amorem omnia propter Deum facile perferentem, iustitiam amorem Deo tantum servientem et ob hoc bene imperantem ceteris quae homini subiecta sunt, prudentiam amorem bene discernentem ea quibus adiuvetur in Deum ab his quibus impediri potest.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-60002100181943879492012-10-08T04:50:00.003-05:002012-10-08T04:50:28.924-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Virtues, How Are There Four?<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>HILIP THE CHANCELLOR explores the four cardinal virtues in his <i>Summa de bono</i>. The first questions he asks regarding the virtues regards to their division and their number. Philip defines virtue as "a perfection of the rational soul based on its powers," and so posits the possibility that the virtues might be identified by the powers in the soul so that for each power there is a corresponding virtue.<br />
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<i><span style="color: #e69138;">From the Mosaics at Qasr Libya</span></i></div>
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However, for Philip shared the Augustinian opinion that the soul had only three powers: reason, emotion, and desire (<i>rationabilitas</i>, <i>irascibilitas</i>, and <i>concupiscibilitas</i>). This made the one-on-one correlation between the powers of the soul and the virtues impossible, at least if the cardinal virtues were to be maintained at four. While the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity might be neatly fitted to the tripartite powers of the soul, the relationship between the powers of the soul and the four cardinal virtues was not so neat.<br />
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Philip explored the possibility that one might assign one cardinal virtue to one particular power, and then reserve the fourth cardinal virtue, justice, which might be applied to "all the powers" of the soul. Drawing on a gloss derived from Augustine's commentary on Genesis against the Manichees regarding Genesis 2:10-14, Philip suggested that the relationship among the virtues was like the relationship between the four rivers in Genesis: the Pishon, Gihon, Tigris, and Euphrates:<br />
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<blockquote class="poemblue">
The LORD God planted a garden in Eden, in the east, and placed there the man whom he had formed. Out of the ground the LORD God made grow every tree that was delightful to look at and good for food, with the tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. A river rises in Eden to water the garden; beyond there it divides and becomes four branches. The name of the first is the Pishon; it is the one that winds through the whole land of Havilah, where there is gold. The gold of that land is good; bdellium and lapis lazuli are also there. The name of the second river is the Gihon; it is the one that winds all through the land of Cush. The name of the third river is the Tigris; it is the one that flows east of Asshur. The fourth river is the Euphrates.<br />
<br /></blockquote>
Gen. 2:10-14. The rivers Pishon, Gihon, and Tigris are all given further descriptions in Genesis, lands about which they circle. The fourth river, the Euphrates, is not. The Euphrates is "not assigned a land it circles," and so, the virtues of prudence, courage or fortitude, and temperance had lands about which they circle, yet justice, like the Euphrates, pertains to all the powers of the soul. Augustine's gloss on this passage suggests this as a plausible solution.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="orange">
Justice pertains to all the parts of the soul, because it is the order and equity in the soul, through which are united the other virtues: prudence, temperance, and courage. For one is just in so far as his soul is prudent in contemplating truth, temperate in restraining desires, and brave in withstanding adversity.
</blockquote>
<br />
Q.1, obj. 3.<br />
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While the suggestion of St. Augustine that assigned justice an overarching role seemed plausible, it seemed that if an overarching principle was needed in the case of the cardinal virtues, there should be an overarching principle in the case of the theological virtues. <br />
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Moreover, if St. Augustine's principle is taken as true, then it would appear to be equally applicable to the theological virtues, so that one is just in so far as one believes in God (by faith), hopes in God (by hope), and loves God (through charity). Is justice then an overarching theological virtue? "For just as the fourth virtue, which puts order into the three human virtues, is a human virtue, so likewise what put order into the three theological virtues must be a theological virtues, which makes four theological virtues." Q.1, obj. 4.<br />
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Drawing from various works of Aristotle,* Philip also noted that all motion of the soul may divided into three ways depending upon what it seeks: its own sake, removing an evil, or adding a good. The first is good <i>simpliciter</i>. The second is not enjoyable as it is chooses an "expedient evil." The third is enjoyable as it is chooses an "expedient good." There are thee types of objects, the good, what accompanies, and the enjoyable, and three pleasures, and there are three powers--reason, desire, and emotion. It follows that there are three virtues only: prudence for the reasoning part, which concerns the good; courage in the emotions, which withstands evil; and temperance for the desires, which relates to enjoyment. <br />
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However, tradition did not provide for four theological virtues, but only three.<br />
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So the solution sought by Philip shifted its focus by applying the Aristotelian distinction between matter and for. Matter could be considered as power, and the form as act. If the powers of the soul is the matter upon which virtue acts, then its form should be manifested by a sort of act. By focusing on the <i>acts </i>of the soul, rather than the <i>powers </i>of the soul, a solution presented itself. His resolution is found in his reply to the first objection:<br />
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The number of virtues is not taken from the number of the powers [in the soul] but from their principal acts. Since the virtues are perfections of the powers, their perfections are compared to their acts. Therefore, temperance is based on an act of desires (<i>concupiscibilis</i>) as it is subject to the order of reason, that is, to restrain our cupidities. Courage is based on the act of the emotions (<i>irascibilis</i>) which has been ordered, that is, to confront what produces fear. Both prudence and justice are based upon acts of reason, because prudence is taken from the act of distinguishing good from bad, which is an absolute act concerning ourselves, while justice, which orders us in relation to neighbor through rendering what is sue to him, is based on act of reason, namely ordering, which concerns others.
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Q.1, rep. obj. 1. So to summarize Philip's solution: temperance relates to the ordering of an act of concupiscible desire, courage or fortitude relates to ordering an act of the irascible emotion, prudence relates to ordering an act of reason as it relates to oneself, and justice relates to the ordering of an act of reason as it relates to others.<br />
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*Aristotle's <i>On the Soul</i>, <i>Sophistical Refutations</i>, and <i>Topics</i>.<br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-53522801871473982372012-10-05T04:20:00.002-05:002012-10-05T04:20:46.051-05:00Philip the Chancellor on Virtue: Recruitment of Aristotle<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">T</span>HE SUMMA DE BONO OF PHILIP the Chancellor's treatment on the cardinal virtues begins with thee questions concerning them. It is standard enough, and relies clearly on the introduction to the subject as contained in Peter Lombard's <i>Sentences </i>(Book III, Dist. 33). It asks about the basis of the quadripartite number of the cardinal virtues and what justifies such division. It addresses the ordering among the virtues and assesses prior opinions on that subject. It asks why the cardinal virtues are called "cardinal," and whether they can be called divine virtues based upon the fact that they are, at least for the Christian, infused into the soul. Finally, after an introduction to the cardinal virtues through these three questions, it launches into a lengthy discussion of the cardinal virtues themselves. Contrary to the treatment of the virtues by prior teachers, Philip the Chancellor's treatment is extensive, covering about 300 pages in his <i>Summa de Bono</i>.* He round up his discussion of the virtues after this extensive treatment by focusing on the connection among the virtues and their equality, here relying on the <i>Sentences </i>(Book III, Dist. 36). In short, within a sort of envelope of convention we find a real developmental <i>tour de force</i>.<br />
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In order to develop the notion of virtues within the Christian moral context, Philip drew heavily from Aristotle, especially relying upon the so-called <i>Ethica vetus</i> (Nicomachean Ethics 2-3). Thus we find central in his elaboration of the virtues, Aristotle's "four causes"** and Aristotle's famous analysis of virtue as a mean between two extremes, the so-called golden mean (<i>aurea mediocritas</i> or <i>sectio aurea</i>). <br />
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<span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>Four Virtues, from Palace at Esztergom, Hungary</i></span></div>
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Philip also drew from what R.E. Houser describes as the "moral psychology" of Aristotle, namely that each human had a soul whose powers were the proximate causes of both actions and passions. Philip also relies on the Aristotelian method for introspection, namely one that relies on the notion of "object." Therefore, Philip applies the Aristotelian assessment of the soul's interior by reference to its acts which are to be understood by reference to their object. "Powers differ on acts," says Philip, "and acts based on their objects or causes of motion." [<i>Summa de bono</i>, I.227). As Houser describes the concept of "object" as the vehicle for understanding the soul's interior:<br />
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<i>Object </i>in Philip's usage meant that feature of a real thing or set of real things which serves as the term of a cognitive relation between things and their knowers. The <i>object</i>, then, provides an external and real basis for understanding the inner workings of the soul, a perceptible basis for knowing what is not directly perceptible and especially for distinguishing powers, acts, and passions from each other. Philip knew that Aristotle had used their <i>objects </i>to distinguish the five senses from each other and that this account of sensation had provided the model for his account of virtue: 'act, properly speaking, has a definite matter, such as seeing has color, hearing has sound.'
