Philip the Chancellor on Virtue: Recruitment of Aristotle

THE SUMMA DE BONO OF PHILIP the Chancellor's treatment on the cardinal virtues begins with thee questions concerning them.  It is standard enough, and relies clearly on the introduction to the subject as contained in Peter Lombard's Sentences (Book III, Dist. 33).  It asks about the basis of the quadripartite number of the cardinal virtues and what justifies such division.  It addresses the ordering among the virtues and assesses prior opinions on that subject.  It asks why the cardinal virtues are called "cardinal," and whether they can be called divine virtues based upon the fact that they are, at least for the Christian, infused into the soul.  Finally, after an introduction to the cardinal virtues through these three questions, it launches into a lengthy discussion of the cardinal virtues themselves.  Contrary to the treatment of the virtues by prior teachers, Philip the Chancellor's treatment is extensive, covering about 300 pages in his Summa de Bono.*  He round up his discussion of the virtues after this extensive treatment by focusing on the connection among the virtues and their equality, here relying on the Sentences (Book III, Dist. 36).  In short, within a sort of envelope of convention we find a real developmental tour de force.

In order to develop the notion of virtues within the Christian moral context, Philip drew heavily from Aristotle, especially relying upon the so-called Ethica vetus (Nicomachean Ethics 2-3).  Thus we find central in his elaboration of the virtues, Aristotle's "four causes"** and Aristotle's famous analysis of virtue as a mean between two extremes, the so-called golden mean (aurea mediocritas or sectio aurea).

Four Virtues, from Palace at Esztergom, Hungary

Philip also drew from what R.E. Houser describes as the "moral psychology" of Aristotle, namely that each human had a soul whose powers were the proximate causes of both actions and passions.  Philip also relies on the Aristotelian method for introspection, namely one that relies on the notion of "object."  Therefore, Philip applies the Aristotelian assessment of the soul's interior by reference to its acts which are to be understood by reference to their object.  "Powers differ on acts," says Philip, "and acts based on their objects or causes of motion."  [Summa de bono, I.227).  As Houser describes the concept of "object" as the vehicle for understanding the soul's interior:

Object in Philip's usage meant that feature of a real thing or set of real things which serves as the term of a cognitive relation between things and their knowers. The object, then, provides an external and real basis for understanding the inner workings of the soul, a perceptible basis for knowing what is not directly perceptible and especially for distinguishing powers, acts, and passions from each other. Philip knew that Aristotle had used their objects to distinguish the five senses from each other and that this account of sensation had provided the model for his account of virtue: 'act, properly speaking, has a definite matter, such as seeing has color, hearing has sound.'

Houser, 44 (quoting Summa de bono, I.227).***

One of Philip the Chancellor's important principles was the connection or relationship between the Aristotelian causal principles, particularly the notion of material cause, and the psychological principles, in particular the notion of object.  By tying these two together, he was also able to draw out an objective component of moral virtue and its subjective component.

Since the object in its technical sense gives content to our understanding of a power, Philip thought of that object as a kind of matter. [He writes in the Summa, 2:206.2-207.6: "Therefore, diversity of rational powers is based on diversity of acts; but diversity of acts is based on specific diversity of their matter."] On the other hand, since a virtue perfects some power of the soul, he also thought of such powers as matter. As Philip used the term, then, matter can refer either to the power of the soul which is delimited by the object of its activity (this is the subjective senses of the matter) or to that object which so delimits a power or act (its objective sense).

Houser, 45.

These Aristotelian tools allowed Philip greatly to amplify his understanding of the cardinal virtues.  By using Aristotle's final, efficient, formal, and material causes to explain the cardinal virtues, focusing mainly on both the objective and subject components of their matter, Philip was able greatly to expand thinking about virtue.  It is what in part allowed him then to give an expansive treatment to a broad range of human virtues, the so-called "parts" of virtues which are subordinate-yet-related to one of the cardinal virtues.

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*Philip's extensive treatment of the virtues was to influence later authors, including St. Albert the Great and Philips pupil Ulrich of Stasbourg who also wrote his own Summa de bono and whose book 6 thereof was entirely dedicated to treating the issue of the virtues.
**Aristotle's traditional causes are: material, formal, final, and efficient.
***One might note the importance of the object in the assessment of the morality of an act and its centrality in the first Papal encyclical to deal with morality in general, Veritatis splendor.  We have addressed this issue in a prior posting.  See Veritatis splendor Part 27: Objects of Acts.

