There Ain't No Such Thing as Philosophical-Only Sin

DURING THE GREAT DEBATE between the casuistic Jesuit theologians (who were prone to laxity) and the Jansenists (who were prone to rigorism), a concept known as philosophical sin (peccatum philosophicum) developed. The theory was that for an act to be formally sinful (as distinguished from materially, or objectively sinful), there had to be advertence to the act as sinful and knowledge that the act was a violation of a precept of God. If both components did not exist, then the sin was not theological (peccatum theologicum), but was only philosophical (peccatum philosophicum). Whereas theological sin was a sin against both God and reason, philosophical sin was an offense only against reason, since the actor (be he an atheist, or simply ignorant that an act, say use of artificial contraception, was against the law of God). One had to had knowledge of God as legislator to be guilty of theological sin. Some, however, rejected this distinction as artificial, and, like the Spanish Cistercian Juan Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606-1682), whom St. Alphonsus Liguori called the "Prince of the Laxists," found a middle road, arguing that while a person may not have knowledge of an act being against God as legislator, he would have knowledge, even if implicit, of the offense against God as creator.*

The notion of distinguishing between philosophical and theological sin appears to have been first proposed by a Jesuit named Dereux (who was president of a Jesuit college in Dijon, France) and defended by Etienne Bougot. According to this concept (the Dijon thesis):

Peccatum Philosophicum, or moral sin, is a human act incompatible with rational nature and right reason. Peccatum Theologicum, or moral sin, is free transgression of divine law. The Philosophicum, however grave, in a man who is ignorant of God, or who in the act does not think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offence to God, nor a moral sin sundering friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishments.

Lea, 331.

Pope Alexander VIII
All sin is an offense against both God and Reason

In the Decree Sanctissimus of August 24, 1690, the Dijon thesis was condemned by Pope Alexander VIII, but it was not condemned as fully heretical, but rather as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous. Lea, 333. Thus stood condemned the following proposition:

Peccatum philosophicum seu morale est actus humanus disconvniens naturae rationalis et rectae ration; theologicum vero et morale est transgressio libera divinae legis. Philosophicum, quamvis grave, in illo, qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque aeterna poena dignum.

Philosophical or moral sin is a human act not in agreement with rational nature and right reason, theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of the Divine law. However grievous it may be, philosophical sin in one who is either ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is indeed a grievous sin, but not an offense to God, nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship with God, nor worthy of eternal punishment.

It seems that the opposite then must be maintained, namely that sin can be offensive to God even if the sinner fails to know or does not consider God. So the Jesuit Viva argued that it is morally impossible that there is in any given man the ignorance of God and of the natural law so as to justify the notion of peccatum philosophicum, so that all violations of the natural law are ipso facto, even if implicitly, peccata theologica.** All sin is an offense against both God and reason.
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*Caramuelis Theologia Fundamentalis, Fund. XII. See Henry C. Lea, "Philosophical Sin" International Journal of Ethics (1895), 331 (herein Lea).
**Viva, Comment. in Prop. alteram Alexandri VIII, nn. 1, 12 (cited in Lea, 335). In his La Providence de Dieu, Cardinal Billot argued that since there is no philosophical sin, then if one is ignorant of God or does not advert to God one has no theological sin. But this is a "faulty interpretation" of the Alexandrine condemnation of the Dijon thesis. It is not that ignorance that an act is against the law of God qua God excuses from theological sin; rather, it is that any immoral act is necessarily theological, i.e., an offense against God, whether one is ignorant that an act is against the law of God or not. "If the interpretation is applied to one adversative it must hold for the other since both are included." Bertke, 884-86 & n. 10.

Ignorance of the Wrong-The Modern Rude

INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE OF THE NATURAL LAW must be admitted; however, there must also be care in how far one extends this principle. Can one say, for example, that men can be invincibly ignorant of the foundational precept of the natural law--that one ought to do good and avoid evil? Or that men may be invincibly ignorant of some of the first principles? Can there be a man who is invincibly ignorant of the principle that one ought not to take the life of an innocent man? What about the more remote conclusions or determinations? Can there be men who are invincibly ignorant of the natural moral law that would prohibit the procurement of a direct abortion under all circumstances as a necessary corollary to the principle that one ought not intentionally to take the innocent life of another human being? When in this intellectual movement between the general and the particular, between theory and practice, between the abstract and the contingent does the possibility of invincible ignorance of the natural law (and hence excuse from formal sin) begin to exist?

The common answer, now part of Catholic tradition, is that first principles--that which is ensconced in the seat of conscience or the Thomistic synderesis--cannot be the subject of invincible ignorance. "This conclusion has come down intact [from the Scholastic theologians such as Sts. Thomas, Bonaventure, and Duns Scotus, etc.] through Suarez and the post-reformation theologians and is now unanimous." Bertke, 65-66. Excepted from this view are those who do not have the normal use of practical reason--infants, the insane, and so forth. What is meant by conscience or synderesis in this context is the "constant disposition [i.e., a habitus] of the intellect by which it immediately sees first principles . . . in the practical order," and this includes the self-evident principles and the intellectual feltness that the fundamental inclinations in all men are inclinations to the good.

Knowledge is lost when one steps down from the universal to apply the law to particular instances, i.e., in the exercise of practical reason in the prudential decisions required by man in the various contingent situations in which he may find himself. Here, not only is there internal static which may frustrate the proper application of the general principle to the particular situation (disordered will, inherited predispositions to certain sins), there may be external static as well (evil customs, bad moral formation, habitual participation in sin which deadens sensitivity to violation of principle).*

Though not invincibly ignorant of first principles, men may be invincibly ignorant of some of the direct (or proximate) conclusions derived from the self-evident first principles. However, we may say that the majority of men will not be invincibly ignorant of such direct conclusions such as the prohibitions against murder, adultery, or stealing for example. There are however a minority of men (extraordinary cases) that may be invincibly ignorance of one or another of these fundamental precepts, and this because of evil traditions or customs, education, or depraved habits.

Whether this ignorance will be invincible or not depends on the individual person. But when we consider the overpowering weight of long tradition and custom justifying an action which may be objectively contrary to the law and yet the object of a strong lower appetite, inculpable ignorance may be possible. In such circumstances it is only with great difficulty that the conviction of the surrounding culture could be discarded; that is, more diligence would have to be exercised than required for ordinary invincible ignorance. Theologians generally admit the possibility of invincible ignorance in the case of rudes or the uncultured. The term rudes may very well be applied to the finished products of some modern education where all values are relative and the moral order is considered a collection of taboos and customs.

Bertke, 71.

It follows that if men may in extraordinary situations (which may still be quite common) be ignorant of proximate conclusions, that they will be a greater tendency toward invincible ignorance in the area of more remote conclusions. Even Saints--whose good will and formation cannot be gainsaid--may find themselves in situation where there is uncertainty, and yet where one would seem to have got it wrong. Bertke gives the example of the difference of opinion between St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventure on what a judge ought to do if, under the admissible evidence in a judicial forum, a defendant is judicially guilty, but he is known by the judge as a result of matters outside the forum to be innocent. Ought the judge condemn the defendant as part of his sworn obligation to follow the positive law and procedures or not? St. Thomas would hold the judge bound in justice to condemn. St. Bonaventure finds this conclusion impossible to maintain as consonant with justice. Bertke, 73.
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*In distinguishing between an incontinent man and an intemperate man, Bertke notes that the "constancy of action attained by the intemperate man through habit," is different from that "unsteadiness of the incontinent" who has not lost the force of "universal moral principle." In the intemperate man (of which there are many) "the habit of sin is so ingrained that the subject finds a certain equilibrium in sin." Bertke, 69. This is a horrible, yet unquestionable reality: that many of our fellows operate in this moral limbo, this "equilibrium in sin." Yet even in the intemperate, invincible ignorance of the fundamental principles cannot be said to exist. "True, obscured by habits of sin, the universal moral principles do not affect the immediate question of action. However, speculatively, when no action is involved the intemperate man will still admit the first principles." Bertke, 69. This is evidence that they are not wholly inoperative and the subject of invincible ignorance. The ignorance lies in the particular domain (he is blind as to his own intemperance), but not in the universal domain.

