Angilbert (fl. ca. 840/50), On the Battle Which was Fought at Fontenoy

The Law of Christians is broken,
Blood by the hands of hell profusely shed like rain,
And the throat of Cerberus bellows songs of joy.

Angelbertus, Versus de Bella que fuit acta Fontaneto

Fracta est lex christianorum
Sanguinis proluvio, unde manus inferorum,
gaudet gula Cerberi.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Cardinal Virtues as Acquired

IN THE FOURTH QUESTION DEALING WITH virtues in Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono, we confront the question of whether the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are infused or not infused but instead acquired (or "political").  If infused, then Philip asks whether they might be called divine virtues.

In answering this question, Philip the Chancellor distinguishes between justice and the other three virtues.  With respect to those virtues other than justice, Philip the Chancellor does not see these three of the four cardinal virtues as "divine."  The reason for this position is that the description "divine" does not make reference to "the principle 'from which' something comes," but rather "to the term 'to which' something leads."  In other words, "divine" as used in reference to virtue, speaks of the terminus ad quem, and not the terminus a quo.

"Since these cardinal virtues [of prudence, temperance, and fortitude] concern what leads up to our end (ad finem), but not into our end (in finem), namely God, they should not be called divine."  In short, Philip the Chancellor appears to take the position that these three cardinal virtues are acquired, or human, virtues, and not infused.*  (Houser, 50).

Justice surrounded by the other virtues, by Domenico Beccafumi

Justice, however, is different.  "Justice . . . which  orders things to our end holds a middle place [between the three other cardinal virtues and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity] and therefore can be called both human and divine, since it orders things to our end."

Another question that Philip addresses is this: if the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity--which are directly and intrinsically related to our end, the finis ultimus, God, then why aren't these three virtues called "cardinal," since it would appear that these three theological or divine virtues are the hinges upon which    our destiny depends.

However, Philip responds to this last issue by observing that the virtues that are called cardinal are called cardinal not in relation to the theological virtues, but rather in relation to virtues other than the theological.

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*This takes Philip out of what would become the majority or at least the Thomistic view, and that is that these virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are of two kinds: acquired (or human or political) and, in the Christian, also infused.  There are then acquired cardinal virtues which are available to all men, and, in the baptized, infused cardinal virtues.



Monday, October 22, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Cardinal Virtues--Why Four?

IN HIS THIRD QUESTION dealing with the virtues in his Summa de bono, Philip the Chancellor asks the question why the four virtues identified as prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice--and not "other virtues" with "their own proper acts different from the acts of these virtues"--are called cardinal.

Philip offers three reasons why the four virtues are called cardinal virtues.  The first reason is "taken from their conditions, the second from the meaning of the term, and the third from their acts."

The four virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice are called cardinal from their conditions.  Drawing on St. Bernard's book On Consideration to Pope Eugenius (De Consideratione ad Eugenium Papam Libri V), Philip states the following:

For the existence (esse) of virtue four things are required: to now, to will, to persevere amid difficulties, and to attain the mean between excess and deficiency. But to now comes from prudence, to will from justice, to persevere from courage, and to attain the mean between excess and deficiency from temperance. Therefore, since some universal condition is touched upon there in each of these [virtues], they are rightly called cardinal, that is principal.

But, Philip notes, this argument of St. Bernard seems to prove too much since these conditions are present in all virtues (and not only the cardinal virtues), and this supported by Aristotle in his Ethics (2.4 [1105a31 ff]).  In response, however, Philip notes that this characteristic in the other virtues is shared with the cardinal virtues because the other virtues are in fact "reduced" to the cardinal virtues, "either as their parts or as their species or as their dispositions," and so these characteristics will be shared with the cardinal virtues of which these other virtues stem from.  All other virtues are subsidiary to the cardinal virtues, as the cardinal virtues are the "principal or initiating virtues."  Drawing from On Rest for the Mind by a certain unidentified Harold, the cardinal virtues (which are required for the health of the soul) are compared to the needs of the body, and that author concludes: "As there are four element for the health of the body, so are found four bases for the virtues of the soul."


The second reason why the identified virtues are called cardinal stems from the meaning of the term cardinal. As Philip summarizes this reason:

For cardinal comes from cardo, the hinge on which a door turns. Now there are two things by means of which we enter into life: actions and passions. What is said in Matt. 19:17 concerns actions: "If you would enter life, keep the commandments," that is, act according to the commandments; and Acts 14:22 concerns passions: "through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God." Two virtues are taken based on actions: prudence with regard to actions as they concern us, justice with regard to actions as they concern our neighbor. Tow other virtues are taken based on passions, concerning passions in us and natural to us is temperance, concerning passions introduced by others is courage.
The reason why there are four cardinal virtues "comes from their acts," Philip says.  Again, we might simply quote Philip's treatment of this entire:

The acts of these virtues are principal because they are acts of the three primary motive powers in relation to those things which lead to our end (ad finem). For the act of reasoning is to distinguish between the good which leads to that end and the bad which leads away from that end, or between two goods, to distinguish which of them leads more to the end, or two bad things, which of them leads more away from that end. Also, the principal act of the power of desire in relation to those things which lead to our end is to will the changeable good to exist under the highest good, which pertains to temperance. Also the principal act of the power of emotion in relation to those things which lead to our end is to confront the arduous, which is frightening to confront and difficult to withstand, and this pertains to courage. But the act of justice is to order all these to our proximate end and this is an act in relation to all the powers, not just one. Therefore, for this reason they are called cardinal or principal, because they are the primary acts of the powers acting in those things which lead to our end, namely, God.

Philip the Chancellor interposes an objection to naming the four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice the cardinal virtues.  Since pride is the primary vice (as Ecclesiastes 10:15 states, "Pride is the beginning of all sin") it would seem that humility is the primary virtue, and therefore there is but one cardinal virtue, and that is humility.

