PERFECT HAPPINESS IS NOT MAN'S LOT IN HIS EARTHLY LIFE. It is not man's lot so long as he is living in time and space, in the sublunary world. Here, man is subject to imperfection, to "griefs of body," and "defects of mind." The best things do not come to us without pain, and the constant and continual effort required to maintain those goods which are most desirous as perfecting us make us weary. In this world, we are subject to the tedium of time, to the burdens of labor. Not so is it for those "in a state of bliss," something which arises "when our union with God is complete." I.11.3, 113.
While our intellect and will may be limited during the span of our temporal life, it is not so before God when we are in complete union with him.
Man's will in this life is moved principally by a self-regarding desire. When in union with God, this self-regarding desire will be, as it were, replaced by a selfless, supernatural love cum natural desire. So the dross of selfishness by which our desires move us in this world will be transformed, by the grace of glory, into the pure caritas of God. "As the will does not work upon that object [good] by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall work also by love." I.11.3, 113.
Hooker here misquotes St. Augustine: Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis, which he freely translates as: "The longing disposition of them that thirst is changed into the sweet affection of them that taste and are replenished." I.11.3, 133. [The quote, from St. Augustine's De Trinitate (IX.18) should be: Appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae fit amor cognitae, , that is, "the desire which led us to long for the knowing of the thing, becomes the love of the thing when known." The intendment is the same. One thinks here of Psalm 41:2-3: "As the hart panteth after the fountains of water; so my soul panteth after thee, O God. My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God; when shall I come and appear before the face of God? Sicut areola praeparata ad inrigationes aquarum sic anima mea praeparata est ad te Deus; sitivit anima mea Deum fortem viventem quando veniam et parebo ante faciem tuam.]
This remarkable transformation, purification, refinement of our desires into love is the apostolic "crown which withereth not." I.11.3, 113 (cf. 2 Tim. 4:8 and 1 Pet. 1:4).
Hooker clarifies that this transformational destiny of man is not one that is inherited or obtained by his own nature, his own powers. Rather, this is a supernatural destiny, one that is given, as gift, by God. This supernatural destiny "does neither depend upon the nature of the thing itself, nor proceed from any natural necessity that our souls should so exercise themselves." I.11.3, 113. No, this supernatural destiny proceeds "from the will of God, which does both freely perfect our nature in so high a degree and continue it so perfected." I.11.13, 113. So while this grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, this grace is clearly supernatural.
This dignity is man's alone. Brute creation does not enjoy this grace. "Under man no creature in the world is capable of felicity and bliss." I.11.13, 113. And this for two reasons. First, the perfection of brute creation is that which is best for them. Second, the good sought by brute creation is always some external good lesser than themselves. Contrariwise, our perfection is the best simpliciter and absolutissimum, that is God, the perfectissimum. This a remarkable calling, and one that should not lead to hubris, but to humble marvel and wonder, even praise of God, such as that expressed by David in Psalm 8:5-10:
What then can be inferred from this intrinsic desire for happiness we find in man? What, further, can we infer from the fact that in this world man simply is unable to fulfill this desire? Applying reason to these two facts allows us to anticipate man's eternal destiny.
[In Keble's version of Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, cite is made to St. Thomas as author of the Commentary on Aristotle referred to by Hooker: "Si comprehensio esset impossibilis, tunc desiderium esset otiosum: et concessum est ab omnibus, quod nulla res est otiosa in fundamento naturæ et creaturæ." But from what I've gathered, this is not St. Thomas Aquinas, but a Latin translation of Averroes's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Regardless, it is a principle that the pagan Aristotle, the Muslim Averroes, and the Christian St. Thomas all shared.]
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie
Consonant with both man's nature and supernatural destiny, man seeks a "triple perfection," a sensual, an intellectual, and a spiritual or divine perfection.
It is error to forget the tripartite destiny of man, to overemphasize one at the exclusion of the other, or to disregard any one of them. Those that focus merely on the first perfection are, in essence, atheists, or perhaps better, idolaters.
Hooker's argument (and Tertullian's anima naturaliter Christiana) is none other than the argument that Orestes Brownson advanced in his Essay, "Labor and Association," found in Volume 10 of his Works (pp. 51-52):
How then is this third perfection which is intimated, suggested, implied by our disaffection with all the world's sensual and intellectual goods, but not naturally known or naturally available to us, obtained? The answer to that question is what Hooker next turns to.
Portrait of Richard Hooker
While our intellect and will may be limited during the span of our temporal life, it is not so before God when we are in complete union with him.
Complete union with him must be according unto every power and faculty of our minds apt to receive so glorious an object. Capable we are of God both by understanding and will, by understanding that he is that sovereign truth, which comprehends the rich treasures of all wisdom; by will, as he is that sea of goodness, whereof who so tastes shall thirst no more.I.11.3, 113. There is a remarkable fit between our intellect and will, and God. But how is this so? In answer to this, Hooker explores the differences between man's temporal life, and his life hereafter, and he enters thereby into a discussion of the difference between man's natural and supernatural life.
Man's will in this life is moved principally by a self-regarding desire. When in union with God, this self-regarding desire will be, as it were, replaced by a selfless, supernatural love cum natural desire. So the dross of selfishness by which our desires move us in this world will be transformed, by the grace of glory, into the pure caritas of God. "As the will does not work upon that object [good] by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet unobtained, so likewise upon the same hereafter received it shall work also by love." I.11.3, 113.
Hooker here misquotes St. Augustine: Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis, which he freely translates as: "The longing disposition of them that thirst is changed into the sweet affection of them that taste and are replenished." I.11.3, 133. [The quote, from St. Augustine's De Trinitate (IX.18) should be: Appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae fit amor cognitae, , that is, "the desire which led us to long for the knowing of the thing, becomes the love of the thing when known." The intendment is the same. One thinks here of Psalm 41:2-3: "As the hart panteth after the fountains of water; so my soul panteth after thee, O God. My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God; when shall I come and appear before the face of God? Sicut areola praeparata ad inrigationes aquarum sic anima mea praeparata est ad te Deus; sitivit anima mea Deum fortem viventem quando veniam et parebo ante faciem tuam.]
This remarkable transformation, purification, refinement of our desires into love is the apostolic "crown which withereth not." I.11.3, 113 (cf. 2 Tim. 4:8 and 1 Pet. 1:4).
Whereas we now love the thing that is good, but good especially in respect of benefit unto us, we shall then love the thing that is good, only or principally for the goodness of beauty in itself. The soul being in this sort as it is active, perfected by love of that infinite good, shall, as it is receptive, be also perfected with those supernatural passions of joy, peace, and delight. All this is endless and everlasting.I.11.13, 113.
Hooker clarifies that this transformational destiny of man is not one that is inherited or obtained by his own nature, his own powers. Rather, this is a supernatural destiny, one that is given, as gift, by God. This supernatural destiny "does neither depend upon the nature of the thing itself, nor proceed from any natural necessity that our souls should so exercise themselves." I.11.3, 113. No, this supernatural destiny proceeds "from the will of God, which does both freely perfect our nature in so high a degree and continue it so perfected." I.11.13, 113. So while this grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it, this grace is clearly supernatural.
This dignity is man's alone. Brute creation does not enjoy this grace. "Under man no creature in the world is capable of felicity and bliss." I.11.13, 113. And this for two reasons. First, the perfection of brute creation is that which is best for them. Second, the good sought by brute creation is always some external good lesser than themselves. Contrariwise, our perfection is the best simpliciter and absolutissimum, that is God, the perfectissimum. This a remarkable calling, and one that should not lead to hubris, but to humble marvel and wonder, even praise of God, such as that expressed by David in Psalm 8:5-10:
What is man that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man that thou visitest him?Man is designed to be happy; it is a fundamental aspect of his nature. So intrinsic is this desire for happiness, that one may even say that man is compelled to seek his happiness. The desire to be happy "in man is natural. It is not in our power not to do the same: how should it then be in our power to do it coldly or remissly?" I.11.4, 114. For Hooker, this desire for happiness is, as it were, an involuntary response; like the heart, it beats and throbs willy nilly. A man who does not desire happiness is an oxymoron, a metaphysical impossibility, a non-man. It is impossible for man to desire unhappiness, or even to give a lie to it: "so that our desire being natural is also in that degree of earnestness whereunto nothing can be added." I.11.4, 114.
Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honour:
And hast set him over the works of thy hands.
Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover the beasts also of the fields.
The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that pass through the paths of the sea.
O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth!
What then can be inferred from this intrinsic desire for happiness we find in man? What, further, can we infer from the fact that in this world man simply is unable to fulfill this desire? Applying reason to these two facts allows us to anticipate man's eternal destiny.
And is it probable that God should frame the hearts of all men so desirous of that which no man may obtain? It is an axiom of nature that natural desire cannot utterly be frustrate. This desire of ours being natural should be frustrate, if that which may satisfy the same were a thing impossible for man to aspire unto.I.11.4, 114.
[In Keble's version of Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, cite is made to St. Thomas as author of the Commentary on Aristotle referred to by Hooker: "Si comprehensio esset impossibilis, tunc desiderium esset otiosum: et concessum est ab omnibus, quod nulla res est otiosa in fundamento naturæ et creaturæ." But from what I've gathered, this is not St. Thomas Aquinas, but a Latin translation of Averroes's Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Regardless, it is a principle that the pagan Aristotle, the Muslim Averroes, and the Christian St. Thomas all shared.]
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie Consonant with both man's nature and supernatural destiny, man seeks a "triple perfection," a sensual, an intellectual, and a spiritual or divine perfection.
Man does seek a triple perfection, first a sensual, consisting in those things which very life itself requires either as necessary supplements, or as beauties and ornaments thereof; then an intellectual, consisting in those things which none underneath man is either capable of or acquainted with; lastly, a spiritual and divine, consisting in those things whereunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cannot here attain unto them.I.11.4, 114.
It is error to forget the tripartite destiny of man, to overemphasize one at the exclusion of the other, or to disregard any one of them. Those that focus merely on the first perfection are, in essence, atheists, or perhaps better, idolaters.
They that make the first of these three the scope of their whole life, as said by the Apostle [Paul] to have no God, but only their belly, to be earthly minded men.I.11.14, 114. To desire the second perfection is not as vicious, for the second perfection leads to knowledge and to virtue, to moral and civil perfection. And yet, the second perfection, though apparently a good, does not satisfy. Hooker's conclusion is worthy of being quoted in full:
That there is somewhat higher than either of these no other proof is needed, than the very process of man's desire, which being natural should be frustrate if there were not some farther thing wherein it might rest at the length contended, which in the former [two perfections] it cannot do. For man does not seem to rest satisfied either with fruition of that wherewith his life is preserved, or with performance of such actions as advance him most deservedly in estimation; but does further covet, yea oftentimes manifestly pursue with great sedulousness and earnestness that which cannot stand him in any stead for vital use; that which exceeds the reach of his sense; yea, somewhat above capacity of reason, somewhat divine and heavenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmises than conceives; somewhat it seeks and what that is directly it knows not, yet very intentive desire thereof does so incite it, that all other known delights and pleasures are laid aside, they give place to the search of this but only suspected desire. If the soul of man did serve only to give him being in this life, then things appertaining unto this life would content him, as we see they do other creatures: which creatures enjoying what they live by, seek no further, but this contentation [i.e., satisfaction] does show a kind of acknowledgment that there is no higher good which does any way belong to them. With us it is otherwise. For although the beauties, riches, honors, sciences, virtues, and perfections of all men living were in the present possession of one: yet somewhat beyond and above all this there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for. Sot that nature even in this life does plainly claim and call for a more divine perfection, than either of these that have been mentioned.I.11.4,114-15. For Hooker it is clear: Anima naturaliter Christiana!
Hooker's argument (and Tertullian's anima naturaliter Christiana) is none other than the argument that Orestes Brownson advanced in his Essay, "Labor and Association," found in Volume 10 of his Works (pp. 51-52):
Man is never satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which he is naturally drawn. All experience proves it; the experience of each particular man proves it; else wherefore this deep wail from the heart of every one who lives simply the life of nature, this outbreak of despair, Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas? Build man the most splendid palace; lavish on it all the decorations of the most perfect art; furnish it with the most exquisite and most expensive taste; lodge him in it on the soft, voluptuous couch; spread his table with the most delicate viands and the rarest fruits; refresh him with the most costly wines; regale him with the richest music; rain down upon him the most fragrant odors; ravish him with beauty; gratify every sense, every taste, every wish, as soon as formed; and the poor wretch will sigh for he knows not what, and behold with envy even the ragged beggar feeding on offal. No variety, no change, no art, can satisfy him. All that nature or art can offer palls upon his senses and his heart,— is to him poor, mean, and despicable. There arise in him wants which are too vast for nature, which swell out beyond the bounds of the universe, and cannot, and will not, be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite and eternal God. Never yet did nature suffice for man, and it never will.Indeed.
This great and solemn fact, which it is vain to attempt to deny,—a fact deep graven on all hearts that have experience, that have lived the natural life,—should lead thoughtful men to ask,—nay, it does lead thoughtful men to ask,—if, after all, it be not a mistake to attempt to satisfy ourselves with the vain and perishing things of this world; if the inability to find our satisfaction in nature be not a strong presumption that our Creator did not design us for a natural destiny; if, in fact, he did not intend us for an end above nature; and therefore, that our precise error is in seeking a natural destiny in opposition to his design, in neglecting our true destiny for a false destiny, that is, neglecting true good and pursuing real evil. We should suppose that this universal experience of all men would have created, at least, a doubt, in the minds of our friends, as to the soundness of their assumption of the natural as the true destiny of man on this globe.
How then is this third perfection which is intimated, suggested, implied by our disaffection with all the world's sensual and intellectual goods, but not naturally known or naturally available to us, obtained? The answer to that question is what Hooker next turns to.
Portrait of Richard Hooker
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