THE FIRST BOOK OF HOOKER'S Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity shall be the focus of these next several blog entries. In his book, Richard Hooker addresses the issue of law, and the different kinds of law, in particular the role of reason in law, and the distinctions and similarities between the natural law based upon Reason and the divine law based upon Revelation.
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie
As an apologist for the existing order aimed at the public, Hooker realizes that he faces intrinsic difficulties, what he calls "the secret lets and difficulties," I.1.1, 56, that confront a person undertaking such public discussion. The adversaries of the existing order enjoy presumption that they are attacking disorders of the state, and that they are more liberated and ingenious. Therefore, what is founding wanting "in the weight of their speech," is compensated by the public's natural bias in their favor. Conversely, the public sees the apologist for the existing order as defending their privileges or seeking preferment, brown-nosing, as it were, the powers that be. Particularly difficult is discussion directly with the leaders of those who advocate resistance or change in the existing order, since their minds are already predisposed against that order. In short, the public pulls for the underdog, and the opposing party has already invested too much in his rebellion.
Additionally, very few people have the discipline to go through the tedium required to think from the basics or general principles to the particular issue at hand. They prefer to walk "those beaten paths wherewith they are inured," and never have "sounded the depths from whence [truth] springs." I.1.2, 56. Though perhaps obscure, dark, and intricate, the origin of laws is as necessary to study as is a foundation to a house, or the root of a tree. Sometimes more important that the things we readily see and admire, is the underlying basis, foundation, or roots that we do not see. "In like manner," Hooker states, "the use and benefit of good laws, all that live under them may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit the grounds and first original causes from whence they have sprung be unknown, as to the greatest part of men they are." I.I.2, 57. Return to foundations is particularly necessary when confronting the arguments of those who "withdraw their obedience" to existing laws, or argue that they "are corrupt and vicious." I.I.2, 57. For this reason, invoking God's aid, Hooker will first begin his discussion of Church governance "with consideration of the nature of law in general, and of that law which gives life unto all the rest, which are commendable just and good, namely the law whereby the Eternal himself does work." I.I.3, 58.
All things that are, Hooker, begins come from "some operation not violent or casual." I.2.1, 58. In other words, the world before us is not the product of chance or arbitrariness. Additionally, Hooker assumes that nothing that exists operates "without some foreconceived end for which it works." "For unto every end every operation will not serve." This observation takes us to Hooker's definition of law in general:
All things, including humans, work according to law, but that law in things finds its source in some superior to which they are subject. With respect to creation, then, the subject that works according to law is distinct from the superior source who promulgates the law. Only God is both source of law and of his works. Only God is self-law. "Only the works and operations of God have him for both their worker, and for the law whereby they are wrought. Even the inner life of God, the "being of God," "is a kind of law to his working: for that perfection which God is, gives perfection to that he does." I.2.2, 59. In his analysis of law, Hooker does not address the inner operations of the Trinitarian God, but only "such operations as have their beginning and being by a voluntary purpose, wherewith God has eternally decreed when and how they should be." I.2.2, 59. This eternal decree is what is termed eternal law. We should not presume, Hooker warns, that we can understand or comprehend the Eternal Law by reason, at most we apprehend its existence.
It is true, Hooker concedes, that we do not always grasp or discern the reason in God's works, it sometimes appears "secret" to us, and sometimes amazes us. Nor should we even expect to comprehend the Eternal Law: "[H]ow should either men or Angels be able perfectly to behold [the Eternal Law]? The book of this law we are neither able nor worthy to open and look into. That little thereof which we darkly apprehend, we admire, the rest with religious ignorance we humbly and meekly adore." I.2.5, 62.
But we may be assured with certainty that there is such reason, "undoubtedly a proper and certain reason there is of every finite work of God, in as much as there is a law imposed upon it." I.2.4,5, 61. That law is absolute, perfect, and just; it is eternal and therefore "can have no show or color of mutability." I.2.6, 62. For this reason of the eternal law, God's promises can be absolutely relied upon because it is not possible that God deny his promises, fail to perform on them, thereby denying himself.