In answering this objection, Philip distinguishes between pride as a love of one's own excellence and pride as one's own good.  The former is a power of the emotions and is not the beginning of sin; consequently, the humility opposed to it will not be a principal virtue.  The latter, however, is the beginning of all sin since it is equivalent to contempt for the commandments.  Therefore the love of one's self as one's own good is the source of all sin.  Similarly, the love of the highest good (the summum bonum, God) is the beginning of every cardinal virtue.  It seems, then, that Philip suggests that the cardinal virtues are all clothed with humility since both humility and the cardinal virtues have love of God in view.  Humility and the cardinal virtues therefore have God as their final cause.

That humility and the four cardinal virtues have God as their final cause would seem to lead to another problem since that would make the cardinal virtues enter into the bailiwick of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which also have God as their end.  But as Philip will later distinguish, the cardinal virtues "concern what leads up to our end, but not into our end, namely God."  It is the theological virtues which take us all the way "into" God and heaven, whereas the cardinal virtues only "carry us along the road (via) toward God," though "they do have God in sight."  Houser, 49.

Having God as the cardinal virtues' end, then raises another question: that being whether the cardinal virtues are acquired or infused.  If acquired, it seems that perhaps God is something attained through human effort, which seems to suggest a Pelagianism.  If infused, the cardinal virtues then seem to be synonymous with the divine or theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.  Accordingly, Philip the Chancellor focuses on the distinctions between the cardinal virtues and he theological virtues and their quality of being infused rather than acquired.

Friday, October 19, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Ordering the Virtues

WHAT IS THE ORDER BETWEEN the various virtues? Is there any virtue that is preeminent? Is there any hierarchy that orders them? How do they interrelate? These are the subjects of the second question on the virtues in the Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor.

Once again, before giving his answer, Philip the Chancellor reviews some authorities regarding this for possible answers.  He notes that scriptural glosses on the second chapter of Genesis and on 15:38 of the Gospel of Matthew [Gloss. margin. 5:271B] provide that prudence is first, then temperance, then courage, and finally justice.  Drawing on a cryptic numerology, for example, the gloss on the Gospel of Matthew (which addresses the miracle of Jesus and states that "those who ate were 4,000 men," meant by that number "the four virtues [each presumably being given the figure of 1,000] by which one lives correctly, prudence, temperance, courage, justice."  That same mysterious reference is found in the four rivers of Genesis.*

A different ordering of the virtues is given by St. Augustine in his book on the On the Customs of the Catholic Church.**  This order is followed by Isaac of Stella in his book On the Spirit and Soul.  Therein, temperance is first, then courage, followed by justice and prudence.

Looking for guidance to the book of Wisdom (8:7), we find temperance listed first, then followed by prudence, justice, and courage.

In his Ethics, Philip the Chancellor notes, Aristotle appears to list courage first, then chastity (temperance), then prudence, then justice.***  Cicero in his De Officiis lists prudence first, then justice, then temperance, and finally courage.†

With all this controverting authority, Philip the Chancellor offers his own answer.  To order the virtues, he finds that there is an underlying order "based on worth," a worth that is determined by reference to the powers of the rational soul.  Those powers that relate to the rational soul have more dignity than those that relate to the powers of desire and emotion which we share with the brute animals.  Viewed in this way, "prudence and justice, since they exist in the rational power, are prior by reason and the worth of their subject."  Between prudence and justice, prudence may be said to precede.  The reason for this, Philip states, is that prudence looks at the the good of the subject, whereas justice looks at the good of others. Yet there is a competing principle that also orders the virtues.  Those virtues that deal with the subject (the actor) have more dignity than those that relate to others.  From this perspective, prudence and temperance are more importance than courage and justice because they involve acts that relate to the subject while courage and justice relate to others.  Between courage and justice, justice might be said to follow courage because "the other powers and their acts are like materials in relations to it."  It appears, then, that Philip the Chancellor's opinion is that prudence is first, followed by temperance, followed by courage or fortitude, and finally, justice.

So we may summarize the various orders as follows:

Glossesprudence, temperance, courage, justice
St. Augustinetemperance, courage, justice, prudence
Wisdom 8:7temperance, prudence, justice, courage
Aristotlecourage, temperance, prudence, justice
Ciceroprudence, justice, temperance, courage
Philip the Chancellorprudence, temperance, courage, justice

Philip the Chancellor, then, seems to deviate from St. Augustine, Wisdom, Aristotle, and Cicero, and align himself with the Glosses, in adopting the prudence, temperance, courage, and justice ordering.

Philip the Chancellor justifies his deviation from St. Augustine by observing that St. Augustine views the virtues from the perspective of the pursuit of happiness, "the highest good," namely God.  The ordering he gives the virtues is based upon "their motive cause," "their end," or what is the same thing, "their motive cause."  Ultimately, love is what orders his virtues between themselves.  Since desire or love is St. Augustine's perspective, that virtue that orders desire--temperance--is first.  Courage must follow because the affective emotions relate to desire, which is the principle of love.  Love is only said to be in the power of reason in a "secondary way," and for that reason, the rational virtues of prudence and justice follow those relating to desire.  Since prudence is the most cognitive virtue, and that last tied to the "motive part of the soul," it follows that it should be ordered last when viewed from the order of love or desire, which is what St. Augustine does.

The ordering found in Wisdom is based upon the view that a sober soul (i.e., sobriety) is required for there to be a prudence soul (i.e., prudence).  The Scriptural view, according to Philip is reflected in Daniel 1:16-17, where the abstinence of youth is a precursor to the wisdom or prudence of the elderly.  Temperance, then, must precede prudence.  The reason why justice follows prudence in the Scriptural ordering is that "since it is the function of justice to render to each what is his, one first has to know what is his."  Courage is last because "justice concerns action in relation to neighbor, while courage concerns passions, and action is prior to passion."

Philip justifies his departure from Aristotle's ordering because Aristotle's ordering is based upon a precedence to be given to communal virtues before personal virtues.  Aristotle views courage as a civil or common virtue, and therefore puts it before chastity or temperance which is an individual virtue.  Prudence is placed before justice because it is a prerequisite to the communal virtue of justice.  Aristotle viewed that it was the "function of prudence to now what belongs to each, and the function of justice to render it so"  "The act of discerning what belongs to each," which is a task of prudence, "is prior to rendering to each his own."

