Philip the Chancellor: Virtues, How Are There Four?

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR explores the four cardinal virtues in his Summa de bono. The first questions he asks regarding the virtues regards to their division and their number.  Philip defines virtue as "a perfection of the rational soul based on its powers," and so posits the possibility that the virtues might be identified by the powers in the soul so that for each power there is a corresponding virtue.

From the Mosaics at Qasr Libya

However, for Philip shared the Augustinian opinion that the soul had only three powers: reason, emotion, and desire (rationabilitas, irascibilitas, and concupiscibilitas).  This made the one-on-one correlation between  the powers of the soul and the virtues impossible, at least if the cardinal virtues were to be maintained at four.    While the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity might be neatly fitted to the tripartite powers of the soul, the relationship between the powers of the soul and the four cardinal virtues was not so neat.

Philip explored the possibility that one might assign one cardinal virtue to one particular power, and then reserve the fourth cardinal virtue, justice, which might be applied to "all the powers" of the soul.  Drawing on a gloss derived from Augustine's commentary on Genesis against the Manichees regarding Genesis 2:10-14, Philip suggested that the relationship among the virtues was like the relationship between the four rivers  in Genesis: the Pishon, Gihon, Tigris, and Euphrates:

The LORD God planted a garden in Eden, in the east, and placed there the man whom he had formed.  Out of the ground the LORD God made grow every tree that was delightful to look at and good for food, with the tree of life in the middle of the garden and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  A river rises in Eden to water the garden; beyond there it divides and becomes four branches.  The name of the first is the Pishon; it is the one that winds through the whole land of Havilah, where there is gold. The gold of that land is good; bdellium and lapis lazuli are also there. The name of the second river is the Gihon; it is the one that winds all through the land of Cush. The name of the third river is the Tigris; it is the one that flows east of Asshur. The fourth river is the Euphrates.

Gen. 2:10-14.  The rivers Pishon, Gihon, and Tigris are all given further descriptions in Genesis, lands about which they circle.  The fourth river, the Euphrates, is not.  The Euphrates is "not assigned a land it circles," and so, the virtues of prudence, courage or fortitude, and temperance had lands about which they circle, yet justice, like the Euphrates, pertains to all the powers of the soul.  Augustine's gloss on this passage suggests this as a plausible solution.

Justice pertains to all the parts of the soul, because it is the order and equity in the soul, through which are united the other virtues: prudence, temperance, and courage. For one is just in so far as his soul is prudent in contemplating truth, temperate in restraining desires, and brave in withstanding adversity.

Q.1, obj. 3.

While the suggestion of St. Augustine that assigned justice an overarching role seemed plausible, it seemed that if an overarching principle was needed in the case of the cardinal virtues, there should be an overarching principle in the case of the theological virtues.

Moreover, if St. Augustine's principle is taken as true, then it would appear to be equally applicable to the theological virtues, so that one is just in so far as one believes in God (by faith), hopes in God (by hope), and loves God (through charity).  Is justice then an overarching theological virtue?  "For just as the fourth virtue, which puts order into the three human virtues, is a human virtue, so likewise what put order into the three theological virtues must be a theological virtues, which makes four theological virtues."  Q.1, obj. 4.

Drawing from various works of Aristotle,* Philip also noted that all motion of the soul may divided into three ways depending upon what it seeks: its own sake, removing an evil, or adding a good.  The first is good simpliciter.  The second is not enjoyable as it is chooses an "expedient evil."  The third is enjoyable as it is  chooses an "expedient good."   There are thee types of objects, the good, what accompanies, and the enjoyable, and three pleasures, and there are three powers--reason, desire, and emotion.  It follows that there are three virtues only: prudence for the reasoning part, which concerns the good; courage in the emotions, which withstands evil; and temperance for the desires, which relates to enjoyment.

However, tradition did not provide for four theological virtues, but only three.