Because of his emphasis of the reason behind the eternal law, Hooker, in his analysis of law, clearly rejects voluntarism: "They err therefore who think that of the will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides his will." I.2.5, 61. Hooker rejects any suggestion that God's self-imposition of law "any whit abates" God's freedom of will. This is because the "imposition of this law upon himself is his own free and voluntary act." I.2.6, 62-63. Hooker concludes this section: "This law therefore we may name eternal, being that order which God before all ages has set down with himself, for himself to do all things by." I.2.6, 63.
*All quotes from Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity here and in following blog postings are to the Folger Library Edition of the Words of Richard Hooker (Volume 1) (Harvard: Belknap Press, 1977). Citation will be by Book, Chapter, Section, followed by page. However, I have taken the liberty of modernizing spelling and, where I thought appropriate, simplifying the text.
Portrait of Richard Hooker
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical PolitieAs an apologist for the existing order aimed at the public, Hooker realizes that he faces intrinsic difficulties, what he calls "the secret lets and difficulties," I.1.1, 56, that confront a person undertaking such public discussion. The adversaries of the existing order enjoy presumption that they are attacking disorders of the state, and that they are more liberated and ingenious. Therefore, what is founding wanting "in the weight of their speech," is compensated by the public's natural bias in their favor. Conversely, the public sees the apologist for the existing order as defending their privileges or seeking preferment, brown-nosing, as it were, the powers that be. Particularly difficult is discussion directly with the leaders of those who advocate resistance or change in the existing order, since their minds are already predisposed against that order. In short, the public pulls for the underdog, and the opposing party has already invested too much in his rebellion.
Additionally, very few people have the discipline to go through the tedium required to think from the basics or general principles to the particular issue at hand. They prefer to walk "those beaten paths wherewith they are inured," and never have "sounded the depths from whence [truth] springs." I.1.2, 56. Though perhaps obscure, dark, and intricate, the origin of laws is as necessary to study as is a foundation to a house, or the root of a tree. Sometimes more important that the things we readily see and admire, is the underlying basis, foundation, or roots that we do not see. "In like manner," Hooker states, "the use and benefit of good laws, all that live under them may enjoy with delight and comfort, albeit the grounds and first original causes from whence they have sprung be unknown, as to the greatest part of men they are." I.I.2, 57. Return to foundations is particularly necessary when confronting the arguments of those who "withdraw their obedience" to existing laws, or argue that they "are corrupt and vicious." I.I.2, 57. For this reason, invoking God's aid, Hooker will first begin his discussion of Church governance "with consideration of the nature of law in general, and of that law which gives life unto all the rest, which are commendable just and good, namely the law whereby the Eternal himself does work." I.I.3, 58.
All things that are, Hooker, begins come from "some operation not violent or casual." I.2.1, 58. In other words, the world before us is not the product of chance or arbitrariness. Additionally, Hooker assumes that nothing that exists operates "without some foreconceived end for which it works." "For unto every end every operation will not serve." This observation takes us to Hooker's definition of law in general:
That which assigns unto each thing the kind, that which moderates the force and power, that which appoints the form and measure of working, the same we term a Law. So that no certain end could ever be attained, unless the actions whereby it is attained were regular, that is to say, made suitably fit and correspondent undo their end, by some canon, rule or law.I.2.1, 58. This is true, preeminently in fact, "in the works even of God himself." I.2.1, 58.
All things, including humans, work according to law, but that law in things finds its source in some superior to which they are subject. With respect to creation, then, the subject that works according to law is distinct from the superior source who promulgates the law. Only God is both source of law and of his works. Only God is self-law. "Only the works and operations of God have him for both their worker, and for the law whereby they are wrought. Even the inner life of God, the "being of God," "is a kind of law to his working: for that perfection which God is, gives perfection to that he does." I.2.2, 59. In his analysis of law, Hooker does not address the inner operations of the Trinitarian God, but only "such operations as have their beginning and being by a voluntary purpose, wherewith God has eternally decreed when and how they should be." I.2.2, 59. This eternal decree is what is termed eternal law. We should not presume, Hooker warns, that we can understand or comprehend the Eternal Law by reason, at most we apprehend its existence.