Finally, Philip explains his departure from Cicero by observing that the Ciceronian order places prudence before justice (and those two before the other virtues) "because each is in the reasoning power."  Between justice and prudence, prudence takes precedence in Cicero's view "because [prudence] concerns us, while justice concerns the other.  Prudence is the reasoning power principally, and prudence knows what belongs to whom, which is the function of justice."  Temperance is placed before courage by Cicero "because temperance concerns good we should make use of, while courage concerns evils we should withstand."


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*See Philip the Chancellor: Virtues, How are They Four?
**As discussed in prior postings, this work was erroneously attributed to St. Augustine.
***Nic. Eth. 3.9, 13, 5.1, 6.5.
De off., 1.6-42, nn. 18-151.

Monday, October 15, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Different Perspectives of Virtue

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR is not content with the description of virtues as a sort of reasoned love or loving reason, an insight obtained by synthesizing Isaac of Stella and St. Augustine's observations on virtues. He also looks at the virtues from other perspectives in distinguishing the cardinal virtues from each other.

A distinction among the virtues can also be made by invoking the "three-fold law," the law of reason which leads to free choice, the law of "indigent" or unaided nature, and the "natural law of reason."  The distinctions Philip the Chancellor makes in his "three-fold law" is between utilitarian, experiential, and relational.

"The law of reason is found in choosing what is useful," says Philip the Chancellor.  It there is concerned with prudence.  "The law of indigent nature is found in making use of good and evil."  The use of temporal goods to sustain natural life brings in the virtue of temperance.  Our confrontation with bad temporal goods, whether "for experience or to cure ourselves," will require the virtue of courage.  Finally, the "natural law of reason," which concerns itself with distributing goods between ourselves and "our neighbor who is our confederate by nature," a law which invokes the Golden rule,* involves the virtue of justice.  Again, we find confirmation in the writings of St. Augustine (De spiritu et anima, c. 20): "Prudence is found in choice, temperance in use, courage in endurance, and justice in distribution."**

The Cardinal Virtues, Fresco by Cherubino Alberti

An alternative way of distinguishing among the cardinal virtues is based on "principle and end," and this can be done because "every human virtue perfects the soul, either in its actions or passions."  With respect to actions which have an end in vie, these can be viewed the perspective of self (in which case prudence is involved) or from the perspective of others (in which case justice is involved).  When we look at passions, as distinguished from actions, then we confront those passions which come from us (and the control of these is handled by the virtue of temperance) or that which covers from others (which involves the virtue of courage).   It is the control of the passions which is based upon the principle of action.

Yet another basis for distinguishing among the four cardinal virtues is to look at their opposite: vice.  "The soul has four virtues," Philip says, "by which it is armed against vice and instructed bout its operations."

In its operations, [the soul] is instructed either in relation to us, and then we have prudence, or in relation to neighbor, and then we have justice. And it is armed against vice, either in regard to prosperity, and then we have temperance, or in regard to adversity, and then we have courage.

Summa de bono, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.)  Philip elaborates: virtue is perfection of the soul based upon reason, and that perfection arises "either in relation to neighbor or for some other reason."  If the perfection arises for some other reason, "it will concern the rational motive power or the motive power of desire or the motive power of emotion."  Prudence is concerned with the rational motive power, temperance with the motive power of desire, and courage with the motive power of emotion.  If perfection is looked at from the perspective of relations with one's neighbor, then one needs the virtue of justice.***

The distinctions between the cardinal virtues may also be looked at from the perspective of possibility.***

The function of prudence is to now what is possible, that of courage is to do what is possible, that of temperance is not to presume to do what is not possible, and that of justice is to will has is possible. Now this division is based on what is necessary for virtue, namely, to know, which requires prudence, to will, which requires justice, to do, which requires courage, and the mode of acting which requires temperance.

Summa de bono, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.).

Finally, again drawing on De spiritu et anima,**/*** Philip the Chancellor gives another way of identifying the distinction between the four cardinal virtues.  This way looks at the function of the virtue and focuses on "interior appetite, exterior deed, order to our end, and not letting stand an impediment on the way to our end."  With this quadripartite division, one can divide the virtues into four.  "The function of prudence," then, "is to desire nothing regretful, that of courage is to fear nothing but what is based, that of temperance is to repress earthly desires and completely to forget them, and that justice is to direct every motion in the soul to God alone."  "Consequently," Philip summarizes, "the function of prudence is to rule the beginning we desire, that of temperance is to rule over the means which is the deed, that of courage is to remove impediments, and that of justice is to order us to our end."  Summa de bono, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.).

Next in his treatment of the cardinal virtues, Philip the Chancellor asks about the ordering among and between the virtues, a matter he handles in Question 2 of this treatment on the virtues in his Summa de bono.  We shall address his thinking on this matter in our next few postings.

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*Philip the Chancellor cites to both negative and affirmative versions of the rule by quoting Tobit 4:16 ("Do to no one what you would not want done to you") and Matt. 7:12 and Luke 6:31 ("And as you wish that  men would do to you, do so to them.")
**This is a text wrongly attributed to St. Augustine.
***As authority for this view, Philip draws from chapter 20 of the pseudo-Augustinian text of De spiritu et anima.

Thursday, October 11, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Virtues as Reasoned Love

WHEN PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR asked himself the question in Q. 1 of his treatment of the cardinal virtues in the Summa de bono why the virtues are four in number, he identified the principal explanation: namely that the related to the acts of the soul (which are four: act of desire or concupiscence  act of emotion or irascibility, the act of distinguishing good and bad towards ourselves, and the act of distinguishing good and bad as it relates to others), and not the powers of the soul (which are three: reason, desire, emotion).

Philip also noted that the cardinal virtues are related to temporal affairs, things we use; the theological virtues are related to eternal affairs, namely God, and are therefore things we enjoy.  Thus, Philip distinguishes between the uti and the frui, the use and the enjoyment.  Quoting St. Augustine, Philip observes that "all perverse human order consists in either enjoying what should be used and using what should be enjoyed; correct order, however, consists in enjoying what should be enjoyed and using what should be used."*

Philip also relied upon authority to buttress his conclusion that the cardinal virtues were four in number based upon the four human acts. These also gave him additional reasons to regard the cardinal virtues as four.  We will briefly look at these.

