IN OUR LAST POSTING WE discussed the distinction that Scotus made between the two tables of the Ten Commandments or Decalogue. The first two precepts of the Decalogue--not to commit idolatry or worship images, and not to use the Lord's name in vain--were precepts of the natural law in the strict sense. The third precept--to keep the Sabbath holy--is sort of a mixture, with the general injunction to set aside time formally to worship God part of the natural law in the strict sense, but the precept to do so on the Sabbath, not part of the natural law, but rather part of the divine positive law. The next seven precepts--to honor mother and father, not to kill, not to commit adultery, not to steal, not to lie, not to covet the neighbor's goods or neighbor's wife--are not, in Scotus's view, part of the natural law in the strict sense, but only in a loose sense, because they are in harmony with it. Natural law in its strict sense, as Scotus defines it, is law that is self-evident or conclusions that are derived immediately and in a logically necessary way from those self-evident precepts. And the entirety of the second table of the Decalogue is not necessarily inferred from the first principle; hence, at best, the second table of the Decalogue can only be considered to come from a positive law of God, that is the divine law, not from the natural law in the strict sense.
Scotus anticipates some objections to his view. He begins with a Scriptural objection, referring to Romans 13:9* and Matthew 22:37-40,** where it seems that the Golden Rule as a summary of the second table of the Ten Commandments (love your neighbor as yourself) and the first table of the Ten Commandments (summarized as loving the Lord God with all one's heart, soul, mind, and strength) are identified: "The second [table] is like it [the first table]." Matt. 22:39. Doesn't this suggest that the precepts of the second table necessarily follow from the first precept that God is to be loved, Deus est diligendus? Moreover, would a perfect and well-ordered love of God necessarily not be jealous and solipsistic, but rather would want that others also love the God who is to be loved? And isn't this wanting that others also love the God who is to be loved nothing less than love of neighbor? So it seems to follow that the second table of the Decalogue necessarily follows from the first table, and this means that the second table is natural law, strictly-so-called.
Blessed Duns Scotus
Scotus handles these objections to his view that the second table of the Decalogue is not natural law strictly-so-called, but only natural law loosely-speaking because it is in harmony with the natural law strictly-so-called. Scotus argues that for one precept to follow necessarily from another precept, it must follow both from the latter's positive formulation and negative formulation. Thus, he notes that the positive precept to love God with all one's heart, mind, and strength may be necessarily framed as a negative: Do not hate God. Framing the positive precept into a negative prohibition follows necessarily from the first. Though one can argue that love of neighbor (i.e., that we should not have any qualms about our neighbor loving the God who is to be loved) may be a conclusion from the precept to love God, it does not follow that love of neighbor (defined as not being adverse to him loving the God who is to be loved) may be concluded from the precept not to hate God. Since the precepts of the second table (assuming they can be derived from the injunction that we not be adverse to our neighbor loving the God who is to be loved) cannot be derived necessarily from the negative formulation of the first precept, the second table is not natural law, strictly speaking.
But beyond that, Scotus takes issue with whether the injunction to love one's neighbor follows necessarily from the affirmative formulation of the law that one is to love God. From the fact that one's love of God ought not to be jealous (i.e., we ought not to exclude others from loving God), it is not necessary that we must will the good of others. The good of others is only to be desired if God desires the good of the other, or God accepts the love of the other, e.g., one who is not destined to be damned. Why should we not be adverse to another loving the God who is to be loved, if God does not care or accept the love of the other, our neighbor? "But it is not certain from the law of nature that everyone is such that his love is accepted by the God who is loved or should be loved." Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37 (Wolter, 205) Since the natural law does not necessarily tell us that God wants us to desire the good of the other or accepts our neighbor's love, it follows that we need not, as a matter of natural law, will that the other love God or simply not be adverse to our neighbor loving God. So, in Scotus's view, the love of neighbor does not flow necessarily from the strict natural law principle that one is to love God.
The last counterargument offered by Scotus as to why the second table of the Decalogue is not necessarily implied by the first table, is that--assuming we are required necessarily from the injunction to love God to want our neighbor to love God--the requirements of the second table of the Decalogue do not necessarily follow from the first table. Assuming that wanting our neighbor to love God is a natural law precept, it does not follow, for example, that one must not kill our neighbor, or not want him to commit adultery, or not want him to steal, etc. "For it is possible," Scotus argues, "for me to will that my neighbor love God and nevertheless not will that he preserve corporeal life or conjugal fidelity, and so on wit the other precepts." Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37 (Wolter, 205-06).
Accordingly, Scotus maintains that the only real principle of the natural law in its strict sense is that God is to be loved, Deus est diligendus. The second table of the Decalogue--the divine injunction that we love our neighbor as our self--is something to which we are enjoined. But it is incumbent upon us to follow the Golden Rule not because it is part of the natural law in the strict sense, but because it has been commanded (positively) by God. St. Paul in his letter to the Romans, and Christ in the Gospels, impose upon the Christian a law greater than the natural law when they tell us that we ought follow the Golden Rule and love our neighbor as ourselves understood as following the second table of the Decalogue. Paul and Christ urge us to follow "a higher love of neighbor that transcends that which is included in, or follows from the principles of the law of nature."
Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37 (Wolter, 206)
For someone devoted to the Thomist way of looking at things, this is deeply unsettling. To suggest that one's love of neighbor or the Golden Rule is something that is the result of a positive precept of God alone and not also part of the natural law means that it is known only by revelation and not by reason. And there is something very bothersome about this since it seems to go against the tradition of the Church that the second table of the Decalogue is a summary of the natural law and bind all men regardless of race or creed. This is a great limitation on the natural law, and it seems to be too great a sacrifice for the purpose of assuring the immutability of the natural law and easing the problems that arise from the apparent Scriptural exceptions or dispensations from the natural law such as Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, the Jews' plundering of Egyptian goods, and Hosea's marriage to a whore.
Scotus is setting the stage for handling the seeming exceptions in Scripture to the second table of the Decalogue: the command by God that Abraham slay Isaac; the taking by the Jews, by Moses's command, of Egyptian treasure; the taking of an adulterous wife by Hosea in order to highlight Israel's infidelity. If the second table of the Decalogue is not a matter of natural law strictly so-called, but a matter Divine positive law, then the issue of dispensation is not problematic. Although the natural law does not allow of any dispensation since it is immutable, the positive law does allow for dispensation because it is not immutable, but is entirely based upon the will of God and not of necessity. Still, to solve the problem of these Scriptural anomalies, one fears that maybe Scotus gave away too much.
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*"The commandments, 'You shall not commit adultery; you shall not kill; you shall not steal; you shall not covet,' and whatever other commandment there may be, are summed up in this saying, (namely) 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.'"
**"'You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. The whole law and the prophets depend on these two commandments.'"
Scotus anticipates some objections to his view. He begins with a Scriptural objection, referring to Romans 13:9* and Matthew 22:37-40,** where it seems that the Golden Rule as a summary of the second table of the Ten Commandments (love your neighbor as yourself) and the first table of the Ten Commandments (summarized as loving the Lord God with all one's heart, soul, mind, and strength) are identified: "The second [table] is like it [the first table]." Matt. 22:39. Doesn't this suggest that the precepts of the second table necessarily follow from the first precept that God is to be loved, Deus est diligendus? Moreover, would a perfect and well-ordered love of God necessarily not be jealous and solipsistic, but rather would want that others also love the God who is to be loved? And isn't this wanting that others also love the God who is to be loved nothing less than love of neighbor? So it seems to follow that the second table of the Decalogue necessarily follows from the first table, and this means that the second table is natural law, strictly-so-called.
Blessed Duns ScotusScotus handles these objections to his view that the second table of the Decalogue is not natural law strictly-so-called, but only natural law loosely-speaking because it is in harmony with the natural law strictly-so-called. Scotus argues that for one precept to follow necessarily from another precept, it must follow both from the latter's positive formulation and negative formulation. Thus, he notes that the positive precept to love God with all one's heart, mind, and strength may be necessarily framed as a negative: Do not hate God. Framing the positive precept into a negative prohibition follows necessarily from the first. Though one can argue that love of neighbor (i.e., that we should not have any qualms about our neighbor loving the God who is to be loved) may be a conclusion from the precept to love God, it does not follow that love of neighbor (defined as not being adverse to him loving the God who is to be loved) may be concluded from the precept not to hate God. Since the precepts of the second table (assuming they can be derived from the injunction that we not be adverse to our neighbor loving the God who is to be loved) cannot be derived necessarily from the negative formulation of the first precept, the second table is not natural law, strictly speaking.
But beyond that, Scotus takes issue with whether the injunction to love one's neighbor follows necessarily from the affirmative formulation of the law that one is to love God. From the fact that one's love of God ought not to be jealous (i.e., we ought not to exclude others from loving God), it is not necessary that we must will the good of others. The good of others is only to be desired if God desires the good of the other, or God accepts the love of the other, e.g., one who is not destined to be damned. Why should we not be adverse to another loving the God who is to be loved, if God does not care or accept the love of the other, our neighbor? "But it is not certain from the law of nature that everyone is such that his love is accepted by the God who is loved or should be loved." Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37 (Wolter, 205) Since the natural law does not necessarily tell us that God wants us to desire the good of the other or accepts our neighbor's love, it follows that we need not, as a matter of natural law, will that the other love God or simply not be adverse to our neighbor loving God. So, in Scotus's view, the love of neighbor does not flow necessarily from the strict natural law principle that one is to love God.
The last counterargument offered by Scotus as to why the second table of the Decalogue is not necessarily implied by the first table, is that--assuming we are required necessarily from the injunction to love God to want our neighbor to love God--the requirements of the second table of the Decalogue do not necessarily follow from the first table. Assuming that wanting our neighbor to love God is a natural law precept, it does not follow, for example, that one must not kill our neighbor, or not want him to commit adultery, or not want him to steal, etc. "For it is possible," Scotus argues, "for me to will that my neighbor love God and nevertheless not will that he preserve corporeal life or conjugal fidelity, and so on wit the other precepts." Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37 (Wolter, 205-06).
Accordingly, Scotus maintains that the only real principle of the natural law in its strict sense is that God is to be loved, Deus est diligendus. The second table of the Decalogue--the divine injunction that we love our neighbor as our self--is something to which we are enjoined. But it is incumbent upon us to follow the Golden Rule not because it is part of the natural law in the strict sense, but because it has been commanded (positively) by God. St. Paul in his letter to the Romans, and Christ in the Gospels, impose upon the Christian a law greater than the natural law when they tell us that we ought follow the Golden Rule and love our neighbor as ourselves understood as following the second table of the Decalogue. Paul and Christ urge us to follow "a higher love of neighbor that transcends that which is included in, or follows from the principles of the law of nature."
[A]lthough the love of neighbor that can be inferred from principles of the law of nature only requires that we love him in himself, still the love of neighbor as explained [by Christ and Paul] includes willing him these other goods, or at least not wishing him the opposite evils, such as not wanting him to be deprived unjustly of corporeal life, of conjugal fidelity, or temporal goods, and the like. Hence it is true that love of neighbor fulfills the law, viz., in the way it has been explained that this law of love must be observed, although not in the way that love of neighbor follows from the first principles of natural law. In a similar fashion, the whole law--so far as the second table and the prophets are concerned--depends on this commandment: "Love your neighbor as yourself," again understanding this not as something that follows of necessity from the first practical principles of the law of nature, but as the Lawgiver intended the love of neighbor to be observed according to the precepts of the second table.
Ordinatio III, suppl., dist. 37 (Wolter, 206)
For someone devoted to the Thomist way of looking at things, this is deeply unsettling. To suggest that one's love of neighbor or the Golden Rule is something that is the result of a positive precept of God alone and not also part of the natural law means that it is known only by revelation and not by reason. And there is something very bothersome about this since it seems to go against the tradition of the Church that the second table of the Decalogue is a summary of the natural law and bind all men regardless of race or creed. This is a great limitation on the natural law, and it seems to be too great a sacrifice for the purpose of assuring the immutability of the natural law and easing the problems that arise from the apparent Scriptural exceptions or dispensations from the natural law such as Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, the Jews' plundering of Egyptian goods, and Hosea's marriage to a whore.
Scotus is setting the stage for handling the seeming exceptions in Scripture to the second table of the Decalogue: the command by God that Abraham slay Isaac; the taking by the Jews, by Moses's command, of Egyptian treasure; the taking of an adulterous wife by Hosea in order to highlight Israel's infidelity. If the second table of the Decalogue is not a matter of natural law strictly so-called, but a matter Divine positive law, then the issue of dispensation is not problematic. Although the natural law does not allow of any dispensation since it is immutable, the positive law does allow for dispensation because it is not immutable, but is entirely based upon the will of God and not of necessity. Still, to solve the problem of these Scriptural anomalies, one fears that maybe Scotus gave away too much.
____________________________________________
*"The commandments, 'You shall not commit adultery; you shall not kill; you shall not steal; you shall not covet,' and whatever other commandment there may be, are summed up in this saying, (namely) 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.'"
**"'You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. The second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself. The whole law and the prophets depend on these two commandments.'"
This seems like a heavy price to pay in order to deal with the scriptural problems. With this "thin" natural law, won't we have problems establishing universal human rights and judging human positive laws? Not that Scotus needs to be accountable to 21st century issues, but the Scotus position seems to undercut Pope Benedict XVI's "project" in defending natural law as the antidote to a dictatorship of relativism.
ReplyDeleteRob
Rob:
ReplyDeleteI would have to agree with you. Essentially, Scotus puts the entirety of human relationships outside of the pale of natural law. I have trouble with the notion that the only real natural law is to love God, because that would suggest there is no self-evident law since God is not known self-evidently, but only through reason. The Thomist view is that the natural law is self-evidently known (do good, avoid evil) and applies even without knowledge of God (Who is not self-evidently known, but is known through application of reason to our observations of cause, contingency, etc.) or who is known by Faith.