So the solution sought by Philip shifted its focus by applying the Aristotelian distinction between matter and for.  Matter could be considered as power, and the form as act.  If the powers of the soul is the matter upon which virtue acts, then its form should be manifested by a sort of act. By focusing on the acts of the soul, rather than the powers of the soul, a solution presented itself.   His resolution is found in his reply to the first objection:

The number of virtues is not taken from the number of the powers [in the soul] but from their principal acts. Since the virtues are perfections of the powers, their perfections are compared to their acts. Therefore, temperance is based on an act of desires (concupiscibilis) as it is subject to the order of reason, that is, to restrain our cupidities. Courage is based on the act of the emotions (irascibilis) which has been ordered, that is, to confront what produces fear. Both prudence and justice are based upon acts of reason, because prudence is taken from the act of distinguishing good from bad, which is an absolute act concerning ourselves, while justice, which orders us in relation to neighbor through rendering what is sue to him, is based on act of reason, namely ordering, which concerns others.

Q.1, rep. obj. 1.  So to summarize Philip's solution: temperance relates to the ordering of an act of concupiscible desire, courage or fortitude relates to ordering an act of the irascible emotion, prudence relates to ordering an act of reason as it relates to oneself, and justice relates to the ordering of an act of reason as it relates to others.

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*Aristotle's On the Soul, Sophistical Refutations, and Topics.

Philip the Chancellor on Virtue: Recruitment of Aristotle

THE SUMMA DE BONO OF PHILIP the Chancellor's treatment on the cardinal virtues begins with thee questions concerning them.  It is standard enough, and relies clearly on the introduction to the subject as contained in Peter Lombard's Sentences (Book III, Dist. 33).  It asks about the basis of the quadripartite number of the cardinal virtues and what justifies such division.  It addresses the ordering among the virtues and assesses prior opinions on that subject.  It asks why the cardinal virtues are called "cardinal," and whether they can be called divine virtues based upon the fact that they are, at least for the Christian, infused into the soul.  Finally, after an introduction to the cardinal virtues through these three questions, it launches into a lengthy discussion of the cardinal virtues themselves.  Contrary to the treatment of the virtues by prior teachers, Philip the Chancellor's treatment is extensive, covering about 300 pages in his Summa de Bono.*  He round up his discussion of the virtues after this extensive treatment by focusing on the connection among the virtues and their equality, here relying on the Sentences (Book III, Dist. 36).  In short, within a sort of envelope of convention we find a real developmental tour de force.

In order to develop the notion of virtues within the Christian moral context, Philip drew heavily from Aristotle, especially relying upon the so-called Ethica vetus (Nicomachean Ethics 2-3).  Thus we find central in his elaboration of the virtues, Aristotle's "four causes"** and Aristotle's famous analysis of virtue as a mean between two extremes, the so-called golden mean (aurea mediocritas or sectio aurea).

Four Virtues, from Palace at Esztergom, Hungary

Philip also drew from what R.E. Houser describes as the "moral psychology" of Aristotle, namely that each human had a soul whose powers were the proximate causes of both actions and passions.  Philip also relies on the Aristotelian method for introspection, namely one that relies on the notion of "object."  Therefore, Philip applies the Aristotelian assessment of the soul's interior by reference to its acts which are to be understood by reference to their object.  "Powers differ on acts," says Philip, "and acts based on their objects or causes of motion."  [Summa de bono, I.227).  As Houser describes the concept of "object" as the vehicle for understanding the soul's interior:

Object in Philip's usage meant that feature of a real thing or set of real things which serves as the term of a cognitive relation between things and their knowers. The object, then, provides an external and real basis for understanding the inner workings of the soul, a perceptible basis for knowing what is not directly perceptible and especially for distinguishing powers, acts, and passions from each other. Philip knew that Aristotle had used their objects to distinguish the five senses from each other and that this account of sensation had provided the model for his account of virtue: 'act, properly speaking, has a definite matter, such as seeing has color, hearing has sound.'

Houser, 44 (quoting Summa de bono, I.227).***

One of Philip the Chancellor's important principles was the connection or relationship between the Aristotelian causal principles, particularly the notion of material cause, and the psychological principles, in particular the notion of object.  By tying these two together, he was also able to draw out an objective component of moral virtue and its subjective component.

