Philip the Chancellor: Cardinal Virtues as Acquired

IN THE FOURTH QUESTION DEALING WITH virtues in Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono, we confront the question of whether the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are infused or not infused but instead acquired (or "political").  If infused, then Philip asks whether they might be called divine virtues.

In answering this question, Philip the Chancellor distinguishes between justice and the other three virtues.  With respect to those virtues other than justice, Philip the Chancellor does not see these three of the four cardinal virtues as "divine."  The reason for this position is that the description "divine" does not make reference to "the principle 'from which' something comes," but rather "to the term 'to which' something leads."  In other words, "divine" as used in reference to virtue, speaks of the terminus ad quem, and not the terminus a quo.

"Since these cardinal virtues [of prudence, temperance, and fortitude] concern what leads up to our end (ad finem), but not into our end (in finem), namely God, they should not be called divine."  In short, Philip the Chancellor appears to take the position that these three cardinal virtues are acquired, or human, virtues, and not infused.*  (Houser, 50).

Justice surrounded by the other virtues, by Domenico Beccafumi

Justice, however, is different.  "Justice . . . which  orders things to our end holds a middle place [between the three other cardinal virtues and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity] and therefore can be called both human and divine, since it orders things to our end."

Another question that Philip addresses is this: if the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity--which are directly and intrinsically related to our end, the finis ultimus, God, then why aren't these three virtues called "cardinal," since it would appear that these three theological or divine virtues are the hinges upon which    our destiny depends.

However, Philip responds to this last issue by observing that the virtues that are called cardinal are called cardinal not in relation to the theological virtues, but rather in relation to virtues other than the theological.

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*This takes Philip out of what would become the majority or at least the Thomistic view, and that is that these virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are of two kinds: acquired (or human or political) and, in the Christian, also infused.  There are then acquired cardinal virtues which are available to all men, and, in the baptized, infused cardinal virtues.

Philip the Chancellor: Cardinal Virtues--Why Four?

IN HIS THIRD QUESTION dealing with the virtues in his Summa de bono, Philip the Chancellor asks the question why the four virtues identified as prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice--and not "other virtues" with "their own proper acts different from the acts of these virtues"--are called cardinal.

Philip offers three reasons why the four virtues are called cardinal virtues.  The first reason is "taken from their conditions, the second from the meaning of the term, and the third from their acts."

The four virtues of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice are called cardinal from their conditions.  Drawing on St. Bernard's book On Consideration to Pope Eugenius (De Consideratione ad Eugenium Papam Libri V), Philip states the following:

For the existence (esse) of virtue four things are required: to now, to will, to persevere amid difficulties, and to attain the mean between excess and deficiency. But to now comes from prudence, to will from justice, to persevere from courage, and to attain the mean between excess and deficiency from temperance. Therefore, since some universal condition is touched upon there in each of these [virtues], they are rightly called cardinal, that is principal.

But, Philip notes, this argument of St. Bernard seems to prove too much since these conditions are present in all virtues (and not only the cardinal virtues), and this supported by Aristotle in his Ethics (2.4 [1105a31 ff]).  In response, however, Philip notes that this characteristic in the other virtues is shared with the cardinal virtues because the other virtues are in fact "reduced" to the cardinal virtues, "either as their parts or as their species or as their dispositions," and so these characteristics will be shared with the cardinal virtues of which these other virtues stem from.  All other virtues are subsidiary to the cardinal virtues, as the cardinal virtues are the "principal or initiating virtues."  Drawing from On Rest for the Mind by a certain unidentified Harold, the cardinal virtues (which are required for the health of the soul) are compared to the needs of the body, and that author concludes: "As there are four element for the health of the body, so are found four bases for the virtues of the soul."