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Houser, 44 (quoting <i>Summa de bono</i>, I.227).***<br />
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One of Philip the Chancellor's important principles was the connection or relationship between the Aristotelian causal principles, particularly the notion of <i>material cause</i>, and the psychological principles, in particular the notion of <i>object</i>. By tying these two together, he was also able to draw out an objective component of moral virtue and its subjective component.<br />
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Since the <i>object </i>in its technical sense gives content to our understanding of a power, Philip thought of that object as a kind of <i>matter</i>. [He writes in the <i>Summa</i>, 2:206.2-207.6: "Therefore, diversity of rational powers is based on diversity of acts; but diversity of acts is based on specific diversity of their matter."] On the other hand, since a virtue perfects some power of the soul, he also thought of such powers as matter. As Philip used the term, then, <i>matter </i>can refer either to the power of the soul which is delimited by the object of its activity (this is the <i>subjective </i>senses of the matter) or to that object which so delimits a power or act (its <i>objective </i>sense).
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Houser, 45. <br />
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These Aristotelian tools allowed Philip greatly to amplify his understanding of the cardinal virtues. By using Aristotle's final, efficient, formal, and material causes to explain the cardinal virtues, focusing mainly on both the objective and subject components of their matter, Philip was able greatly to expand thinking about virtue. It is what in part allowed him then to give an expansive treatment to a broad range of human virtues, the so-called "parts" of virtues which are subordinate-yet-related to one of the cardinal virtues.<br />
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*Philip's extensive treatment of the virtues was to influence later authors, including St. Albert the Great and Philips pupil Ulrich of Stasbourg who also wrote his own Summa de bono and whose book 6 thereof was entirely dedicated to treating the issue of the virtues. <br />
**Aristotle's traditional causes are: material, formal, final, and efficient.<br />
***One might note the importance of the object in the assessment of the morality of an act and its centrality in the first Papal encyclical to deal with morality in general, <i>Veritatis splendor</i>. We have addressed this issue in a prior posting. See <a href="http://lexchristianorum.blogspot.com/2011/08/veritatis-splendor-part-26-object-of.html"><i>Veritatis splendor</i> Part 27: Objects of Acts</a>.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-23236085738979687982012-10-04T05:47:00.002-05:002012-10-04T05:51:44.495-05:00Philip the Chancellor: Summing up the Good<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>HILIP THE CHANCELLOR, head of the University of Paris, theologian master, poet and musician, and supporter of the Dominicans, is an important figure in the history of the Christian understanding of virtue in between Peter Lombard and St. Thomas Aquinas. Philip the Chancellor's great work, <i>Summa on the Good</i> (<i>Summa de Bono</i>), proved to be an important bridge between Peter Lombard's <i>Sentences </i>and St. Thomas Aquinas's fully-developed doctrine of virtue in his own <i>Summa</i>, the <i>Summa Theolgiae</i>. As Houser describes his influence:<br />
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They [Sts. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, but also the Dominicans in general] were enamored of his <i>Summa</i>, which moved far in the direction of realizing [Peter] Lombard's promise of a full treatment of the vast range of moral excellence and depravity, and all the stages between them. To do so, Philip had to move well beyond Lombard's brief remarks about the cardinal virtues.
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Houser, 43. <br />
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Philip the Chancellor's systematic and methodological treatment of the good began with understanding the good as one of the transcendentals--that is, one of this qualities or features of reality that transcend genera, that transcend, in fact, any of Aristotle's ten categories.* The good, is something that is found in all things, in all being inasmuch as it is being. Like being, good is learned through a sort of attributive analogy: one never completely learns it, as one is in contact communication with individual things, each with its own expression of "good" which contribute to one's understanding of the transcendent concept of good. One would literally have to know the entirety of the visible and invisible world fully to comprehend good.<br />
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Aristotle's transcendental of the good finds a natural entry into Christian thought through the creation story in <i>Genesis</i>, in particular the frequent reference that God observed that his creation was "good," even "very good."** Applying the notion of the transcendental to the notion of creation and combing it with the notion that all creation not only came from God but that all creation's end is God (<i>exitus</i>, <i>reditus</i>), helped arrive at a "good of nature" (<i>bonum naturae</i>) and an analogous albeit supernatural "good of grace" (<i>bonum gratiae</i>).<br />
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Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the "good of grace," the <i>bonum gratiae</i>, was, in the words of Houser, a <i>tour de force</i>:<br />
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[The] questions on the "good of grace" [in Philip's <i>Summa </i>were] a masterful transformation of part of Book 3 of the <i>Sentences </i>[of Peter Lombard] into a full-blown treatise on who the seven principal virtues--three theological and four cardinal--aid humans in their <i>reditus </i>to God.