Ignorance of the Wrong-How is it We are Hoodwinked

IGNORANCE LEADS TO ERROR, and so we tend to conflate the two concepts. Ignorance, which is the lack of knowledge in a person who is capable of having such knowledge, causes error in the practical intellect. The error in the practical intellect is, when it all comes down to it, an error where an apparent good instead of an authentic or true good is sought. The apparent good must have some good inhering in it, or else it would not be able to disguise itself as an apparent good. If it can even be conceived, something that would be a total evil would never be sought, because it could never deceive anyone as an apparent good, having no goodness with which it could drape itself to make itself becoming to a person who is blinded by an error in practical intellect caused by ignorance. Evil always woos under the guise of being good and true. Omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et omne falsum in aliquo vero. (Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 2) Every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.

How is it that the intellect can be so deceived? One would think that the intellect would not embrace something as something when it is in fact something that is nothing. Since evil is nothing other than privity or absence of some good, how is it that the intellect accepts the privity or absence of good as its opposite, as good? One would think that the intellect could detect the black as black, and the white as white.

Seeing Evil as Good

The error in judgment comes from the fact that we do not apprehend the object in its fulness with our intellect. Knowledge is not intuitive, grasped at once. In the realistic philosophical system of St. Thomas Aquinas, the intellect actualizes in itself in a manner of speaking the object that it comprehends (its essence), and it does this, not intuitively, but through means of the senses. The error comes through this sometimes imperfect means of transmission, a means which can further be manipulated by a disordered will. The object in the mind is therefore not adequate to the reality outside oneself, and this is, by definition, something that is neither true or good.

The proper object of knowledge in the present state of union between soul and body is the sensible thing which can only become a part of the knowing subject through the avenue of the senses. Those avenues are often by-paths which lead to error as they grasp only outer qualities which may be shared by diverse but apparently similar thing. it must be carefully observed, however, that the senses are not the cause, but the occasion of intellectual error. . . . [T]he intellect's dependence upon sense knowledge is a fertile ground for error . . . . [since] associations and combinations may be effected [in the mind] which have no corresponding realities, and this disproportion may be enhanced because the work of the internal senses may be, in part, subconscious and not subject to the directed control of reason.

Bertke, 60-61.

As suggested above, the human will plays its part masking evil as good or falsity as true. The will can cause the human to assent to something where the intellect's grasp of the object is incomplete or inadequate. The will plays this commanding part in assent in two instances: in faith or belief and in error. In faith, the will commands the intellect to assent to a truth (though the senses do not inform the intellect of it) because of the authority of the one revealing that truth. In error, the will commands the intellect to assent to a truth (though the senses do not inform the intellect of it) because of an improper desire.

Since the intellect never will never assent unless solicited by at least some semblance of the truth, the good desired by the will must be, under some aspect, a true good. This is especially the case when the will solicits the intellect in a practical judgment under the influence of a sensible good, the possession of which is here and now contrary to the natural law.

Bertke, 62.

In summary, then, error in the practical judgment is the result of errors in translation between the real world and our minds which may be caused either (i) by problems or difficulties associated with the translation of reality outside us to the reality inside us through our senses, or (ii) a disordered will which meddles with the process because it is enthralled or wooed by some disordered desire.

Ignorance of the Wrong, Development of an Idea, St. Thomas

StTHOMAS AQUINAS'S VIEW ON IGNORANCE OF THE LAW seems to depart from the rigorism of his teacher, St. Albert the Great, and pattern itself more after the Franciscan savant St. Bonaventure. There are, it is true, statements in some of the works outside of the Summa Theologiae that could be invoked to support an argument that St. Thomas held a strict view along the lines of William of Auxerre and the early Franciscan school. Ignorantia iuris peccata est--ignorance of the law is sin--St. Thomas says in his De veritate.* Ignorantia iuris ad negligentiam reputatur--Ignorance of the law may be chalked up to negligence on the part of the actor--St. Thomas says in his De malo.**

But when St. Thomas treats the subject extensively, we see that his view is more nuanced, and takes into consideration instances where ignorance of the law--ignorantia iuris--may be excused, and thus may not lead to an actor being held accountable as having incurred fault or sin.

St. Thomas Aquinas (The Angelic Doctor)
Wearing a Four-Horned Doctoral Biretta

St. Thomas handles the issue of ignorance and sin in his Summa Theologiae (IaIIae, q. 76, questions. 1-4). He begins his analysis by distinguishing between the sort of ignorance which excuses from that which does not, and his focus is on the effect that the ignorance has on causing the voluntariness of the act, so that if the actor commits an act that--in the absence of the ignorance--he would not have done, then the ignorance is the cause of the act, and the actor is not guilty for the sin. If, however, the ignorance is "concomitant with the sin," that is, if the actor would engage in the act whether or not ignorant so that the ignorance really has no role in the voluntariness of the act, then ignorance will not excuse. There is a difference between a man acting "in ignorance," (peccat ignorans) and a man acting "from ignorance" or "because of ignorance" (propter ignorantiam).***

For St. Thomas, ignorance is a privation of knowledge, not mere nescience. Nescience is the absence of knowledge and implies no ability to know that knowledge. So, for example, a dog is nescient of any religious duty to God, and yet there is no fault involved in that since the brute animal has no capacity to know God. Ignorance on the other hand is privation of knowledge, that is lack of knowledge of those things which one has the natural ability to know. Accordingly, since man has a natural ability to know God as First Cause by the use of reason and his perception of the world and its intrinsic order and the need for an explanatory original and ending cause, the lack or privation of such knowledge is not mere nescience, it is ignorance.

Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.

Manifestum est autem quod quicumque negligit habere vel facere id quod tenetur habere vel facere, peccat peccato omissionis. Unde propter negligentiam, ignorantia eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur, est peccatum. Non autem imputatur homini ad negligentiam, si nesciat ea quae scire non potest. Unde horum ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio superari non potest. Et propter hoc talis ignorantia, cum non sit voluntaria, eo quod non est in potestate nostra eam repellere, non est peccatum. Ex quo patet quod nulla ignorantia invincibilis est peccatum, ignorantia autem vincibilis est peccatum, si sit eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur; non autem si sit eorum quae quis scire non tenetur.

S.T., IaIIae q. 76 a. 2 co.

Ignorance may excuse, in whole or in part, the guilt involved in an act, depending upon whether the voluntariness of that act is diminished or altogether erased b that ignorance.

Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.

Ignorance may in some cases reduce or altogether eliminate the voluntary nature of an act, and without an act being voluntary, fault cannot be placed upon the actor. If the ignorance is voluntary, as, for example, when the ignorance is affected, cultivated, or purposefully or recklessly maintained (ignorantia affectata), then one can be held morally accountable for that ignorance. One cannot avoid sin by remaining in ignorance, when that ignorance is maintained purposefully. There is no ostrich-head-in-the-sand defense to sin.† This is particularly true when one is under a duty to know, but one is neglectful in complying or meeting that duty. In his Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas explains:

Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.

S.T. IaIIae, q. 76, art. 4, c.

Clearly, St. Thomas believed that ignorance, and its effect on voluntariness, comprehended both ignorance of fact and of law. In his De malo, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas uses ignorance of the law--in this instance ignorance of the law that fornication is sinful--as an example of ignorance that may excuse the voluntary nature of the act:

Thus, voluntary action is impossible in relation to the thing of which the subjected is ignorant. Wherefore, if in the same act something is known and something is not known, it can be voluntary only in relation to the thing known. However, it will always be involuntary in relation to the thing which is not known. As, for example, when a person does not know fornication is a sin. The person in such a state indeed commits fornication voluntarily, but he does not voluntarily commit a sin.