Philip the Chancellor: Summing up the Good

PHILIP THE CHANCELLOR, head of the University of Paris, theologian master, poet and musician, and supporter of the Dominicans, is an important figure in the history of the Christian understanding of virtue in between Peter Lombard and St. Thomas Aquinas. Philip the Chancellor's great work, Summa on the Good (Summa de Bono), proved to be an important bridge between Peter Lombard's Sentences and St. Thomas Aquinas's fully-developed doctrine of virtue in his own Summa, the Summa Theolgiae.  As Houser describes his influence:

They [Sts. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, but also the Dominicans in general] were enamored of his Summa, which moved far in the direction of realizing [Peter] Lombard's promise of a full treatment of the vast range of moral excellence and depravity, and all the stages between them. To do so, Philip had to move well beyond Lombard's brief remarks about the cardinal virtues.

Houser, 43.

Philip the Chancellor's systematic and methodological treatment of the good began with understanding the good as one of the transcendentals--that is, one of this qualities or features of reality that transcend genera, that transcend, in fact, any of Aristotle's ten categories.*  The good, is something that is found in all things, in all being inasmuch as it is being.  Like being, good is learned through a sort of attributive analogy: one never completely learns it, as one is in contact communication with individual things, each with its own expression of "good" which contribute to one's understanding of the transcendent concept of good.  One would literally have to know the entirety of the visible and invisible world fully to comprehend good.

Aristotle's transcendental of the good finds a natural entry into Christian thought through the creation story in Genesis, in particular the frequent reference that God observed that his creation was "good," even "very good."**  Applying the notion of the transcendental to the notion of creation and combing it with the notion that all creation not only came from God but that all creation's end is God (exitus, reditus), helped arrive at a "good of nature" (bonum naturae) and an analogous albeit supernatural "good of grace" (bonum gratiae).

Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the "good of grace," the bonum gratiae, was, in the words of Houser, a tour de force:

[The] questions on the "good of grace" [in Philip's Summa were] a masterful transformation of part of Book 3 of the Sentences [of Peter Lombard] into a full-blown treatise on who the seven principal virtues--three theological and four cardinal--aid humans in their reditus to God.

Houser, 43.  The development of the doctrine on the cardinal virtues in Philip the Chancellor's treatment of it in his Summa is remarkable.  It is part of his greater treatment of the good in his Summa, a text which has been described as the first comprehensive and systematic treatment of moral theology of the 13th century.

We shall spend the next few blog postings discussing Philip the Chancellor's treatment of the cardinal virtues in his Summa de Bono in the next few posts, including Philip's sources, the nature of the cardinal virtues, and the "parts" of the virtues (a development which greatly expanded the depth of virtue-based moral theology)

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*The ten categories of Aristotle as found in his Organon (also known by their Latin term as predicamenta or predicates) are: (1) substance [οὐσία, ousia], i.e.,what something is something is essentially (e.g., human, dog); (2) quantity [πόσον, poson],(e.g., ten yards, three gallons); (3) quality [ποῖον, poion] (e.g., blue, visible); (4) relation [πρός τι, pros ti] (e.g., father/son, on the left of another); (5) location [ποῦ, pou] (e.g., at a movie, on a couch); (6) time [ποτέ, pote] (e.g., yesterday, during an eclipse); (7) position [κεἱσθαι, keisthai] (e.g., sitting, squatting); (8) possession [ἔχειν, echein] (e.g., wearing a robe, holding a pipe); (9) active doing [ποιεῖν, poiein] (e.g., running, smiling); and (10) passively undergoing [πάσχειν, paschein](e.g., being hit, being ridiculed).  Some of these overlap.
**ṭō·wḇ (ט֑וֹב): See Genesis Chapter 1 (καλά, Greek; bonum, Latin)

Peter Lombard on Virtues: Distinction 36

PETER LOMBARD ALSO ADDRESSES the issue of virtues from a Christian perspective in Distinction 36 of Book 3 of his Sentences.   In this distinction, Lombard addresses the interconnectivity of the virtues and their essential equality.  Essentially, he comes to the "probable" conclusion that the theological virtues enjoy a strong unity, as do the "infused" cardinal virtues.  This is based upon the view that the theological and cardinal virtues are all "children" of the mother of all virtues, charity, that is, love of God and love of neighbor for love of God.

Peter Lombard

As we did in our last blog posting, we shall quote those parts of Distinction 36 which relate to the virtues [Chapter 1 and 2 (except for the last paragraph), but not Chapter 3], allowing the Master to speak for himself, and then simply closing this posting with some comments.

DISTINCTION XXXVI

Chapter 1 (135)

1.  ON THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE NOT SEPARATED.  It is also usual to ask whether the virtues are so conjoined that thy cannot be possessed separately by anyone: one who has one of them has all of the.  --JEROME, ON ISAIAS.  Concerning this, Jerome says: "All the virtues are joined to each other, so that he ho lacks one of them lacks all of them."  [Interlinear gloss, on Is. 56:1 see also Jerome, In Isaiam 16.11], and so one ho has one of them has all of them.

