HAPPINESS IS THE OBJECT AND FULFILLMENT OF MAN'S DESIRE, and so all men necessarily choose those things that they believe will lead them to it. So does Hooker maintain, placing him squarely in the Aristotelian tradition of eudaemonistic ethics, an ethics of happiness. Importantly, however, this happiness is not a subjective feeling of happiness, a "what-feels-good" ethic; rather, Hooker's ethic of happiness, like Aristotle's and like St. Thomas Aquinas's, is rigorously objective, a rational ordering, an ethic that aims at the objective and natural good and perfection of man through the use of right reason, not emotional or vital impulse or urge. This is a happiness as reason would have it.
The good may be discerned in two ways: through knowledge of the causes of good, or through knowledge of "those signs and tokens" that are always annexed or attached to goodness. I.8.2, 82. Knowledge of good through its causes is "the most sure and infallible way" of determining the good, and yet it is also the most difficult to do. For this reason, most men shun it, and "had rather walk as men do in the dark hap hazard, than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge's sake." I.8.2, 83. Most men are "full of tongue and weak of brain," and generally do not invest the effort required to inquire the causes of goodness.
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie
There are, however, sundry kinds of "signs and tokens" that can be relied upon to discern the good. These are sort of like rules of thumb or heuristic short cuts, and some of them are more sure than others. Among these, perhaps the strongest and most reliable is the "universal consent of men" that something is good or evil. I.8.3, 83. Only the weightiest reasoning, and not mere "surmises and slight possibilities," can overcome such universal beliefs. This is true even if "we know not the cause" for common consent, as we can assume "that some necessary cause there is" when the common and near universal consent of mankind opines that something is good or evil. This is the principle of vox populi, vox Dei:
Ultimately, however, it is not the rules of thumb that determine the rule, it is reason itself that is the rule for determining the good. "The rule of voluntary agents on earth," such as man, "is the sentence that reason gives concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do." I.8.3, 85. These "sentences" or judgments "are some more, some less general," and they must be applied to "particular actions" to determine whether the particular is good.
Hooker then turns to the question of the basic principles of moral reasoning. The main principles of reason are self-evident or "in themselves apparent." Hooker notes that if one were to reject self-evident principles, one would destroy knowledge. "For to make nothing evident of itself unto man's understanding were to take away all possibility of knowing anything. . . . In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the mind does presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof." I.8.5, 85. Necessarily, we must start with such self-evident foundations. If we were to seek the reason behind self-evident principles, we may never get off the ground, and would wallow in skepticism and irrational chaos. As the Greek philosopher Theophrastus put it: "They that seek a reason of all things do utterly overthrow reason" (Ἁπάντων ζητου̑ντες λόγον, ἀναιρου̑σι λόγον).
Hooker gives as an example of one of these self-evident principles or axioms of reason the notion that the greater good is to be chosen before the lesser good. Other such self-evident axioms not subject to direct proof, though less general, include: God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, and the Golden Rule should be followed (i.e., we should do unto others as we would like them to do unto us). I.8.5, 86. "Such things, as soon as they are alleged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proof or further discourse to be assured of their goodness." I.8.5, 86.
These self-evident principles are fundamental, were "first found out by discourse," and were, as it were, "drawn out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." I.8.5, 86. This may be said because all things created and observed by the senses of man serve three purposes. First, they materially serve to preserve mankind's life. But they also serve two higher purposes: knowledge of being and knowledge of order. Man rejoices in the knowledge of these things beyond the simple utility they may have to his survival. Additionally, creation serves to provide us the source of knowledge of law, of the order of the way things are, the ratio ordinis. "[T]he knowledge of every the least thing in the whole world, has in it a second peculiar benefit unto us, inasmuch as it serves to minister rules, canons, and laws for men to direct those actions by, which we properly term human." I.8.5, 86. The world, then, evidences law, a ratio ordinis, and not just for those things, but for man also. It is our source of the Eternal Law, the deep Magic, Dharma, the Dao.
The Greeks "insinuate" this very mystery in their notion of Themis, in Latin Jus, and what we call Right. The Greeks considered Themis the daughter of heaven (Ouranos, or Οὐρανός) and earth (Gaia, or Γαῖα). [Cf. Hesiod's Theogony] Thus law is to be found in the order of the Cosmos.
