Law, Sit Up Higher: Richard Hooker and the Natural Law, Part 9

THE BENEFIT OF KEEPING THE LAW OF REASON is Hooker's last area of discussion before he goes into the issue of human law and its relationship to the natural law of reason. "Now the due observation of this law which reason teaches us, cannot but be effectual unto the great good that observe the same." I.9.1, 93. In the same manner that the natural world suffers if one of its parts goes awry--hypothetically, one could consider what would happen to the cosmos if the sun or the moon to swerve from its orbit--so likewise does man suffer from going awry, that is not following the natural moral law. Man is a microcosmos, a "very world in himself," and the transgression of the natural law of reason might be expected to result in as much harm as a sun or a moon that fails in its elliptical compass. "Yes, " says Hooker quoting St. Paul (Romans 1:19), "tribulation and anguish unto every soul that does evil." I.9.1, 93.

Title Page of Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie

There is, however, a distinction between a disorder in the natural world arising from a failure to follow the law of nature, and disorder in man arising from the failure to follow the law of reason. Good comes from following both the law of nature and the law of reason; similarly, evil comes from a failure to follow those laws. However, there is no sense of Reward associated with natural agents' compliance with the law of nature. Nor is there any sense of Punishment associated with natural agents' failure to follow the law of nature. The sense of reward and punishment is only found only in man, and not among the larger creation. "And the reason of this is the difference in the manner of observing or transgressing the law of his [man's] nature." I.9.1, 94. There is therefore a difference--one arising out of free will--between benefit and reward, and between hurt and punishment. I.9.1, 94.

Now rewards and punishments do always presuppose something willingly done well or ill, without which respect though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit, and not a reward, the other simply a hurt, not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man's will, which is the root of all his actions, there grows variety in the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured

I.9.1, 94-95. The watershed distinction is free will. Hooker cites Justinian's Codex: Voluntate sublata, omnem actum parem esse: "Take away the will, and all acts are equal." Bonam voluntatem plerumque pro facto reputari: "That which we do not and would do is commonly accepted as done." (One would have thought Hooker would cite Christ's teaching on adultery here [Matthew 5:28]: an adulterous act of will is adultery already, even if the act has not been accomplished.) Man either follows or rejects the law of reason voluntarily, and it is the voluntary nature of this obedience or disobedience that gives right to merit or demerit, to righteousness or sin. Hooker therefore develops this important aspect of his thought.

Things that we do against our wills or under some sort of external constraint or force, "we are not properly said to do it, because the motive cause of doing it is not in ourselves, but carries us, as if the wind should drive a feather in the air, we no[t a] whit furthering that whereby we are driven." I.9.1, 94. We are moved to feel compassion and pity with respect to someone compelled to act against his will, and do not view that person as culpable or evil.

There are other instances where an evil act is caused, not as a result of any kind of external force constraint or compulsion, nor even against a person's will, but nevertheless without that person's will. This happens when a person is bereft of his mind, or suffers from an absence or defect of thought or judgment. "For which cause, no man did ever think the hurtful actions of furious men and innocents to be punishable." I.9.1, 94.

There is still another category of things that are done, neither against nor without one's will, but yet "not simply and merely with our wills, but with our will in such sort moved, that albeit there be no impossibility but that we might, nevertheless we are not so easily able to do otherwise." I.9.1, 94. These present situations where there is some sort of greater or lesser defect of will. Some of these difficulties present extenuating circumstances that, to a greater or lesser extent, may make one evil deed more pardonable than another.

Finally, an evil act may be more pardonable "by how much the exigence of so doing, or the difficulty of doing otherwise is greater." Thus, factual circumstances may put such pressure on us to do evil, or make it so difficult for us to do good, so as to make evil acts more or less pardonable. However, factual circumstances may not be exculpatory if this "necessity or difficulty have originally risen from ourselves." I.9.1, 94.

It is no excuse therefore unto him, who being drunk, commits incest, and alleges that his wits were not his own, inasmuch as himself might have chosen whether his wits should by that mean have been taken from him.

I.9.1, 94. From the importance of the will in determining reward and punishment, Hooker turns to the issue of judgment. "Rewards and punishments are not received, but at the hands of such a being above us, have power to examine and judge our deeds." I.9.2, 95. Men may judge over other men on the basis of "external actions," a matter which Hooker will handle later. What Hooker addresses at this point is the reward or punishments merited by the internal acts of will, which arise in the internal forum of man, as well as those external acts which may be under the concurrent jurisdiction of man and God.

[E]very man's heart and conscience does in good or evil, even secretly committed and known to none but itself, either like or disallow itself, and accordingly either rejoice, very nature exulting (as it were) in certain hope of reward, or else grieve (as it were) in a sense of future punishment, neither of which can in this case be looked for from any other, saving only from him, who discerns and judges the very secrets of all hearts.

I.9.2., 95. Man is not the ultimate judge of those acts accomplished in his internal forum. It is God, "the only rewarder and revenger of all such actions, although not of such actions only, but of all, whereby the law of nature is broken, whereof himself is the author." I.9.2, 95. This internal nature of law, and of judgment, and of reward and punishment was known to the Romans. In his De Legibus (II.8.19), Cicero relates how the Roman laws of the Twelve Tables recognized that some laws are simply outside of the cognizance of human law and human enforcement: enforcement is the exclusive bailiwick of God. Ad divos adeunto caste, pietatem adhibento, opes amovento. Qui secus faxit, deus ipse vindex erit. "Let the Gods be worshiped chastely, superfluity of riches and pomp removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger."

In the next blog posting, we will begin Hooker's treatment of the human law and its relationship to the natural law or the law of reason.

Portrait of Richard Hooker