Libertas Christi Urget Nos

“FOR FREEDOM, CHRIST HAS SET US FREE," the Apostle Paul wrote to the Galatians (Gal. 5:1): qua libertate nos Christus liberavit. Freedom is a central value of the Church's social doctrine, along with truth, justice, and love. Libertas Christi urget nos. The freedom of Christ spurs us on.

Freedom, however, is one of those words that is so easily abused in the lips of the libertine, of the moral relativist who considers himself unbounded by objective truth and objective right. "O Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom!" exclaimed Madam Roland as she bowed before the statute of liberty in the Place de la Révolution before the guillotine severed here head from her body. "O Liberty! What crimes are committed in thy name!"

Many kinds of slavery wear a false frock of freedom to cover their blemishes. But the freedom the Church has in mind is a responsible freedom, not an irresponsible freedom. As John Paul II defined it in his homily in Orioles Park at Camden Yards in October 1995, "freedom consists not in doing what we like, but in having the right to do what we ought."

It is not the freedom to do what we want, but the freedom to do what we ought that is the "highest sign in man of his being made in the divine image and, consequently, as a sign of the sublime dignity of every human person." (Compendium, No. 199) An irresponsible freedom detracts from the freedom of the sons of God and consequently stains--even eclipses--his dignity. "Every human person," states the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, "created in the image of God, has the natural right to be recognized as a free and responsible being." (Compendium, No. 199) It is important to note the conjunction: we have a natural right to be "free and responsible," not "free and irresponsible."

Freedom is not something we exercise only in regard to ourselves, solipsistically, egoistically. Such a restrictive notion of freedom is Hell. "Hell," T. S. Eliot had the loveless husband say to his unloving wife in his play "The Cocktail Party," "is oneself, Hell is alone, the other figures in it, merely projections. There is nothing to escape from and nothing to escape to. One is always alone." In such a place, there is no where to go, nothing to do. All is restraint. There is no choice. There is no freedom.



In his "Stanzas on Freedom," the American Romantic poet and abolitionist James Russell Lowell asked this question:

Is true Freedom but to break
Fetters for our own dear sake,
And, with leathern hearts, forget
That we owe mankind a debt?

Freedom is exercised not only for oneself, but with regard to others, that is to say, communally. Freedom is necessarily "exercised in relationships between human beings." For this reason, the "meaning of freedom must not be restricted, considering it from a purely individualistic perspective and reducing it to the arbitrary and uncontrolled exercise of one's own personal autonomy." (Compendium, No.199) Heaven is not alone. Heaven is communion, communion with God, and with his angels and saints. To invoke again James Russell Lowe, who answers the question he posed just earlier in the poem and quoted above:

No! true freedom is to share
All the chains our brothers wear,
And, with heart and hand, to be
Earnest to make others free!

The Compendium summarizes this quite nicely: "Far from being achieved in total self-sufficiency and the absence of relationships, freedom only truly exists where reciprocal bonds, governed by truth and justice, link people to one another."* (Compendium, No. 199).

While communal and not solipsistic, the cloth of freedom is not dyed one color and does not come in one size, like a Mao suit. Freedom allows for legitimate self-expression within certain moral constraints and constraints required by the requirements of civil society and life in common. Freedom's value allows for the "expression of the singularity of each human person" within the constraints of right and due order. (Compendium, No. 200)

This sort of freedom should be reflected in the civil liberties enjoyed and practiced by those in a well-ordered polity. In a well-ordered civil society, the following are the broad freedoms within which one can express his personal autonomy responsibly:

• the freedom to fulfill his personal vocation;
• the freedom to seek the truth and profess his religious, cultural, and political ideas;
• the freedom to express his opinions;
• the freedom to choose his state of life, and, as far as possible, his line of work;
• the freedom to pursue initiatives of an economic, social, or political nature.
  

Naturally, these freedoms are not exercised in vacuo, in a vacuum. They are exercised in communio, within a community. For this reason, they must be exercised within the matrix of a "'strong juridical framework,' within the limits imposed by the common good and public order, and, in every case, in a manner characterized by responsibility." (Compendium, No. 200)

There are some places where freedom cannot go, where it may not enter. For there are places where one goes from freedom to unfreedom, from true freedom to what are just elusive shades and shadows of freedom. Freedom will recognize those limits, and therefore it will "refuse what is morally negative, in whatever guise it may be presented." Freedom accordingly includes the "capacity to distance oneself effectively from everything that could hinder personal, family, or social growth." (Compendium, No. 200) This suggests that freedom is found only in virtue, and never in vice. "Only a virtuous people," wrote Benjamin Franklin unerringly, "are capable of freedom."