The second reason why the identified virtues are called cardinal stems from the meaning of the term cardinal. As Philip summarizes this reason:

For cardinal comes from cardo, the hinge on which a door turns. Now there are two things by means of which we enter into life: actions and passions. What is said in Matt. 19:17 concerns actions: "If you would enter life, keep the commandments," that is, act according to the commandments; and Acts 14:22 concerns passions: "through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God." Two virtues are taken based on actions: prudence with regard to actions as they concern us, justice with regard to actions as they concern our neighbor. Tow other virtues are taken based on passions, concerning passions in us and natural to us is temperance, concerning passions introduced by others is courage.

The reason why there are four cardinal virtues "comes from their acts," Philip says.  Again, we might simply quote Philip's treatment of this entire:

The acts of these virtues are principal because they are acts of the three primary motive powers in relation to those things which lead to our end (ad finem). For the act of reasoning is to distinguish between the good which leads to that end and the bad which leads away from that end, or between two goods, to distinguish which of them leads more to the end, or two bad things, which of them leads more away from that end. Also, the principal act of the power of desire in relation to those things which lead to our end is to will the changeable good to exist under the highest good, which pertains to temperance. Also the principal act of the power of emotion in relation to those things which lead to our end is to confront the arduous, which is frightening to confront and difficult to withstand, and this pertains to courage. But the act of justice is to order all these to our proximate end and this is an act in relation to all the powers, not just one. Therefore, for this reason they are called cardinal or principal, because they are the primary acts of the powers acting in those things which lead to our end, namely, God.

Philip the Chancellor interposes an objection to naming the four virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice the cardinal virtues.  Since pride is the primary vice (as Ecclesiastes 10:15 states, "Pride is the beginning of all sin") it would seem that humility is the primary virtue, and therefore there is but one cardinal virtue, and that is humility.

In answering this objection, Philip distinguishes between pride as a love of one's own excellence and pride as one's own good.  The former is a power of the emotions and is not the beginning of sin; consequently, the humility opposed to it will not be a principal virtue.  The latter, however, is the beginning of all sin since it is equivalent to contempt for the commandments.  Therefore the love of one's self as one's own good is the source of all sin.  Similarly, the love of the highest good (the summum bonum, God) is the beginning of every cardinal virtue.  It seems, then, that Philip suggests that the cardinal virtues are all clothed with humility since both humility and the cardinal virtues have love of God in view.  Humility and the cardinal virtues therefore have God as their final cause.

That humility and the four cardinal virtues have God as their final cause would seem to lead to another problem since that would make the cardinal virtues enter into the bailiwick of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which also have God as their end.  But as Philip will later distinguish, the cardinal virtues "concern what leads up to our end, but not into our end, namely God."  It is the theological virtues which take us all the way "into" God and heaven, whereas the cardinal virtues only "carry us along the road (via) toward God," though "they do have God in sight."  Houser, 49.

Having God as the cardinal virtues' end, then raises another question: that being whether the cardinal virtues are acquired or infused.  If acquired, it seems that perhaps God is something attained through human effort, which seems to suggest a Pelagianism.  If infused, the cardinal virtues then seem to be synonymous with the divine or theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.  Accordingly, Philip the Chancellor focuses on the distinctions between the cardinal virtues and he theological virtues and their quality of being infused rather than acquired.

Philip the Chancellor: Ordering the Virtues

WHAT IS THE ORDER BETWEEN the various virtues? Is there any virtue that is preeminent? Is there any hierarchy that orders them? How do they interrelate? These are the subjects of the second question on the virtues in the Summa de bono of Philip the Chancellor.

Once again, before giving his answer, Philip the Chancellor reviews some authorities regarding this for possible answers.  He notes that scriptural glosses on the second chapter of Genesis and on 15:38 of the Gospel of Matthew [Gloss. margin. 5:271B] provide that prudence is first, then temperance, then courage, and finally justice.  Drawing on a cryptic numerology, for example, the gloss on the Gospel of Matthew (which addresses the miracle of Jesus and states that "those who ate were 4,000 men," meant by that number "the four virtues [each presumably being given the figure of 1,000] by which one lives correctly, prudence, temperance, courage, justice."  That same mysterious reference is found in the four rivers of Genesis.*

A different ordering of the virtues is given by St. Augustine in his book on the On the Customs of the Catholic Church.**  This order is followed by Isaac of Stella in his book On the Spirit and Soul.  Therein, temperance is first, then courage, followed by justice and prudence.