Since the object in its technical sense gives content to our understanding of a power, Philip thought of that object as a kind of matter. [He writes in the Summa, 2:206.2-207.6: "Therefore, diversity of rational powers is based on diversity of acts; but diversity of acts is based on specific diversity of their matter."] On the other hand, since a virtue perfects some power of the soul, he also thought of such powers as matter. As Philip used the term, then, matter can refer either to the power of the soul which is delimited by the object of its activity (this is the subjective senses of the matter) or to that object which so delimits a power or act (its objective sense).

Houser, 45.

These Aristotelian tools allowed Philip greatly to amplify his understanding of the cardinal virtues.  By using Aristotle's final, efficient, formal, and material causes to explain the cardinal virtues, focusing mainly on both the objective and subject components of their matter, Philip was able greatly to expand thinking about virtue.  It is what in part allowed him then to give an expansive treatment to a broad range of human virtues, the so-called "parts" of virtues which are subordinate-yet-related to one of the cardinal virtues.

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*Philip's extensive treatment of the virtues was to influence later authors, including St. Albert the Great and Philips pupil Ulrich of Stasbourg who also wrote his own Summa de bono and whose book 6 thereof was entirely dedicated to treating the issue of the virtues.
**Aristotle's traditional causes are: material, formal, final, and efficient.
***One might note the importance of the object in the assessment of the morality of an act and its centrality in the first Papal encyclical to deal with morality in general, Veritatis splendor.  We have addressed this issue in a prior posting.  See Veritatis splendor Part 27: Objects of Acts.

Philip the Chancellor: Summing up the Good

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR, head of the University of Paris, theologian master, poet and musician, and supporter of the Dominicans, is an important figure in the history of the Christian understanding of virtue in between Peter Lombard and St. Thomas Aquinas. Philip the Chancellor's great work, Summa on the Good (Summa de Bono), proved to be an important bridge between Peter Lombard's Sentences and St. Thomas Aquinas's fully-developed doctrine of virtue in his own Summa, the Summa Theolgiae.  As Houser describes his influence:

They [Sts. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, but also the Dominicans in general] were enamored of his Summa, which moved far in the direction of realizing [Peter] Lombard's promise of a full treatment of the vast range of moral excellence and depravity, and all the stages between them. To do so, Philip had to move well beyond Lombard's brief remarks about the cardinal virtues.

Houser, 43.

Philip the Chancellor's systematic and methodological treatment of the good began with understanding the good as one of the transcendentals--that is, one of this qualities or features of reality that transcend genera, that transcend, in fact, any of Aristotle's ten categories.*  The good, is something that is found in all things, in all being inasmuch as it is being.  Like being, good is learned through a sort of attributive analogy: one never completely learns it, as one is in contact communication with individual things, each with its own expression of "good" which contribute to one's understanding of the transcendent concept of good.  One would literally have to know the entirety of the visible and invisible world fully to comprehend good.

Aristotle's transcendental of the good finds a natural entry into Christian thought through the creation story in Genesis, in particular the frequent reference that God observed that his creation was "good," even "very good."**  Applying the notion of the transcendental to the notion of creation and combing it with the notion that all creation not only came from God but that all creation's end is God (exitus, reditus), helped arrive at a "good of nature" (bonum naturae) and an analogous albeit supernatural "good of grace" (bonum gratiae).

Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the "good of grace," the bonum gratiae, was, in the words of Houser, a tour de force:

[The] questions on the "good of grace" [in Philip's Summa were] a masterful transformation of part of Book 3 of the Sentences [of Peter Lombard] into a full-blown treatise on who the seven principal virtues--three theological and four cardinal--aid humans in their reditus to God.

Houser, 43.  The development of the doctrine on the cardinal virtues in Philip the Chancellor's treatment of it in his Summa is remarkable.  It is part of his greater treatment of the good in his Summa, a text which has been described as the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of moral theology of the 13th century.