In short, as the Catechism of the Catholic Church defines it (§ 1731):

Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one's own responsibility. By free will one shapes one's own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.

The Compendium summarizes its view of freedom in this manner: "The fullness of freedom consists in the capacity to be in possession of oneself in view of the genuine good," which, of course ultimately is God, "within the context of the universal common good." (Compendium, No. 200)
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*The Compendium quotes the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Libertas conscientia, 26.

Veritas Christi Urget Nos

IN ADDITION TO THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Church's social doctrine which we have reviewed--the dignity of the human person, the common good, subsidiarity (and participation), and solidarity*--there are also four fundamental moral values that ought to inspire and guide the entire enterprise of social life: truth, freedom, justice, and love. In this blog posting, we will review the moral value of truth and its significance in social life from the perspective of the Church's social doctrine. Later posts will handle the other values.

"Men and women have the specific duty to move always towards the truth, to respect it, and bear responsible witness to it." (Compendium, No. 198) "Suffer us not," wrote T. S. Eliot in his poem "Ash Wednesday," "to mock ourselves with falsehood."

We have a duty to move towards the truth. This recognizes that we have a duty to conform ourselves to reality, to what is, as truth is our conformity--whether it be our intellect or our life--to reality. Veritas, goes the philosophic axiom, est adaequatio intellectus et rei: truth is the conformity of our intellect with reality. We might go further than this and say that the value of truth is the conformity of one's entire life, including one's social life, to reality, to what is. Veritas est adaequatio vitae et rei. Truth is the beacon toward which we aim personally and in our social relations.



All things, the philosopher Josef Pieper reminds us in his book Living in the Truth, are true. What is, Father James V. Schall has always insisted in his writings, is true. Truth is reflected in the world about us, for it was created by God who is true.

The value of truth is important to apply in our life in common. "The more people and social groups strive to resolve social problems according to truth, the more they distance themselves from abuses and act in accordance with the objective demands of morality." (Compendium, No. 198) We cannot build a society on a mock truth, on a non-committal shrug of the shoulders to truth. We cannot build a society on a question on a mock question like Pontius Pilate, "What is truth?" and then not stay for an answer or supply an answer of our own.

To be sure, the quest for truth is not easy. "Falsehood is so easy," George Eliot pseudonymously wrote in her book Adam Bede, "truth so difficult." And with the poet Virgil, we can recall the reality that it is either to descend to the falsehoods of Averno, that to climb to the summit of truth:

Facilis descensus Averno; noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis; sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras, hoc opus, hic labor est.**

But the difficulty of the quest ought not to discourage us: veritas Christi urget nos. The truth of Christ urges us on. "I hate and abhor falsehood," the Psalmist said, "but your law do I love." (Psalm 119 [118]:163)

This suggestion that we are to "move always" to the truth suggests that this duty is never over. In a certain sense we are becoming in the truth. Only one person can say "I am the truth, the way, and the life," (John 14:6) and even He, in his humanity, "grew in wisdom and statute, and in favor with God and men" (Luke 2:52). Truth's demand is that one's entire life must be engaged in the desire to have greater conformity with reality. We must, in the words of Shakespeare in his play The Rape of Lucrece, continue to "unmask falsehood, and bring truth to light." While on this earth we are on pilgrimage to the truth, and we must be willing to discard those mental notions that do not accord with truth when we learn that we have held them in error. We must, further, learn to take up truths when we come to recognize them.

While the striving for truth is never over, we must not despair that truth is something entirely unachievable. Though in one sense we are always striving for truth, yet in another we can also say that we have a hold on some truths.

The notion of truth entertained by the Church is that it is an objective reality. Truth is not what we make of it. Intellectual subjectivism or moral relativism is out of the question. Truth is not the modernist notion of adaequatio realis mentis et vitae, only the conformity of our life with the truth in our mind. The value of truth is not internal integrity or sincerity, though it certainly does not disdain these things. But fundamentally, truth implies something objective, something which masters us and which we never master; hence, it is something that can make moral demands of us. The "truth" in "our mind" must conform to the truth "out there."