2.  And this indeed seems probable.  For since charity is the mother of all the virtues [See Distinctions 23, c. 3 n. 2], it is rightly believed that in whomever is the mother herself, namely charity, in him also are all her children, that is the virtues.--AUGUSTINE, ON JOHN.  Hence Augustine: "Where there is charity, what can possibly be wanting?  But where there is none, what is there that can possibly be profitable?" [Aug., In Ioannem 15.12, tr. 83, n. 3]--AUGUSTINE TO JEROME: "Why, then, do we not say that, whoever has this virtue has all of them, since charity is the fullness of the Law? [Cf. Rom. 13:10]  And the more it is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; the less, the less is there virtue in him; and the less virtue is in him, the more is there vice." [Aug., Epistola 167, c. 3, n. 11]

Chapter 2 (136)

1.  WHETHER ALL THE VIRTUES ARE EQUALLY PRESENT IN ANYONE IN WHOM THEY ARE.  But it is a question whether one who possesses all the virtues has them in equal measure, or whether some flourish more and some less in someone.

2.  For it has seemed to some that some of them had more and some less by someone, as patience was eminent in Job, humility in David, meekness in Moses.  These also grant that one may merit more by one virtue than by another, just as he has the one more fully than the other.  And yet they say that one cannot merit more by any other virtue than by charity, nor can any other be had more fully by anyone than charity.   And so they say that the other virtues can be more or less in someone, but none more fully than charity, which generates the others.  And they say that these are the many faces which the Apostle mentions, saying: From the persons of man faces, etc. [Cf. 2 Cor. 1:11]

3.  Others say more truly that all virtues are joined and equal in anyone in whom they are, so whoever is equal to another in one of the virtues, is also equal to him in all the others.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 6, ON THE TRINITY.  Hence Augustine: "The virtues which are in the human mind, although each is understood in its own distinct way, are yet in no way separable from each other, so that, for instance, those who are equal in fortitude are also equal in prudence, and in justice, and in temperance.  For if you were to say that these men are equal in fortitude, but that one of them is greater in prudence, it follows that the fortitude of the other is less prudent, and so they are not equal in fortitude, since the fortitude of the form is more prudent.  And so you will find it to be with the other virtues, if you consider them in the same way." [Aug., De Trin., 6.4.6]

4.  From these words, it is clear that all the virtues are not only connected, but also equal in a man's spirit.  And so, when someone is said to be pre-eminent in some virtue, as Abraham in faith, Job in patience, this is to be taken according to external uses, or by comparison to other men.  Either such a man especially displays the habit of humility, or he particularly performs the work of faith, or of another of the virtues, so that he is said to be stronger in it than others, or to excel singularly in it among other men.

5.  AUGUSTINE, TO JEROME.  According to this manner, namely according to the reasons for external acts, Augustine says elsewhere that in someone one virtue is more and another less, or that one virtue is in him and another not.  For he speaks as follows: "From that most famous dissertation of yours, it is sufficiently clear that it has not seemed good to our authors, or rather to truth itself, that all sins are equal, even if this is true of the virtues."  [Aug., Epistola 167, c. 2, n. 4]  "For even though it is true that he who has one virtue has all of them, and that he who lacks one virtue has none of them, all sins are not equal in the same way.  For where there is no virtue, there is nothing right, and yet it does not follow that worse cannot become even worse, or what is distorted become even more so  But if, as I believe to be more true and more congruent with the sacred Letters, the dispositions of the soul are like embers of the body (not that they appear in [higher or lower] places, but that they are perceived by the affections), then one is illuminated more fully, another less so, and a third entirely lacks light.  If this is the case, then just as each person is affected by the light of pious charity, and more in one action, less in another, or not at all in a third, so he may be said to have one virtue and to lack another one, or to have one virtue more and another less.  For insofar as it pertains to that charity which is piety, we may rightly say that 'charity is greater in this man than in that one,' and 'there is some of it in this man, none in that one.'  Also, as to an individual, [we may say] that he has greater chastity than patience, and that he has it in a higher degree today than he had yesterday, if he is making progress; or that he still lacks continence, but possesses not a small measure of mercy.  To summarize generally and briefly the view which I have of virtue: Virtue is the charity with which that which ought to be loved is loved.  This is greater in some people, in others less, and in others not at all; but in its greatest fullness, which admits of no increase, it exists in no man while in this life." [Ibid., c. 4, nn. 14-15]

6.  Here it seems to be indicated that one may be said to have one virtue more than another by reason that, through charity, he applies himself more to the act of one virtue than of another; and because of the difference in acts, he may be said to have the virtues themselves more or less, or not to have one of them, even though he has all of them equally and conjointly as to the habit of mind or the essence of each.  But in act he has the one ore, the other less; he may also lack one of them, as a just man, who makes use of marriage, does not have continence in act, which he nevertheless has in habit."*/**

Drawing principally from St. Augustine, though in some measure from St. Jerome and the Venerable Bede, Peter Lombard set the stage for the medieval Scholastics to ruminate on the Sentences, including those provisions dealing with the cardinal virtues.  Clearly, the virtues are no longer pagan, as they find their doctrinal source in the biblical book of Wisdom, and they find their spiritual source in charity, the paradigmatic Christian virtue.