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Houser, 43. The development of the doctrine on the cardinal virtues in Philip the Chancellor's treatment of it in his <i>Summa </i>is remarkable. It is part of his greater treatment of the good in his <i>Summa</i>, a text which has been described as the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of moral theology of the 13th century.<br />
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We shall spend the next few blog postings discussing Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the cardinal virtues in his <i>Summa de Bono</i> in the next few posts, including Philip's sources, the nature of the cardinal virtues, and the "parts" of the virtues (a development which greatly expanded the depth of virtue-based moral theology)<br />
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*The ten categories of Aristotle as found in his <i>Organon </i>(also known by their Latin term as <i>predicamenta </i>or predicates) are: (1) <i>substance</i> [οὐσία, <i>ousia</i>], i.e.,what something is something is essentially (e.g., human, dog); (2) <i>quantity </i> [πόσον, <i>poson</i>],(e.g., ten yards, three gallons); (3) <i>quality </i>[ποῖον, <i>poion</i>] (e.g., blue, visible); (4) <i>relation </i>[πρός τι, <i>pros ti</i>] (e.g., father/son, on the left of another); (5) <i>location </i> [ποῦ, <i>pou</i>] (e.g., at a movie, on a couch); (6) <i>time </i> [ποτέ, <i>pote</i>] (e.g., yesterday, during an eclipse); (7) <i>position </i> [κεἱσθαι, <i>keisthai</i>] (e.g., sitting, squatting); (8) <i>possession </i> [ἔχειν, <i>echein</i>] (e.g., wearing a robe, holding a pipe); (9) active <i>doing </i> [ποιεῖν, <i>poiein</i>] (e.g., running, smiling); and (10) passively <i>undergoing </i> [πάσχειν, <i>paschein</i>](e.g., being hit, being ridiculed). Some of these overlap.<br />
**ṭō·wḇ (ט֑וֹב): See <i>Genesis </i>Chapter 1 (καλά, Greek; <i>bonum</i>, Latin)</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-72604539714256275162012-10-01T03:00:00.000-05:002012-10-01T03:00:07.456-05:00Peter Lombard on Virtues: Distinction 36<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>ETER LOMBARD ALSO ADDRESSES the issue of virtues from a Christian perspective in Distinction 36 of Book 3 of his <i>Sentences</i>. In this distinction, Lombard addresses the interconnectivity of the virtues and their essential equality. Essentially, he comes to the "probable" conclusion that the theological virtues enjoy a strong unity, as do the "infused" cardinal virtues. This is based upon the view that the theological and cardinal virtues are all "children" of the mother of all virtues, charity, that is, love of God and love of neighbor for love of God.<br />
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<span style="color: #b45f06;"><i>Peter Lombard</i></span></div>
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As we did in our last blog posting, we shall quote those parts of Distinction 36 which relate to the virtues [Chapter 1 and 2 (except for the last paragraph), but not Chapter 3], allowing the Master to speak for himself, and then simply closing this posting with some comments. <br />
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DISTINCTION XXXVI
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Chapter 1 (135)</div>
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1. ON THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE NOT SEPARATED. It is also usual to ask whether the virtues are so conjoined that thy cannot be possessed separately by anyone: one who has one of them has all of the. --JEROME, ON ISAIAS. Concerning this, Jerome says: "All the virtues are joined to each other, so that he ho lacks one of them lacks all of them." [Interlinear gloss, on Is. 56:1 see also Jerome, <i>In Isaiam</i> 16.11], and so one ho has one of them has all of them.<br />
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2. And this indeed seems probable. For since charity is the mother of all the virtues [See Distinctions 23, c. 3 n. 2], it is rightly believed that in whomever is the mother herself, namely charity, in him also are all her children, that is the virtues.--AUGUSTINE, <i>ON JOHN</i>. Hence Augustine: "Where there is charity, what can possibly be wanting? But where there is none, what is there that can possibly be profitable?" [Aug., <i>In Ioannem</i> 15.12, tr. 83, n. 3]--AUGUSTINE <i>TO JEROME</i>: "Why, then, do we not say that, whoever has this virtue has all of them, since charity is the fullness of the Law? [Cf. Rom. 13:10] And the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; the less, the less is there virtue in him; and the less virtue is in him, the more is there vice." [Aug., <i>Epistola </i>167, c. 3, n. 11]<br />
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Chapter 2 (136)</div>
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1. WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES ARE EQUALLY PRESENT IN ANYONE IN WHOM THEY ARE. But it is a question whether one who possesses all the virtues has them in equal measure, or whether some flourish more and some less in someone.<br />
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2. For it has seemed to some that some of them had more and some less by someone, as patience was eminent in Job, humility in David, meekness in Moses. These also grant that one may merit more by one virtue than by another, just as he has the one more fully than the other. And yet they say that one cannot merit more by any other virtue than by charity, nor can any other be had more fully by anyone than charity. And so they say that the other virtues can be more or less in someone, but none more fully than charity, which generates the others. And they say that these are the many faces which the Apostle mentions, saying: <i>From the persons of man faces</i>, etc. [Cf. 2 Cor. 1:11]<br />
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3. Others say more truly that all virtues are joined and equal in anyone in whom they are, so whoever is equal to another in one of the virtues, is also equal to him in all the others.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 6, <i>ON THE TRINITY</i>. Hence Augustine: "The virtues which are in the human mind, although each is understood in its own distinct way, are yet in no way separable from each other, so that, for instance, those who are equal in fortitude are also equal in prudence, and in justice, and in temperance. For if you were to say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one of them is greater in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of the other is less prudent, and so they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the form is more prudent. And so you will find it to be with the other virtues, if you consider them in the same way." [Aug., <i>De Trin</i>., 6.4.6]<br />
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4. From these words, it is clear that all the virtues are not only connected, but also equal in a man's spirit. And so, when someone is said to be pre-eminent in some virtue, as Abraham in faith, Job in patience, this is to be taken according to external uses, or by comparison to other men. Either such a man especially displays the habit of humility, or he particularly performs the work of faith, or of another of the virtues, so that he is said to be stronger in it than others, or to excel singularly in it among other men.<br />
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5. AUGUSTINE, <i>TO JEROME</i>. According to this manner, namely according to the reasons for external acts, Augustine says elsewhere that in someone one virtue is more and another less, or that one virtue is in him and another not. For he speaks as follows: "From that most famous dissertation of yours, it is sufficiently clear that it has not seemed good to our authors, or rather to truth itself, that all sins are equal, even if this is true of the virtues." [Aug., <i>Epistola </i>167, c. 2, n. 4] "For even though it is true that he who has one virtue has all of them, and that he who lacks one virtue has none of them, all sins are not equal in the same way. For where there is no virtue, there is nothing right, and yet it does not follow that worse cannot become even worse, or what is distorted become even more so But if, as I believe to be more true and more congruent with the sacred Letters, the dispositions of the soul are like embers of the body (not that they appear in [higher or lower] places, but that they are perceived by the affections), then one is illuminated more fully, another less so, and a third entirely lacks light. If this is the case, then just as each person is affected by the light of pious charity, and more in one action, less in another, or not at all in a third, so he may be said to have one virtue and to lack another one, or to have one virtue more and another less. For insofar as it pertains to that charity which is piety, we may rightly say that 'charity is greater in this man than in that one,' and 'there is some of it in this man, none in that one.' Also, as to an individual, [we may say] that he has greater chastity than patience, and that he has it in a higher degree today than he had yesterday, if he is making progress; or that he still lacks continence, but possesses not a small measure of mercy. To summarize generally and briefly the view which I have of virtue: Virtue is the charity with which that which ought to be loved is loved. This is greater in some people, in others less, and in others not at all; but in its greatest fullness, which admits of no increase, it exists in no man while in this life." [Ibid., c. 4, nn. 14-15]<br />
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6. Here it seems to be indicated that one may be said to have one virtue more than another by reason that, through charity, he applies himself more to the act of one virtue than of another; and because of the difference in acts, he may be said to have the virtues themselves more or less, or not to have one of them, even though he has all of them equally and conjointly as to the habit of mind or the essence of each. But in act he has the one ore, the other less; he may also lack one of them, as a just man, who makes use of marriage, does not have continence in act, which he nevertheless has in habit."*/**<br />
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Drawing principally from St. Augustine, though in some measure from St. Jerome and the Venerable Bede, Peter Lombard set the stage for the medieval Scholastics to ruminate on the Sentences, including those provisions dealing with the cardinal virtues. Clearly, the virtues are no longer pagan, as they find their doctrinal source in the biblical book of Wisdom, and they find their spiritual source in charity, the paradigmatic Christian virtue. <br />
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As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's ultimate contribution:<br />
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For the development of the doctrine of the cardinal virtues, Lombard initiated a new age. In his <i>Sentences</i>, thirteenth-century Masters, whose greater knowledge of Aristotelian principles allowed them to move far beyond the Master's rudimentary ideas saw several things of importance: seven virtues--three theological and four cardinal; seven Christian virtues designed for the sake of returning us to our "heavenly homeland (<i>patria</i>)"; and cardinal virtues that are infused by God and as connected and equal to each other as are the theological virtues. And in Lombard they met vestiges of antique and Patristic moral rigorism; but only vestiges, for he approached morality with a new spirit. This was perhaps his most important bequest to the century to follow. His thought may not have been sophisticated but his moral canvas was wide; at least it was wide enough to incorporate ordinary folk along with saints and sinners. In this respect, he can be said to have begun the scholastic drive for an all-encompassing moral vision, one which radically revised the doctrine of the cardinal virtues inherited from the Fathers.