[P]raecedit enim ex necessitate actus intellectus actum voluntatis, quia bonum intellectum est voluntatis obiectum; et ideo sublata cognitione intellectus per ignorantiam, aufertur voluntatis actus; et sic tollitur voluntarium quantum ad id quod est ignoratum. Unde si in eodem actu aliquid sit ignoratum et aliquid scitum, potest esse voluntarium quantum ad id quod est scitum: semper tamen est involuntarium quantum ad id quod est ignoratum; sive ignoretur deformitas actus (puta cum aliquis nescit fornicationem esse peccatum, voluntarie quidem facit fornicationem, sed non voluntarie facit peccatum)

De malo, q. 3 a. 8 co. (Bertke's English translation).

Patently, St. Thomas Aquinas avoids a rigoristic view of the law, and his view, like that of St. Bonaventure, has become the common teaching of the Church.†† There are instances where ignorance, even ignorance of the natural moral law, can excuse the voluntariness of the act and therefore the blame imputable on the actor for that law's unknowing violation. It should go without saying that the act, though it may not be imputable as a sin upon the actor (because it lacks the voluntariness requisite to sin), it still is an objectively disordered act against the will of God and the law itself. Ignorance does not make the act good, it simply absolves the actor of any moral guilt for its unknowing and unknowable breach. Accordingly, someone may not be guilty of formal sin, and yet he may be involved in what would be called materially a sin.

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*De ver., 17, 4, ad 5um.
**De malo, q. 3, a. 8.
***S.T. IaIIae, q. 76, art. 1, c.
†E.g., S.T., III, q. 47, art. 4, ad. 3. (ignorantia affectata non excusat a culpa)
††The following proposition was condemned by Pope Alexander VIII (Dec. 7, 1690): Tametsi detur ignorantia invincibilis iuris naturae, haec in statu naturae lapsae operantem ex ipsa non excusat a peccato formali. Given the invincible ignorance of the law of nature, this [invincible ignorance] operating in the state of fallen nature does not excuse formally from sin. The reverse is implied by the condemnation; namely, that in a state of fallen nature, there may be invincible ignorance of the natural law, and, if so, it may excuse from formal (though not material) sin.

Ignorance of the Wrong, Development of an Idea, St. Bonaventure

THE FRANCISCAN SAINT BONAVENTURE, the Doctor Seraphicus, addressed the issue of ignorance and responsibility and sin. We will start with his treatment of it in his Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences.* In addressing the seeming conflicting authorities on the question, St. Bonaventure concludes that the ignorance of things that are essential for salvation (which, of course, includes the natural law**) may or may not be sinful.

Ignorance is a privation of knowledge, and "since privations are cognized through possessions" or habitus (privationes cognascantur per habitus), the cognition of ignorance depends upon the cognitition of its opposite, namely knowledge (cognitio ignorantiae pendet ex cognitione scientiae). Some of our knowledge does not relate to matters of salvation. The mechanical or liberal arts, for example, are not strictly speaking part of the moral life, and an engineer can got to heaven equally as can a painter. Knowledge of these practical sciences do not touch and concern "the 'being' of virtue," nec est virtus nec de esse virtutis. It follows that ignorance of these sorts of sciences, even if voluntary do not relate to moral fault.

But this is not so with respect to other matters. There are some things that all men must know, for all men are called to do good and to act rightly, and so knowledge that relates to this is required of all men:

Another is the cognition of (things) able to be believed and done, which is necessary for salvation in the adult; and this is the cognition of faith and prudence; and we are bound to have this cognition, because without it no one can live uprightly.

Alia est cognitio credibilium et operabilium, quae ad salutem necessaria est in adulto; et haec est cognitio fidei et prudentiae; et ad hanc cognitionem habendam tenemur, quia sine hac nullus potest recte vivere.

II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 2, c.

Ignorance of this knowledge or privation may be said to exist in two ways according to St. Bonaventure, in one way excusing and in another way not excusing. Thus in some situations, the obligation continues despite the lack of knowledge or ignorance. In other situations, the obligation ceases with the lack of knowledge. If the obligation remains regardless of knowledge, then there is moral fault in such ignorance.

If with the obligation remaining, then there is a fault in this, because, when one is bound to something and does not fulfill it, he is faulted on this very account and is worthy of punishment. But if there is a privation in us, with the obligation not remaining, such as when one cannot know, the impotence also excuses from the obligation [ab obligatione]; in this manner5 the privation of this cognition is not a fault, such as in the mad [in furiosis].

Id.

St. Bonaventure by Domenico Morone (1503)

An alternative way of looking at this matter (which leads to the same conclusion) is by looking at whether the lack of knowledge (i.e., the ignorance) is "in us, but not from us" (in nobis, sed non a nobis) or whether it is "in us and from us" (in nobis et a nobis).

That ignorance which is "in us, but not from us" is not a moral fault (i.e., we are blameless for it). We are not the principle or source of that ignorance, and so we neither obtain merit or demerit from its presence. (It may be the result of punishment, however.)

But that ignorance which is "in us and from us" may be imputable to us as moral fault, although a three-fold distinction must be made:

Moreover this can be in a threefold manner: either when standing forth [existentes] on the way of truth we voluntarily recede from it and precipitate ourselves into the ditch of error, and this privation can be said (to be) the “erroneous ignorance”, which is in heretics; and/or when, being strong enough [valentes] to attain to the way of truth, we desire to walk in shadows, and this can be said (to be) “affected ignorance”; or because out of a certain niggardliness and negligence we do not care to learn the truth, and this is said (to be) “crass and supine ignorance”. — And any of these is a fault, though the first (is) a greater (fault) than the second, and the second (more) than the third.

Id.***

Though all men, even the wisest, live in a state of ignorance (being that their knowledge is never complete), that ignorance is not counted as sin unless the matter or the man is under a duty to know, in which case that ignorance is imputable to him as sin:

[T]hat ‘to be ignorant’ is not said to be a fault except to the extent, by which one is bound to know what one is ignorant of. And for that reason, even if one is ignorant in every instant and is bound in every instant, yet because an affirmative precept does not oblige at all times [pro semper], but according to place and time [pro loco et tempore]; the one ignorant by being ignorant does not sin except in that instant and time, in which he is bound to know and/or learn what he is ignorant of; for that reason, even though he is always said “to be ignorant”, yet he is not always said “to sin”.

II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5.†

All ignorance excuses sin, in some manner (ignorantia aliquo modo excusat peccatum). Ignorance lessens (though it might not entirely erase) both the voluntary nature of an act and the contempt against God related to that act. "For with all other (things being) equal , he who sins out of industry contemns more, than he who sins ignorantly." II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 3, c. "[I]f [the ignorance] is so great, that it deprives entirely the reckoning of the voluntary and the reckoning of contempt, it excuses from the whole (sin)." Id.

In his discussion of the various authorities, St. Bonaventure treats the issue of ignorance of fact and ignorance of law:††

To that which is asked, “Which ignorance excuses and how much?”; it must be said, that there is ignorance of fact and ignorance of law. — Ignorance of fact can be in a twofold manner: either with due diligence employed, or not. If due diligence (has) been employed, it excuses from the whole (sin); if (it has) not been employed, it does not excuse from the whole (sin), but from as much as (it would have been).

But if the ignorance be of a law, this can be in a twofold manner: either it is vincible, or invincible. If vincible, then it is an ignorance, which is a fault. And this either is out of a true consent, such as (in) affected ignorance, and this excuses thus on one side, that it aggravates more on the other side; or it is out of negligence and idleness [ignavia], just as crass and supine ignorance (does), and thus, even if it excuses in some manner, yet it does not «excuse so much, that one will not burn in sempiternal fire», just as (St.) Augustine says, and Master (Peter) in the text.

But if the ignorance be invincible, this can be in a twofold manner: either this ignorance has been introduced into us through a preambulary fault, or apart from all fault. If apart from all fault, it either deprives a cognition of the law simply, as in infants and in the mad, who entirely lack the use of reason; and this excuses from the whole (sin) — wherefore (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux) says, «that to infant and sleeping children nothing, which they do, is imputed». — Or it does not take away entirely the use of reason, but the full (use of reason); and then it does not excuse from the whole (sin), but from as much as (it would have been), just as is among those who are not fully mad, but have in some manner lucid intervals, and in children, who in some manner are capable of (knowing) the precept, though not fully. — But if the ignorance has been introduced through one’s own fault, just as it is the inebriated and the mad, each of whom has precipitated himself into this through his own fault; in this manner it does not excuse from the whole (sin), but from as much as (it would have been), because, just as the Philosopher says, «the inebriated will have a twofold malediction, namely a malediction for the preceding fault and a malediction for the subsequent fault».