As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's ultimate contribution:

For the development of the doctrine of the cardinal virtues, Lombard initiated a new age. In his Sentences, thirteenth-century Masters, whose greater knowledge of Aristotelian principles allowed them to move far beyond the Master's rudimentary ideas saw several things of importance: seven virtues--three theological and four cardinal; seven Christian virtues designed for the sake of returning us to our "heavenly homeland (patria)"; and cardinal virtues that are infused by God and as connected and equal to each other as are the theological virtues. And in Lombard they met vestiges of antique and Patristic moral rigorism; but only vestiges, for he approached morality with a new spirit. This was perhaps his most important bequest to the century to follow. His thought may not have been sophisticated but his moral canvas was wide; at least it was wide enough to incorporate ordinary folk along with saints and sinners. In this respect, he can be said to have begun the scholastic drive for an all-encompassing moral vision, one which radically revised the doctrine of the cardinal virtues inherited from the Fathers.

Houser, 41-42.
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*Peter Lombard, The Sentences, Book III (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008).
**The Latin text with notes removed:

DISTINCTIO XXXVI 

Caput 1 (135). 

1. De connexione virtutum quae non separantur. Solet etiam quaeri utrum virtutes ita sint sibi coniunctae, ut separatim non possint possideri ab aliquo, sed qui unam habet, omnes habeat. — Hieronymus, super Isaiam. De hoc Hieronymus ait: "Omnes virtutes sibi haerent, ut qui una caruerit, omnibus careat"; qui ergo unam habet, omnes liabet. 2. Quod quidem probabile est. Cum enim caritas mater sit omnium virtutum, in quocumque mater ipsa est, scilicet caritas, et cuncti filii eius, id est virtutes, recte fore creduntur. — Augustinus, super Ioannem. Unde Augustinus: "Ubi caritas est, quid est quod possit deesse? Ubi autem non est, quid est quod possit prodesse?" — Augustinus, ad Hieronymum: "Cur ergo non dicimus, qui hanc virtutem habet, habere omnes, cum plenitudo Legis sit caritas? quae quanto magis est in homme, tanto magis est virtute praeditus; quanto vero minus, tanto minus inest virtus; et quanto minus inest virtus, tanto magis est vitium."

Caput 2 (136). 

1. Si cunctae virtutes pariter sit in quocumque sunt. Utrum vero pariter quis omnes possideat virtutes, an aliae magis, aliae minus in aliquo ferveant, quaestio est.

2. Quibusdam 1 enim videtur quod aiiae magis, aiiae minus habean tur ab aliquo, sicut in lob patientia eminuit, in David humilitas, in Moyse mansuetudo. Qui etiam concedunt magis aliquem mereri per aliquam unam virtutem quam per aliam, sicut eam plenius habet quam aliam. Non ta men magis per aliquam mereri dicunt quam per caritatem, nec aliquam plenius a quoquam liaberi quam caritatem. Alias igitur magis et alias minus in aliquo esse dicunt, sed nuilam pienius cantate, quae Ceteras gignit. Hasque dicunt esse multas facies quas memorat Apostolus dicens: Ex personis multarum facierum etc.

3. Alii venus dicunt omnes virtutes et simul et pares esse in quo— cumque sunt, ut qui in una alteri par exstiterit, in omnibus eidem ae qualis sit. — Augustinus In VI libro De Trinitate . Unde Augustinus: "Virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, quamvis alio et alio modo singulae inteliigantur, nuilo modo tamen separantur ab invicem: ut quicumque fuerint aequales, verbi gratia, in fortitudine, aequales sint et prudentia et iustitia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris aequales esse istos in fortitudine, sed ilium praestare prudentia, sequitur ut huius fortituclo minus prudens sit; ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quia est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras".

4. Ex his clarescit omnes virtutes non modo esse connexas, sed etiam pares in animo hominis. Cum ergo dicitur aliquis aliqua praeminere vir tute, ut Abraham fide, Iob patientia, secundum usus exteriores accipien dum est, vel in comparatione aliorum hominum. Quia vel humilitatis habitum maxime praefert, vel opus fidei vel alicuius ceterarum virtutum praecipue exsequitur: unde et ea prae aliis pollere, vel inter alios hommes singulariter excellere dicitur.