Those truths we have, and their adoption tried, we must grapple them to our souls with hoops of steel to paraphrase and slightly modify Shakespeare. But we must do more than grapple truth to our souls. Truth must be preached from the housetops. (Matt. 10:27) We also have a duty to bear responsible witness to the truth. That means that our words must be true to truth.

"Simply let your 'yes' be 'yes,' and your 'no,' 'no,'" the Lord tells us. (Matt. 5:37) With respect to truth, there ought to be less maybes, and our "yes" must never be "no," and our "no" must never be "yes." There ought to be a conformity of our words with the truth. Or as Aristotle in his Metaphysics put it: "To say of what is, that it is, or of what is not, that it is not, is true."

The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church recognizes the importance of replanting the notion of objective truth in the mass of men. Wallowing in the slough of relativism, we seem unable--not unlike the mastodons and saber tooth cats of old in the La Brea Tar Pits--to extricate ourselves from the ooze in which we slowly sink:

Modern times call for an intense educational effort, and a corresponding commitment on the part of all regarding the quest for truth--which cannot be ascribed to the sum of different opinions, nor to one or another of these opinions--will be encouraged in every sector and will prevail over ever attempt to make relative its demands or to offend against it.

There are powers that work against the propagation of the truth, and that have a vested interest in promoting falsehood. We are heirs to a tendentious media and other institutions of communication, entertainment, commerce, and other human intercourse--that are too often founded upon the desire for gain, an "unscrupulous use of money" or profit, rather than a concern with the truth. (Compendium, No. 198) As T. S. Eliot reminds us in his work Christianity and Culture, Christians face an uphill battle:

[We are compromised] by our implication in a network of institutions from which we cannot dissociate ourselves: institutions the operation of which appears no longer neutral, but non-Christian. And as for the Christian who is not conscious of this dilemma--and he is in the majority--he is becoming more and more de-Christianized by all sorts of unconscious pressure: paganism holds all the most valuable advertising space.***

Truth is impartial. Truth has no friends except itself. That is why Isaac Newton wrote in his notebook, Amicus Plato, amicus Aristoteles, magis amica veritas. Plato is my friend. Aristotle is my friend. But my greatest friend is truth.

The truth is important for what we gain from it: "Ye shall know the truth," said the Lord Christ, "and the truth shall make you free." (John 8:31) We can say of Truth what John Donne said of the Trinity in his Sonnet "Batter my Heart, Three Person'd God":

"Take me to you, imprison me, for I,
Except you enthrall me, never shall be free.

This takes us to the next value identified in the Compendium, the value of freedom. This we shall handle in our next post.

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*For the four principles and four values generally, see The Four Principles and Four Values of Catholic Social Doctrine. For the principle of the dignity of the human person, see The Equal Dignity of All Persons. For the principle of the common good, see Property is Yours, Mine, and Ours. For the principle of subsidiarity (and participation), see Trickle Up Power and Pour Down Participation. For the principle of solidarity, see Solidarity as Principle and Fundamental Social Virtue. **Virgil, Aeneid, VI.124 ff. Rough translation: "It is easy to descend to Averno / The gates of hell are open night and day / Smooth is the descent, but not the climb / The climb upward is the work, the laborious way."
***T. S. Eliot, Christianity and Culture (New York: Houghton Mifflin Hartcourt, 1980), 17.

Solidarity as Principle and Fundamental Social Virtue

SOLIDARITY IS ANOTHER GREAT principle of the Church's social doctrine. As a social principle, solidarity is the recognition that man is interdependent, that we are all responsible for all. It is an absolute rejection of individualism and any political, economic, or social theory based upon such a narrow view of man. These individualistic or atomistic theories hold or stress that we are only responsible for ourselves. On the other hand, solidarity recognizes that all men"are debtors of the society in which they have become part." (Compendium, No. 195)

Solidarity as a principle might be defined as an expression "in summary fashion the need to recognize in the composite ties that unite men and social groups among themselves, the space given to human freedom for common growth in which all share and in which they participate." It views "separation and fragmentation" among humans as something to be overcome. There is therefore an "intimate bond" between the principle of solidarity and the principle of the common good, the concept of the universal destination of goods, equality among men and peoples, and the efforts toward establishing peace in the world. (Compendium, No. 194)

