THE AMBROSIAN SPIN ON the Platonic-Stoic notion of the virtues, and his denomination of the four principle virtues as "cardinal" proved to be popular. So we find the Ambrosian teaching adopted by other Church fathers, including such ecclesiastical lights such as St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and Pope St. Gregory the Great. Whether they adopted the notion directly from Ambrose or whether they arrived at the conclusion that there was a compatibility of the Stoic teaching with Christian doctrine independently is difficult to establish.
St. Jerome clearly believed in the unity of the four virtues that St. Ambrose identified as cardinal. In an epistle to Paulina (dated 397 A.D.), St. Jerome states: "The Stoics say the four virtues are closely connected to each other and mutually conjoined that whoever does not have one, lacks all."* Contextually, it is clear that St. Jerome is mentioning the Stoic doctrine with approval. St. Jerome likened the four virtues to the "law" of St. James, who in his epistle (James 2:10) had stated that he who keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is guilty of failing the law in its entirety. In a manner redolent of St. James, St. Jerome therefore understood that "whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all."
St. Augustine elaborated on the Ambrosian notion of the virtues to a much larger extent than St. Jerome. R. E. Houser states that it was St. Augustine who drew "the full logical and rhetorical consequences of the Ambrosian doctrine" of the cardinal virtues. Houser, 37. For example, in his On the Practices of the Catholic Church (De moribus ecclesiae), St. Augustine stated that the Catholic moral practices (mores) depend upon two commandments, the commandments of love of God and love of neighbor, and that therefore the moral virtues may be defined in terms of love.
Pope St. Gregory the Great also adopted the Ambrosian synthesis in his great work on Christian morals, the Moralia on Job. Pope St. Gregory analogized the virtues to the Beatitudes, and likewise came to the conclusion that all virtues stood or fell together:
The all-or-nothing view of virtues does no seem entirely satisfactory since it does not seem to be in full accord with our experience. There seem to be a whole mass of men who are neither saints nor inveterate sinners, and it is difficult to believe that there is no such thing as authentic virtue even among the imperfect. Similarly, there seems to be no sense of infused virtue versus acquired virtue, a distinction which was to arise during the middle ages.
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*Quatuor virtutes describunt Stoici, ita sibi invicem nexas, et mutuo cohaerentes, ut qui unam non habuerit, omnibus careat: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. Has omnes sic habetis singuli, ut tamen emineatis in singulis. Ep. 66.3 (ad Pammachium).
**Itaque illas quattuor virtutes, quarum utinam ita in mentibus vis ut nomina in ore sunt omnium, sic etiam definire non dubitem, ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. Sed hunc amorem non cuiuslibet sed Dei esse diximus, id est summi boni, summae sapientiae summaeque concordiae.
***Una virtus sine aliis, aut nulla est, aut minima.---Hoc autem primum sciendum est, quia quisquis virtute aliqua pollere creditur, tunc veraciter pollet, cum vitiis ex alia parte non subiacet. Nam si ex alio vitiis subditur, nec hoc est solidum, ubi stare putabatur. Unaquaeque enim virtus tanto minor est, quanto desunt caeterae: Nam saepe quosdam pudicos quidem vidisse nos contigit, sed non humiles; quosdam vero quasi humiles, sed non misericordes; quosdam quasi misericordes, sed nequaquam iustos; quosdam vero quasi iustos, sed in se potius quam in Domino confidentes. Et certum est quia nec castitas in eius corde vera est, cui humilitas deest, quippe quia superbia se intrinsecus corrumpente fornicatur, si semetipsum diligens, a divino recedit amore. Nec humilitas vera est cui misericordia iuncta non est, quia nec debet humilitas dici, quae ad compassionem fraternae miseriae nescit inclinari. Nec misericordia vera est quae a rectitudine iustitiae existit aliena, quia quae potest per iniustitiam pollui, nescit procul dubio sibimetipsi misereri. Nec iustitia vera est quae fiduciam suam non in conditore omnium, sed in se fortasse, aut in rebus conditis ponit, quia dum a creatore spem subtrahit, ipse sibi principalis iustitiae ordinem pervertit. Una itaque virtus sine aliis, aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Ut enim, sicut quibusdam visum est, de primis quatuor virtutibus loquar, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudine, atque iustitia; tanto perfectae sunt singulae, quanto vicissim sibimet coniunctae. Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.