5. Augustinus, ad Hieronymum. Secundum hunc modum, scilicet secundum rationem actuum exteriorum, alibi Augustinus dicit in aliquo aliam magis esse virtutem, aliam minus, et unam esse et non alteram. Ait enim sic: "Clarissima disputatione tua satis apparuit non placuisse auctoribus nostris, immo ipsi veritati, omnia paria esse peccata, etiam si hoc de virtutibus verum sit". "Quia etsi verum est eum qui  habet unam, omnes habere virtutes, et eum qui unam non habet, nullam habere, nec sic peccata sunt paria. Quia ubi virtus nulla est, nihil rectum est, nec tamen ideo non est pravo pravius distortoque distortius. Si autem, quod puto esse verjus sacrisque Litteris congruentius, ita sunt animae intentiones ut corporis membra (non quod videantur locis, sed quod sentiantur affectibus), et alius illuminatur amplius, alius minus, alius omnino caret lumine: profecto ut quisque illustratione piae caritatis af fectus est: in alio actu magis, in alio minus, in aliquo nihil, sic dici potest habere aliam, et aliam non habere; et aliam magis, aliam minus habere virtutem. Nam et ‘major est in isto caritas quam in illo’ recte possumus dicere; et ‘aliqua in isto, nulla in illo’, quantum pertinet ad caritatem quae pietas est. Et in uno homme, quod maiorem habeat pudicitiam quam patientiam; et maiorem hodie quam heri, si proficit; et adhuc non habeat continentiam, et habeat non parvam misericordiam. Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeo notionem: Virtus est caritas qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. Haec in aliis maior, in aliis minor, in aliis nulla est; plenissima vero, quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, in nemine".

6. Hic insinuari videtur quod aliquis ea ratione possit dici habere unam virtutem magis quam aliam, quia per caritatem magis afficitur in actu unius virtutis quam alterius; et propter differentiam actuum, ipsas virtutes magis vel minus habere dici potest; et aliquam non habere, cum tamen simul omnes et pariter habeat quantum ad mentis habitum vel essentiam cuiusque. In actu vero aliam magis, aliam minus habet; aliam etiam non habet, ut vir iustus, utens coniugio, non habet continentiam in actu, quam tamen habet in habitu.

The Latin text is available at: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735212

Peter Lombard on the Virtues: Distinction 33

PETER LOMBARD'S SENTENCES--"a florilegium of theological texts plucked from the writings of the Fathers . . . and arranged in four books: God, creation, Christ the 'Incarnate Word,' and the sacraments"--was the subject of legion commentaries. Peter Lombard (c. 1096-1164) was a Master of Theology and Bishop of Paris, and it is impossible to believe he could have anticipated the popularity of his anthology.  Commenting on the Sentences was de rigeur, and indeed soon became a requirement for those seeking Masters in Theology.

The Sentences of Peter Lombard are divided into four books.  The third book describes the benefits, both internal and external, that God gives us as part of our life in Christ, including the theological virtues (d. 23-32), the gifts of the Holy Spirit (d. 34-35) and the Ten Commandments (d. 37-40).  Planted as it were, like grout between two blocks of ashlar, we find a treatment on the cardinal virtues (d. 33) between the treatments of the theological virtues and the gift of the Holy Spirit.  Similarly, we have a short treatment of the connection between the virtues (d. 36) found in between the treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Ten Commandments.

Peter Lombard

These two short treatment on the virtues (d. 33 and d. 36) in the Sentences proved to be the source of a "detailed doctrine of cardinal virtues" as a result of development through the many commentaries inspired by Peter Lombard's work.

The cardinal virtues were found perfectly in Christ, and so it is toward Christ that Peter Lombard (affectionately called "the Master) turns in his treatment of the virtues in Distinction XXXIII.

We may as well quote the entire Distinction XXXIII:

DISTINCTION XXXIII

Chapter 1 (120)

1.  ON THE FOUR PRINCIPAL VIRTUES.  After the above matters, we must treat the four virtues which are called principal or cardinal; they are justice, fortitude, prudence, temperance.

2.  ON THEIR USES HERE.--IN BOOK 14, ON THE TRINITY.  Concerning these, Augustine says: "Justice consists in helping the wretched, prudence in guarding against treacheries, fortitude in bearing troubles, temperance in controlling evil pleasures."  [Aug., De Trin., 14.9.12]

3.  Of these, it is said in the book of Wisdom: He teaches sobriety and prudence, justice, and truth. [Wis. 8:7]  This text calls temperance sobriety, and fortitude truth.  These virtues are called 'cardinal,' as Jerome says [Cf. Jerome, Epist. 66 (ad Pammachium), n3]; 'by them, it is possible to live well in this mortal life,' and afterwards to come to eternal life.