Solidarity, however, may also be characterized as a virtue. In fact, it may be recognized as the "fundamental social virtue" one that is in the "sphere of justice" but extends out into friendship and even into love. In its sense as virtue, a habitual disposition in a person, solidarity is the virtue that involves "a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good. That is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really responsible for all."* (Compendium, No. 193)


Solidarity as a virtue is something that goes beyond mere justice: it goes beyond merely a firm resolution of giving each his due. It recognizes that we are our brother's keeper, that we must be committed to the good of our neighbor, and must resolutely try to be other-regarding, and less self-regarding. One must, as the Compendium says, be willing "to 'lose oneself' for he sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to 'serve him' instead of oppressing him for one's own advantage."* (Compendium, No. 193) Solidarity is a sort of blend between justice and love of neighbor. In terms of action, it "translates into the willingness to give oneself for the good of one's neighbor, beyond any individual or particular interest." (Compendium, No. 194)

Solidarity, while to some extent participating in the natural virtues of altruism and selflessness, is "undoubtedly a Christian virtue." There are so many points of contact between the social virtue of solidarity and charity, as to make it plain that solidarity, in its fullness and totality, is a Christian virtue and ought to be "the distinguishing mark of Christ's disciples." (Compendium, note 424) (quoting John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, No. 40)

Those with the virtue of solidarity are able to determine the proper order, that is to say, the proper structuring of political, economic, or social institutions. Those practiced in the virtue of solidarity are therefore able identify those "structures of sin" which detract from or violate the proper order. Identifying those "structures of sin" allows them to be overcome and changed, "through the creation or appropriation modification of laws, market regulations, and juridical systems," into properly ordered "structures of solidarity." (Compendium, No.193)

Solidarity--both as a principle and as a virtue--finds its greatest meaning and blooming, its sign, its model, its "unsurpassed apex of perspective" in the life of Jesus of Nazareth, the"New Man, who is one with humanity even to the point of 'death on a cross'(Phil. 2:8)." (Compendium, No. 196) Jesus went far beyond justice into the realm of love and mercy, and, though God and under no obligation to any of mankind, was entirely Other-regarding. He called us friends. (John 15:9-18) He called us to be one, as He and the Father are one. (John 17:21) He gave us the great mandatum: to love one another as He loved us. (John 13:34-35) Christ's entire life was one lived for all men, for one and for all. In his life, he displayed in a most exemplary fashion, the virtue of solidarity. Jesus was solidarity in the flesh.

We can do no better than quote the closing paragraph of this section of the Compendium:

Jesus of Nazareth makes the connection between solidarity and charity shine brightly before all, illuminating the entire meaning of this connection: "In the light of faith, solidarity seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the specifically Christian dimensions of total gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation. One's neighbor is then not only a human being with his or her own rights and a fundamental equality with everyone else, but becomes the living image of God the Father, redeemed by the blood of Jesus Christ and placed under the permanent action of the Holy Spirit. One's neighbor must therefore be loved, even if an enemy, with the same love with which the Lord loves him or her; and for that person's sake one must be ready for sacrifice, even the ultimate one: to lay down one's life for the brethren (cf. 1 Jn 3:16).

(Compendium, No. 196)

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*John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis, No. 38. The term solidarity is of rather recent origin, derived from the French solidarité meaning "mutual responsibility," itself a borrowing from the "Encyclopédie" of 1765's term solidaire meaning "interdependent, complete, entire," all ultimately coming from the word solide meaning solid. Building on notions of "friendship" found, for example, in Aristotle, the principle of solidarity goes beyond this understanding. As the Church's social doctrine developed, Popes struggled with this concept, to formulate it and to give it a name. It is found "though not yet with that explicit name," for example, in Pope Leo XIII's Rerum novarum under the concept of "friendship." Pope Pius XI refers to this principle under the moniker "social charity." Pope Paul VI hearkened the principle in his broad conception of a "civilization of love." Originally conceived as a "law" by Pope Pius XII, who first used the term in his encyclical Summi Pontificatus, No. 35 ("The first of these pernicious errors, widespread today, is the forgetfulness of that law of human solidarity and charity which is dictated and imposed by our common origin and by the equality of rational nature in all men, to whatever people they belong, and by the redeeming Sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on the Altar of the Cross to His Heavenly Father on behalf of sinful mankind."). Since first used by Pius XII, it has expanded to the broader concept of "principle." For the history behind this term, see Compendium, Note 421.