We shall spend the next few blog postings discussing Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the cardinal virtues in his Summa de Bono in the next few posts, including Philip's sources, the nature of the cardinal virtues, and the "parts" of the virtues (a development which greatly expanded the depth of virtue-based moral theology)

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*The ten categories of Aristotle as found in his Organon (also known by their Latin term as predicamenta or predicates) are: (1) substance [οὐσία, ousia], i.e.,what something is something is essentially (e.g., human, dog); (2) quantity [πόσον, poson],(e.g., ten yards, three gallons); (3) quality [ποῖον, poion] (e.g., blue, visible); (4) relation [πρός τι, pros ti] (e.g., father/son, on the left of another); (5) location [ποῦ, pou] (e.g., at a movie, on a couch); (6) time [ποτέ, pote] (e.g., yesterday, during an eclipse); (7) position [κεἱσθαι, keisthai] (e.g., sitting, squatting); (8) possession [ἔχειν, echein] (e.g., wearing a robe, holding a pipe); (9) active doing [ποιεῖν, poiein] (e.g., running, smiling); and (10) passively undergoing [πάσχειν, paschein](e.g., being hit, being ridiculed).  Some of these overlap.
**ṭō·wḇ (ט֑וֹב): See Genesis Chapter 1 (καλά, Greek; bonum, Latin)

Peter Lombard on Virtues: Distinction 36

PETER LOMBARD ALSO ADDRESSES the issue of virtues from a Christian perspective in Distinction 36 of Book 3 of his Sentences.   In this distinction, Lombard addresses the interconnectivity of the virtues and their essential equality.  Essentially, he comes to the "probable" conclusion that the theological virtues enjoy a strong unity, as do the "infused" cardinal virtues.  This is based upon the view that the theological and cardinal virtues are all "children" of the mother of all virtues, charity, that is, love of God and love of neighbor for love of God.

Peter Lombard

As we did in our last blog posting, we shall quote those parts of Distinction 36 which relate to the virtues [Chapter 1 and 2 (except for the last paragraph), but not Chapter 3], allowing the Master to speak for himself, and then simply closing this posting with some comments.

DISTINCTION XXXVI

Chapter 1 (135)

1.  ON THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE NOT SEPARATED.  It is also usual to ask whether the virtues are so conjoined that thy cannot be possessed separately by anyone: one who has one of them has all of the.  --JEROME, ON ISAIAS.  Concerning this, Jerome says: "All the virtues are joined to each other, so that he ho lacks one of them lacks all of them."  [Interlinear gloss, on Is. 56:1 see also Jerome, In Isaiam 16.11], and so one ho has one of them has all of them.

2.  And this indeed seems probable.  For since charity is the mother of all the virtues [See Distinctions 23, c. 3 n. 2], it is rightly believed that in whomever is the mother herself, namely charity, in him also are all her children, that is the virtues.--AUGUSTINE, ON JOHN.  Hence Augustine: "Where there is charity, what can possibly be wanting?  But where there is none, what is there that can possibly be profitable?" [Aug., In Ioannem 15.12, tr. 83, n. 3]--AUGUSTINE TO JEROME: "Why, then, do we not say that, whoever has this virtue has all of them, since charity is the fullness of the Law? [Cf. Rom. 13:10]  And the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; the less, the less is there virtue in him; and the less virtue is in him, the more is there vice." [Aug., Epistola 167, c. 3, n. 11]

Chapter 2 (136)

1.  WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES ARE EQUALLY PRESENT IN ANYONE IN WHOM THEY ARE.  But it is a question whether one who possesses all the virtues has them in equal measure, or whether some flourish more and some less in someone.

2.  For it has seemed to some that some of them had more and some less by someone, as patience was eminent in Job, humility in David, meekness in Moses.  These also grant that one may merit more by one virtue than by another, just as he has the one more fully than the other.  And yet they say that one cannot merit more by any other virtue than by charity, nor can any other be had more fully by anyone than charity.   And so they say that the other virtues can be more or less in someone, but none more fully than charity, which generates the others.  And they say that these are the many faces which the Apostle mentions, saying: From the persons of man faces, etc. [Cf. 2 Cor. 1:11]

3.  Others say more truly that all virtues are joined and equal in anyone in whom they are, so whoever is equal to another in one of the virtues, is also equal to him in all the others.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 6, ON THE TRINITY.  Hence Augustine: "The virtues which are in the human mind, although each is understood in its own distinct way, are yet in no way separable from each other, so that, for instance, those who are equal in fortitude are also equal in prudence, and in justice, and in temperance.  For if you were to say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one of them is greater in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of the other is less prudent, and so they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the form is more prudent.  And so you will find it to be with the other virtues, if you consider them in the same way." [Aug., De Trin., 6.4.6]

4.  From these words, it is clear that all the virtues are not only connected, but also equal in a man's spirit.  And so, when someone is said to be pre-eminent in some virtue, as Abraham in faith, Job in patience, this is to be taken according to external uses, or by comparison to other men.  Either such a man especially displays the habit of humility, or he particularly performs the work of faith, or of another of the virtues, so that he is said to be stronger in it than others, or to excel singularly in it among other men.