Chapter 2 (121)

THAT THESE VIRTUES WERE IN CHRIST.  They were and are must fully in Christ, of whose fullness e have received [John 1:16]; in him, they had the same uses which they have in the fatherland, and even some of those which they have on the way.

Chapter 3 (122)

1.  ON THEIR USES.--AUGUSTINE, IN BOOK 14, ON THE TRINITY.  But "there is a little question a to whether these virtues, since they begin to be in the mind (which was a mind even when it existed before without them), cease to be when they have brought us to things eternal.  To some, it has seemed that they will cease, and in the case of three [of them], namely prudence, fortitude, and temperance, such an assertion seems not to be entirely empty." [Aug., De Trin., 14.9.12]

2.  ON THE USE OF JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE.  "For justice is immortal, [Wis. 1:15] and will then be made more perfect in us rather than cease to be, when we may blessedly live in contemplation of the divine nature, which created and established all other natures, and than which nothing is better and more loveable.  It pertains to justice to be subject to the rule of this nature, and so justice is wholly immortal; nor will it cease to exist in that [state of] blessedness, but it will be such and so great that it cannot be more perfect or greater." [Aug., De Trin., 14.9.12]

3.  ON THE USES OF THE OTHER THREE IN THE FUTURE.  "Perhaps, the other three virtues (prudence, but now without any risk of error, and fortitude without the trouble of bearing evils, and temperance without the thwarting of lust) will also exist in that [state of] felicity  there it will pertain to prudence to prefer to equate no other good to God; and to fortitude to adhere to him with the greatest steadfastness  and t temperance to take pleasure in no harmful defect."  [Ibid.]

4.  "But that which justice now does in assisting the wretched, and prudence in guarding against treacheries, and fortitude in bearing troubles, and temperance in controlling evil pleasures, will not at all exist there, where there will be no evil.  And so these works of these the virtues, which are necessary to this mortal life, like the faith to which they are to be referred will be reckoned among things past."  [Ibid.]  See, Augustine plainly states here that the aforesaid virtues will exist in the future, but they will then have other sues than they have now.

5.  BEDE.  And Bede agrees with him, speaking as follows, on Exodus: "The columns before which hands the veil are the heavenly powers, shining brightly with the four most excellent virtues, namely fortitude, prudence, temperance, justices; these are kept otherwise in heaven by the angels and the holy souls than they are here by the faithful."  [Ordinary gloss on Ex. 26:32, from Bede, De tabernaculo, 2.8]  Bede then distinguishes the uses of those virtues according to the present state and the future one, imitating Augustine in the distinctions placed above.*

As Houser summarizes Peter Lombard's thinking as found in Distinction 33:

For Lombard, then, the cardinal virtues are clearly Christian virtues: they are caused by God, and they lead us to 'eternal life.' Not distinguishing sufficiently between final and efficient causality, Lombard seems to have thought that, simply because they lead to the Christian end, the cardinal virtues must be 'infused,' that is, caused efficiently by divine grace rather than by human effort."

Houser, 41.

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*Peter Lombard, The Sentences (Book 3) (Giulio Silano, trans.) (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008)
**The Latin text for Peter Lombard's Sentences may be found at: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm#_Toc83735191  The text is given here with footnotes and other academic instruments removed.

DISTINCTIO XXXIII Caput 1 (120). 1. De quatuor virtutibus principalibus. Post praedicta de quatuor virtutibus quae principales vel cardinales vocantur disserendum est, quae sunt iustitia, fortitudo, prudentia, temperantia.
2. De usibus earum hic. — In XIV libro De Trinitate. De quibus Augustinus ait: "iustitia est in subveniendo nhiseris, prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis". 
3. De his dicitur in libro Sapientiae: Sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiarum et veritatem. Sobrietatem vocat temperantiam, et yen tatem vocat fortitudinem. Hae virtutes ‘cardinales’ dicuntur, ut ait Hieronymus; "quibus in hac mortalitate bene vivitur", et post ad aeternam vitam pervenitur.

Caput 2 (121). Quod hae virtutes In Christo fuerint. Quae in Christo plenissinime fuerunt et sunt, de cuius plenitudine nos accepimus; in quo habuerunt usus eosdem quos in patria habent, et quosdam etiam viae. 