St. Jerome clearly believed in the unity of the four virtues that St. Ambrose identified as cardinal. In an epistle to Paulina (dated 397 A.D.), St. Jerome states: "The Stoics say the four virtues are closely connected to each other and mutually conjoined that whoever does not have one, lacks all."* Contextually, it is clear that St. Jerome is mentioning the Stoic doctrine with approval. St. Jerome likened the four virtues to the "law" of St. James, who in his epistle (James 2:10) had stated that he who keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is guilty of failing the law in its entirety. In a manner redolent of St. James, St. Jerome therefore understood that "whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all."
St. Augustine elaborated on the Ambrosian notion of the virtues to a much larger extent than St. Jerome. R. E. Houser states that it was St. Augustine who drew "the full logical and rhetorical consequences of the Ambrosian doctrine" of the cardinal virtues. Houser, 37. For example, in his On the Practices of the Catholic Church (De moribus ecclesiae), St. Augustine stated that the Catholic moral practices (mores) depend upon two commandments, the commandments of love of God and love of neighbor, and that therefore the moral virtues may be defined in terms of love.
But if virtue leads us to the happy life, I would say that virtue altogether is nothing other than the highest love of God. For what is called fourfold virtue is named, so far as I can tell, from certain varied affections of love itself.
Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur.De mor. eccl., 15.25. By attaching the four cardinal virtues to love, St. Augustine was able to unify them, indeed reduce them to love, so that there were not four separate virtues, but one "fourfold virtue," four manifestations of charity.** This shows a big distinction between the pagan notion of virtue (e.g., Socrates reducing them all to knowledge) and the Christian notion (reducing them all to love).
Pope St. Gregory the Great also adopted the Ambrosian synthesis in his great work on Christian morals, the Moralia on Job. Pope St. Gregory analogized the virtues to the Beatitudes, and likewise came to the conclusion that all virtues stood or fell together:
[P]erfected virtues can in no way be disjoined, because there is not true prudence which is not just, temperate, and brave; nor perfected temperance which is not brave, just, and prudent; nor integral fortitude which is not prudent, temperate, and just; nor true justice which is not prudent, brave, and temperate.
Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.Moralia in Job, 22.1.2***
The all-or-nothing view of virtues does no seem entirely satisfactory since it does not seem to be in full accord with our experience. There seem to be a whole mass of men who are neither saints nor inveterate sinners, and it is difficult to believe that there is no such thing as authentic virtue even among the imperfect. Similarly, there seems to be no sense of infused virtue versus acquired virtue, a distinction which was to arise during the middle ages.
____________________________________________
*Quatuor virtutes describunt Stoici, ita sibi invicem nexas, et mutuo cohaerentes, ut qui unam non habuerit, omnibus careat: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. Has omnes sic habetis singuli, ut tamen emineatis in singulis. Ep. 66.3 (ad Pammachium).
**Itaque illas quattuor virtutes, quarum utinam ita in mentibus vis ut nomina in ore sunt omnium, sic etiam definire non dubitem, ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. Sed hunc amorem non cuiuslibet sed Dei esse diximus, id est summi boni, summae sapientiae summaeque concordiae.
***Una virtus sine aliis, aut nulla est, aut minima.---Hoc autem primum sciendum est, quia quisquis virtute aliqua pollere creditur, tunc veraciter pollet, cum vitiis ex alia parte non subiacet. Nam si ex alio vitiis subditur, nec hoc est solidum, ubi stare putabatur. Unaquaeque enim virtus tanto minor est, quanto desunt caeterae: Nam saepe quosdam pudicos quidem vidisse nos contigit, sed non humiles; quosdam vero quasi humiles, sed non misericordes; quosdam quasi misericordes, sed nequaquam iustos; quosdam vero quasi iustos, sed in se potius quam in Domino confidentes. Et certum est quia nec castitas in eius corde vera est, cui humilitas deest, quippe quia superbia se intrinsecus corrumpente fornicatur, si semetipsum diligens, a divino recedit amore. Nec humilitas vera est cui misericordia iuncta non est, quia nec debet humilitas dici, quae ad compassionem fraternae miseriae nescit inclinari. Nec misericordia vera est quae a rectitudine iustitiae existit aliena, quia quae potest per iniustitiam pollui, nescit procul dubio sibimetipsi misereri. Nec iustitia vera est quae fiduciam suam non in conditore omnium, sed in se fortasse, aut in rebus conditis ponit, quia dum a creatore spem subtrahit, ipse sibi principalis iustitiae ordinem pervertit. Una itaque virtus sine aliis, aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Ut enim, sicut quibusdam visum est, de primis quatuor virtutibus loquar, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudine, atque iustitia; tanto perfectae sunt singulae, quanto vicissim sibimet coniunctae. Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.
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