Dangerous it were for the feeble brain of man to wade far into the doings of the most High, whom although to know be life, and joy to make mention of his name: yet our soundest knowledge is to know that we know him not as indeed he is, neither can know him: and our safest eloquence concerning him is our silence, when we confess without confession that his glory is inexplicable, his greatness above our capacity and reach. He is above, and we upon earth, therefore it behoves our words to be wary and few.I.2.2, 59. The idea of an eternal law derived from God, the first cause "whereupon originally the being of all things depends," and the notion of an order or law in the workings of the world were perceived by the wisest pagans. As examples of this, Hooker cites the the first book of Homer's Iliad: Διὸς δ’ ἐτελείετο βουλή (God's [Zeus's] counsel was accomplished), Mercurius (Hermes) Trismegistus, the pre-Socratic philosopher: Τὸν πάντα κόσμον ἐποίησεν ὁ δημιουργὸς οὐ χερσὶν ἀλλὰ λόγῳ [The creator made the whole world not with his hands, but by Reason]. He also refers to Anaxagoras and Plato, both of whom call the maker of the world, the demiurge, a work of the intellect, as they speak of a God with mind, a νοὺς ὁ Θεός. I.2.3, 60. Following in that line of thinking are the Stoics, who though perceiving erroneously the first cause as "fire," did recognize nevertheless that that fire did ὁδῳ̑ βαδίζειν ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου (proceed by a certain and set way in the making of the world). These pagans
all confess therefore in the working of that first cause, that counsel is used, reason followed, a way observed, that is to say, constant order and law is kept, whereof itself must needs be author unto itself. Otherwise it should have some worthier and higher to direct it, and so could not itself be the first. Being the first, it can have no other than itself to be the author of that law which it willingly works by. God therefore is a law both to himself, and to all other things besides.I.2.3, 60. It is plain that Hooker sees that all things are the works of God, that God works nothing without cause, that every cause must have a purpose, some end for its being done, and that the end for which things are done is the "reason of [God's] will to do them." I.2.3, 60. Though God is infinte in power and ability, God's power is limited by reason of the "end which he has proposed, and the laws whereby his wisdom has stinted the effects of his power in such sort, that it does not work infinitely by correspondently unto that end for which it works, even all things χρηστως, in most decently and complete sort, all things 'in measure, number and weight.'" I.2.3, 61.
It is true, Hooker concedes, that we do not always grasp or discern the reason in God's works, it sometimes appears "secret" to us, and sometimes amazes us. Nor should we even expect to comprehend the Eternal Law: "[H]ow should either men or Angels be able perfectly to behold [the Eternal Law]? The book of this law we are neither able nor worthy to open and look into. That little thereof which we darkly apprehend, we admire, the rest with religious ignorance we humbly and meekly adore." I.2.5, 62.
But we may be assured with certainty that there is such reason, "undoubtedly a proper and certain reason there is of every finite work of God, in as much as there is a law imposed upon it." I.2.4,5, 61. That law is absolute, perfect, and just; it is eternal and therefore "can have no show or color of mutability." I.2.6, 62. For this reason of the eternal law, God's promises can be absolutely relied upon because it is not possible that God deny his promises, fail to perform on them, thereby denying himself.
Because of his emphasis of the reason behind the eternal law, Hooker, in his analysis of law, clearly rejects voluntarism: "They err therefore who think that of the will of God to do this or that, there is no reason besides his will." I.2.5, 61. Hooker rejects any suggestion that God's self-imposition of law "any whit abates" God's freedom of will. This is because the "imposition of this law upon himself is his own free and voluntary act." I.2.6, 62-63. Hooker concludes this section: "This law therefore we may name eternal, being that order which God before all ages has set down with himself, for himself to do all things by." I.2.6, 63.
*All quotes from Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity here and in following blog postings are to the Folger Library Edition of the Words of Richard Hooker (Volume 1) (Harvard: Belknap Press, 1977). Citation will be by Book, Chapter, Section, followed by page. However, I have taken the liberty of modernizing spelling and, where I thought appropriate, simplifying the text.
Portrait of Richard Hooker
No comments:
Post a Comment