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Houser, 41-42.
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*Peter Lombard, <i>The Sentences</i>, Book III (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008).<br />
**The Latin text with notes removed:<br />
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DISTINCTIO XXXVI </div>
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Caput 1 (135). </div>
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1. De connexione virtutum quae non separantur. Solet etiam quaeri utrum virtutes ita sint sibi coniunctae, ut separatim non possint possideri ab aliquo, sed qui unam habet, omnes habeat. — Hieronymus, super Isaiam. De hoc Hieronymus ait: "Omnes virtutes sibi haerent, ut qui una caruerit, omnibus careat"; qui ergo unam habet, omnes liabet.
2. Quod quidem probabile est. Cum enim caritas mater sit omnium virtutum, in quocumque mater ipsa est, scilicet caritas, et cuncti filii eius, id est virtutes, recte fore creduntur. — Augustinus, super Ioannem. Unde Augustinus: "Ubi caritas est, quid est quod possit deesse? Ubi autem non est, quid est quod possit prodesse?" — Augustinus, ad Hieronymum: "Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet, habere omnes, cum plenitudo Legis sit caritas? quae quanto magis est in homme, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto vero minus, tanto minus inest virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis est vitium."<br />
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Caput 2 (136). </div>
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1. Si cunctae virtutes pariter sit in quocumque sunt. Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes, an aliae magis, aliae minus in aliquo ferveant, quaestio est.<br />
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2. Quibusdam 1 enim videtur quod aiiae magis, aiiae minus habean tur ab aliquo, sicut in lob patientia eminuit, in David humilitas, in Moyse mansuetudo. Qui etiam concedunt magis aliquem mereri per aliquam unam virtutem quam per aliam, sicut eam plenius habet quam aliam. Non ta men magis per aliquam mereri dicunt quam per caritatem, nec aliquam plenius a quoquam liaberi quam caritatem. Alias igitur magis et alias minus in aliquo esse dicunt, sed nuilam pienius cantate, quae Ceteras gignit. Hasque dicunt esse multas facies quas memorat Apostolus dicens: Ex personis multarum facierum etc.<br />
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3. Alii venus dicunt omnes virtutes et simul et pares esse in quo— cumque sunt, ut qui in una alteri par exstiterit, in omnibus eidem ae qualis sit. — Augustinus In VI libro De Trinitate . Unde Augustinus: "Virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio et alio modo singulae inteliigantur, nuilo modo tamen separantur ab invicem: ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia, in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris aequales esse istos in fortitudine, sed ilium praestare prudentia, sequitur ut huius fortituclo minus prudens sit; ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quia est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras".<br />
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4. Ex his clarescit omnes virtutes non modo esse connexas, sed etiam pares in animo hominis. Cum ergo dicitur aliquis aliqua praeminere vir tute, ut Abraham fide, Iob patientia, secundum usus exteriores accipien dum est, vel in comparatione aliorum hominum. Quia vel humilitatis habitum maxime praefert, vel opus fidei vel alicuius ceterarum virtutum praecipue exsequitur: unde et ea prae aliis pollere, vel inter alios hommes singulariter excellere dicitur.<br />
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5. Augustinus, ad Hieronymum. Secundum hunc modum, scilicet secundum rationem actuum exteriorum, alibi Augustinus dicit in aliquo aliam magis esse virtutem, aliam minus, et unam esse et non alteram. Ait enim sic: "Clarissima disputatione tua satis apparuit non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi veritati, omnia paria esse peccata, etiam si hoc de virtutibus verum sit". "Quia etsi verum est eum qui habet unam, omnes habere virtutes, et eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere, nec sic peccata sunt paria. Quia ubi virtus nulla est, nihil rectum est, nec tamen ideo non est pravo pravius distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verjus sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones ut corporis membra (non quod videantur locis, sed quod sentiantur affectibus), et alius illuminatur amplius, alius minus, alius omnino caret lumine: profecto ut quisque illustratione piae caritatis af fectus est: in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam, et aliam non habere; et aliam magis, aliam minus habere virtutem. Nam et ‘major est in isto caritas quam in illo’ recte possumus dicere; et ‘aliqua in isto, nulla in illo’, quantum pertinet ad caritatem quae pietas est. Et in uno homme, quod maiorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam; et maiorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeo notionem: Virtus est caritas qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. Haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est; plenissima vero, quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, in nemine".<br />
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6. Hic insinuari videtur quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius; et propter differentiam actuum, ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest; et aliquam non habere, cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet; aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in actu, quam tamen habet in habitu.<br />
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The Latin text is available at: <a href="http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735212">http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735212</a></div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-65351000507710860342012-09-30T15:50:00.003-05:002012-09-30T15:50:23.265-05:00Peter Lombard on the Virtues: Distinction 33<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">P</span>ETER LOMBARD'S <i>SENTENCES</i>--"a florilegium of theological texts plucked from the writings of the Fathers . . . and arranged in four books: God, creation, Christ the 'Incarnate Word,' and the sacraments"--was the subject of legion commentaries. Peter Lombard (c. 1096-1164) was a Master of Theology and Bishop of Paris, and it is impossible to believe he could have anticipated the popularity of his anthology. Commenting on the <i>Sentences </i>was <i>de rigeur</i>, and indeed soon became a requirement for those seeking Masters in Theology. <br />
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The Sentences of Peter Lombard are divided into four books. The third book describes the benefits, both internal and external, that God gives us as part of our life in Christ, including the theological virtues (d. 23-32), the gifts of the Holy Spirit (d. 34-35) and the Ten Commandments (d. 37-40). Planted as it were, like grout between two blocks of ashlar, we find a treatment on the cardinal virtues (d. 33) between the treatments of the theological virtues and the gift of the Holy Spirit. Similarly, we have a short treatment of the connection between the virtues (d. 36) found in between the treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Ten Commandments.<br />
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<span style="color: #e69138;"><i>Peter Lombard</i></span></div>