Looking for guidance to the book of Wisdom (8:7), we find temperance listed first, then followed by prudence, justice, and courage.

In his Ethics, Philip the Chancellor notes, Aristotle appears to list courage first, then chastity (temperance), then prudence, then justice.***  Cicero in his De Officiis lists prudence first, then justice, then temperance, and finally courage.†

With all this controverting authority, Philip the Chancellor offers his own answer.  To order the virtues, he finds that there is an underlying order "based on worth," a worth that is determined by reference to the powers of the rational soul.  Those powers that relate to the rational soul have more dignity than those that relate to the powers of desire and emotion which we share with the brute animals.  Viewed in this way, "prudence and justice, since they exist in the rational power, are prior by reason and the worth of their subject."  Between prudence and justice, prudence may be said to precede.  The reason for this, Philip states, is that prudence looks at the the good of the subject, whereas justice looks at the good of others. Yet there is a competing principle that also orders the virtues.  Those virtues that deal with the subject (the actor) have more dignity than those that relate to others.  From this perspective, prudence and temperance are more importance than courage and justice because they involve acts that relate to the subject while courage and justice relate to others.  Between courage and justice, justice might be said to follow courage because "the other powers and their acts are like materials in relations to it."  It appears, then, that Philip the Chancellor's opinion is that prudence is first, followed by temperance, followed by courage or fortitude, and finally, justice.

So we may summarize the various orders as follows:

Glosses	prudence, temperance, courage, justice
St. Augustine	temperance, courage, justice, prudence
Wisdom 8:7	temperance, prudence, justice, courage
Aristotle	courage, temperance, prudence, justice
Cicero	prudence, justice, temperance, courage
Philip the Chancellor	prudence, temperance, courage, justice

Philip the Chancellor, then, seems to deviate from St. Augustine, Wisdom, Aristotle, and Cicero, and align himself with the Glosses, in adopting the prudence, temperance, courage, and justice ordering.

Philip the Chancellor justifies his deviation from St. Augustine by observing that St. Augustine views the virtues from the perspective of the pursuit of happiness, "the highest good," namely God.  The ordering he gives the virtues is based upon "their motive cause," "their end," or what is the same thing, "their motive cause."  Ultimately, love is what orders his virtues between themselves.  Since desire or love is St. Augustine's perspective, that virtue that orders desire--temperance--is first.  Courage must follow because the affective emotions relate to desire, which is the principle of love.  Love is only said to be in the power of reason in a "secondary way," and for that reason, the rational virtues of prudence and justice follow those relating to desire.  Since prudence is the most cognitive virtue, and that last tied to the "motive part of the soul," it follows that it should be ordered last when viewed from the order of love or desire, which is what St. Augustine does.

The ordering found in Wisdom is based upon the view that a sober soul (i.e., sobriety) is required for there to be a prudence soul (i.e., prudence).  The Scriptural view, according to Philip is reflected in Daniel 1:16-17, where the abstinence of youth is a precursor to the wisdom or prudence of the elderly.  Temperance, then, must precede prudence.  The reason why justice follows prudence in the Scriptural ordering is that "since it is the function of justice to render to each what is his, one first has to know what is his."  Courage is last because "justice concerns action in relation to neighbor, while courage concerns passions, and action is prior to passion."

Philip justifies his departure from Aristotle's ordering because Aristotle's ordering is based upon a precedence to be given to communal virtues before personal virtues.  Aristotle views courage as a civil or common virtue, and therefore puts it before chastity or temperance which is an individual virtue.  Prudence is placed before justice because it is a prerequisite to the communal virtue of justice.  Aristotle viewed that it was the "function of prudence to now what belongs to each, and the function of justice to render it so"  "The act of discerning what belongs to each," which is a task of prudence, "is prior to rendering to each his own."

Finally, Philip explains his departure from Cicero by observing that the Ciceronian order places prudence before justice (and those two before the other virtues) "because each is in the reasoning power."  Between justice and prudence, prudence takes precedence in Cicero's view "because [prudence] concerns us, while justice concerns the other.  Prudence is the reasoning power principally, and prudence knows what belongs to whom, which is the function of justice."  Temperance is placed before courage by Cicero "because temperance concerns good we should make use of, while courage concerns evils we should withstand."


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*See Philip the Chancellor: Virtues, How are They Four?
**As discussed in prior postings, this work was erroneously attributed to St. Augustine.
***Nic. Eth. 3.9, 13, 5.1, 6.5.
†De off., 1.6-42, nn. 18-151.

Philip the Chancellor: Different Perspectives of Virtue

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR is not content with the description of virtues as a sort of reasoned love or loving reason, an insight obtained by synthesizing Isaac of Stella and St. Augustine's observations on virtues. He also looks at the virtues from other perspectives in distinguishing the cardinal virtues from each other.

A distinction among the virtues can also be made by invoking the "three-fold law," the law of reason which leads to free choice, the law of "indigent" or unaided nature, and the "natural law of reason."  The distinctions Philip the Chancellor makes in his "three-fold law" is between utilitarian, experiential, and relational.

"The law of reason is found in choosing what is useful," says Philip the Chancellor.  It there is concerned with prudence.  "The law of indigent nature is found in making use of good and evil."  The use of temporal goods to sustain natural life brings in the virtue of temperance.  Our confrontation with bad temporal goods, whether "for experience or to cure ourselves," will require the virtue of courage.  Finally, the "natural law of reason," which concerns itself with distributing goods between ourselves and "our neighbor who is our confederate by nature," a law which invokes the Golden rule,* involves the virtue of justice.  Again, we find confirmation in the writings of St. Augustine (De spiritu et anima, c. 20): "Prudence is found in choice, temperance in use, courage in endurance, and justice in distribution."**

The Cardinal Virtues, Fresco by Cherubino Alberti

An alternative way of distinguishing among the cardinal virtues is based on "principle and end," and this can be done because "every human virtue perfects the soul, either in its actions or passions."  With respect to actions which have an end in vie, these can be viewed the perspective of self (in which case prudence is involved) or from the perspective of others (in which case justice is involved).  When we look at passions, as distinguished from actions, then we confront those passions which come from us (and the control of these is handled by the virtue of temperance) or that which covers from others (which involves the virtue of courage).   It is the control of the passions which is based upon the principle of action.

Yet another basis for distinguishing among the four cardinal virtues is to look at their opposite: vice.  "The soul has four virtues," Philip says, "by which it is armed against vice and instructed bout its operations."

In its operations, [the soul] is instructed either in relation to us, and then we have prudence, or in relation to neighbor, and then we have justice. And it is armed against vice, either in regard to prosperity, and then we have temperance, or in regard to adversity, and then we have courage.

Summa de bono, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.)  Philip elaborates: virtue is perfection of the soul based upon reason, and that perfection arises "either in relation to neighbor or for some other reason."  If the perfection arises for some other reason, "it will concern the rational motive power or the motive power of desire or the motive power of emotion."  Prudence is concerned with the rational motive power, temperance with the motive power of desire, and courage with the motive power of emotion.  If perfection is looked at from the perspective of relations with one's neighbor, then one needs the virtue of justice.***

The distinctions between the cardinal virtues may also be looked at from the perspective of possibility.***

The function of prudence is to now what is possible, that of courage is to do what is possible, that of temperance is not to presume to do what is not possible, and that of justice is to will has is possible. Now this division is based on what is necessary for virtue, namely, to know, which requires prudence, to will, which requires justice, to do, which requires courage, and the mode of acting which requires temperance.