II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 3, ad 5.

A review of St. Bonaventure's teaching makes it clear that he has "abandon[ed] the earlier narrow views of the Franciscan to advance a milder doctrine," more in keeping with the early Dominicans.†††
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*Commentaria in Qutuor Libros Sententiarum, available on the Internet in English/Latin at http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/sent.html.
**As we have noted before, obedience to the natural law is essential for salvation. In the words of Cardinal Archbishop Raymond Burke, "Obedience to the demands of the natural law is necessary for salvation." See Compliance with the Natural Law is Essential for Salvation.
***Hoc autem potest esse tripliciter: vel cum in via veritatis existentes voluntarie ab ea recedimus et in erroris foveam nos praecipitamus, et haec privatio potest dici ignorantia erronea, quae est in haereticis; vel cum, ad viam veritatis valentes pertingere, cupimus in tenebris ambulare, et haec potest dici ignorantia affectata; aut quia ex quadam pigritia et negligentia non curamus veritatem addiscere, et haec dicitur ignorantia crassa et supina. — Et quaelibet istarum est culpa, licet prima maior quam secunda, et secunda quam tertia.
†[I]gnorare non dicitur esse culpa nisi eatenus, qua quis tenetur scire quod ignorat. Et ideo, etsi in quolibet instanti ignoret et in quolibet teneatur, quia tamen praeceptum affirmativum non obligat pro1 semper, sed pro loco et tempore; ignorans ignorando non peccat nisi in illo instanti et tempore, in quo tenetur nosse vel addiscere quod ignorat; ideo, quamvis semper dicatur ignorare, non tamen semper dicitur peccare.
††Here, Bertke is just plain wrong when he says that the "expression ignorantia iuris is not found in this exposition." Bertke, 56.
†††See Ignorance of the Wrong--Development of an Idea, Part 1

Ignorance of the Wrong-Development of an Idea, St. Albert the Great

IN OUR LAST POSTING WE ENDED our review of the historical development of the role of ignorance of the law, the ignorantia iuris, by exploring the concept from Gratian through William of Auxerre and then its division into the Franciscan rigorist school (which maintained William of Auxerre's exceptionless dictum that any ignorance of the natural law was inexcusable) and the less rigorous Dominican school (which soft-pedaled but did not retract or contradict William of Auxerre's dictum).

We shall now turn to St. Albert the Great and his Commentary on the Sentences, where he directly approaches the question of whether ignorance of the law, ignorantia iuris, is sinful or whether there may be mitigating circumstances that may offer excuse. In addressing this question, St. Albert appears to depart from the early Dominicans and lapses back into a more rigorist position. For example, St. Albert opines that ignorance of those moral truths that are necessary for life in common and those necessary for salvation--the precepts against fornication, murder, and so forth--is always sinful and is inexcusable. Similarly treated is ignorance of that knowledge necessary for one's state or office in life, the ignorance of which is sinful and without excuse.

St. Albert the Great
(Sanctus Albertus Magnus)

[E]t est privatio habitus regentibus in moribus necessariis ad salutem: et haec est duplex, scilicet quaedam est habitus privatio instruentis ad ea quae necessaria sunt vitae in communi, ut ignorantia juris divini ordinantis mores in praceptis, ut fornicationem esse peccatum mortale, et homicidium, et hujusmodi: et haec est peccatum in habentibus usum rationis. Alia est privatio habitus practici intellectus regentis in pertinentibus ad officium, ut Pontifex factas litteras ad fidem et mores instituentes tenetur scire, et sacerdos ea sine quibus actus sacerdotalis non valet exerceri, et hujusmodi: et haec ignorantia habitu officio etiam peccatum est, sed non habito, non est peccatus.

And it is the privation of a habit of morals the guidance of which is necessary for salvation: and this is of two kinds, namely, there is a certain privation of the habit of which instructs as to those things that are necessary for life in common, as, for example, ignorance of the divine law which which precepts of the manners of such life, such as that fornication, or murder, or the like are mortal sins: and this is a sin in those who have the use of reason. The other is the privation of a habit ruling the practical intellect in the things pertaining to their office [state in life], such as the obligation of the Pope to know matters of faith and morals, and that of the priest to know those things without which his priestly acts are invalid, and such like, and this ignorance in the habit of their office [or state of life] is a sin, but if it is not in the habit, it is not a sin.

II Sent., D. XXII, I, art. 7.*/**

St. Albert distinguishes further between affective or voluntary ignorance (i.e., involving an act of will) and intellectual ignorance. If the ignorance is affective or voluntary, then the consequent act is sinful and without excuse. However, if the ignorance is intellectual and not voluntary, there may be an excusing cause. If the ignorance is one of fact alone, there is a complete excuse because the act would be involuntary. (If the fact were known, the wrongful act would not have been done.) This is not the case is the intellectual ignorance is an ignorance of law. Ignorance of the law may or may not excuse, depending upon its level of crassness.

Dicendum, quod ignorantia secundum quod est peccatum, sive de se, sive de annexo, aliquid habet in affectu, secundum quod affectata dicitur: et habet aliquid in intellectu scilicet privationem habitus regentis in operabilibus pertinentibus ad vitam vel officium.

Dicendum igitur, quod quantum ad primum, peccatum est. Quantum autem ad secundum non est peccatum, et excusat vel a toto, si est particularis et facti: vel a tanto, si est juris vel universalis, quod idem est: quia ex illa parte facit ignorare circumstantias in quibus est actus, et ita est causa involuntarii quod meretur ignoscentiam et misericordiam aliquam.

It must be said, that ignorance insofar as it is a sin, whether of itself (de se), or collaterally (de annexo), is something had in the affection, according to which it said to be affected, and such a person has something in the intellect, that is, a privation in the habit which governs practical matters pertaining to life or one's office [or state] in life.

It must be said, therefore, that in regard to the former, it is sinful. As to the latter, it is not sinful, and one may be excused in part or entirely, if it is [a privation involving] something particular and of fact; but inasmuch as [the privation] is one of law or something universal, which is the same: for that part done when ignorant of the circumstances regarding the act is an involuntary cause done in ignorance which merits a certain mercy.

II Sent., D. XXII, I, art. 9 & ad. 1.

St. Albert distinguishes different kinds of ignorance, though the most basic division is vincible ignorance from invincible ignorance. There is ignorance which invincible in the nature of things (invincibilis ex natura), such as those who do not have the use of reason (stulti, morionibus, et melancholicis), and such ignorance totally excuses. There is ignorance which is accidentally invicible (invincibilis ex accidente), and this is two-fold, depending upon whether the accidental aspect is separable or inseparable (aut separabile, aut inseparabile), that is temporary or lasting, the former existing as a result of inebriation or drug-induced states, the latter being something as a result of an illness. Here the great division is based upon whether such accidental states are self-imposed. If one has no fault in the accidental loss of knowledge, one is entirely excused. However, if the accidental loss of knowledge is knowingly self-imposed, then it depends upon whether the state of ignorance was the result of a licit or illicit act. If the temporary loss of knowledge results as a collateral effect of some licit act, there is an excuse. If, however, the temporary loss of knowledge is something venially illicit, one is excused, but if it is mortally illicit, then one is not entirely excused.

Vincible ignorance can be divided into ignorance of fact and of law, which is the same distinction as the particular and the universal. Law is nothing but the universal rule that governs life or governs one's office or state (quia ius vocatur hic regulae universales et regentes vitam, vel officium). When it comes to particular matters, that is, contingent matters of fact, even the wise can be ignorant. And as to particular or contingent matters--which are matters of fact--ignorance of such matters may entirely excuse someone from sin. Ignorance of the law, however, is assessed differently:

Juris autem est duplex: quia quoddam est jus universale, quod omnimbus imponitur ad sciendum: et quoddam est particular, quod non scitur nisi per studium: et puto, quod prima est crassa et supona, non excusans. Secunda autem excusat, vel a tanto, vel a toto, si est casus multum dificilis.