First, Philip noted that, in regard to temporal goods which are used, there is temporal good and temporal evil. He further subdivided temporal good into two and temporal evil into two.  Temporal goods are either apparent goods, "and in this respect deceptive," or they are excessive goods, "and in this way corruptive."  Those apparent temporal goods which deceive are avoided by the virtue of prudence.  The excessive goods which corrupt us are avoided by temperance.

Anonymous, Design for Four Virtues 

Something similar can be done with temporal evils, which are either adverse or perverse.  Perverse evil is called the "evil of guilt."  Adverse evil is called the "evil of pain."  Perverse evil perverts the soul, destroying its beauty, and rendering it ugly.  Its contrary is the virtue of justice, as justice "introduces order in the would, which is beauty in the soul."  Adverse evil, the evil which causes pain, saddens the soul.  To overcome sadness of soul, we need the virtue of courage which allows us to endure it for the sake of love.  He quotes St. Augustine: "Courage is love easily enduring everything for the sake of what is loved."**

Second, Philip relied on Isaac of Stella and his book On Spirit and Soul.  This book, Philip notes, follows St. Augustine.  In his book, Isaac of Stella identifies the three powers of the soul: reason (from which arises sensibility) and the affectations which arise from the power of desire (concupiscence) or the power of emotion (irascibility).   There are four affections in man, depending upon whether (i) we presently enjoy or (ii) hope in the future to enjoy something, or whether (iii) we presently suffer something we hate or (iv) fear that we will suffer something in the future we will hate.  The present enjoyment of something we love is called joy.  The anticipation of a future enjoyment of something we love is what gives rise to hope.  The present suffering of something we do not like is called sorrow.  The future anticipation of having to suffer something we do not like gives rise to fear.

These four elements: joy, hope, sorrow, fear "are like the elements and common materials for all the vices and virtues."  "Since virtue is a habit in a mind which has been correctly instructed," Philip observes, it follows that these four elements "should be instructed and combined and ordered by reason for the sake of that which is right and in the right manner, so that they can produce virtues."  If they are not so rightly ordered, these four elements can "easily sink into vices."  Quoting Isaac of Stella, Philip the Chancellor concludes: "Therefore, when love and hate are instructed prudently, modestly, bravely, and justly, they grow in to the virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice which are said to be like roots or hinges (cardines) for all the virtues."

The reason-based teaching of Isaac of Stella on virtues in his On Spirit and Soul therefore dovetails nicely with St. Augustine's love-based teaching on the virtues in his book On the Customs of the Catholic Church.  There, St. Augustine encapsulates his teaching on the virtues succinctly: "that which is called four-fold virtue is formed from various affections of love . . . so that temperance is love giving itself wholly and incorruptibly to God, courage is love readily enduring all things for God, justice is love serving the beloved alone and for this reason rightly ruling all its subjects, and prudence is love rightly distinguishing what helps us get to God from those things which impeded us from him."***

Wrapping the notions of Isaac of Stella's ordering of reason into virtue with St. Augustine's notion of ordering in love into virtue, Philip the Chancellor synthesizes the insights of both into an understanding of the cardinal virtues that is more complete and merits quotation in full:

There is either good which we desire or evil which we hate (hate is used rather than detest, for hate belongs to the power of desire, as does love, while detesting belongs to the emotions.) If something is good, either it is present, and then we feel joy about it, or it is not present but expected, and then we feel hope about it. Or the thing is bad, and then if present we feel sorrow about it, and if not present we feel fear. Now these sorts of affections, that is, those belonging to desire or emotion, should be ruled by reason, and then they are worthy of praise. Otherwise, if they are disordered, they are contemptible; and this is why the affection puts its name on the deed, whether for good or evil. Now love, when ordered, mounts up to virtue; for when ordered, it loves what should be loved and how it should be loved. Therefore, it loves prudently, so that no appearances of seeming good deceives it. And this is why Augustine says: "Prudence is love wisely preferring what aids, etc." as was said above. It loves sweetly and pleasantly, so that it is not abducted from its delight by anything illicit, and this is what Augustine says: "Temperance is love giving itself wholly to what is loved." It loves resolutely, so that it is not averted from the beloved by any adversity, and this is also what Augustine says: "Courage is love readily enduring everything for what is loved." And love is for the sake of the right end, and this too is what Augustine says: "Justice is love serving the beloved alone, and ruling rightly for the sake of the beloved."

So virtues, then, may be said to be reason-based and love-based, and they are the possession of a man who is governed by reason and governed by love.
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*Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti.   De div. quaest. lxxxiii, 30.
**[F]ortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur. De mor. ecc., 1:15.
***As Houser notes, this is an "extremely free rendering of Augustine's De mor. ecc., 2.15. "Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu . . . ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. . . . Quare definire etiam sic licet, ut temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem, fortitudinem amorem omnia propter Deum facile perferentem, iustitiam amorem Deo tantum servientem et ob hoc bene imperantem ceteris quae homini subiecta sunt, prudentiam amorem bene discernentem ea quibus adiuvetur in Deum ab his quibus impediri potest.

Monday, October 8, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Virtues, How Are There Four?

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR explores the four cardinal virtues in his Summa de bono. The first questions he asks regarding the virtues regards to their division and their number.  Philip defines virtue as "a perfection of the rational soul based on its powers," and so posits the possibility that the virtues might be identified by the powers in the soul so that for each power there is a corresponding virtue.

From the Mosaics at Qasr Libya

However, for Philip shared the Augustinian opinion that the soul had only three powers: reason, emotion, and desire (rationabilitas, irascibilitas, and concupiscibilitas).  This made the one-on-one correlation between  the powers of the soul and the virtues impossible, at least if the cardinal virtues were to be maintained at four.    While the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity might be neatly fitted to the tripartite powers of the soul, the relationship between the powers of the soul and the four cardinal virtues was not so neat.