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These two short treatment on the virtues (d. 33 and d. 36) in the Sentences proved to be the source of a "detailed doctrine of cardinal virtues" as a result of development through the many commentaries inspired by Peter Lombard's work.<br />
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The cardinal virtues were found perfectly in Christ, and so it is toward Christ that Peter Lombard (affectionately called "the Master) turns in his treatment of the virtues in Distinction XXXIII.<br />
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We may as well quote the entire Distinction XXXIII:<br />
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<blockquote class="poemblue">
DISTINCTION XXXIII<br />
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Chapter 1 (120)<br />
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1. ON THE FOUR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES. After the above matters, we must treat the four virtues which are called principal or cardinal; they are justice, fortitude, prudence, temperance.<br />
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2. ON THEIR USES HERE.--IN BOOK 14, <i>ON THE TRINITY</i>. Concerning these, Augustine says: "Justice consists in helping the wretched, prudence in guarding against treacheries, fortitude in bearing troubles, temperance in controlling evil pleasures." [Aug., <i>De Trin</i>., 14.9.12]<br />
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3. Of these, it is said in the book of Wisdom: <i>He teaches sobriety and prudence, justice, and truth.</i> [Wis. 8:7] This text calls temperance <i>sobriety, </i>and fortitude <i>truth.</i> These virtues are called 'cardinal,' as Jerome says [<i>Cf</i>. Jerome, <i>Epist</i>. 66 (<i>ad Pammachium</i>), n3]; 'by them, it is possible to live well in this mortal life,' and afterwards to come to eternal life.<br />
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Chapter 2 (121)<br />
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THAT THESE VIRTUES WERE IN CHRIST. They were and are must fully in Christ, <i>of whose fullness e have received </i>[John 1:16]; in him, they had the same uses which they have in the fatherland, and even some of those which they have on the way.<br />
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Chapter 3 (122)<br />
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1. ON THEIR USES.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 14, <i>ON THE TRINITY</i>. But "there is a little question a to whether these virtues, since they begin to be in the mind (which was a mind even when it existed before without them), cease to be when they have brought us to things eternal. To some, it has seemed that they will cease, and in the case of three [of them], namely prudence, fortitude, and temperance, such an assertion seems not to be entirely empty." [Aug., <i>De Trin</i>., 14.9.12]<br />
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2. ON THE USE OF JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE. <i>"For justice is immortal, </i>[Wis. 1:15] and will then be made more perfect in us rather than cease to be, when we may blessedly live in contemplation of the divine nature, which created and established all other natures, and than which nothing is better and more loveable. It pertains to justice to be subject to the rule of this nature, and so justice is wholly immortal; nor will it cease to exist in that [state of] blessedness, but it will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater." [Aug., <i>De Trin</i>., 14.9.12]<br />
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3. ON THE USES OF THE OTHER THREE IN THE FUTURE. "Perhaps, the other three virtues (prudence, but now without any risk of error, and fortitude without the trouble of bearing evils, and temperance without the thwarting of lust) will also exist in that [state of] felicity there it will pertain to prudence to prefer to equate no other good to God; and to fortitude to adhere to him with the greatest steadfastness and t temperance to take pleasure in no harmful defect." [Ibid.]<br />
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4. "But that which justice now does in assisting the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treacheries, and fortitude in bearing troubles, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not at all exist there, where there will be no evil. And so these works of these the virtues, which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred will be reckoned among things past." [Ibid.] See, Augustine plainly states here that the aforesaid virtues will exist in the future, but they will then have other sues than they have now.<br />
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5. BEDE. And Bede agrees with him, speaking as follows, on Exodus: "The columns before which hands the veil are the heavenly powers, shining brightly with the four most excellent virtues, namely fortitude, prudence, temperance, justices; these are kept otherwise in heaven by the angels and the holy souls than they are here by the faithful." [Ordinary gloss on Ex. 26:32, from Bede, <i>De tabernaculo</i>, 2.8] Bede then distinguishes the uses of those virtues according to the present state and the future one, imitating Augustine in the distinctions placed above.*<br />
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As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's thinking as found in Distinction 33:<br />
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<blockquote class="orange">
For Lombard, then, the cardinal virtues are clearly Christian virtues: they are caused by God, and they lead us to 'eternal life.' Not distinguishing sufficiently between final and efficient causality, Lombard seems to have thought that, simply because they lead to the Christian end, the cardinal virtues must be 'infused,' that is, caused efficiently by divine grace rather than by human effort."
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Houser, 41.<br />
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*Peter Lombard, <i>The Sentences</i> (Book 3) (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008)<br />
**The Latin text for Peter Lombard's Sentences may be found at: <a href="http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735191">http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735191</a> The text is given here with footnotes and other academic instruments removed.<br />
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DISTINCTIO XXXIII
Caput 1 (120).
1. De quatuor virtutibus principalibus. Post praedicta de quatuor virtutibus quae principales vel cardinales vocantur disserendum est, quae sunt iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia, temperantia.<br />
2. De usibus earum hic. — In XIV libro De Trinitate. De quibus Augustinus ait: "iustitia est in subveniendo nhiseris, prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis". <br />
3. De his dicitur in libro Sapientiae: Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiarum et veritatem. Sobrietatem vocat temperantiam, et yen tatem vocat fortitudinem. Hae virtutes ‘cardinales’ dicuntur, ut ait Hieronymus; "quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur", et post ad aeternam vitam pervenitur.<br />
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Caput 2 (121).
Quod hae virtutes In Christo fuerint. Quae in Christo plenissinime fuerunt et sunt, de cuius plenitudine nos accepimus; in quo habuerunt usus eosdem quos in patria habent, et quosdam etiam viae.
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Caput 3 (122).