Following this principle, one observes in creation first that "the best things, where they are not hindered, do still produce the best operations." I.8.6, 86. Where there is a variety of things that must concur to yield one effect, the best such combination is one in which "all congruity of reason to guide the residue, that it prevailing most," so that the combined work may have the greatest perfection. Applying this principle to ourselves, we perceive that the excellence of our souls exceeds the excellence of our bodies, and that the "diviner part" of our souls exceeds the perfection of "the baser part" of our souls. I.8.6, 87. It follows that the diviner part of the soul , that is, reason, should guide the combination of body and the "baser part" of our soul so as to yield the greatest perfection.
In short, we may summarize Hooker's doctrine thus far: Reason is the guide of the good and the beautiful, the kaloskagathos. It ought to direct the baser part of our souls, and a fortiori the use of our body. Reason is not, as Hume would have it, the slave of the passions. Nay. Rather, the passions must be made subordinate to right Reason, "God's viceroy" in us.
[*The compound adjective kaloskagathos (also kalokagathos or kalos kai agathos) comes from Greek: καλὸςκἀγαθός, καλὸκἀγαθός, or καλὸς καί ἀγαθός) literally the joinder of καλός, beautiful, and ἀγαθός, good. The nounal form is kalokagathia (καλοκαγαθία)]
Portrait of Richard Hooker
All particular things, which are subject unto action, the will does so far forth incline to, as reason judges them the better for us, and consequently the more available to our bliss. If reason err, we fall into evil, and are so far forth deprived of the general perfection we seek.I.8.1, 82. How is the good that man seeks--his happiness--to be determined? Is there one rule for knowing what is good, and another for knowing what is evil? Hooker rejects the concept of two rules: there is but one rule for knowing what is good and evil. "For he that knows what is straight, does even thereby discern what is crooked, because the absence of straightness in bodies capable thereof is crookedness." I.8.1, 82. Man is then obliged to find the straight way, the most direct route between himself and the end he desires.
For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that travels, because by it he comes soonest to his journey's end: so in action, that which does lie in the evenest between us and the end we desire, must needs be the fittest for our use. Besides which fitness for use there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity deformity.I.8.1, 82. The linkage, even overlap, between beauty and good is expressed "most divinely" in the Greek compound noun kalokagathia (καλοκαγαθία) to describe the "active perfection of men."* Beauty is good, and good beauty. The natural law is beauty-good, kalokagathia.
The good may be discerned in two ways: through knowledge of the causes of good, or through knowledge of "those signs and tokens" that are always annexed or attached to goodness. I.8.2, 82. Knowledge of good through its causes is "the most sure and infallible way" of determining the good, and yet it is also the most difficult to do. For this reason, most men shun it, and "had rather walk as men do in the dark hap hazard, than tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge's sake." I.8.2, 83. Most men are "full of tongue and weak of brain," and generally do not invest the effort required to inquire the causes of goodness.
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie There are, however, sundry kinds of "signs and tokens" that can be relied upon to discern the good. These are sort of like rules of thumb or heuristic short cuts, and some of them are more sure than others. Among these, perhaps the strongest and most reliable is the "universal consent of men" that something is good or evil. I.8.3, 83. Only the weightiest reasoning, and not mere "surmises and slight possibilities," can overcome such universal beliefs. This is true even if "we know not the cause" for common consent, as we can assume "that some necessary cause there is" when the common and near universal consent of mankind opines that something is good or evil. This is the principle of vox populi, vox Dei:
The general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the author of nature, her voice is but his instrument.I.8.3, 83-84. Thus, the common consent of mankind may be said to be law, in the manner of St. Paul's letter to the Romans: "They are a law unto themselves." (Rom. 2:14) "A law therefore generally taken," such as a universally accepted rule of right, "is a directive rule unto goodness of operation." I.8.3, 84.
Ultimately, however, it is not the rules of thumb that determine the rule, it is reason itself that is the rule for determining the good. "The rule of voluntary agents on earth," such as man, "is the sentence that reason gives concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do." I.8.3, 85. These "sentences" or judgments "are some more, some less general," and they must be applied to "particular actions" to determine whether the particular is good.