Philip explored the possibility that one might assign one cardinal virtue to one particular power, and then reserve the fourth cardinal virtue, justice, which might be applied to "all the powers" of the soul.  Drawing on a gloss derived from Augustine's commentary on Genesis against the Manichees regarding Genesis 2:10-14, Philip suggested that the relationship among the virtues was like the relationship between the four rivers  in Genesis: the Pishon, Gihon, Tigris, and Euphrates:

The LORD God planted a garden in Eden, in the east, and placed there the man whom he had formed.  Out of the ground the LORD God made grow every tree that was delightful to look at and good for food, with the tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  A river rises in Eden to water the garden; beyond there it divides and becomes four branches.  The name of the first is the Pishon; it is the one that winds through the whole land of Havilah, where there is gold. The gold of that land is good; bdellium and lapis lazuli are also there. The name of the second river is the Gihon; it is the one that winds all through the land of Cush. The name of the third river is the Tigris; it is the one that flows east of Asshur. The fourth river is the Euphrates.

Gen. 2:10-14.  The rivers Pishon, Gihon, and Tigris are all given further descriptions in Genesis, lands about which they circle.  The fourth river, the Euphrates, is not.  The Euphrates is "not assigned a land it circles," and so, the virtues of prudence, courage or fortitude, and temperance had lands about which they circle, yet justice, like the Euphrates, pertains to all the powers of the soul.  Augustine's gloss on this passage suggests this as a plausible solution.

Justice pertains to all the parts of the soul, because it is the order and equity in the soul, through which are united the other virtues: prudence, temperance, and courage. For one is just in so far as his soul is prudent in contemplating truth, temperate in restraining desires, and brave in withstanding adversity.

Q.1, obj. 3.

While the suggestion of St. Augustine that assigned justice an overarching role seemed plausible, it seemed that if an overarching principle was needed in the case of the cardinal virtues, there should be an overarching principle in the case of the theological virtues.


Moreover, if St. Augustine's principle is taken as true, then it would appear to be equally applicable to the theological virtues, so that one is just in so far as one believes in God (by faith), hopes in God (by hope), and loves God (through charity).  Is justice then an overarching theological virtue?  "For just as the fourth virtue, which puts order into the three human virtues, is a human virtue, so likewise what put order into the three theological virtues must be a theological virtues, which makes four theological virtues."  Q.1, obj. 4.

Drawing from various works of Aristotle,* Philip also noted that all motion of the soul may divided into three ways depending upon what it seeks: its own sake, removing an evil, or adding a good.  The first is good simpliciter.  The second is not enjoyable as it is chooses an "expedient evil."  The third is enjoyable as it is  chooses an "expedient good."   There are thee types of objects, the good, what accompanies, and the enjoyable, and three pleasures, and there are three powers--reason, desire, and emotion.  It follows that there are three virtues only: prudence for the reasoning part, which concerns the good; courage in the emotions, which withstands evil; and temperance for the desires, which relates to enjoyment.


However, tradition did not provide for four theological virtues, but only three.

So the solution sought by Philip shifted its focus by applying the Aristotelian distinction between matter and for.  Matter could be considered as power, and the form as act.  If the powers of the soul is the matter upon which virtue acts, then its form should be manifested by a sort of act. By focusing on the acts of the soul, rather than the powers of the soul, a solution presented itself.   His resolution is found in his reply to the first objection:

The number of virtues is not taken from the number of the powers [in the soul] but from their principal acts. Since the virtues are perfections of the powers, their perfections are compared to their acts. Therefore, temperance is based on an act of desires (concupiscibilis) as it is subject to the order of reason, that is, to restrain our cupidities. Courage is based on the act of the emotions (irascibilis) which has been ordered, that is, to confront what produces fear. Both prudence and justice are based upon acts of reason, because prudence is taken from the act of distinguishing good from bad, which is an absolute act concerning ourselves, while justice, which orders us in relation to neighbor through rendering what is sue to him, is based on act of reason, namely ordering, which concerns others.

Q.1, rep. obj. 1.  So to summarize Philip's solution: temperance relates to the ordering of an act of concupiscible desire, courage or fortitude relates to ordering an act of the irascible emotion, prudence relates to ordering an act of reason as it relates to oneself, and justice relates to the ordering of an act of reason as it relates to others.

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*Aristotle's On the Soul, Sophistical Refutations, and Topics.

Friday, October 5, 2012

Philip the Chancellor on Virtue: Recruitment of Aristotle

THE SUMMA DE BONO OF PHILIP the Chancellor's treatment on the cardinal virtues begins with thee questions concerning them.  It is standard enough, and relies clearly on the introduction to the subject as contained in Peter Lombard's Sentences (Book III, Dist. 33).  It asks about the basis of the quadripartite number of the cardinal virtues and what justifies such division.  It addresses the ordering among the virtues and assesses prior opinions on that subject.  It asks why the cardinal virtues are called "cardinal," and whether they can be called divine virtues based upon the fact that they are, at least for the Christian, infused into the soul.  Finally, after an introduction to the cardinal virtues through these three questions, it launches into a lengthy discussion of the cardinal virtues themselves.  Contrary to the treatment of the virtues by prior teachers, Philip the Chancellor's treatment is extensive, covering about 300 pages in his Summa de Bono.*  He round up his discussion of the virtues after this extensive treatment by focusing on the connection among the virtues and their equality, here relying on the Sentences (Book III, Dist. 36).  In short, within a sort of envelope of convention we find a real developmental tour de force.

In order to develop the notion of virtues within the Christian moral context, Philip drew heavily from Aristotle, especially relying upon the so-called Ethica vetus (Nicomachean Ethics 2-3).  Thus we find central in his elaboration of the virtues, Aristotle's "four causes"** and Aristotle's famous analysis of virtue as a mean between two extremes, the so-called golden mean (aurea mediocritas or sectio aurea).