1. De usibus earum. — Augustinus in XIV libro De Trinitate. Verumtamen "an hae virtutes, cum et ipsae in animo esse incipiant (qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat), desinant esse cum ad aeterna. Quibusdam visum est esse desituras; et de tribus quidem, prudentia scilicet, fortitudine, temperantia, cum hoc dicitur, non nihil dici videtur".<br />
2. De usu iustitiae In fiituro. "lustitia enim immortalis est, et magis tunc perficietur in nobis quam esse cessabit, cum beate vivemus contemplatione naturae divinae, quae creavit omnes ceterasque instituit naturas, qua nihil melius et amabilius est. Cui regenti esse subditum, iustitiae est; et ideo immortalis est omnino iustitia; nec in illa beatitudine esse desinet, sed talis ac tanta erit, ut perfectior et maior esse non possit".<br />
3. De usibus aliarum trium in futuro. "Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam peniculo errons, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, tempenantia sine repugnatione libidinum, erunt in illa felicitate: ut prudentiae ibi sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare, fortitudinis ei firmissime cohaenere, temperantiae nuflo defectu noxio delectari".<br />
4. "Quod vero nunc agit iustitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis niolestiis, quod tempenantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis, non erit ibi omnino, ubi nihil mali erit. Ista igitur virtutum opera, huic mortali vitae neces— sana, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in praeteritis habebuntur". Ecce aperte hic dicit Augustinus quod praedictae virtutes in futuro erunt, sed alios usus tunc habebunt quam modo.<br />
5. Beda. Cui Beda consentit, super Exodum, ita dicens: "Columnae ante quas appensum est velum, potestates caeli sunt, quatuor eximiis virtutibus praeclarae, id est fortitudine, prudentia, temperantia,, iustitia; quae aliter in caelis servantur ab angelis et animabus sanctis, quam hic a fidelibus". Et consequenter assignat Beda usus illarum virtutum secundum praesentem statum et futurum, imitans Augustinum in praemissis assignationibus.<br />
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The entire Sentences can be found here: <a href="http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm">http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm</a></div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-43771557848507070082012-09-27T05:15:00.000-05:002012-09-27T05:15:03.254-05:00Cardinal Virtues and Sts. Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">T</span>HE AMBROSIAN SPIN ON the Platonic-Stoic notion of the virtues, and his denomination of the four principle virtues as "cardinal" proved to be popular. So we find the Ambrosian teaching adopted by other Church fathers, including such ecclesiastical lights such as St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and Pope St. Gregory the Great. Whether they adopted the notion directly from Ambrose or whether they arrived at the conclusion that there was a compatibility of the Stoic teaching with Christian doctrine independently is difficult to establish.<br />
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St. Jerome clearly believed in the unity of the four virtues that St. Ambrose identified as cardinal. In an epistle to Paulina (dated 397 A.D.), St. Jerome states: "The Stoics say the four virtues are closely connected to each other and mutually conjoined that whoever does not have one, lacks all."* Contextually, it is clear that St. Jerome is mentioning the Stoic doctrine with approval. St. Jerome likened the four virtues to the "law" of St. James, who in his epistle (James 2:10) had stated that he who keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is guilty of failing the law in its entirety. In a manner redolent of St. James, St. Jerome therefore understood that "whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all."<br />
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St. Augustine elaborated on the Ambrosian notion of the virtues to a much larger extent than St. Jerome. R. E. Houser states that it was St. Augustine who drew "the full logical and rhetorical consequences of the Ambrosian doctrine" of the cardinal virtues. Houser, 37. For example, in his On the Practices of the Catholic Church (<i>De moribus ecclesiae</i>), St. Augustine stated that the Catholic moral practices (mores) depend upon two commandments, the commandments of love of God and love of neighbor, and that therefore the moral virtues may be defined in terms of love. <br />
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But if virtue leads us to the happy life, I would say that virtue altogether is nothing other than the highest love of God. For what is called fourfold virtue is named, so far as I can tell, from certain varied affections of love itself.
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Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur.
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<i>De mor. eccl</i>., 15.25. By attaching the four cardinal virtues to love, St. Augustine was able to unify them, indeed reduce them to love, so that there were not four separate virtues, but one "fourfold virtue," four manifestations of charity.** This shows a big distinction between the pagan notion of virtue (e.g., Socrates reducing them all to knowledge) and the Christian notion (reducing them all to love).<br />
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Pope St. Gregory the Great also adopted the Ambrosian synthesis in his great work on Christian morals, the <i>Moralia on Job</i>. Pope St. Gregory analogized the virtues to the Beatitudes, and likewise came to the conclusion that all virtues stood or fell together:<br />
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[P]erfected virtues can in no way be disjoined, because there is not true prudence which is not just, temperate, and brave; nor perfected temperance which is not brave, just, and prudent; nor integral fortitude which is not prudent, temperate, and just; nor true justice which is not prudent, brave, and temperate.
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<blockquote>
Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.</blockquote>
<i>Moralia in Job</i>, 22.1.2***<br />
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The all-or-nothing view of virtues does no seem entirely satisfactory since it does not seem to be in full accord with our experience. There seem to be a whole mass of men who are neither saints nor inveterate sinners, and it is difficult to believe that there is no such thing as authentic virtue even among the imperfect. Similarly, there seems to be no sense of <i>infused </i>virtue versus <i>acquired </i>virtue, a distinction which was to arise during the middle ages.<br />
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*Quatuor virtutes describunt Stoici, ita sibi invicem nexas, et mutuo cohaerentes, ut qui unam non habuerit, omnibus careat: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. Has omnes sic habetis singuli, ut tamen emineatis in singulis. Ep. 66.3 (<i>ad Pammachium</i>).<br />
**Itaque illas quattuor virtutes, quarum utinam ita in mentibus vis ut nomina in ore sunt omnium, sic etiam definire non dubitem, ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. Sed hunc amorem non cuiuslibet sed Dei esse diximus, id est summi boni, summae sapientiae summaeque concordiae.<br />
***Una virtus sine aliis, aut nulla est, aut minima.---Hoc autem primum sciendum est, quia quisquis virtute aliqua pollere creditur, tunc veraciter pollet, cum vitiis ex alia parte non subiacet. Nam si ex alio vitiis subditur, nec hoc est solidum, ubi stare putabatur. Unaquaeque enim virtus tanto minor est, quanto desunt caeterae: Nam saepe quosdam pudicos quidem vidisse nos contigit, sed non humiles; quosdam vero quasi humiles, sed non misericordes; quosdam quasi misericordes, sed nequaquam iustos; quosdam vero quasi iustos, sed in se potius quam in Domino confidentes. Et certum est quia nec castitas in eius corde vera est, cui humilitas deest, quippe quia superbia se intrinsecus corrumpente fornicatur, si semetipsum diligens, a divino recedit amore. Nec humilitas vera est cui misericordia iuncta non est, quia nec debet humilitas dici, quae ad compassionem fraternae miseriae nescit inclinari. Nec misericordia vera est quae a rectitudine iustitiae existit aliena, quia quae potest per iniustitiam pollui, nescit procul dubio sibimetipsi misereri. Nec iustitia vera est quae fiduciam suam non in conditore omnium, sed in se fortasse, aut in rebus conditis ponit, quia dum a creatore spem subtrahit, ipse sibi principalis iustitiae ordinem pervertit. Una itaque virtus sine aliis, aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Ut enim, sicut quibusdam visum est, de primis quatuor virtutibus loquar, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudine, atque iustitia; tanto perfectae sunt singulae, quanto vicissim sibimet coniunctae. Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-67183921506075553812012-09-24T04:22:00.000-05:002012-09-24T04:26:36.284-05:00St. Ambrose: The Virtues and the Beatitudes<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">S</span>AINT AMBROSE FITTED THE CARDINAL VIRTUES into the teachings of Jesus as found in the New Testament. St. Ambrose found a connection between the beatitudes--the central focus of Christian life--and the cardinal virtues. He found there to be a parallel between the Lucan presentation of the beatitudes which are four in number with the four cardinal virtues of Christian life. Given the focus of the Church on the moral teachings of Jesus as found in the beatitudes, such a move would have been considered essential.<br />
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We find St. Ambrose's direct connection of the beatitudes in his exposition of the Gospel of Luke (<i>Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam</i>, 5.64-67). The beatitudes in Luke are found in Luke 6:20–22, when Jesus addresses his followers in the so-called "Sermon on the Plain." These are followed by the four "woes" that are parallel to the beatitudes in 6:24-26. <br />