Hooker then turns to the question of the basic principles of moral reasoning. The main principles of reason are self-evident or "in themselves apparent." Hooker notes that if one were to reject self-evident principles, one would destroy knowledge. "For to make nothing evident of itself unto man's understanding were to take away all possibility of knowing anything. . . . In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed the mind does presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof." I.8.5, 85. Necessarily, we must start with such self-evident foundations. If we were to seek the reason behind self-evident principles, we may never get off the ground, and would wallow in skepticism and irrational chaos. As the Greek philosopher Theophrastus put it: "They that seek a reason of all things do utterly overthrow reason" (Ἁπάντων ζητου̑ντες λόγον, ἀναιρου̑σι λόγον).
Hooker gives as an example of one of these self-evident principles or axioms of reason the notion that the greater good is to be chosen before the lesser good. Other such self-evident axioms not subject to direct proof, though less general, include: God is to be worshiped, parents are to be honored, and the Golden Rule should be followed (i.e., we should do unto others as we would like them to do unto us). I.8.5, 86. "Such things, as soon as they are alleged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proof or further discourse to be assured of their goodness." I.8.5, 86.
These self-evident principles are fundamental, were "first found out by discourse," and were, as it were, "drawn out of the very bowels of heaven and earth." I.8.5, 86. This may be said because all things created and observed by the senses of man serve three purposes. First, they materially serve to preserve mankind's life. But they also serve two higher purposes: knowledge of being and knowledge of order. Man rejoices in the knowledge of these things beyond the simple utility they may have to his survival. Additionally, creation serves to provide us the source of knowledge of law, of the order of the way things are, the ratio ordinis. "[T]he knowledge of every the least thing in the whole world, has in it a second peculiar benefit unto us, inasmuch as it serves to minister rules, canons, and laws for men to direct those actions by, which we properly term human." I.8.5, 86. The world, then, evidences law, a ratio ordinis, and not just for those things, but for man also. It is our source of the Eternal Law, the deep Magic, Dharma, the Dao.
The Greeks "insinuate" this very mystery in their notion of Themis, in Latin Jus, and what we call Right. The Greeks considered Themis the daughter of heaven (Ouranos, or Οὐρανός) and earth (Gaia, or Γαῖα). [Cf. Hesiod's Theogony] Thus law is to be found in the order of the Cosmos.
We know things either as they are in themselves, or as they are in mutual relation one to another. The knowledge of that which man is in reference unto himself, and other things in relation unto man, I may justly term the mother of all those principles which are as it were edicts, statutes, and decrees in that law of nature, whereby human actions are framed.I.8.6, 86.
Following this principle, one observes in creation first that "the best things, where they are not hindered, do still produce the best operations." I.8.6, 86. Where there is a variety of things that must concur to yield one effect, the best such combination is one in which "all congruity of reason to guide the residue, that it prevailing most," so that the combined work may have the greatest perfection. Applying this principle to ourselves, we perceive that the excellence of our souls exceeds the excellence of our bodies, and that the "diviner part" of our souls exceeds the perfection of "the baser part" of our souls. I.8.6, 87. It follows that the diviner part of the soul , that is, reason, should guide the combination of body and the "baser part" of our soul so as to yield the greatest perfection.
[S]eeing that all these concur in producing human actions: it cannot be well unless the chiefest do command and direct the rest. The soul then ought to conduct the body, and the spirit of our minds the soul.I.8.6, 87. This then yields what Hooker calls the "first law," that we learn from the application of self-evident principles to the order of the cosmos. That "first law " is "whereby the highest power of the mind requires general obedience at the hands of all the reason concurring with it unto action." I.8.6, 87. As a sort of proof that such a "first law" is derived from Reason, and not from Revelation, Hooker cites Aristotle's Politics (see 1254b), which sets forth this principle.
In short, we may summarize Hooker's doctrine thus far: Reason is the guide of the good and the beautiful, the kaloskagathos. It ought to direct the baser part of our souls, and a fortiori the use of our body. Reason is not, as Hume would have it, the slave of the passions. Nay. Rather, the passions must be made subordinate to right Reason, "God's viceroy" in us.
[*The compound adjective kaloskagathos (also kalokagathos or kalos kai agathos) comes from Greek: καλὸςκἀγαθός, καλὸκἀγαθός, or καλὸς καί ἀγαθός) literally the joinder of καλός, beautiful, and ἀγαθός, good. The nounal form is kalokagathia (καλοκαγαθία)]
Portrait of Richard Hooker
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