[Ignorance of] law, however, is twofold: that which relates to the universal law, which is imposed upon all and of which all have knowledge: and that which relates to the particular, such that it is not known except by study: And I say that the first [kind of ignorance] is crass and supine, and inexcusable. The second kind [of ignorance] is subject to excuse, whether in whole or in part, depending upon whether the case is very difficult.

II Sent., D. XXII, I, art. 10.

Manifestly, for St. Albert, ignorance of the basic, universal natural moral law is never excused. Such ignorance is always crass and supine and blameworthy.

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*For St. Albert the Great's notion of habit, see our prior posting St. Albert the Great: Natural Law as Habitus.
**St. Albert's Commentaries are found at http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~albertus/pdfs/Borgnet-volumen%2027.PDF.

Ignorance of the Wrong-Development of an Idea, Part 1

IT IS COMMON TO SPEAK OF A DISTINCTION between ignorance of the law and ignorance of fact, ignorantia iuris and ignorantia facti. But it was not always common to make this distinction between law and fact, and the concept arose rather late and then went through a process of development. Rev. Stanley Bertke has a quick excursus on the development of this idea in pages 52 through 58 of his excellent little work, The Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law, and it merits being summarized here.

At the outset, the canonist Gratian (mid-12th century)* mentions the distinction between ignorance of fact and ignorance of law:

Est enim ignorantia alia facti, alia iuris. Facti alia quod non portuit eum scire quod oportuit cum scire . . . Quod oportuit eum scire . . . haec neminem excusat. Item ignorantia iuris alia naturalis, alia civilis. Naturalis omnimbus adulties damanbilis est; ius vero civile aliis permittitur ignorare, aliis non.

For there is one ignorance of fact, and another of law. The [ignorance] of fact may be that of which there was no need to know and that which was necessary to know. That which is is necessary to know. . . . [Ignorance] of that which is necessary to know excuses no one. There is also ignorance of the natural law and [ignorance] of the civil law. [Ignorance] of the natural law in adult is damnable; of the civil law, some are permitted to be ignorant, others not.

C.XII, C.1, q. 4. Gratian's distinction appears to be a common starting point for the scholastic theologians who reviewed and later systematized the matter over a period of time.

Simon of Tournai (1130-1201) focuses on Gratian's distinction, and, following the canonists, he advanced the view that ignorance of fact excused from sin. Thus, if someone unknowingly hurled a stone and it struck another and killed him, the lack of knowledge excuses from the thrower of the rock from sin. Simon of Tournai also distinguished between ignorance of the natural law and ignorance of positive law. A knowing violation of the positive law is, in addition to a legal infraction, also sinful. However, ignorance of the positive law excuses one from sin (though not necessarily from the legal infraction). Thus someone who travels through a foreign jurisdiction ignorant that a certain act is unlawful, is excused from sin even if he breaches the positive law. However, ignorance of the natural law never excuses from sin in Simon of Tournai's view. This is because natural law is so innate to human reason, and so readily known that noluit enim scire quod naturaliter posset, it is impossible for one not to know that which he naturally possesses.** "Simon of Tournai would therefore hold that ignorance of the natural law never excuses from sin for the very ignorance is a sin in itself." Bertke, 52. Simon of Tournai's view suffers from an excessive inatism as it relates to the natural moral law.

William of Auxerre (c. 1150-1231) was perhaps the first Scholastic theologian to handle in a systematic way the natural law (in his Summa Aurea). In his treatment of ignorance, William of Auxere elaborated a three-fold distinction in ignorance

[William of Auxerre] distinguished a triplex ignorance: ignorantia simplicis negationis, which is the absence of knowledge when there is no obligation to know; ignorantia privationis, which is the absence of knowledge one is obliged to possess; and ignorantia dispositionis qua quis aliter opinatur de re quam sit, which implies not only the absence of knowledge but a positive error to the contrary. Though the latter may excuse from win when it cannot be overcome, the former is always culpable.

Bertke, 53. For William of Auxerre ignorance of the natural law was always sinful--ignorantia iuris neminem excusat, and that without any exception. Although the speculative knowledge of the law might not be sinful without an act, the moment that speculative error was put into play in an erroneous practical judgment which, by definition, was against the virtue of prudence, that act (as long as it was free) was sinful. Bertke, 53. William of Auxerre thus advanced a rigoristic notion of ignorance of the natural law. It simply did not exist.

The Meeting of St. Dominic and St. Francis by Benozzo Gozzoli c. 1452

The first softening of this position was seen among the Dominicans. So Roland of Cremona (1178-1259), Hugh of Saint Cher (ca. 1200-1263), Richard Fishacre (or Fitzacre) (ca. 1200-1248), and John of Treves, while they follow William of Auxerre generally, they seem to reject the absolute principle that ignorance of the law never excuses one from fault. They do so, not by expressly rejecting that teaching, but by more or less suppressing the absolute formula of William of Auxerre. On the other hand, the Franciscan school, at least as it may be found in John of La Rochelle (also known as Jean de La Rochelle, or Johannes de Rupella, died 1245), appears to have maintained the original rigor of William of Auxerre. For John of La Rochelle, "[t]he natural law is written on the hearts of men; therefore, ignorantia iuris naturalis nullum adultum excusat, sicut dicit Decretum." Bertke, 54 (citing to Summa de Vitiis, 228, f. 11).

Similarly, Alexander of Hales (1185-1245) follows the rigoristic line. In answering questions on the issue of the levels of ignorance and the concomitant level of excuse, Alexander of Hales "holds that the more one is held to know the law, the less ignorance and excuse for transgressions." Bertke, 54. It follows from this that since all have the obligation to know the natural law, no one who is ignorant of the natural law can be said to be excused of it. Ignorance of the natural law is, in all cases, imputable to the actor and sinful, at least insofar as one has the use of reason and is not mad or lacking reason. "Ignorantia enim iuris naturalis neminem excusat qui usum potest habere sciendi, sicut dicitur, 'ignorantia iuris naturalis omnibus adultis damnabilis est,' adultis dico, qui habent usum rationis, propter furiosos et huiusmodi." Bertke, 54.

And so the issue seemed to be: the early Dominicans seemed sub silentio to soften William of Auxerre's rigorism, while the Franciscans "resolutely adopt it." Bertke, 54. Unlike St. Dominic and St. Francis, who so touchingly met and embraced as shown in Gozzoli's artwork, on the matter of ignorance of the natural law, there was no such embracing among the theologians.

In the next blog posting, we will see what effect the Aristotelian revolution had on development of this issue. We shall review the work of the great Dominicans, St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas, and the great Franciscan, St. Bonaventure.
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*Lex Christianorum has handled Gratian's contribution to the natural law and his Decretum before. See Gratian and the Natural Law: Concordance and Discordance in the Natural Law, Part 1 and Gratian and the Natural Law: Concordance and Discordance in the Natural Law, Part 2.
**Bertke, 52 (quoting Paris Nat. Lat. 14886, f. 29, cited by Lottin, D.O., "Le Probleme de Ignorantia Iuris," Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Medievale, Vol.5, 1933, p. 352.

Ignorance of the Wrong-Kinds of Ignorance

IGNORANCE, WHICH ST. THOMAS DEFINES as a privation of knowledge by one capable of knowing,* plays a role in the assessment of a moral act, and it does so in various ways depending upon how it affects that moral act. Ignorance may have an effect in four ways:

1. it may be the cause (causa per accidens or the causa removens prohibens) of it;
2. it may constitute the basis of an excuse from guilt;
   
3. it may constitute the basis of an increase of guilt; or
4. it may be sin itself.
   