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Accordingly, we have "Blessed are you who are poor: for yours is the kingdom of God." Those who are poor display the virtue of temperance, a temperance which overcomes the seductions of the goods of the present life. A temperate man will avoid the woe that Jesus imparts to the rich, for they have received their consolation in this life. In the Ambrosian synthesis, the woes that Jesus imparts to the rich, are warnings against those who are intemperate.<br />
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"Blessed are you who are now hungry, for you will be satisfied," is a reference to those who hunger and thirst for the virtue of justice, a virtue which looks toward the needs of neighbor with a compassionate heart, one full of largesse and altruism. Woe to those who are unjust, those who are filled now at the expense of their neighbor.<br />
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"Blessed are you who are now weeping, for you will laugh" is a reference to Christian prudence, one which avoids the mundane, and seeks the eternal, the lasting. Woe to those who are imprudent, who laugh now, for they eventually will grieve and weep.<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan</span></i></div>
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Finally, the virtue of fortitude or courage is tied to the last Lucan beatitude: "Blessed are you when people hate you, and when they exclude and insult you, and denounce your name as evil on account of the Son of Man. Rejoice and leap for joy on that day! Behold, your reward will be great in heaven." Woe when, because you renounced the Son of Man for lack of courage, you are well-spoken of. The crown of suffering is the "consummation of courage" for the Christian. <br />
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While the Lucan four-fold version of the beatitudes in the Gospel of Luke fit nicely with the four-fold scheme of the cardinal virtues, the beatitudes of the Gospel of Matthew did not fit so nicely. Yet Ambrose managed to find a parallel even here, largely through the use of allegory. He insisted that the eight beatitudes of the Gospel of St. Matthew were reducible to the four of the Gospel of Luke and therefore also the four cardinal virtues. "The four are in the eight, and the eight in the four," <i>sed in istis octo illae quattuor sunt et in his quattuor illae octo</i>. (<i>Exp. ev. sec. Lucam</i>, 5.49)<br />
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The Matthean beatitudes are found in Matthew 5:3-10, and are part of the Sermon on the Mount:<br />
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<ul>
<li>Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. (5:3) </li>
<li>Blessed are those who mourn: for they will be comforted. (5:4) </li>
<li>Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. (5:5) </li>
<li>Blessed they who hunger and thirst for righteousness: for they will be satisfied. (5:6) </li>
<li>Blessed are the merciful: for they will be shown mercy. (5:7) </li>
<li>Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. (5:8) </li>
<li>Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called children of God. (5:9) </li>
<li>Blessed are those who are persecuted for the sake of righteousness: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. (5:10)</li>
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There are numerous ways where the Beatitudes in the Gospel of Matthew and the Beatitudes in the Gospel of Luke may be reconciled or synthesized. One way is to expand each Lucan beatitude into two Matthean beatitudes, so that two Matthean beatitudes correlate to one of Luke's beatitudes. The other method--which was the method chosen by St. Ambrose--is to see all the beatitudes are contained within one another.<br />
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It was a Platonic nostrum that all the virtues had to be had together, so that the virtues while "ontologically distinct, are unified operationally." One will recall that for Socrates the union of virtue was even more unified as "essentially one while operationally many." Houser, 36. So we find in St. Ambrose a Platonic, even a Socratic notion of one overarching virtue, a binding together of beatitude to beatitude, of virtue to virtue in a circular chain of virtue:<br />
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Therefore, the virtues are so connected and chained together, that whoever has one seems to have them all; and there accrues to the saints one virtue.
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<i>Conexae igitur sibi sunt concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet plures habere videatur, et sanctis una conpetit virtus</i>.</blockquote>
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<i>Exp. ev. sec. Lucam</i>, 5.62-3. It was this synthesis of St. Ambrose that was to influence the teachings of the Fathers and the medieval "masters" or <i>magistri</i>.</div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-79970264411360423352012-09-18T04:30:00.000-05:002012-09-18T04:31:41.611-05:00St. Ambrose and the Cardinal Virtues<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">S</span>AINT AMBROSE, THE REDOUBTABLE bishop of Milan, is the first of the <i>sancti </i>that we will look at in the issue of virtues. St. Ambrose is particularly notable for his moral teachings. With regard to virtues in particular, he is to be regarded as the one who "invented the term 'cardinal virtues' because he was an inveterately allegorical thinker." Houser, 32. As Peter Lombard put it in his Sentences: <i>primus autem qui eas cardinales vocat est Ambrosius</i>. "The first therefore who called them [the four principle virtues] cardinal was Ambrose." (2:188, n.3).*<br />
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An example of St. Ambrose's allegorical style is his <i>On Paradise</i>, written circa 377 A.D. As Houser summarizes it:<br />
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[T]he fertile land of paradise is like a fertile soul; Adam is like its intellect and Eve like its senses. The four rivers in Eden are in reality the four great rivers of the earth. These rivers in turn are analogous to the four Platonic virtues within the soul, because each is 'principal' within its own realm. Platonic analogy turned into Christian allegory when Ambrose connected the two sides of the comparison--the four rivers with the four virtues--through a common point of reference, namely, through God, who is at once the cosmic artisan who created the rivers of paradise, and, in the person of Jesus Christ, the wisdom producing virtue in individual men.</blockquote>
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Houser, 32 (citing to <i>De par</i>. 3.18)<br />
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We have a similar allegorical notion of the four virtues in St. Ambrose's funeral oration for his brother Satyrus (ca. 378). In this funeral oration--where St. Ambrose first appears to have applied the term "cardinal virtues"--St. Ambrose praised his brother for having lived the four-Platonic virtues, but in a manner which exceeded the limits placed upon these virtues by the <i>philosophi</i>. After recalling emotionally past rememberances of life with his brother and regarding him as a true friend, an "other self," Ambrose launches into an analysis of his brother's life by framing it within the four cardinal virtues.<br />
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After handling prudence, courage, and temperance, St. Ambrose addresses justice:<br />
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What remains, in order to complete the cardinal virtues, is that we also show the parts of justice in him [referring to Satyrus]. For even though the virtues are born together and perfected together, nevertheless one desires to know the form and outline of each one of them, and especially of justice.
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Superest, ut ad conclusionem cardinalium virtutum etiam partes in eo debeamus advertere. Nam etsi cognatur sint inter se concretaeque virtutes, tamen singularum aquedam form et expression desideraturs maximeque iustitiae.
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Houser, 3 (quoting <i>De excessu fratris Satyri</i> 1.57).<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">The Four Virtues</span></i></div>
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St. Ambrose tied the cardinal virtues to his brother's life and its culmination in his death. It was these four cardinal virtues that helped his brother Satyrus face death, and, in particular, that great confrontation after death of judgment. This is the "cardinal" moment of one's life, and it is the "cardinal" virtues that are aimed at not only living life well here on earth, but preparing for the ultimate "crisis" of one's life: one's judgment before God. For St. Ambrose, therefore, the cardinal virtues are directly tied to God, to a life that is consecrated to God, to a life which is lived with an eye to the <i>summum bonum</i>, the Almighty God of Jesus Christ.<br />
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Ambrose turned to Plato to explain his brother's life, not his death, because Plato's four virtues are designed for living, for living the whole of life with an eye to the good. Ambrose simply replaced the abstract Platonic good with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and in so doing he gave Plato's four virtues a more concrete end than the philosophers ever had. This teleological orientation toward God would always be maintained by Ambrose's patristic and medieval descendants.