5.  AUGUSTINE, TO JEROME.  According to this manner, namely according to the reasons for external acts, Augustine says elsewhere that in someone one virtue is more and another less, or that one virtue is in him and another not.  For he speaks as follows: "From that most famous dissertation of yours, it is sufficiently clear that it has not seemed good to our authors, or rather to truth itself, that all sins are equal, even if this is true of the virtues."  [Aug., Epistola 167, c. 2, n. 4]  "For even though it is true that he who has one virtue has all of them, and that he who lacks one virtue has none of them, all sins are not equal in the same way.  For where there is no virtue, there is nothing right, and yet it does not follow that worse cannot become even worse, or what is distorted become even more so  But if, as I believe to be more true and more congruent with the sacred Letters, the dispositions of the soul are like embers of the body (not that they appear in [higher or lower] places, but that they are perceived by the affections), then one is illuminated more fully, another less so, and a third entirely lacks light.  If this is the case, then just as each person is affected by the light of pious charity, and more in one action, less in another, or not at all in a third, so he may be said to have one virtue and to lack another one, or to have one virtue more and another less.  For insofar as it pertains to that charity which is piety, we may rightly say that 'charity is greater in this man than in that one,' and 'there is some of it in this man, none in that one.'  Also, as to an individual, [we may say] that he has greater chastity than patience, and that he has it in a higher degree today than he had yesterday, if he is making progress; or that he still lacks continence, but possesses not a small measure of mercy.  To summarize generally and briefly the view which I have of virtue: Virtue is the charity with which that which ought to be loved is loved.  This is greater in some people, in others less, and in others not at all; but in its greatest fullness, which admits of no increase, it exists in no man while in this life." [Ibid., c. 4, nn. 14-15]

6.  Here it seems to be indicated that one may be said to have one virtue more than another by reason that, through charity, he applies himself more to the act of one virtue than of another; and because of the difference in acts, he may be said to have the virtues themselves more or less, or not to have one of them, even though he has all of them equally and conjointly as to the habit of mind or the essence of each.  But in act he has the one ore, the other less; he may also lack one of them, as a just man, who makes use of marriage, does not have continence in act, which he nevertheless has in habit."*/**

Drawing principally from St. Augustine, though in some measure from St. Jerome and the Venerable Bede, Peter Lombard set the stage for the medieval Scholastics to ruminate on the Sentences, including those provisions dealing with the cardinal virtues.  Clearly, the virtues are no longer pagan, as they find their doctrinal source in the biblical book of Wisdom, and they find their spiritual source in charity, the paradigmatic Christian virtue.

As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's ultimate contribution:

For the development of the doctrine of the cardinal virtues, Lombard initiated a new age. In his Sentences, thirteenth-century Masters, whose greater knowledge of Aristotelian principles allowed them to move far beyond the Master's rudimentary ideas saw several things of importance: seven virtues--three theological and four cardinal; seven Christian virtues designed for the sake of returning us to our "heavenly homeland (patria)"; and cardinal virtues that are infused by God and as connected and equal to each other as are the theological virtues. And in Lombard they met vestiges of antique and Patristic moral rigorism; but only vestiges, for he approached morality with a new spirit. This was perhaps his most important bequest to the century to follow. His thought may not have been sophisticated but his moral canvas was wide; at least it was wide enough to incorporate ordinary folk along with saints and sinners. In this respect, he can be said to have begun the scholastic drive for an all-encompassing moral vision, one which radically revised the doctrine of the cardinal virtues inherited from the Fathers.

Houser, 41-42.
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*Peter Lombard, The Sentences, Book III (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008).
**The Latin text with notes removed:

DISTINCTIO XXXVI 

Caput 1 (135). 