Summa de bono, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.).

Finally, again drawing on De spiritu et anima,**/*** Philip the Chancellor gives another way of identifying the distinction between the four cardinal virtues.  This way looks at the function of the virtue and focuses on "interior appetite, exterior deed, order to our end, and not letting stand an impediment on the way to our end."  With this quadripartite division, one can divide the virtues into four.  "The function of prudence," then, "is to desire nothing regretful, that of courage is to fear nothing but what is based, that of temperance is to repress earthly desires and completely to forget them, and that justice is to direct every motion in the soul to God alone."  "Consequently," Philip summarizes, "the function of prudence is to rule the beginning we desire, that of temperance is to rule over the means which is the deed, that of courage is to remove impediments, and that of justice is to order us to our end."  Summa de bono, 2: 744-56 (Q. 1, resp.).

Next in his treatment of the cardinal virtues, Philip the Chancellor asks about the ordering among and between the virtues, a matter he handles in Question 2 of this treatment on the virtues in his Summa de bono.  We shall address his thinking on this matter in our next few postings.

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*Philip the Chancellor cites to both negative and affirmative versions of the rule by quoting Tobit 4:16 ("Do to no one what you would not want done to you") and Matt. 7:12 and Luke 6:31 ("And as you wish that  men would do to you, do so to them.")
**This is a text wrongly attributed to St. Augustine.
***As authority for this view, Philip draws from chapter 20 of the pseudo-Augustinian text of De spiritu et anima.

Philip the Chancellor: Virtues as Reasoned Love

WHEN PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR asked himself the question in Q. 1 of his treatment of the cardinal virtues in the Summa de bono why the virtues are four in number, he identified the principal explanation: namely that the related to the acts of the soul (which are four: act of desire or concupiscence  act of emotion or irascibility, the act of distinguishing good and bad towards ourselves, and the act of distinguishing good and bad as it relates to others), and not the powers of the soul (which are three: reason, desire, emotion).

Philip also noted that the cardinal virtues are related to temporal affairs, things we use; the theological virtues are related to eternal affairs, namely God, and are therefore things we enjoy.  Thus, Philip distinguishes between the uti and the frui, the use and the enjoyment.  Quoting St. Augustine, Philip observes that "all perverse human order consists in either enjoying what should be used and using what should be enjoyed; correct order, however, consists in enjoying what should be enjoyed and using what should be used."*

Philip also relied upon authority to buttress his conclusion that the cardinal virtues were four in number based upon the four human acts. These also gave him additional reasons to regard the cardinal virtues as four.  We will briefly look at these.

First, Philip noted that, in regard to temporal goods which are used, there is temporal good and temporal evil. He further subdivided temporal good into two and temporal evil into two.  Temporal goods are either apparent goods, "and in this respect deceptive," or they are excessive goods, "and in this way corruptive."  Those apparent temporal goods which deceive are avoided by the virtue of prudence.  The excessive goods which corrupt us are avoided by temperance.

Anonymous, Design for Four Virtues 

Something similar can be done with temporal evils, which are either adverse or perverse.  Perverse evil is called the "evil of guilt."  Adverse evil is called the "evil of pain."  Perverse evil perverts the soul, destroying its beauty, and rendering it ugly.  Its contrary is the virtue of justice, as justice "introduces order in the would, which is beauty in the soul."  Adverse evil, the evil which causes pain, saddens the soul.  To overcome sadness of soul, we need the virtue of courage which allows us to endure it for the sake of love.  He quotes St. Augustine: "Courage is love easily enduring everything for the sake of what is loved."**

Second, Philip relied on Isaac of Stella and his book On Spirit and Soul.  This book, Philip notes, follows St. Augustine.  In his book, Isaac of Stella identifies the three powers of the soul: reason (from which arises sensibility) and the affectations which arise from the power of desire (concupiscence) or the power of emotion (irascibility).   There are four affections in man, depending upon whether (i) we presently enjoy or (ii) hope in the future to enjoy something, or whether (iii) we presently suffer something we hate or (iv) fear that we will suffer something in the future we will hate.  The present enjoyment of something we love is called joy.  The anticipation of a future enjoyment of something we love is what gives rise to hope.  The present suffering of something we do not like is called sorrow.  The future anticipation of having to suffer something we do not like gives rise to fear.