Trickle Up Power and Pour Down Participation

ONE OF THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHURCH'S social doctrine is the principle of subsidiarity, and with it, like the caboose behind the train, comes the necessary implication of subsidiarity: participation.

The principle of subsidiarity is a foundational principle of social philosophy that has two prongs. First, it holds that political, economic, and other social matters ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest, or least centralized competent authority able to handle them. This preserves the vast and healthy network of relations in civil society, from the family on upwards. Second, it includes the concept that any higher authority, if and when it justifiably intervenes, should have at most a subsidiary, helping function (subsidium), performing only those tasks which cannot be performed adequately at a lower level, and only for such time as the lower level is unable adequately to handle them.* Any such necessary intervention "must not continue any longer than is absolutely necessary, since justification for such intervention is found only in the exceptional nature of the situation." (Compendium, No. 188)

The principle of subsidiarity means we ought to have a bias or presumption against centralization, and a bias or presumption in favor of de-centralization. "The principle of subsidiarity is opposed," therefore, "to certain forms of centralization, bureaucratization, and welfare assistance and to the unjustified and excessive presence of the State in public mechanisms." (Compendium, No. 187)

The principle of subsidiarity is not limited to government and political questions only. It covers all all civil society, and includes, for example, the economic realm. The principle of subsidiarity will therefore distrust concentrations of economic power in bureaucratic, powerful, often impersonal corporations. It abhors monopolies. It would rather see such economic resources and economic power distributed as low down as possible. Distributist in spirit,*** it prefers the mom-and-pop store over a Wal-Mart. It prefers a family farm over an big agribusiness. To a subsidiarist, small is beautiful in the world of economics as E. F. Schumacher put it in the title of his famous book on economics.

In short, power ought at best to "trickle up," and, conversely, participation ought to "pour down." Anyone who believes in the principle of subsidiarity will entertain a healthy horror grapheocratiae,** a horror of bureaucracy, an antipathy to big government and big business. He will see the serious injustice to persons and society involved by the arrogation of powers by an overweening, intermeddling state or corporate culture. He will view the intervention of the State as one of last resort. He will understand the great truth behind Ronald Regan's joke: "The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, 'I'm from the government and I'm here to help.'"

The principle of subsidiarity stems directly from the dignity of the human person. It recognizes the truth that "every person, family, and intermediate group has something original to offer to the community," and that potential ought not be stymied by higher ups, since it tends to suppress or even destroy the "spirit of freedom and initiative." (Compendium, No. 187) "It is impossible," the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church therefore tells us, "to promote the dignity of the person without showing concern for the family, groups, associations, local territorial realities; in short, for that aggregate of economic, social, cultural, sport-oriented, recreational, professional, and political expressions to which people spontaneously give life and which make it possible for them to achieve effective social growth." (Compendium, No. 185)

"Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institutional, or juridical assistance offered to lesser social entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implications that require the State to refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells of society. Their initiative, freedom, and responsibility must not be supplanted." (Compendium, No. 186)

The principal of subsidiarity is a bulwark against abuse of power. It "protects people from abuses by higher-level social authority and calls on these same authorities to help individuals and intermediate groups to fulfill their duties." (Compendium, No. 187)

Concretely, the principle of subsidiarity, when put into effect, will result in the following:

1. "respect and effective promotion of the human person and family"
2. "ever greater appreciation of associations and intermediate organizations in their fundamental choices and in those that cannot be delegated to or exercised by others."
3. "the encouragement of private initiate so that ever social entity remains at the service of the common good, each with its own distinctive characteristics"
   
4. "the presence of pluralism in society and due representation of its vital components"
5. "safeguarding the rights of minorities"
6. "bringing about bureaucratic and administrative decentralization"
7. "striking a balance between the public and private spheres, with the resulting recognition of the social function of the private sphere"
8. "appropriate methods for making citizens more responsible in actively 'being a part' of the political and social reality of their country."
   