1. De connexione virtutum quae non separantur. Solet etiam quaeri utrum virtutes ita sint sibi coniunctae, ut separatim non possint possideri ab aliquo, sed qui unam habet, omnes habeat. — Hieronymus, super Isaiam. De hoc Hieronymus ait: "Omnes virtutes sibi haerent, ut qui una caruerit, omnibus careat"; qui ergo unam habet, omnes liabet. 2. Quod quidem probabile est. Cum enim caritas mater sit omnium virtutum, in quocumque mater ipsa est, scilicet caritas, et cuncti filii eius, id est virtutes, recte fore creduntur. — Augustinus, super Ioannem. Unde Augustinus: "Ubi caritas est, quid est quod possit deesse? Ubi autem non est, quid est quod possit prodesse?" — Augustinus, ad Hieronymum: "Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet, habere omnes, cum plenitudo Legis sit caritas? quae quanto magis est in homme, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto vero minus, tanto minus inest virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis est vitium."

Caput 2 (136). 

1. Si cunctae virtutes pariter sit in quocumque sunt. Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes, an aliae magis, aliae minus in aliquo ferveant, quaestio est.

2. Quibusdam 1 enim videtur quod aiiae magis, aiiae minus habean tur ab aliquo, sicut in lob patientia eminuit, in David humilitas, in Moyse mansuetudo. Qui etiam concedunt magis aliquem mereri per aliquam unam virtutem quam per aliam, sicut eam plenius habet quam aliam. Non ta men magis per aliquam mereri dicunt quam per caritatem, nec aliquam plenius a quoquam liaberi quam caritatem. Alias igitur magis et alias minus in aliquo esse dicunt, sed nuilam pienius cantate, quae Ceteras gignit. Hasque dicunt esse multas facies quas memorat Apostolus dicens: Ex personis multarum facierum etc.

3. Alii venus dicunt omnes virtutes et simul et pares esse in quo— cumque sunt, ut qui in una alteri par exstiterit, in omnibus eidem ae qualis sit. — Augustinus In VI libro De Trinitate . Unde Augustinus: "Virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio et alio modo singulae inteliigantur, nuilo modo tamen separantur ab invicem: ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia, in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris aequales esse istos in fortitudine, sed ilium praestare prudentia, sequitur ut huius fortituclo minus prudens sit; ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quia est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras".

4. Ex his clarescit omnes virtutes non modo esse connexas, sed etiam pares in animo hominis. Cum ergo dicitur aliquis aliqua praeminere vir tute, ut Abraham fide, Iob patientia, secundum usus exteriores accipien dum est, vel in comparatione aliorum hominum. Quia vel humilitatis habitum maxime praefert, vel opus fidei vel alicuius ceterarum virtutum praecipue exsequitur: unde et ea prae aliis pollere, vel inter alios hommes singulariter excellere dicitur.

5. Augustinus, ad Hieronymum. Secundum hunc modum, scilicet secundum rationem actuum exteriorum, alibi Augustinus dicit in aliquo aliam magis esse virtutem, aliam minus, et unam esse et non alteram. Ait enim sic: "Clarissima disputatione tua satis apparuit non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi veritati, omnia paria esse peccata, etiam si hoc de virtutibus verum sit". "Quia etsi verum est eum qui  habet unam, omnes habere virtutes, et eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere, nec sic peccata sunt paria. Quia ubi virtus nulla est, nihil rectum est, nec tamen ideo non est pravo pravius distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verjus sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones ut corporis membra (non quod videantur locis, sed quod sentiantur affectibus), et alius illuminatur amplius, alius minus, alius omnino caret lumine: profecto ut quisque illustratione piae caritatis af fectus est: in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam, et aliam non habere; et aliam magis, aliam minus habere virtutem. Nam et ‘major est in isto caritas quam in illo’ recte possumus dicere; et ‘aliqua in isto, nulla in illo’, quantum pertinet ad caritatem quae pietas est. Et in uno homme, quod maiorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam; et maiorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeo notionem: Virtus est caritas qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. Haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est; plenissima vero, quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, in nemine".

6. Hic insinuari videtur quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius; et propter differentiam actuum, ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest; et aliquam non habere, cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet; aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in actu, quam tamen habet in habitu.