These four elements: joy, hope, sorrow, fear "are like the elements and common materials for all the vices and virtues."  "Since virtue is a habit in a mind which has been correctly instructed," Philip observes, it follows that these four elements "should be instructed and combined and ordered by reason for the sake of that which is right and in the right manner, so that they can produce virtues."  If they are not so rightly ordered, these four elements can "easily sink into vices."  Quoting Isaac of Stella, Philip the Chancellor concludes: "Therefore, when love and hate are instructed prudently, modestly, bravely, and justly, they grow in to the virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice which are said to be like roots or hinges (cardines) for all the virtues."

The reason-based teaching of Isaac of Stella on virtues in his On Spirit and Soul therefore dovetails nicely with St. Augustine's love-based teaching on the virtues in his book On the Customs of the Catholic Church.  There, St. Augustine encapsulates his teaching on the virtues succinctly: "that which is called four-fold virtue is formed from various affections of love . . . so that temperance is love giving itself wholly and incorruptibly to God, courage is love readily enduring all things for God, justice is love serving the beloved alone and for this reason rightly ruling all its subjects, and prudence is love rightly distinguishing what helps us get to God from those things which impeded us from him."***

Wrapping the notions of Isaac of Stella's ordering of reason into virtue with St. Augustine's notion of ordering in love into virtue, Philip the Chancellor synthesizes the insights of both into an understanding of the cardinal virtues that is more complete and merits quotation in full:

There is either good which we desire or evil which we hate (hate is used rather than detest, for hate belongs to the power of desire, as does love, while detesting belongs to the emotions.) If something is good, either it is present, and then we feel joy about it, or it is not present but expected, and then we feel hope about it. Or the thing is bad, and then if present we feel sorrow about it, and if not present we feel fear. Now these sorts of affections, that is, those belonging to desire or emotion, should be ruled by reason, and then they are worthy of praise. Otherwise, if they are disordered, they are contemptible; and this is why the affection puts its name on the deed, whether for good or evil. Now love, when ordered, mounts up to virtue; for when ordered, it loves what should be loved and how it should be loved. Therefore, it loves prudently, so that no appearances of seeming good deceives it. And this is why Augustine says: "Prudence is love wisely preferring what aids, etc." as was said above. It loves sweetly and pleasantly, so that it is not abducted from its delight by anything illicit, and this is what Augustine says: "Temperance is love giving itself wholly to what is loved." It loves resolutely, so that it is not averted from the beloved by any adversity, and this is also what Augustine says: "Courage is love readily enduring everything for what is loved." And love is for the sake of the right end, and this too is what Augustine says: "Justice is love serving the beloved alone, and ruling rightly for the sake of the beloved."

So virtues, then, may be said to be reason-based and love-based, and they are the possession of a man who is governed by reason and governed by love.
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*Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti.   De div. quaest. lxxxiii, 30.
**[F]ortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur. De mor. ecc., 1:15.
***As Houser notes, this is an "extremely free rendering of Augustine's De mor. ecc., 2.15. "Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu . . . ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. . . . Quare definire etiam sic licet, ut temperantiam dicamus esse amorem Deo sese integrum incorruptumque servantem, fortitudinem amorem omnia propter Deum facile perferentem, iustitiam amorem Deo tantum servientem et ob hoc bene imperantem ceteris quae homini subiecta sunt, prudentiam amorem bene discernentem ea quibus adiuvetur in Deum ab his quibus impediri potest.