Traditionally in Catholic moral theology, ignorance has been categorized with reference to diligence and capability of overcoming it, thus ignorance may be divided into two categories:

1. vincible ignorance is ignorance which could be overcome with reasonable moral diligence, and so exists in the subject as a result of failure to use such diligence.
2. invincible ignorance is ignorance which exists or would exist despite the use of reasonable moral diligence (assuming that the subject is aware of such a duty) or that which exists when the subject is not even aware of the possibility of error or the obligation or inquiring further (i.e., when the subject is not even aware he is under a duty of inquiry).
   

Vincible ignorance--assuming the subject is under a moral duty to know the truth--is for that reason morally imputable to the subject and hence morally culpable.

Ignorance may also be viewed from the perspective of the relationship between the will of the subject and the act which that subject performs. From this perspective, ignorance may be said to be antecedent, concomitant, or consequent.

1. antecedent ignorance is the cause (causa per accidens or causa removens prohibens) of an act when, if such knowledge were present in the subject, the act would not have taken place;
2. concomitant ignorance is one which accompanies the act, but which has no causal effect upon the act: it is collateral to and immaterial to the act in terms of its cause, as the actor would have performed the act whether he was ignorant or not. Thus the presence of concomitant ignorance, though not causal, renders the act non-voluntary.
   
3. consequent ignorance is a result of an act of will, consequently it always follows the act of will, but not the sinful act of which it is cause (i.e., it precedes the sinful act which it causes).

The will is the efficient cause, that is the agent, of an act, and if the act is sinful it the cause per se of the act itself (the act qua act), and it is the cause per accidens of the sin as deordination, that is as a deflection or departing of the guiding influence of law. But the will must have an object which it seeks to attain, that is its intellect must have some sort of "picture" of what the will desires. If the intellect is in a state of privation or lack, then what is it that moves the will? How can nothing (a privation) influence the will to act?

Nothing comes from nothing, so the lack of knowledge or ignorance can never be the per se causa or direct cause of an action; rather, ignorance is something which, if it had been possessed, would prevent the action.** Ignorance is therefore a causa removens prohibens of an act.

Can ignorance be sin? The answer to this question depends upon whether there is a duty to know. St. Thomas insists that all persons have an obligation to know those things which make man man, that is, a rational animal with a created nature. He has an obligation to know, for example, the universal principles of the natural moral law and of his particular duties in life. The failure to know these universal principles or one's particular duties if he has the ability to do so (i.e., if he is in a state of vincible ignorance) is a sin of omission.

Generally, since ignorance is not the direct cause of an objective moral infraction, but is rather the causa per accidens or removens prohibens of the moral infraction, the moral wrong is not imputed to the subject. (In the moral order, as distinguished from the legal order, ignorance of the law is generally an excuse.) Two kinds of ignorance, however, are imputable to the subject: (1) where the ignorance itself is voluntary (when the ignorance is consequent to an act of will); or (2) where there is only partial excuse because the ignorance relates to the object sought.

As to (1): Obviously, one cannot will oneself to be ignorant and escape moral fault. "Ignorance, as an excuse, then will lose validity in proportion as the will is inclined toward it." Bertke, 51. If ignorance is directly sought, then it is called affected ignorance, and any sin arising from it is directly imputable to the actor, and, in fact, increases the guilt involved in the act. When the ignorance is not directly sought, but is the indirect result of the difficulty involved in, or repugnance to, learning the truth, then the acts which result from that indirect ignorance are more or less imputable to the actor, and though the actor's guilt is more or less diminished, it is not entirely diminished to the point of exoneration or complete excuse.

As to (2): The ignorance here concerns the object. Since St. Thomas excludes concomitant ignorance from his assessment, ignorance must be such so that had one known of the truth, one would not have acted in the manner he did. However, one can consider circumstances where, if the actor was not ignorant, he would not engage in the particular sin, and yet, he would engage in another sin, and so he is not blameless. For example, a man may be ignorant that the woman with whom he is having sexual relations is married and, had he known she was married he would not have engaged in sexual relations. However, had she not been married he would not have had similar scruple. In such a case, the actor would be partially excused (of adultery), but not excused as to his act of impurity (fornication).
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*S. T. IaIIae, q. 76, art. 2, c. (Ignorantia vero importat scientiae privationem, dum scilicet alicui deest scientia eorum quae aptus natus est scire. Ignorant implies a privation of knowledge, when someone lacks something which he is naturally capable of knowing.)
**It follows that St. Thomas excludes the notion of concomitant ignorance from his analysis since it has no relevance to the moral assessment of an act, since the act would have occurred whether ignorance was present or was not present. S.T. IaIIae, q. 76, art. 1, c.

Ignorance of the Wrong-Intellectus Movet Voluntatem

MODERN MORALITY IS ALMOST ALWAYS a matter of feeling, and not a matter of reason. The only real exception to subjectivism and emotivism in modern morality is Kant, and he is clinically intellectual. Kant's morality is sort of like an archaeologist pointing to a human skeleton with bleached bones and maintaining that this citizen of an ossuary is a living, breathing, thriving man. But it is clear that the skeleton lacks a heart, not to mention other organs of passion. No wonder when faced with Kant's pure reason, people run to the feelings and passions of the flesh and its impulses as if they have seen a ghost. Either that, or they turn to the simple and simplistic practical logic of utilitarianism, as the only pragmatic and realistic option. The only problem is that the modern avenues--a Kantian pure reason, pure emotivism, or pure utilitarianism or consequentialism--are dead ends, moral cul-de-sacs.

As we have seen, the classical theories of natural law, although reason-based, do not for all that neglect the natural inclinations of man, man as body and soul. These inclinations are those deeply felt, though nevertheless rational impulses (since they arise from the plan designed in that nature by the God who created it) that arise from man's nature-seeking-to-be-fulfilled, that is man's very entelechy, a nature which seeks readmission, as it were, into the very God who made it. The classical theories of natural law recognize also the disorder in the passions, customs, and conventions of men (though they do not necessarily know their source--revelation will tell them of that), but are confident and optimistic that man's reason is able, at least in theory and in its wise and virtuous exemplars, to overcome these disordered passions, conventions, and customs, and point out what is objectively right and consonant with nature and right reason, and what is wrong and opposed to nature and is unreasonable.

St. Thomas Aquinas

In this life, that is on this side of eternity, man is nothing but a bundle of potentialities seeking to actualize themselves: becoming is an important part of his being. He has being, is not being itself; this being who has being, lives in the flux of time and outside of eternity. He is therefore not at his end, but he seeks his end, must act toward that end, which means that he must exercise his will toward that end. Man is in pursuit of happiness. That pursuit requires the exercise of the will. That will is ultimately moved by man's intellect, for in the created being, the will follows the intellect, which is the storehouse of knowledge: Intellectus movet voluntatem.*

But the intellect does not move the will necessarily: "The good perceived" by the intellect, St. Thomas says, "moves the will in the same way as a man who counsels or persuades, that is to say, by pointing out the goodness of an object." Bertke, 46-47.

The intellect's role in moving the will, however, is not one-way or unilateral. The will likewise affects the intellect:

This reciprocal causality by which the intellect proposes various goods to the will as capable of attainment, and the will freely chooses between the goods proposed, while retaining within itself the power to direct the intellect tot he consideration of particular goods, helps us to understand that statement[s] of St. Thomas that the "judgment which decides that a certain action is to be placed can never be out of harmony with appetite," and "evil desire is always linked up with some error of practical knowledge."

Bertke, 47.***

In further exploring the role of the intellect in the classical natural law theory, we must distinguish between particular knowledge and universal or general knowledge. The former is more important in our moral life because it is more proximate to the day-to-day moral decisions that we make. It is a particularization of the universal or general principles that governs us in the concrete. Indeed, the universal knowledge that we have "has no value whatever unless particularized for the action itself, which, as concerned with concrete things, is always the result of a particular judgment acting as the dispositive cause." Bertke, 47. The moral life is lived in the particular and concrete, and practical judgment is concerned with the practical and concrete. It moves and lives and thrives in the rough-and-tumble and dizzying world of contingency, a world of virtue and vice, of habit and one-of-a-kind acts, of detail and flux, of impulse and counter-impulse, of sense and passion, in both light and fog and darkness, and in heat and in cold. It does not find itself in some Kantian intellectual ivory tower, withdrawn from the real world into an idealistic dream world of pure reason or in some Nor does it find itself in some utilitarian accounting office with a moral abacus which counts all evil results and all good results of any one act from here to eternity to calculate with precision what is right and what is wrong.