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Houser, 35. "In Ambrose's conception," Houser summarizes, "three features make the four virtues 'cardinal': they involve death, judgment, and orientation toward God." It was in this manner that St. Ambrose effectively transformed the four Platonic virtues that had already been developed by the Stoics into something entirely different. As Professor Colish puts it in her book, <i>The Stoic Tradition</i>, "Ambrose seeks to bring the Stoic sage into the fullness of being through Christian redemption." Houser, 35 n. 70. <br />
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St. Ambrose therefore transformed the virtues from philosophical concepts to theological concepts, from natural virtues to virtues that were engraced. They become Christian virtues; indeed, they become the <i>principal </i>virtues of the Christian life. <i>Et omnes quidem virtutes ad spiritum pertinent, sed istae quasi cardinales sunt, quasi principales. De off. min</i>., 1.29.142. After St. Ambrose treats of the philosophical virtues, they become baptized, and they arise from the water as if reborn into the cardinal virtues. They thus become something that is intrinsically part of life in the Holy Spirit.<br />
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">*In Latin, of course, the term <i>cardo</i> (pl., <i>cardines</i>; the adjectival form is <i>cardinalis</i>)<i> </i>or term "cardinal" is most frequently said to mean hinge-like. In light of St. Ambrose's allegorical viewpoint, we can see the cardinal virtues as being the four hinges upon which the doors of the moral life swing. However, the term <i>cardo </i>also can mean the tenon and mortise which dovetail to form a door's frame. In Roman surveying, the term <i>cardo </i>mean the baseline or datum for the surveyor's measurement of the field. The terms was also extended to include more comprehensively an entire geographical district, region, or boundary. Houser, 33-34. The term cardo was used by numerous Latin authors (Varro, Pliny, Cicero, Ovid, Statius, and Seneca) to refer to the poles of the earth or the points of a compass. It was used by Pliny to refer to those days when the seasons would change. Quintilian used the term to refer to the points on an ecliptic. Servius, who was a contemporary of St. Ambrose, used the word to refer to the four winds. Houser, 34 n. 67. The allegorical possibilities of the word <i>cardo </i>are therefore quite rich. As Houser summarizes it: "These meanings, however, are not haphazard but are united by he notion of something which is extraordinarily important, in no small part because it is a point of transition." Indeed, Seneca used the term cardo to refer to that very important transition, death.</span></div>
Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8585732092994259978.post-19177731100148496092012-09-17T03:50:00.001-05:002012-09-17T03:51:22.798-05:00Seneca and Virtue: Four Political Virtues<div style="text-align: justify;">
<span class="dropcaps">L</span>UCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, known as Seneca the Younger (to distinguish him from his father, Seneca the Elder), was a Roman Stoic philosopher, statesman, and writer (ca. 4 B.C. to 65 A.D.). Famously, he was tutor and counselor to the emperor Nero, who, in his caprice, eventually sentenced the probably innocent Seneca to death (by forced suicide) for allegedly taken part in the Pisonian conspiracy to assassinate Nero.<br />
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Seneca, like Cicero, was not a markedly innovative thinker, so Stoicism cannot be said to have been developed as a result of his writings. With respect to the Stoic doctrines on virtue, we find that he accepts the four-fold division of virtue. Seneca also accepted the Chryssipian schema of have sub-virtues underneath the cardinal virtues, sort of like children beneath the skirts of their mother.
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Seneca was highly favored by the early Christians. Tertullian referred to Seneca as "frequently our own," <i>saepe noster</i>, and St. Jerome referred to him as "our Seneca" in his <i>Ad Jovinian</i> I.49. He was even supposed (falsely) to have known and corresponded with St. Paul. Such correspondence is certainly apocryphal. Even the rigorist Tertullian calls Seneca "our Seneca." <br />
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His popularity was no less keen in the middle ages. "His influence was paramount in the early middle ages and the most notable doctrine about the cardinal virtues that this favorite of emperors handed onto the medievals was the way he gave it a secular and political interpretation."* Houser, 30. The virtues as presented by Seneca were seen by the medieval ruler as essential in the recipe for governing. From Seneca, rulers would have "learned that the four Stoic virtues were the best guides to practical life, that they come together as a 'package' of four virtues necessarily united together, that they involve other virtues connected with them, and above all that they are most fitting for emperors and princes." Houser, 31. Machiavelli, then, the consummate anti-medievalist, may be said to have been an anti-Seneca. Machiavelli's <i>virtù </i>is something quite different from Seneca's virtue.<br />
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<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">Seneca between Plato and Aristotle </span></i><br />
<i><span style="color: #b45f06;">From and early 14th century manuscript</span></i></div>
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Seneca's Stoic virtues--with their political twist--can be distinguished from the Ambrosian Christianization of the Stoic virtues, where the virtues as seen as part of an entire way of life, and not simply limited to political circumstance. The Senecan notion is secular; the Ambrosian notion is religious. We see, therefore, two strands of virtue-thought: the Senecan political virtues and the Ambrosian personal or religious virtue. The Senecan teaching we find for example in Martin of Braga's (ca. 520- ca. 580 A.D.) treatise on virtue entitled <i>Formula vitae honestae </i>or in Isidore of Seville. We find the Ambrosian notion adopted by Pope Gregory I (ca. 540-614 A.D.). This dual strand of virtue thought continued well into the middle ages.<br />
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Seneca's treatment of the virtues is probably worth a series of posting, but at this juncture, we shall not focus on Seneca. Instead, we shall view him as an interim figure between the pagan world and the Christian world, for we are leaving behind the pagan world and entering into the Christian. From the philosophical sage, we enter into the world of the Christian saint. From <i>philosophi </i>to <i>sancti</i>. And we will never be able to look at virtue from the vantage point of the man without grace.<br />
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But for all his popularity and his supposed tie to St. Paul and supposed conversion, Seneca was not a Christian saint; yet he was a Stoic, albeit one with a fine sense of style and dedication to Stoic principles and values, particularly that quality of <i>apatheia, </i>a sort of self-possession of emotions that allowed one to go through life entirely nonplussed by its vicissitudes. He was perhaps, along with Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, one of Stoicism's most famous advocates. His 124 moral epistles to Lucilius were perhaps the most famous and popular of his works, though his works on constancy (<i>De constantia</i>) and mercy (<i>De clementia</i>) were also popular. <br />
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">*It is perhaps not proper to call these virtues "cardinal," since as Houser says later on, the Stoic development of the virtues classified the four virtues through "prolonged meditation on Socrates and whose primary exponents were Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. But as much as these three great ethical schools had done, they had not made the cardinal virtues 'cardinal.' This innovation required the wholesale revolution in thought known as Christian wisdom." Houser, 31.</span><br />
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Andrew M. Greenwellhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17242573723573203387noreply@blogger.com0