WE CANNOT APPROACH THE QUESTIONS we have posed in our prior posting about the invincible ignorance of the natural law without some sort of distinctions being made as a preliminary to addressing the answers.
We are wont to say that the natural law is innate, that it is impressed upon the very nature of man, and in a manner of speaking it is. But in a manner of speaking it is not. The natural law is not innate in the sense that Plato or Descartes understood innate knowledge to be, as knowledge preexisting in the mind of man. Like all human knowledge, we come to the knowledge of the natural law largely by observation, by experience, though the observation and experience includes both internal assessments (e.g., conscience) as well as external assessments (e.g., bodily needs, needs of the social good) and the use of reason. Our senses must look both inward and outward, be informed by the realities of life, and then we must apply reason to these observations to obtain knowledge of this law. It is, moreover, a law that can be taught intellectually, learned through character or behavior (that is by culture, or individual virtue), which suggests that it is a work of reason, not of mere innate disposition.
There is, however, a certain innateness regarding the law, but this innateness is tendential, inclinatory, not fully intellectual, though it certainly is not irrational. It means, simply, that "man, like all other creatures, must tend to his end according to laws bound up with his very nature." Bertke, 15.* When we say that the natural law is innate, we mean only that "man, like every other creature, tends to his end according to laws which agree with his nature." Bertke, 15. These inclinations, of course, would involve man as body-and-rational-soul.
But the natural law, though it is this innate tendency, is also more than this innate tendency of man-wanting-to-reach-his-end, this entelechy. The natural law is, as St. Thomas puts it, aliquid rationis, "something of reason," or aliquid pertinens ad rationem, "something pertaining to reason.** It is, as he further clarifies, something "established by reason," in fact a "work of reason," an opus rationis, "just as the proposition is a work of reason."*** The natural law, then, is clearly something more than innate tendency, disposition, or inclination though it is also includes this tendency, disposition, or inclination. The natural law is not solely a proposition of reason without tie to the tendencies, dispositions, or inclinations in man that are part of his innate nature. "A careful reading of St. Thomas reveals that the essence of the natural law may be understood in a sense that protects both its innate character in the strict sense of the word, and at the same time does not sacrifice the relation of the intellect to being." Bertke, 16.
Several commentators of St. Thomas have tried to understand the innatism in natural law with the realism in natural law by distinguishing three elements in the essence of natural law. They observe that St. Thomas Aquinas appears sometimes to refer to the natural law as innate, at other times he seems to see it as something relating to the application of practical reason and propositional, and though natural, not innate. Sometimes he seems to see it both natural an innate.† As a consequence, they distinguish three elements of the Thomistic teaching of the natural law, all of which combine to be part of the natural law in its essence:
Bertke, 19 (quoting from St. Thomas's Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Book VI, Lecture 2, n. 8 (rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica).
Bertke sums up the three elements in the essence of the natural law thus:
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*Rev. Stanley Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1941) (hereinafter "Bertke").
**S.T. IaIIae, q. 90, art. 1, s. c. & c.
***S.T. IaIIae, q. 93, art. 1. (lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis).
†Bertke cites to the work of Walter Farrell, The Natural Moral Law (Ditchling: St. Dominic's Press, 1930), 82-103 and Henricus Benedictus Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis (Paris: Desclee), T.1, 227. For examples where St. Thomas treats the natural law as something innate, Bertke (pp. 16-18) quotes the following:
As an example of natural law in the second sense, the following example is given:
[Id.]
As an example of natural law in the third sense:
Finally, as an example of all three elements together, Bertke cites the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas:
†The terms "actus primus" and "actus secundus," literally prime actuality and secondary actuality, respectively, are scholastic terms in Latin. The term actus means a determination, complement, perfection, an actuality. The actus primus, then, is the first such actuality that begins another actuality or series of actualities or upon which a subsequent actuality or series of further actualities is founded. These second actualities are the acta secunda (singular, "actus secundus"). Since the actus secundus does not come into play until after the actus primus, the actus secundus may be said to be in potentiality relative to the actus primus. As the conclusion to C. A. Dubray's treatment of it in the Catholic Encyclopedia (1913, s.v. "actus primus") notes:
We are wont to say that the natural law is innate, that it is impressed upon the very nature of man, and in a manner of speaking it is. But in a manner of speaking it is not. The natural law is not innate in the sense that Plato or Descartes understood innate knowledge to be, as knowledge preexisting in the mind of man. Like all human knowledge, we come to the knowledge of the natural law largely by observation, by experience, though the observation and experience includes both internal assessments (e.g., conscience) as well as external assessments (e.g., bodily needs, needs of the social good) and the use of reason. Our senses must look both inward and outward, be informed by the realities of life, and then we must apply reason to these observations to obtain knowledge of this law. It is, moreover, a law that can be taught intellectually, learned through character or behavior (that is by culture, or individual virtue), which suggests that it is a work of reason, not of mere innate disposition.
There is, however, a certain innateness regarding the law, but this innateness is tendential, inclinatory, not fully intellectual, though it certainly is not irrational. It means, simply, that "man, like all other creatures, must tend to his end according to laws bound up with his very nature." Bertke, 15.* When we say that the natural law is innate, we mean only that "man, like every other creature, tends to his end according to laws which agree with his nature." Bertke, 15. These inclinations, of course, would involve man as body-and-rational-soul.
But the natural law, though it is this innate tendency, is also more than this innate tendency of man-wanting-to-reach-his-end, this entelechy. The natural law is, as St. Thomas puts it, aliquid rationis, "something of reason," or aliquid pertinens ad rationem, "something pertaining to reason.** It is, as he further clarifies, something "established by reason," in fact a "work of reason," an opus rationis, "just as the proposition is a work of reason."*** The natural law, then, is clearly something more than innate tendency, disposition, or inclination though it is also includes this tendency, disposition, or inclination. The natural law is not solely a proposition of reason without tie to the tendencies, dispositions, or inclinations in man that are part of his innate nature. "A careful reading of St. Thomas reveals that the essence of the natural law may be understood in a sense that protects both its innate character in the strict sense of the word, and at the same time does not sacrifice the relation of the intellect to being." Bertke, 16.
Several commentators of St. Thomas have tried to understand the innatism in natural law with the realism in natural law by distinguishing three elements in the essence of natural law. They observe that St. Thomas Aquinas appears sometimes to refer to the natural law as innate, at other times he seems to see it as something relating to the application of practical reason and propositional, and though natural, not innate. Sometimes he seems to see it both natural an innate.† As a consequence, they distinguish three elements of the Thomistic teaching of the natural law, all of which combine to be part of the natural law in its essence:
- the natural inclinations;
- the faculty of reason; and
- the proposition of reason.
[T]he superiority of the proposition of reason does not obviate the necessity of the natural inclinations and the light of reason, for the proposition depends for its all-important right ordaining of actions to the end on its conformity with the inclinations. Thought the correct aligning of the inclinations in relation to the means depends on the practical intellect, "the relation to the natural inclination is the measure of truth in the practical reason."
Bertke, 19 (quoting from St. Thomas's Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Book VI, Lecture 2, n. 8 (rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica).
Bertke sums up the three elements in the essence of the natural law thus:
Summing up this doctrine on the essence of the natural law it can be said that the proposition of reason [the third element] pertains to the essence in "actu secundo,"† or as presupposing the other two elements [the natural inclinations and the faculty of reason], while the inclinations and the light of reason pertain to the essence in "actu primo,"† or as necessarily presupposed by the proposition of reason.Bertke, 19 (citing to Merkelbach, 227).
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*Rev. Stanley Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1941) (hereinafter "Bertke").
**S.T. IaIIae, q. 90, art. 1, s. c. & c.
***S.T. IaIIae, q. 93, art. 1. (lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis).
†Bertke cites to the work of Walter Farrell, The Natural Moral Law (Ditchling: St. Dominic's Press, 1930), 82-103 and Henricus Benedictus Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis (Paris: Desclee), T.1, 227. For examples where St. Thomas treats the natural law as something innate, Bertke (pp. 16-18) quotes the following:
Wherefore it (human nature) has a share in the Eternal Reason whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.[Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co.]
Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur.
As an example of natural law in the second sense, the following example is given:
Thus implying that the light of natural reason whereby we discern what is good and what is evil which is the function of the natural law is nothing else than the imprint of the divine light [being the faculty of reason].
[Q]uasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis.
[Id.]
As an example of natural law in the third sense:
Hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.[Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 2]
[I]deo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.
Finally, as an example of all three elements together, Bertke cites the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas:
[L]aw, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (Article 1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations [element 1] to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others [element 3, as it requires propositional reason]. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end [element 1]: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason [element 2], whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.[Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co.]
[L]ex, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo, uno modo, sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.
†The terms "actus primus" and "actus secundus," literally prime actuality and secondary actuality, respectively, are scholastic terms in Latin. The term actus means a determination, complement, perfection, an actuality. The actus primus, then, is the first such actuality that begins another actuality or series of actualities or upon which a subsequent actuality or series of further actualities is founded. These second actualities are the acta secunda (singular, "actus secundus"). Since the actus secundus does not come into play until after the actus primus, the actus secundus may be said to be in potentiality relative to the actus primus. As the conclusion to C. A. Dubray's treatment of it in the Catholic Encyclopedia (1913, s.v. "actus primus") notes:
And this is the most frequent application of the terms actus primus and actus secundus. The former is the faculty; the latter, the exercise, or function. To see in actu primo simply means to have the sense of vision; to see in actu secundo is to actually perform acts of vision. The modern distinction of potential and kinetic energy might serve as another illustration: the loaded gun, or the engine with steam up represent first actualities; the bullet speeding to the mark, the engine flying over the rails, represent second actualities.
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