Knowledge of the good is thus essential for right moral action, even though the will is not necessarily moved by knowledge of the good. Yet, it is messy in the real world where decisions are made. And it is a fact of life that we may lack that knowledge of the good. We may, in fact, labor in ignorance. Our intellect may suffer from some privation.

Considering that knowledge and its influence over the will is so essential to the moral life, what happens when that knowledge is lacking?
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*Contra gentiles, III.88.2 (So, no created substance can move the will except by means of a good which is understood. Nulla igitur substantia creata potest movere voluntatem nisi mediante bono intellecto.) See also S. T. Ia, q. 82 art. 4 co. (A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis.)
**De malo, q. 3, art. 3, c. (For we say that the apprehended object moves the will, and we say that one who commends or persuades moves the will in this way, namely, inasmuch as such a one makes something seem good (Regan's translation). [N]am bonum apprehensum movere dicitur voluntatem; et per hunc modum dicitur movere consilians vel suadens, in quantum scilicet facit apparere aliquod esse bonum). Bertke translates rather freely it thus: "The good perceived moves the will in the same way that a man who counsels and persuades, that is to say, by pointing out the goodness of an object." Bertke, 46-47.
***The quotes are to De veritate, q. 24, art. 2, c. (Sed iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, nunquam potest esse contrarium appetitui) and De malo, q. 16, art. 6, ad. 11 (perversitas appetitus non possit esse sine falsitate cognitionis).

Ignorance of the Wrong-Levels of Knowledge

IN OUR EARLIER POSTING WE EXPLORED the issue of the ontological division of precepts with a focus on the relationship of the precept to the ultimate end. In this posting, we shall explore the epistemological division of precepts. The former looked at the precepts in se; the latter will look at the precepts quoad nos, as we know (or are ignorant of) them. Knowledge of the precepts is obviously important for if the precepts are to guide us in our reasonable quest for happiness and our ultimate good, then we must have knowledge of the precepts when choosing among the various particular goods that confront us in determining whether the particular goods are, in fact, leading us to happiness or our ultimate good.

The practical reason in man, not less than the speculative, is discursive; it draws conclusions from general principles which are, so to speak, their causes. As principles are better known than conclusions, it becomes evident that some precepts of the natural moral law will be better known than others. There will be a hierarchy of order according to the cognoscibility.

Bertke, 37. Knowledge of principles is affected by a variety of factors, but we may categorize them into two general areas: (i) the precepts' generality versus their particularity, and (ii) their closeness to our natural inclinations. These two areas are important in distinguishing what affects our knowledge of moral principles.

The general principles of the natural law may be self-evident inclinations or principles or may be direct conclusions from self-evident principles. On the other hand, they may be determinations much further down the discursive chain of reasoning. The injunction, "do not kill the innocent," is much more readily understood (and known) than the application of that principle in the issue of ordinary care and extraordinary care, and when extraordinary medical means may be refused, or when palliative care, which indirectly may hasten death, may be used to alleviate the suffering of a patient. It is apparent at once that the more common or general principle is more readily known than the more particularized application of it.

[I]t becomes evident that the practical intellect will be apt to know precepts which deal with human action in general before it becomes aware of those norms which guide particular actions, and the deeper we descend into the real of particular action surrounded by various circumstances, the more difficulty is encountered by the intellect in determining the correct norm to follow."

Bertke, 40.

Generality of a principle ought not to be confused with self-evidency, as there may be self-evident principles that are general and those that are particularized and require specialized knowledge. Self-evident principles are those in which the predicate is contained within the subject, so that if one knows the subject, one will necessarily know the predicate. St. Thomas divides the propositions into those which are self-evident considered in themselves (secundum se or per se notae quoad se) and those which are self-evident in relation to the knowing subject (quoad nos).* Since knowledge of self-evidency requires that we know the subject and the predicate (so as to recognize that the predicate is contained within the subject), it follows that ignorance of the subject or predicate will result in our failing to comprehend a self-evident proposition or principle.

Since our knowledge is derived from the senses, it follows that those principles that are more closely tied to the senses are more readily known. Similarly, those principles which are strongly tied to natural inclinations are generally better known. "[F]acility in the acceptance of a precept guiding an inclination will be in proportion to the strength of the inclination." Bertke, 39. Inclinations tend to be stronger the more further removed they are from man's conscious intellectual activity. The intellectual feltness found in man's basic inclinations are, in a manner of speaking, guttural and "these inclinations will be stronger in those regions farthest removed from the conscious life."** The principles behind the basic inclinations which incline and direct the will strongly will be more readily grasped than those to which the will is indifferent. There thus arises a certain curious paradox:

It is paradoxical that the intellect will more easily assent to precepts guiding to the attainment of those goods which are farthest removed from conscious life as such, while the easiest assent of all will be to that precept which guides us to the good which is possible only because of the nature of intellectual apprehension. The reason lies in the strength of the inclination. . . . [M]an must seek the total human good, or perfect happiness; this is man's strongest inclination, and a precept finding its wellspring therein will most easily find acceptance in the intellect.

Bertke, 40. There are, moreover, distinctions within the inclinations arising from whether these relate to being generally, animality, or rationality. There is, therefore a "threefold category of inclinations which man possesses by reason of his complex nature." Bertke, 42. "[E]ach distinct class of being has an inclination to the good which is in conformity with its nature. We find similar inclinations of all these types in man by reason of his complexity." Bertke, 41-42.

Following St. Thomas, Bertke therefore distinguishes the overriding first principle of moral life and "a series of precepts which, though less universal and therefore less easily known than the first principle, are nevertheless self-evident to all and therefore constitute with it the first class of precepts." They are as follows:

• good must be done; evil must be avoided (the first principle).
• being must be conserved.
• the species must be conserved.
• act in accordance with rational nature.
• do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
• give everyone his due.
  

As we descend from these self-evident general principles, we encounter a "second group of precepts," easily deduced from the first class, "and which have to do with determined actions or means to the realization of the general goods proposed to man's reason by the various inclinations." Bertke, 43. By and large, this second group of precepts is well-summarized in the Ten Commandments or Decalogue. Though the Ten Commandments are revealed precepts, they are coterminous with precepts of the natural law that are easily deduced from the fundamental principle of the natural moral law and the self-evident principles identified above.***

To St. Thomas the Ten Commandments are a sort of moral plexus which implicitly contain the fundamental precepts of the natural law and, further, implicitly contain the entirety of all further conclusions and determinations. "The first precepts are to be found in the Decalogue as principles are contained in conclusions drawn from them, while the remote precepts are contained in the Decalogue as conclusions in principles." Bertke, 43.†

From the first level and second level precepts we may mover further down the deductive chain of reasoning. At this point we enter more and more remote conclusions or determinations. As we go further down this often times sinuous mental road, matters become more concrete, particularized, contingent, conditional and therefore more mentally tenuous. Commonly, the precepts of this third level are not self-evident or readily obtained by the ordinary man. The ordinary man needs help, either by reliance upon the judgment of a wise and virtuous person or upon positive law (either divine or human) to determine the correct norm of action. It is evident that a huge part of our lives plays out in this third level of precepts. Accordingly, it follows that a large part of our lives must be governed by the judgment of wise men or positive law.††

Error and ignorance of the natural moral law is not "the normal fruit of the mind," and yet, in the state of man as we find him, fallen and with a loss of integral nature, it is the case that error and ignorance are common, and in fact more frequent than truth and knowledge. Mental or moral abnormality is unfortunately common, and we have modern institutions in competition with the Church for man's soul that encourage, promote, and relish in propagandizing error.††† But before we can assess what is abnormal, we need to know what is normal and what may detract from normalcy.

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*S.T., IaIIae, q. 94, art. 2, c.
**As we have discussed before, it is not that these inclinations are irrational; rather, they are very rational even though their rationality is not such that result from the conscious or propositional rationality. Maritain and others have called this rational (but not conscious) knowledge by inclination or by connaturality, and we have used the concept of "intellectual feltness" to encompass both the rational aspect of it and the inclinatory, connatural, congenial aspect of it. See Jacques Maritain and Natural Law: Inclination and Law, Part 1. Yves Simon uses an interesting analogy to distinguish matters known by inclination versus matters known consciously through discursive knowledge. Knowledge known by inclination is, as it were, "smelled." Knowledge known discursively or consciously is, at it were, "touched," or "seen." See notes to Virtue Defined.
***Excepted would be the requirement to keep the Sabbath holy. Though the worship of God would be preceptive under the natural law, it would not necessarily translate into the separating apart of a particular day of the week to God.
†See S. T. IaIIae, q. 100, art. 3, c.
††Some of these wise men wear habits or soutanes. In the case of a person who has faith in Christ, he would have the further assured help of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, which provides guidance, under some circumstances infallible guidance, of the content of the natural moral law even in this third level. It would seem, however, that even a person without faith in Christ and his Church would pay attention to the Church as an institution that has amassed tremendous wisdom of both matters divine and human. Even as a matter of natural faith, the Church ought to be recognized as a voice crying out in the moral wilderness. Far better to listen to the Church, than to the drone of the media and the opinions of their proffered pundits and talking heads, the psycho-babble of many psychiatrists and psychologists, the foolishness of "Dear Ann" columns or articles in Cosmopolitan, the inanities of the celebrities of Hollywood, or the slogans of self-serving politicians.
†††The names of these competing institutions are Legion (Cf. Mark 5:9; Luke 8:30). We might include such names as PP, ACLU, MSNBC, MTV, NAMBLA, KKK, ANP. Some of these demons of Gadarenes are decidedly less liberal or progressive, e.g., Al-Qaida.

Ignorance of the Wrong-Necessary and Proper

THE LAW UNDER WHICH MAN'S FLOURISHING is assured--the natural moral law--is both one and many. All the many precepts of the natural moral law flow out of, are informed by, and take their lifeblood from that one single, unalterable principle: good ought to be done and evil avoided. There is no moral precept that is not this principal precept--good ought to be done and evil avoided--under another name and fitted to the circumstances of its application. Everything of any validity in the moral life flows from the self-evident principle: bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum! The self-evident root of all moral action, of every selection of means to an end, "is only an expression of the nature of rational action . . . to act for an end conformable to human nature, to the rational good . . . therein the natural law finds it unity." Bertke, 32. This principle--do good, avoid evil--is "the foundation stone which supports the whole edifice" of human morals.

In applying this most general and ubiquitous of moral principles--do good and avoid evil--we must take account man's position in the cosmos. He is, first of all, a blend of matter, animal, and spirit. He is, second of all, limited to relationships with creatures even in the pursuit of his ultimate good, that is the God who created him. Finally, we must consider the difference between precepts that are necessary (primarily intended) and those that are only proper or fitting (secondarily intended) and which make the necessary or primarily intended precepts easier to fulfill or allow us better to fulfill them.

Man is an admixture of those natures below him. He is being, a creature; he is an animal; he is a rational one. It follows that his nature, and the law therein contained, likewise participates in the admixture. "There will be a threefold division [in the precepts] according to the three inclinations arising from nature, animality, and rationality" which are found in man. Yet every one one of the precepts regardless to which division of nature it may principally refer back to is nevertheless "essentially an ordination of reason." A precept referable to man's being (e.g., self-preservation), or from man's animality (e.g., procreation), participates in reason every bit as much as a precept that is principally or immediately referable to man's rational nature (e.g., truth-telling). Bertke, 33. The rational nature, being preeminent and what defines man uniquely as man, rules over both man's animality and his being. Thus, it is never right to strive for self-preservation unreasonably, or to seek to procreate (or prevent procreation) unreasonably. Though self-preservation and procreation relate to the orders of being and of animality respectively, they remain ordered by reason.

The fact that man cannot achieve his ultimate good (God) directly, but must do so only indirectly through creatures gives rise to some distinctions in the precepts which we may classify as ontological. The value of human acts may be determined ontologically, that is, in reference to what they are. This means that the value of human acts vary depending upon their relationship to their end, their closeness to their end, or the quality in achieving that end. What is worse? To hate broccoli, one's co-worker, one's father? It would seem that in this series we travel from bad to worse solely by reference to the relationship of the act (hatred) to its object: the more dignified the object, the more disvalue given to the same act. There is a similar measure that relates to the quality of the means. From an artistic viewpoint, what is more beautiful? A child's rough sketch of his parents or Rembrandt's portrait of his father? What is more noble? To spend $1,000 gambling in Las Vegas or on the college education of one's son? Analogously, the value of a moral act is similarly affected by its end and the quality of its means or the intention of the actor. That this is so allows us to divide precepts ontologically, that is, in reference to their ends and the quality of the means to that end.

Which Portrait of One's Father is More Beautiful?

Man's ultimate end is God. It follows that from an ontological perspective those acts that have God as their immediate object have greater dignity than those which have God only as their remote object. There is no human act, however, which allows direct access to the vision of God's essence. "Entended," said St. Theresa of Avila, "que si es en la cocina, entre los pucheros anda el Señor ayudándoos en lo interior y exterior." Understand that if one finds oneself in the kitchen, among the pots and pans walks the Lord, helping us in the interior and exterior life.*

Figuratively, man always walks with the Lord among the pots and pans. Just like our knowledge of God is mediated through the created world, so likewise are our moral actions (all of which have God as their ultimate reference) mediated through the created world. "It is in the nature of man that he realize the potentialities within himself by contact with matter: he must deal with creatures," pots and pans, horses and mules, bishops and whores. He must deal with il suo fratello asino, his brother ass, as St. Francis of Assisi called the body. He must deal with creatures even when dealing with God.

Therefore, man must of necessity "arrive at his ultimate perfection," that is God, "only through relations with creatures" (and this includes the self). This means that all our relations with creatures (including self) "contain a necessary, though mediate relation to perfect happiness." Bertke, 34. But while man is forced in statu viae to relate to creatures (including self) in his path to God, he ought to recognize that while God is good simpliciter, God's creatures (including one's self) only have goodness, and that this creaturely having of goodness is only in relation to the creature's participation in the God who simply is goodness.

The fact that the Lord walks among the pots and pans, then allows us to distinguish between primarily intended precepts and secondarily intended precepts, those precepts which bind because they are necessary and those precepts which bind because they proper or fitting with respect to a necessary precept.

Thus the precepts guiding love of self and love of neighbor are necessary in relation to the Summum Bonum, though only mediately necessary. In a word, those precepts are said to be primarily intended which command all those things that are necessary in order that men may attain their ultimate end, whether those things are immediately concerned with God, or are immediately concerned with creatures and only mediately with God.

Those precepts are said to be secondarily intended which prescribe those things that, while not strictly necessary for the required direction of men to their ultimate end, render the attainment of the end better and easier, or are directed to the secondary end of a creature.

Bertke, 35. Thus we have a distinction between precepts that are necessary either because they immediately touch and concern God, or mediately concern God but immediately touch and concern creatures (the principally intended precepts) and those things which are fitting or proper for the fulfillment of the principally intended precepts or direct themselves neither immediately or mediately to God, but immediately or mediately to the end of a creature (the secondarily intended precepts).

Precepts, of course, may be affirmative or positive or they may be prohibitory or negative. And we also find the distinction between primarily intended precepts and secondarily intended precepts in negative precepts. If an action directly impedes the attainment of God the ultimate good either directly its prohibition would be governed by a primarily intended precept. If, however, an act renders the motion to the end simply more difficult or is less in harmony with the end, then we are dealing with a prohibition that would be secondarily intended.

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*Santa Teresa de Jesús, Libro de Fundaciones, 5.8.