The Latin text is available at: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735212

Peter Lombard on the Virtues: Distinction 33

PETER LOMBARD'S SENTENCES--"a florilegium of theological texts plucked from the writings of the Fathers . . . and arranged in four books: God, creation, Christ the 'Incarnate Word,' and the sacraments"--was the subject of legion commentaries. Peter Lombard (c. 1096-1164) was a Master of Theology and Bishop of Paris, and it is impossible to believe he could have anticipated the popularity of his anthology.  Commenting on the Sentences was de rigeur, and indeed soon became a requirement for those seeking Masters in Theology.

The Sentences of Peter Lombard are divided into four books.  The third book describes the benefits, both internal and external, that God gives us as part of our life in Christ, including the theological virtues (d. 23-32), the gifts of the Holy Spirit (d. 34-35) and the Ten Commandments (d. 37-40).  Planted as it were, like grout between two blocks of ashlar, we find a treatment on the cardinal virtues (d. 33) between the treatments of the theological virtues and the gift of the Holy Spirit.  Similarly, we have a short treatment of the connection between the virtues (d. 36) found in between the treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Ten Commandments.

Peter Lombard

These two short treatment on the virtues (d. 33 and d. 36) in the Sentences proved to be the source of a "detailed doctrine of cardinal virtues" as a result of development through the many commentaries inspired by Peter Lombard's work.

The cardinal virtues were found perfectly in Christ, and so it is toward Christ that Peter Lombard (affectionately called "the Master) turns in his treatment of the virtues in Distinction XXXIII.

We may as well quote the entire Distinction XXXIII:

DISTINCTION XXXIII

Chapter 1 (120)

1.  ON THE FOUR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES.  After the above matters, we must treat the four virtues which are called principal or cardinal; they are justice, fortitude, prudence, temperance.

2.  ON THEIR USES HERE.--IN BOOK 14, ON THE TRINITY.  Concerning these, Augustine says: "Justice consists in helping the wretched, prudence in guarding against treacheries, fortitude in bearing troubles, temperance in controlling evil pleasures."  [Aug., De Trin., 14.9.12]

3.  Of these, it is said in the book of Wisdom: He teaches sobriety and prudence, justice, and truth. [Wis. 8:7]  This text calls temperance sobriety, and fortitude truth.  These virtues are called 'cardinal,' as Jerome says [Cf. Jerome, Epist. 66 (ad Pammachium), n3]; 'by them, it is possible to live well in this mortal life,' and afterwards to come to eternal life.

Chapter 2 (121)

THAT THESE VIRTUES WERE IN CHRIST.  They were and are must fully in Christ, of whose fullness e have received [John 1:16]; in him, they had the same uses which they have in the fatherland, and even some of those which they have on the way.

Chapter 3 (122)

1.  ON THEIR USES.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 14, ON THE TRINITY.  But "there is a little question a to whether these virtues, since they begin to be in the mind (which was a mind even when it existed before without them), cease to be when they have brought us to things eternal.  To some, it has seemed that they will cease, and in the case of three [of them], namely prudence, fortitude, and temperance, such an assertion seems not to be entirely empty." [Aug., De Trin., 14.9.12]

2.  ON THE USE OF JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE.  "For justice is immortal, [Wis. 1:15] and will then be made more perfect in us rather than cease to be, when we may blessedly live in contemplation of the divine nature, which created and established all other natures, and than which nothing is better and more loveable.  It pertains to justice to be subject to the rule of this nature, and so justice is wholly immortal; nor will it cease to exist in that [state of] blessedness, but it will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater." [Aug., De Trin., 14.9.12]

3.  ON THE USES OF THE OTHER THREE IN THE FUTURE.  "Perhaps, the other three virtues (prudence, but now without any risk of error, and fortitude without the trouble of bearing evils, and temperance without the thwarting of lust) will also exist in that [state of] felicity  there it will pertain to prudence to prefer to equate no other good to God; and to fortitude to adhere to him with the greatest steadfastness  and t temperance to take pleasure in no harmful defect."  [Ibid.]