(Compendium, No. 187)

The flip-side of the principle of subsidiarity is participation. Participation is defined as "a series of activities by means of which the citizen, either as an individual or in association with others, whether directly or through representation, contributes to the cultural, economic, political, and social life of the civil community to which he belongs." (Compendium, No. 189) Participation is to be encouraged and fostered so that people exercise responsibility, participate in all areas of social life, and contribute to the common good.

Bureaucracy, monopoly, privilege, red-tape, excessive regulation are all enemies of participation. Cultural, legal, bureaucratic, attitudinal, and social obstacles to active participation of persons is something that ought to be removed through education or other means.

Though participation is important in any society, it plays a particularly significant role and enjoys a notable vibrant color in democratic societies since by definition,"every democracy must be participative." Participation is, as the Compendium puts it, "one of the pillars of all democratic orders and one of the major guarantees of the permanence of the democratic system." (Compendium, No. 190)

On the other hand, totalitarian or dictatorial regimes de jure deny the public the right to participate in public life outside the confines, supervision, or control of the State since they view a free people as a threat to their power. Somewhere between democracy and totalitarianism is that form of government we see entirely too often in the modern world: one that stifles participation through the heavy bureaucratic machinery and regulations which can sap the citizenry of its creativity and result in de facto or practical denial of the right to participation.
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*The word "subsidarity" in fact comes from the Latin term subsidium, when means help, aid, or assistance.
**Grapheocratia is modern Latin for bureaucracy. See Walter Redmond's Glossarium Anglico-Latinum (s.v. "burocracy" [sic])
***Distributism is an economic philosophy that was formulated and promoted by such Catholic thinkers as G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc as an effort to apply the principles of Catholic social teaching articulated by the Catholic Church, in particular in Pope Leo XIII's social encyclical Rerum Novarum and Pope Pius XI's social encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. Distributism advocates that the ownership of the means of production ought to be distributed as widely as possible among the population, and that it ought not be centralized either under the control of the state (which yields State Socialism) nor under the control of a few large businesses or wealthy men (e.g., laissez-faire capitalism). Distributism, however, is for free markets and private property. It wishes as many as possible to participate in the economic life and the means of production. Perhaps the best summary of distributism can be found in Chesterton's quip: "Too much capitalism does not mean too many capitalists, but too few capitalists." G. K. Chesterton, The Superstition of Divorce (New York: John Lane Company, 1920), 47.

Property is Yours, Mine, and Ours

WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY, the Church's social doctrine balances two principles: the universal destination of goods and the right to private ownership. As a matter of natural law, the Church recognizes that there is such a thing as private property, that property may be divided into "mine" and "yours." How else, for example, could one justify the divine Commandments which are at the same time one of natural law, "You shall not steal" and "You shall not covet your neighbor's goods"?

At the same time, all property, whether it is "mine" or "yours," is in a different and yet real sense also "ours," or, in the words the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, has a "universal destination" to the common good. Ultimately, the notion of the "universal destination" of all goods comes from the Lord's dominion over all property, including that property which is "mine" and "yours." "The earth is the Lord's, and everything in it." (Psalm 24:1; 1 Cor. 10:26) "The principle of the universal destination of goods is an affirmation of God's full and perennial lordship over every reality and of the requirement that the goods of creation remain ever destined to the development of the whole person and of all humanity." (Compendium, No. 177)

The right to private property, though "sacred and inviolable" as Leo XIII stated,* is not therefore absolute. If it were absolute, private property could be owned and used in complete disregard of obligation to God and to our neighbor. And if that were true, no one could complain of the inhumanity, not to mention the injustice and lack of charity, of the rich man who sits on his hoard of bread while those around him starve. Yet to chastise that sort of behavior is exactly what St. John and St. James and most of us would naturally do. "He who has the goods of this world and sees his brother in need and closes his heart to him, how does the love of God abide in him?" (1 John 3:17) "If a brother or a sister be naked and in want of daily food and one of you say to them, 'Go in peace, be warm and filled,' yet you do not give them what is necessary for the body, what does it profit?" (James 2:15-16) Who but the Midases of this world would not add their voices to this?

The Parable of Dives and Lazarus
Codex Aureus Epternacensis (Goldenes Evangeliar) ca. 1035-40 A.D.