Four Virtues, from Palace at Esztergom, Hungary

Philip also drew from what R.E. Houser describes as the "moral psychology" of Aristotle, namely that each human had a soul whose powers were the proximate causes of both actions and passions.  Philip also relies on the Aristotelian method for introspection, namely one that relies on the notion of "object."  Therefore, Philip applies the Aristotelian assessment of the soul's interior by reference to its acts which are to be understood by reference to their object.  "Powers differ on acts," says Philip, "and acts based on their objects or causes of motion."  [Summa de bono, I.227).  As Houser describes the concept of "object" as the vehicle for understanding the soul's interior:

Object in Philip's usage meant that feature of a real thing or set of real things which serves as the term of a cognitive relation between things and their knowers. The object, then, provides an external and real basis for understanding the inner workings of the soul, a perceptible basis for knowing what is not directly perceptible and especially for distinguishing powers, acts, and passions from each other. Philip knew that Aristotle had used their objects to distinguish the five senses from each other and that this account of sensation had provided the model for his account of virtue: 'act, properly speaking, has a definite matter, such as seeing has color, hearing has sound.'

Houser, 44 (quoting Summa de bono, I.227).***

One of Philip the Chancellor's important principles was the connection or relationship between the Aristotelian causal principles, particularly the notion of material cause, and the psychological principles, in particular the notion of object.  By tying these two together, he was also able to draw out an objective component of moral virtue and its subjective component.

Since the object in its technical sense gives content to our understanding of a power, Philip thought of that object as a kind of matter. [He writes in the Summa, 2:206.2-207.6: "Therefore, diversity of rational powers is based on diversity of acts; but diversity of acts is based on specific diversity of their matter."] On the other hand, since a virtue perfects some power of the soul, he also thought of such powers as matter. As Philip used the term, then, matter can refer either to the power of the soul which is delimited by the object of its activity (this is the subjective senses of the matter) or to that object which so delimits a power or act (its objective sense).
Houser, 45.

These Aristotelian tools allowed Philip greatly to amplify his understanding of the cardinal virtues.  By using Aristotle's final, efficient, formal, and material causes to explain the cardinal virtues, focusing mainly on both the objective and subject components of their matter, Philip was able greatly to expand thinking about virtue.  It is what in part allowed him then to give an expansive treatment to a broad range of human virtues, the so-called "parts" of virtues which are subordinate-yet-related to one of the cardinal virtues.

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*Philip's extensive treatment of the virtues was to influence later authors, including St. Albert the Great and Philips pupil Ulrich of Stasbourg who also wrote his own Summa de bono and whose book 6 thereof was entirely dedicated to treating the issue of the virtues.
**Aristotle's traditional causes are: material, formal, final, and efficient.
***One might note the importance of the object in the assessment of the morality of an act and its centrality in the first Papal encyclical to deal with morality in general, Veritatis splendor.  We have addressed this issue in a prior posting.  See Veritatis splendor Part 27: Objects of Acts.

Thursday, October 4, 2012

Philip the Chancellor: Summing up the Good

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR, head of the University of Paris, theologian master, poet and musician, and supporter of the Dominicans, is an important figure in the history of the Christian understanding of virtue in between Peter Lombard and St. Thomas Aquinas. Philip the Chancellor's great work, Summa on the Good (Summa de Bono), proved to be an important bridge between Peter Lombard's Sentences and St. Thomas Aquinas's fully-developed doctrine of virtue in his own Summa, the Summa Theolgiae.  As Houser describes his influence:

They [Sts. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, but also the Dominicans in general] were enamored of his Summa, which moved far in the direction of realizing [Peter] Lombard's promise of a full treatment of the vast range of moral excellence and depravity, and all the stages between them. To do so, Philip had to move well beyond Lombard's brief remarks about the cardinal virtues.

Houser, 43.

Philip the Chancellor's systematic and methodological treatment of the good began with understanding the good as one of the transcendentals--that is, one of this qualities or features of reality that transcend genera, that transcend, in fact, any of Aristotle's ten categories.*  The good, is something that is found in all things, in all being inasmuch as it is being.  Like being, good is learned through a sort of attributive analogy: one never completely learns it, as one is in contact communication with individual things, each with its own expression of "good" which contribute to one's understanding of the transcendent concept of good.  One would literally have to know the entirety of the visible and invisible world fully to comprehend good.



Aristotle's transcendental of the good finds a natural entry into Christian thought through the creation story in Genesis, in particular the frequent reference that God observed that his creation was "good," even "very good."**  Applying the notion of the transcendental to the notion of creation and combing it with the notion that all creation not only came from God but that all creation's end is God (exitus, reditus), helped arrive at a "good of nature" (bonum naturae) and an analogous albeit supernatural "good of grace" (bonum gratiae).

Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the "good of grace," the bonum gratiae, was, in the words of Houser, a tour de force:

[The] questions on the "good of grace" [in Philip's Summa were] a masterful transformation of part of Book 3 of the Sentences [of Peter Lombard] into a full-blown treatise on who the seven principal virtues--three theological and four cardinal--aid humans in their reditus to God.

Houser, 43.  The development of the doctrine on the cardinal virtues in Philip the Chancellor's treatment of it in his Summa is remarkable.  It is part of his greater treatment of the good in his Summa, a text which has been described as the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of moral theology of the 13th century.

We shall spend the next few blog postings discussing Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the cardinal virtues in his Summa de Bono in the next few posts, including Philip's sources, the nature of the cardinal virtues, and the "parts" of the virtues (a development which greatly expanded the depth of virtue-based moral theology)

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*The ten categories of Aristotle as found in his Organon (also known by their Latin term as predicamenta or predicates) are: (1) substance [οὐσία, ousia], i.e.,what something is something is essentially (e.g., human, dog); (2) quantity [πόσον, poson],(e.g., ten yards, three gallons); (3) quality [ποῖον, poion] (e.g., blue, visible); (4) relation [πρός τι, pros ti] (e.g., father/son, on the left of another); (5) location [ποῦ, pou] (e.g., at a movie, on a couch); (6) time [ποτέ, pote] (e.g., yesterday, during an eclipse); (7) position [κεἱσθαι, keisthai] (e.g., sitting, squatting); (8) possession [ἔχειν, echein] (e.g., wearing a robe, holding a pipe); (9) active doing [ποιεῖν, poiein] (e.g., running, smiling); and (10) passively undergoing [πάσχειν, paschein](e.g., being hit, being ridiculed).  Some of these overlap.
**ṭō·wḇ (ט֑וֹב): See Genesis Chapter 1 (καλά, Greek; bonum, Latin)

Monday, October 1, 2012

Peter Lombard on Virtues: Distinction 36

PETER LOMBARD ALSO ADDRESSES the issue of virtues from a Christian perspective in Distinction 36 of Book 3 of his Sentences.   In this distinction, Lombard addresses the interconnectivity of the virtues and their essential equality.  Essentially, he comes to the "probable" conclusion that the theological virtues enjoy a strong unity, as do the "infused" cardinal virtues.  This is based upon the view that the theological and cardinal virtues are all "children" of the mother of all virtues, charity, that is, love of God and love of neighbor for love of God.

Peter Lombard

As we did in our last blog posting, we shall quote those parts of Distinction 36 which relate to the virtues [Chapter 1 and 2 (except for the last paragraph), but not Chapter 3], allowing the Master to speak for himself, and then simply closing this posting with some comments.

DISTINCTION XXXVI

Chapter 1 (135)

1.  ON THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE NOT SEPARATED.  It is also usual to ask whether the virtues are so conjoined that thy cannot be possessed separately by anyone: one who has one of them has all of the.  --JEROME, ON ISAIAS.  Concerning this, Jerome says: "All the virtues are joined to each other, so that he ho lacks one of them lacks all of them."  [Interlinear gloss, on Is. 56:1 see also Jerome, In Isaiam 16.11], and so one ho has one of them has all of them.

2.  And this indeed seems probable.  For since charity is the mother of all the virtues [See Distinctions 23, c. 3 n. 2], it is rightly believed that in whomever is the mother herself, namely charity, in him also are all her children, that is the virtues.--AUGUSTINE, ON JOHN.  Hence Augustine: "Where there is charity, what can possibly be wanting?  But where there is none, what is there that can possibly be profitable?" [Aug., In Ioannem 15.12, tr. 83, n. 3]--AUGUSTINE TO JEROME: "Why, then, do we not say that, whoever has this virtue has all of them, since charity is the fullness of the Law? [Cf. Rom. 13:10]  And the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; the less, the less is there virtue in him; and the less virtue is in him, the more is there vice." [Aug., Epistola 167, c. 3, n. 11]

Chapter 2 (136)

1.  WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES ARE EQUALLY PRESENT IN ANYONE IN WHOM THEY ARE.  But it is a question whether one who possesses all the virtues has them in equal measure, or whether some flourish more and some less in someone.

2.  For it has seemed to some that some of them had more and some less by someone, as patience was eminent in Job, humility in David, meekness in Moses.  These also grant that one may merit more by one virtue than by another, just as he has the one more fully than the other.  And yet they say that one cannot merit more by any other virtue than by charity, nor can any other be had more fully by anyone than charity.   And so they say that the other virtues can be more or less in someone, but none more fully than charity, which generates the others.  And they say that these are the many faces which the Apostle mentions, saying: From the persons of man faces, etc. [Cf. 2 Cor. 1:11]

3.  Others say more truly that all virtues are joined and equal in anyone in whom they are, so whoever is equal to another in one of the virtues, is also equal to him in all the others.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 6, ON THE TRINITY.  Hence Augustine: "The virtues which are in the human mind, although each is understood in its own distinct way, are yet in no way separable from each other, so that, for instance, those who are equal in fortitude are also equal in prudence, and in justice, and in temperance.  For if you were to say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one of them is greater in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of the other is less prudent, and so they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the form is more prudent.  And so you will find it to be with the other virtues, if you consider them in the same way." [Aug., De Trin., 6.4.6]

4.  From these words, it is clear that all the virtues are not only connected, but also equal in a man's spirit.  And so, when someone is said to be pre-eminent in some virtue, as Abraham in faith, Job in patience, this is to be taken according to external uses, or by comparison to other men.  Either such a man especially displays the habit of humility, or he particularly performs the work of faith, or of another of the virtues, so that he is said to be stronger in it than others, or to excel singularly in it among other men.

5.  AUGUSTINE, TO JEROME.  According to this manner, namely according to the reasons for external acts, Augustine says elsewhere that in someone one virtue is more and another less, or that one virtue is in him and another not.  For he speaks as follows: "From that most famous dissertation of yours, it is sufficiently clear that it has not seemed good to our authors, or rather to truth itself, that all sins are equal, even if this is true of the virtues."  [Aug., Epistola 167, c. 2, n. 4]  "For even though it is true that he who has one virtue has all of them, and that he who lacks one virtue has none of them, all sins are not equal in the same way.  For where there is no virtue, there is nothing right, and yet it does not follow that worse cannot become even worse, or what is distorted become even more so  But if, as I believe to be more true and more congruent with the sacred Letters, the dispositions of the soul are like embers of the body (not that they appear in [higher or lower] places, but that they are perceived by the affections), then one is illuminated more fully, another less so, and a third entirely lacks light.  If this is the case, then just as each person is affected by the light of pious charity, and more in one action, less in another, or not at all in a third, so he may be said to have one virtue and to lack another one, or to have one virtue more and another less.  For insofar as it pertains to that charity which is piety, we may rightly say that 'charity is greater in this man than in that one,' and 'there is some of it in this man, none in that one.'  Also, as to an individual, [we may say] that he has greater chastity than patience, and that he has it in a higher degree today than he had yesterday, if he is making progress; or that he still lacks continence, but possesses not a small measure of mercy.  To summarize generally and briefly the view which I have of virtue: Virtue is the charity with which that which ought to be loved is loved.  This is greater in some people, in others less, and in others not at all; but in its greatest fullness, which admits of no increase, it exists in no man while in this life." [Ibid., c. 4, nn. 14-15]

6.  Here it seems to be indicated that one may be said to have one virtue more than another by reason that, through charity, he applies himself more to the act of one virtue than of another; and because of the difference in acts, he may be said to have the virtues themselves more or less, or not to have one of them, even though he has all of them equally and conjointly as to the habit of mind or the essence of each.  But in act he has the one ore, the other less; he may also lack one of them, as a just man, who makes use of marriage, does not have continence in act, which he nevertheless has in habit."*/**

Drawing principally from St. Augustine, though in some measure from St. Jerome and the Venerable Bede, Peter Lombard set the stage for the medieval Scholastics to ruminate on the Sentences, including those provisions dealing with the cardinal virtues.  Clearly, the virtues are no longer pagan, as they find their doctrinal source in the biblical book of Wisdom, and they find their spiritual source in charity, the paradigmatic Christian virtue.

As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's ultimate contribution:

For the development of the doctrine of the cardinal virtues, Lombard initiated a new age. In his Sentences, thirteenth-century Masters, whose greater knowledge of Aristotelian principles allowed them to move far beyond the Master's rudimentary ideas saw several things of importance: seven virtues--three theological and four cardinal; seven Christian virtues designed for the sake of returning us to our "heavenly homeland (patria)"; and cardinal virtues that are infused by God and as connected and equal to each other as are the theological virtues. And in Lombard they met vestiges of antique and Patristic moral rigorism; but only vestiges, for he approached morality with a new spirit. This was perhaps his most important bequest to the century to follow. His thought may not have been sophisticated but his moral canvas was wide; at least it was wide enough to incorporate ordinary folk along with saints and sinners. In this respect, he can be said to have begun the scholastic drive for an all-encompassing moral vision, one which radically revised the doctrine of the cardinal virtues inherited from the Fathers.

Houser, 41-42.
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*Peter Lombard, The Sentences, Book III (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008).
**The Latin text with notes removed:
DISTINCTIO XXXVI 
Caput 1 (135). 

1. De connexione virtutum quae non separantur. Solet etiam quaeri utrum virtutes ita sint sibi coniunctae, ut separatim non possint possideri ab aliquo, sed qui unam habet, omnes habeat. — Hieronymus, super Isaiam. De hoc Hieronymus ait: "Omnes virtutes sibi haerent, ut qui una caruerit, omnibus careat"; qui ergo unam habet, omnes liabet. 2. Quod quidem probabile est. Cum enim caritas mater sit omnium virtutum, in quocumque mater ipsa est, scilicet caritas, et cuncti filii eius, id est virtutes, recte fore creduntur. — Augustinus, super Ioannem. Unde Augustinus: "Ubi caritas est, quid est quod possit deesse? Ubi autem non est, quid est quod possit prodesse?" — Augustinus, ad Hieronymum: "Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet, habere omnes, cum plenitudo Legis sit caritas? quae quanto magis est in homme, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto vero minus, tanto minus inest virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis est vitium."

Caput 2 (136). 

1. Si cunctae virtutes pariter sit in quocumque sunt. Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes, an aliae magis, aliae minus in aliquo ferveant, quaestio est.

2. Quibusdam 1 enim videtur quod aiiae magis, aiiae minus habean tur ab aliquo, sicut in lob patientia eminuit, in David humilitas, in Moyse mansuetudo. Qui etiam concedunt magis aliquem mereri per aliquam unam virtutem quam per aliam, sicut eam plenius habet quam aliam. Non ta men magis per aliquam mereri dicunt quam per caritatem, nec aliquam plenius a quoquam liaberi quam caritatem. Alias igitur magis et alias minus in aliquo esse dicunt, sed nuilam pienius cantate, quae Ceteras gignit. Hasque dicunt esse multas facies quas memorat Apostolus dicens: Ex personis multarum facierum etc.

3. Alii venus dicunt omnes virtutes et simul et pares esse in quo— cumque sunt, ut qui in una alteri par exstiterit, in omnibus eidem ae qualis sit. — Augustinus In VI libro De Trinitate . Unde Augustinus: "Virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio et alio modo singulae inteliigantur, nuilo modo tamen separantur ab invicem: ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia, in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris aequales esse istos in fortitudine, sed ilium praestare prudentia, sequitur ut huius fortituclo minus prudens sit; ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quia est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras".

4. Ex his clarescit omnes virtutes non modo esse connexas, sed etiam pares in animo hominis. Cum ergo dicitur aliquis aliqua praeminere vir tute, ut Abraham fide, Iob patientia, secundum usus exteriores accipien dum est, vel in comparatione aliorum hominum. Quia vel humilitatis habitum maxime praefert, vel opus fidei vel alicuius ceterarum virtutum praecipue exsequitur: unde et ea prae aliis pollere, vel inter alios hommes singulariter excellere dicitur.

5. Augustinus, ad Hieronymum. Secundum hunc modum, scilicet secundum rationem actuum exteriorum, alibi Augustinus dicit in aliquo aliam magis esse virtutem, aliam minus, et unam esse et non alteram. Ait enim sic: "Clarissima disputatione tua satis apparuit non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi veritati, omnia paria esse peccata, etiam si hoc de virtutibus verum sit". "Quia etsi verum est eum qui  habet unam, omnes habere virtutes, et eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere, nec sic peccata sunt paria. Quia ubi virtus nulla est, nihil rectum est, nec tamen ideo non est pravo pravius distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verjus sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones ut corporis membra (non quod videantur locis, sed quod sentiantur affectibus), et alius illuminatur amplius, alius minus, alius omnino caret lumine: profecto ut quisque illustratione piae caritatis af fectus est: in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam, et aliam non habere; et aliam magis, aliam minus habere virtutem. Nam et ‘major est in isto caritas quam in illo’ recte possumus dicere; et ‘aliqua in isto, nulla in illo’, quantum pertinet ad caritatem quae pietas est. Et in uno homme, quod maiorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam; et maiorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeo notionem: Virtus est caritas qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. Haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est; plenissima vero, quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, in nemine".

6. Hic insinuari videtur quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius; et propter differentiam actuum, ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest; et aliquam non habere, cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet; aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in actu, quam tamen habet in habitu.

The Latin text is available at: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735212