4.  "But that which justice now does in assisting the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treacheries, and fortitude in bearing troubles, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not at all exist there, where there will be no evil.  And so these works of these the virtues, which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred will be reckoned among things past."  [Ibid.]  See, Augustine plainly states here that the aforesaid virtues will exist in the future, but they will then have other sues than they have now.

5.  BEDE.  And Bede agrees with him, speaking as follows, on Exodus: "The columns before which hands the veil are the heavenly powers, shining brightly with the four most excellent virtues, namely fortitude, prudence, temperance, justices; these are kept otherwise in heaven by the angels and the holy souls than they are here by the faithful."  [Ordinary gloss on Ex. 26:32, from Bede, De tabernaculo, 2.8]  Bede then distinguishes the uses of those virtues according to the present state and the future one, imitating Augustine in the distinctions placed above.*

As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's thinking as found in Distinction 33:

For Lombard, then, the cardinal virtues are clearly Christian virtues: they are caused by God, and they lead us to 'eternal life.' Not distinguishing sufficiently between final and efficient causality, Lombard seems to have thought that, simply because they lead to the Christian end, the cardinal virtues must be 'infused,' that is, caused efficiently by divine grace rather than by human effort."

Houser, 41.

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*Peter Lombard, The Sentences (Book 3) (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008)
**The Latin text for Peter Lombard's Sentences may be found at: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735191  The text is given here with footnotes and other academic instruments removed.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII Caput 1 (120). 1. De quatuor virtutibus principalibus. Post praedicta de quatuor virtutibus quae principales vel cardinales vocantur disserendum est, quae sunt iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia, temperantia.
2. De usibus earum hic. — In XIV libro De Trinitate. De quibus Augustinus ait: "iustitia est in subveniendo nhiseris, prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis". 
3. De his dicitur in libro Sapientiae: Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiarum et veritatem. Sobrietatem vocat temperantiam, et yen tatem vocat fortitudinem. Hae virtutes ‘cardinales’ dicuntur, ut ait Hieronymus; "quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur", et post ad aeternam vitam pervenitur.

Caput 2 (121). Quod hae virtutes In Christo fuerint. Quae in Christo plenissinime fuerunt et sunt, de cuius plenitudine nos accepimus; in quo habuerunt usus eosdem quos in patria habent, et quosdam etiam viae. 

Caput 3 (122). 1. De usibus earum. — Augustinus in XIV libro De Trinitate. Verumtamen "an hae virtutes, cum et ipsae in animo esse incipiant (qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat), desinant esse cum ad aeterna.  Quibusdam visum est esse desituras; et de tribus quidem, prudentia scilicet, fortitudine, temperantia, cum hoc dicitur, non nihil dici videtur".
2. De usu iustitiae In fiituro. "lustitia enim immortalis est, et magis tunc perficietur in nobis quam esse cessabit, cum beate vivemus contemplatione naturae divinae, quae creavit omnes ceterasque instituit naturas, qua nihil melius et amabilius est. Cui regenti esse subditum, iustitiae est; et ideo immortalis est omnino iustitia; nec in illa beatitudine esse desinet, sed talis ac tanta erit, ut perfectior et maior esse non possit".
3. De usibus aliarum trium in futuro. "Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam peniculo errons, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, tempenantia sine repugnatione libidinum, erunt in illa felicitate: ut prudentiae ibi sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare, fortitudinis ei firmissime cohaenere, temperantiae nuflo defectu noxio delectari".
4. "Quod vero nunc agit iustitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis niolestiis, quod tempenantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis, non erit ibi omnino, ubi nihil mali erit. Ista igitur virtutum opera, huic mortali vitae neces— sana, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in praeteritis habebuntur". Ecce aperte hic dicit Augustinus quod praedictae virtutes in futuro erunt, sed alios usus tunc habebunt quam modo.
 5. Beda. Cui Beda consentit, super Exodum, ita dicens: "Columnae ante quas appensum est velum, potestates caeli sunt, quatuor eximiis virtutibus praeclarae, id est fortitudine, prudentia, temperantia,, iustitia; quae aliter in caelis servantur ab angelis et animabus sanctis, quam hic a fidelibus". Et consequenter assignat Beda usus illarum virtutum secundum praesentem statum et futurum, imitans Augustinum in praemissis assignationibus.

The entire Sentences can be found here: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm