HUMAN LAW FOR HOOKER IS MORE THAN CONVENTION. To suggest that religion or virtue is relative, that is, "only as men will account of them," is "brutishness." I.10.1, 95-96. Nature itself, not man's whim, provides the objective standard of the good, and so "teaches laws and statutes to live by." I.10.1, 96. The law of reason binds men--irrespective of political association, social contract, of positive law. There is, however, a need for association, government, and human law. Ultimately, the source of a governing authority over civil society, a regiment as Hooker calls it, is a necessity of man's fallen state. Its source, however, is from the consent of the people, and is not the result of a natural right of one person ruling over another.
Yet man is not fit to be alone; he must needs live in society. But for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient of furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature does desire, a life fit for the dignity of man: therefore to supply those defects and imperfections, which are in us living, single, and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to see communion and fellowship with others.
I.10.1, 96. Thus it is that the natural more law, the law of reason, compels man to live in political society. A political society demands a government, and a government demands a law. Thus political society, government, and human law all derive from the natural moral law that requires life in common. And as a result, governments are instituted among men through a form of compact or agreement. Before Hooker addresses the issue of human law, he addresses the issue of human government. What is its source? 
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie
Prior to the institution of government, however, men recognized a natural right of self-defense against force and injury. Though they recognized each man's right to pursue his interest, this had to be done without injury to others; and if it were sought to be done by injury to others, it need not be suffered, but could be withstood. Finally, it was recognized that when such disputes arose, some disinterested arbiter was needed, as a man was too partial to be his own judge in his own cause against another. Therefore, disputes would be endless and without just arbitration without the establishment, by common consent, of a man to adjudicate fairly over the adversarial parties. Although some "very great and judicious men" (Hooker here makes reference to Aristotle's Politics) have suggested that the "noble, wise, and virtuous" have "a kind of natural right" to governs those "of a servile disposition," Hooke disagrees. In his opinion, the right of man to adjudicate over his fellows does not arise from a natural right of a greater versus lesser, but as a result of common consent and exigencies of fallen man in the light of the law of nature. Common agreement or consent is required as a matter of "manifestation of this their right," and for peaceable acceptance of and consent to such adjudication. Without assent, these would be absent.
Hooker recognizes that fathers have natural rights over their families in the domestic economy: "To fathers within their private families nature has given a supreme power, for which cause we see throughout the world even from the first foundation thereof, all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful kings in their own houses." I.10.4, 99. There is no similar power over the multitude, however, since there is no natural dependency or natural superiority, such as exists between a family and father, that would suggest that power. Therefore, the power over a political society is either by consent or by immediate appointment of God. Without such consent or without being the result of immediate appointment, any exercise of power by one over the political community would appear to be usurpation and as a result unlawful, that is against the natural law. To be lawful, the power either had to be granted that person, or given immediately to him by God. I.10.4, 99. Hooker finds it reasonable to hold the opinion that Aristotle supposes that the first political ruler was a king modelled after the paternal rule of the father over his family.
However, Hooker notes that kingship is not the only form of authority recognized over political or civil society. Because of the inconveniences or disadvantages of such a rule, others have been devised. But it seems an invariable principle that in all cases alike, regardless of the particular form of public regiment, the origin of public regiment has been consent. And though such government or regiment may not be theoretically required, each man could rule by natural law alone, it is practically a necessity under natural law given man's post-lapsarian state. Government is therefore, under the current dispensation, required by natural law.
Portrait of Richard Hooker
Two foundations there are which bear up public societies, the one, a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship, the other and order expressly or secretly [i.e., implicitly] agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together. The latter is that which we call the law of the common weal, the very soul of a political body, the parts of which are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requires.
I.10.96. Political laws are ordained entirely toward the external order and "regiment among men." They presume, and are only properly framed, if they "presume the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred laws of his nature." In other words, laws should be framed "presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind little better than a wild beast." I.10.1, 96. Law is meant to harness this predisposition, to guide it to a right end, so a to protect and advance the common good, which is the purpose for which political society is instituted.
"The life is led most happily, wherein all virtue is exercised without impediment or let." I.10.2, 97. The exercise of virtue requires a minimal amount of food and raiment, that is, enough for the maintenance of life. Without such a minimum level of maintenance, all men care about is survival. The first thing men begin to think about after meeting their fundamental needs is religion. This is not to suggest that God is less important that food and raiment.
"The life is led most happily, wherein all virtue is exercised without impediment or let." I.10.2, 97. The exercise of virtue requires a minimal amount of food and raiment, that is, enough for the maintenance of life. Without such a minimum level of maintenance, all men care about is survival. The first thing men begin to think about after meeting their fundamental needs is religion. This is not to suggest that God is less important that food and raiment.
True it is that the kingdom of God must be the first thing in our purposes and desires. But in as much as righteous life presupposes life, in as much as to live virtuously it is impossible except we live, therefore the first impediment, which naturally we endeavor to remove, is penury and want of things without which we cannot live.
I.10.2, 97. Man also seeks more than the mere necessary; he naturally seeks to flourish, to have "such a life as has in it joy, comfort, delight, and pleasure," I.10.2, 97, and even "riches." As a consequence, from the beginning man applies the mechanical arts to the things of the world. But of all things desired by men, those things of "greatest dignity" are most sought, at least "by all such as judge rightly." I.10.2, 97.
Although therefore riches be a thing which every man wishes, yet no man of judgment can esteem it better to be rich, than wise, virtuous, and religious.
I.10.2, 97. These goods--whether they are material or those of greater dignity--are not part of our nature; we are not born rich nor virtuous. "For into the world we come as empty of the one as of the other, as naked in mind as we are in body." I.10.2, 97. When born, man's only help is domestic, that is, in the form of paternal and maternal solicitude and instruction.
However, any effort and improving body and mind by instruction is severely curtailed by the presence of wickedness and malice. Even from the beginning, when there was but one family, "no means of instruction human or divine could prevent the effusion of blood." I.10.3, 98. This, obviously, is a reference to the fratricidal murder of Abel by Cain (Gen. 4:1-8). As families multiplied and separated, "each providing for itself," "envy, strife, contention, and violence" was bound to grow. Invariably, the majority of men have used "wit and valor, as it were with armor," to achieve extreme evil; only the minority of men have acted to the contrary. It grew clear that the lack of civil society and the lack of a public regiment, was a serious impediment to human development.
However, any effort and improving body and mind by instruction is severely curtailed by the presence of wickedness and malice. Even from the beginning, when there was but one family, "no means of instruction human or divine could prevent the effusion of blood." I.10.3, 98. This, obviously, is a reference to the fratricidal murder of Abel by Cain (Gen. 4:1-8). As families multiplied and separated, "each providing for itself," "envy, strife, contention, and violence" was bound to grow. Invariably, the majority of men have used "wit and valor, as it were with armor," to achieve extreme evil; only the minority of men have acted to the contrary. It grew clear that the lack of civil society and the lack of a public regiment, was a serious impediment to human development.
To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way, but only by growing unto composition and agreement among themselves, by ordaining some kind of public government, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquility, and happy estate of the rest might be procured.
I.10.4, 98.
Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie Prior to the institution of government, however, men recognized a natural right of self-defense against force and injury. Though they recognized each man's right to pursue his interest, this had to be done without injury to others; and if it were sought to be done by injury to others, it need not be suffered, but could be withstood. Finally, it was recognized that when such disputes arose, some disinterested arbiter was needed, as a man was too partial to be his own judge in his own cause against another. Therefore, disputes would be endless and without just arbitration without the establishment, by common consent, of a man to adjudicate fairly over the adversarial parties. Although some "very great and judicious men" (Hooker here makes reference to Aristotle's Politics) have suggested that the "noble, wise, and virtuous" have "a kind of natural right" to governs those "of a servile disposition," Hooke disagrees. In his opinion, the right of man to adjudicate over his fellows does not arise from a natural right of a greater versus lesser, but as a result of common consent and exigencies of fallen man in the light of the law of nature. Common agreement or consent is required as a matter of "manifestation of this their right," and for peaceable acceptance of and consent to such adjudication. Without assent, these would be absent.
Hooker recognizes that fathers have natural rights over their families in the domestic economy: "To fathers within their private families nature has given a supreme power, for which cause we see throughout the world even from the first foundation thereof, all men have ever been taken as lords and lawful kings in their own houses." I.10.4, 99. There is no similar power over the multitude, however, since there is no natural dependency or natural superiority, such as exists between a family and father, that would suggest that power. Therefore, the power over a political society is either by consent or by immediate appointment of God. Without such consent or without being the result of immediate appointment, any exercise of power by one over the political community would appear to be usurpation and as a result unlawful, that is against the natural law. To be lawful, the power either had to be granted that person, or given immediately to him by God. I.10.4, 99. Hooker finds it reasonable to hold the opinion that Aristotle supposes that the first political ruler was a king modelled after the paternal rule of the father over his family.
It is no improbable opinion therefore which the Arch-philosopher was of, that as the chiefest person in every household was always as it were a king, so when numbers of households joined themselves in civil society together, kings were the first kind of governors amongst them.I.10.4, 99. This explains the residual use of "Father" in reference to kings. A similar situation may have applied in the area of priestly reign, which in antiquity was conjoined to the kingly rule, as it was in the biblical figure Melchizedek, King of Salem, and priest of the God Most High (Gen. 14:18-20).
However, Hooker notes that kingship is not the only form of authority recognized over political or civil society. Because of the inconveniences or disadvantages of such a rule, others have been devised. But it seems an invariable principle that in all cases alike, regardless of the particular form of public regiment, the origin of public regiment has been consent. And though such government or regiment may not be theoretically required, each man could rule by natural law alone, it is practically a necessity under natural law given man's post-lapsarian state. Government is therefore, under the current dispensation, required by natural law.
So that in a word all public regiment of what kind soever seems evidently to have risen from deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between men, judging it convenient and behooveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that men might have lived without any public regiment. Howbeit, the corruption of our nature being presupposed, we may not deny but that the law of nature does now require of necessity some kind of regiment, so that to bring things unto the first course they were in, and utterly to take away all kind of public government in the world, were apparently to overturn the whole world.I.10.4, 100.
Portrait of Richard Hooker
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