Both James and John seem implicitly to be referring to Jesus' parable of the relationship between the rich man and the beggar Lazarus. Aren't their complaints against the rich for their misuse of property in disregard of the poor the same fault that Jesus placed upon the rich man who disregarded Lazarus? None of the statements of Sts. John and James or nothing of Jesus' parable would make sense to us if we did not already recognize that the poor have some moral claim upon our private property. This moral claim comes from our implicit awareness of the "universal destination" of goods.

Private property must never be absolutized, for it then becomes an idol, an end, and not a means. "Those people and societies that go so far as to absolutize the role of property end up experiencing the bitterest type of slavery. . . . Owners who heedlessly idolize their goods. . . become owned and enslaved by them. Only by recognizing that these goods are dependent on God the Creator and then directing their use to the common good, is it possible to give material goods their proper function as useful tools for the growth of individuals and peoples." (Compendium, No. 181)

Private ownership of property does not absolve us from using that property in a morally right way. "The universal destination of goods entails obligations on how goods are to be used by their legitimate owners." (Compendium, No. 178) There are obvious moral duties associated with private ownership, and these moral duties have reference to the common good, and in particular the poor. Because of these moral duties, the right to private property is relative, not absolute, and the common good has a claim on it. Yet again the existence of these moral duties attendant to property ownership does not mean that all property is owned in common, and we have no right to private ownership.

Some ways to understand the interaction between private ownership of property and property's "universal destination" are along the lines of thinking of the latter as a sort of mortgage, claim, limitation, or trust. Private property has a sort of covenant or limitation that runs with it, what John Paul II in his Encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis--drawing from prior teaching even as far back as St. Ambrose and the Apostle John**--called a "social mortgage." Private property, while truly owned by individuals, is held in trust for the common good. Though the property may be "mine," it never quite loses its tie to the common good, to its "universal destination" to which the "mine" is answerable.

The notion of the universal destination of goods is based upon the notion that in its original grant to mankind of the world, "God gave the earth," not to any one man or group of men to the exclusion of others, but "to the whole human race for the sustenance of all its members, without excluding or favoring anyone." (Compendium, No. 171) There is therefore an original "universal right to use the goods of the earth," a "right to common use," which leaves its imprint on all property, even that property privately owned. This original grant survives the matrix of private property. There is therefore always a residue of claim, this "social mortgage," in any property privately owned that requires all property to be "shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity." (Compendium, No. 171) It is this residue of a claim that is the source of moral obligations we may have--above that of pure self interest--in the use of our property.

But one should not understand this notion of the universal destination of goods as a denial of the the natural right to private ownership of goods, of which the Church has been a great defender against the ideologies of Communism and Socialism. Pope Leo XIII could not have been more clear: "The fact that God has given the earth for the use and enjoyment of the whole human race can in no way be a bar to the owning of private property." (Rerum novarum, No. 8)

The Church has made it clear that the universal destination of goods is not a right to common ownership. "Universal destination and utilization of goods does not mean that everything is at the disposal of each person or of all people, or that the same object may be useful or belong to each person or of all people." (Compendium, No. 173) The Church "excludes recourse to forms of 'common and promiscuous dominion.'"*** (Compendium, No. 176) In other words, it is wrong to think that this universal destination of goods allows one to disrespect the natural right of private ownership and the human institutions and variety of positive laws that govern or clarify those rights.

Therefore, the universal destination of goods does not justify the wrongful taking of private property--whether by individuals or governments--even if it be purportedly for the common good. It is, rather, depending upon the circumstances, a sort of more or less loose or strict limitation, burden, "mortgage," or claim upon the private owner's use of the property he owns. In making use of his property, the private owner cannot disregard this universal destination. Ultimately, private property has something more than a mere private function: it has a social function, a social role.

At the same time, private property should not be viewed as an end, but it is a means--and by all measures the most efficient means--to implement the universal destination of goods. "Private property, in fact, regardless of the concrete forms of regulations and juridical norms relative to it, is in the essence only an instrument for respecting the principle of the universal destination of goods; in the final analysis, therefore, it is not an end but a means." (Compendium, No. 177)

The notion of the universal destination of goods includes not only natural goods, such as land, minerals, and their fruit and products, but derived goods: those obtained through our labor or our ingenuity. It includes what the Compendium calls "new goods," goods engendered by "knowledge, technology, and know-how." (Compendium, No. 179) Therefore, it also includes credit, financial instruments and money, intellectual property such as technology and scientific knowledge, which too often is overly protected by positive laws giving rise to monopolies and other barriers that prevent this knowledge from being being fairly at the disposal of all mankind. When, for example, does a huge pharmaceutical company's right to charge an exorbitant price for the formula of a drug that can cure the ills of mankind end? Do the sick not have some claim upon it? There is something unpalatable about having the the secret to reduce our neighbor's suffering, and refusing to share it unless someone puts a lot of money in one's pocket.

It is this social mortgage which justifies, for example, taxes on private property by the public authorities so that it may be used to assure that all citizens have access to basic social services such as food, shelter, healthcare, education, security, and so forth, to the extent that they are unable to provide these for themselves from the property that they have or the labor of their bodies. It is also what is behind the justification for eminent domain powers or what justifies the State's right to regulate the use of our property.

The universal destination of the goods has a particular force when it pertains to the poor, the hungry, the needy, the homeless, those without adequate health care, and those whose life seems hopeless for want of any goods requisite for human flourishing. "The principle of the universal destination of goods requires that the poor, the marginalized, and in all cases those whose living conditions interfere with their proper growth should be the focus of particular concern." (Compendium, No. 182)

Poverty, however, is not only material poverty. It includes cultural, religious, and spiritual poverty. (Compendium, No.184)

While it may be true that the poor will, until Christ's second coming, always be with us, the poor are to be viewed as a sacred trust. Our treatment of the world's poor will be a standard by which we will be judged. (Compendium, No. 183; cf. Matt.25:31-46) The poor are to be loved, and they exert a "special form of primacy" in the exercise of our charity and in our considerations of what is just. (Compendium, No. 182)

The preferential option for the poor and the urgent claim it has on our conscience, in both charity and justice, and in the proper use of our goods is perhaps best summarized by the 6th century Pope St. Gregory the Great (ca.540-604):

When we attend to the needs of those in want, we give them what is their, not ours. More than performing works of mercy, we are paying a debt of justice.

Nam cum qualibet necessaria indigentibus ministramus, sua illis reddimus, non nostra largimur; iustitae potius debitum solvimus.

Regula Pastoralis, 3,21: PL 77,87.


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*Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, No. 40.
**St. John and St. Ambrose are quoted by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Populorum progressio: "He who has the goods of this world and sees his brother in need and closes his heart to him, how does the love of God abide in him?" [1 John 3:17] Everyone knows that the Fathers of the Church laid down the duty of the rich toward the poor in no uncertain terms. As St. Ambrose put it: 'You are not making a gift of what is yours to the poor man, but you are giving him back what is his. You have been appropriating things that are meant to be for the common use of everyone. The earth belongs to everyone, not to the rich.' [De Nabute, c. 12, n. 53: PL 14. 747] These words indicate that the right to private property is not absolute and unconditional."
***The Compendium erroneously cites to Leo XIII's Rerum novarum, 11, for this phrase. In fact, the phrase shows up in section 7 of the Italian version of Rerum novarum (poiché quel dono egli lo fece a tutti, non perché ognuno ne avesse un comune e promiscuo dominio, bensì in quanto non assegnò nessuna parte del suolo determinatamente ad alcuno, lasciando ciò all'industria degli uomini e al diritto speciale dei popoli.). In the English translation, it is found in paragraph 8, not translated as "common and promiscuous," but translated thus: "For God has granted the earth to mankind in general, not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they like, but rather that no part of it was assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man's own industry, and by the laws of individual races." The Latin text of this phrase is found in Paragraph 7: "Deus enim generi hominum donavisse terram in commune dicitur, non quod eius promiscuum apud omnes dominatum voluerit, sed quia partem nullam cuique assignavit possidendam, industriae hominum institutisque populorum permissa privatarum possessionum descriptione." I would translate the Latin thus: "For God granted the earth to humankind in common, that is to say, not in the sense that it may be promiscuously handled by all as they desire, but rather that no part was assigned to any one in particular, leaving the assignment and limits of private possession to be determined through man's industry and and through the various people's institutions and laws."