Caput 3 (122). 1. De usibus earum. — Augustinus in XIV libro De Trinitate. Verumtamen "an hae virtutes, cum et ipsae in animo esse incipiant (qui cum sine illis prius esset, tamen animus erat), desinant esse cum ad aeterna.  Quibusdam visum est esse desituras; et de tribus quidem, prudentia scilicet, fortitudine, temperantia, cum hoc dicitur, non nihil dici videtur".
2. De usu iustitiae In fiituro. "lustitia enim immortalis est, et magis tunc perficietur in nobis quam esse cessabit, cum beate vivemus contemplatione naturae divinae, quae creavit omnes ceterasque instituit naturas, qua nihil melius et amabilius est. Cui regenti esse subditum, iustitiae est; et ideo immortalis est omnino iustitia; nec in illa beatitudine esse desinet, sed talis ac tanta erit, ut perfectior et maior esse non possit".
3. De usibus aliarum trium in futuro. "Fortassis et aliae tres virtutes, prudentia sine ullo iam peniculo errons, fortitudo sine molestia tolerandorum malorum, tempenantia sine repugnatione libidinum, erunt in illa felicitate: ut prudentiae ibi sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare, fortitudinis ei firmissime cohaenere, temperantiae nuflo defectu noxio delectari".
4. "Quod vero nunc agit iustitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis niolestiis, quod tempenantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis, non erit ibi omnino, ubi nihil mali erit. Ista igitur virtutum opera, huic mortali vitae neces— sana, sicut fides ad quam referenda sunt, in praeteritis habebuntur". Ecce aperte hic dicit Augustinus quod praedictae virtutes in futuro erunt, sed alios usus tunc habebunt quam modo.
 5. Beda. Cui Beda consentit, super Exodum, ita dicens: "Columnae ante quas appensum est velum, potestates caeli sunt, quatuor eximiis virtutibus praeclarae, id est fortitudine, prudentia, temperantia,, iustitia; quae aliter in caelis servantur ab angelis et animabus sanctis, quam hic a fidelibus". Et consequenter assignat Beda usus illarum virtutum secundum praesentem statum et futurum, imitans Augustinum in praemissis assignationibus.

The entire Sentences can be found here: http://docteurangelique.free.fr/livresformatweb/complements/sentencesPierreLombardLatin.htm

Cardinal Virtues and Sts. Jerome, Augustine, and Gregory

THE AMBROSIAN SPIN ON the Platonic-Stoic notion of the virtues, and his denomination of the four principle virtues as "cardinal" proved to be popular. So we find the Ambrosian teaching adopted by other Church fathers, including such ecclesiastical lights such as St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and Pope St. Gregory the Great.  Whether they adopted the notion directly from Ambrose or whether they arrived at the  conclusion that there was a compatibility of the Stoic teaching with Christian doctrine independently is difficult to establish.

St. Jerome clearly believed in the unity of the four virtues that St. Ambrose identified as cardinal.  In an epistle to Paulina (dated 397 A.D.), St. Jerome states: "The Stoics say the four virtues are closely connected to each other and mutually conjoined that whoever does not have one, lacks all."*  Contextually, it is clear that St. Jerome is mentioning the Stoic doctrine with approval.  St. Jerome likened the four virtues to the "law" of St. James, who in his epistle (James 2:10) had stated that he who keeps the whole law, but offends in one point, is guilty of failing the law in its entirety.  In a manner redolent of St. James, St. Jerome therefore understood that "whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all."

St. Augustine elaborated on the Ambrosian notion of the virtues to a much larger extent than St. Jerome.  R. E. Houser states that it was St. Augustine who drew "the full logical and rhetorical consequences of the Ambrosian doctrine" of the cardinal virtues.  Houser, 37.  For example, in his On the Practices of the Catholic Church (De moribus ecclesiae), St. Augustine stated that the Catholic moral practices (mores) depend upon two commandments, the commandments of love of God and love of neighbor, and that therefore the moral virtues may be defined in terms of love.

But if virtue leads us to the happy life, I would say that virtue altogether is nothing other than the highest love of God. For what is called fourfold virtue is named, so far as I can tell, from certain varied affections of love itself.

Quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur.

De mor. eccl., 15.25.  By attaching the four cardinal virtues to love, St. Augustine was able to unify them, indeed reduce them to love, so that there were not four separate virtues, but one "fourfold virtue," four manifestations of charity.**  This shows a big distinction between the pagan notion of virtue (e.g., Socrates reducing them all to knowledge) and the Christian notion (reducing them all to love).

Pope St. Gregory the Great also adopted the Ambrosian synthesis in his great work on Christian morals, the Moralia on Job.  Pope St. Gregory analogized the virtues to the Beatitudes, and likewise came to the conclusion that all virtues stood or fell together:

[P]erfected virtues can in no way be disjoined, because there is not true prudence which is not just, temperate, and brave; nor perfected temperance which is not brave, just, and prudent; nor integral fortitude which is not prudent, temperate, and just; nor true justice which is not prudent, brave, and temperate.

Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.

Moralia in Job, 22.1.2***

The all-or-nothing view of virtues does no seem entirely satisfactory since it does not seem to be in full accord with our experience.  There seem to be a whole mass of men who are neither saints nor inveterate sinners, and it is difficult to believe that there is no such thing as authentic virtue even among the imperfect.  Similarly, there seems to be no sense of infused virtue versus acquired virtue, a distinction which was to arise during the middle ages.

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*Quatuor virtutes describunt Stoici, ita sibi invicem nexas, et mutuo cohaerentes, ut qui unam non habuerit, omnibus careat: prudentiam, iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam. Has omnes sic habetis singuli, ut tamen emineatis in singulis.  Ep. 66.3 (ad Pammachium).
**Itaque illas quattuor virtutes, quarum utinam ita in mentibus vis ut nomina in ore sunt omnium, sic etiam definire non dubitem, ut temperantia sit amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur, fortitudo amor facile tolerans omnia propter quod amatur, iustitia amor soli amato serviens et propterea recte dominans, prudentia amor ea quibus adiuvatur ab eis quibus impeditur sagaciter seligens. Sed hunc amorem non cuiuslibet sed Dei esse diximus, id est summi boni, summae sapientiae summaeque concordiae.
***Una virtus sine aliis, aut nulla est, aut minima.---Hoc autem primum sciendum est, quia quisquis virtute aliqua pollere creditur, tunc veraciter pollet, cum vitiis ex alia parte non subiacet. Nam si ex alio vitiis subditur, nec hoc est solidum, ubi stare putabatur. Unaquaeque enim virtus tanto minor est, quanto desunt caeterae: Nam saepe quosdam pudicos quidem vidisse nos contigit, sed non humiles; quosdam vero quasi humiles, sed non misericordes; quosdam quasi misericordes, sed nequaquam iustos; quosdam vero quasi iustos, sed in se potius quam in Domino confidentes. Et certum est quia nec castitas in eius corde vera est, cui humilitas deest, quippe quia superbia se intrinsecus corrumpente fornicatur, si semetipsum diligens, a divino recedit amore. Nec humilitas vera est cui misericordia iuncta non est, quia nec debet humilitas dici, quae ad compassionem fraternae miseriae nescit inclinari. Nec misericordia vera est quae a rectitudine iustitiae existit aliena, quia quae potest per iniustitiam pollui, nescit procul dubio sibimetipsi misereri. Nec iustitia vera est quae fiduciam suam non in conditore omnium, sed in se fortasse, aut in rebus conditis ponit, quia dum a creatore spem subtrahit, ipse sibi principalis iustitiae ordinem pervertit. Una itaque virtus sine aliis, aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta. Ut enim, sicut quibusdam visum est, de primis quatuor virtutibus loquar, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudine, atque iustitia; tanto perfectae sunt singulae, quanto vicissim sibimet coniunctae. Disiunctae autem perfectae esse nequaquam possunt, quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est, nec perfecta temperantia quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est, nec fortitudo integra quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est, nec vera iustitia quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est.

St. Ambrose: The Virtues and the Beatitudes

SAINT AMBROSE FITTED THE CARDINAL VIRTUES into the teachings of Jesus as found in the New Testament. St. Ambrose found a connection between the beatitudes--the central focus of Christian life--and the cardinal virtues. He found there to be a parallel between the Lucan presentation of the beatitudes which are four in number with the four cardinal virtues of Christian life.  Given the focus of the Church on the  moral teachings of Jesus as found in the beatitudes, such a move would have been considered essential.

We find St. Ambrose's direct connection of the beatitudes in his exposition of the Gospel of Luke (Expositio Evangelii Secundum Lucam, 5.64-67).  The beatitudes in Luke are found in Luke 6:20–22, when Jesus addresses his followers in the so-called "Sermon on the Plain."  These are followed by the four "woes" that are parallel to the beatitudes in 6:24-26.

Accordingly, we have "Blessed are you who are poor: for yours is the kingdom of God."  Those who are poor display the virtue of temperance, a temperance which overcomes the seductions of the goods of the present life.  A temperate man will avoid the woe that Jesus imparts to the rich, for they have received their consolation in this life.  In the Ambrosian synthesis, the woes that Jesus imparts to the rich, are warnings against those who are intemperate.

"Blessed are you who are now hungry, for you will be satisfied," is a reference to those who hunger and thirst for the virtue of justice, a virtue which looks toward the needs of neighbor with a compassionate heart, one full of largesse and altruism.  Woe to those who are unjust, those who are filled now at the expense of their neighbor.

"Blessed are you who are now weeping, for you will laugh" is a reference to Christian prudence, one which avoids the mundane, and seeks the eternal, the lasting.  Woe to those who are imprudent, who laugh now, for they eventually will grieve and weep.

St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan

Finally, the virtue of fortitude or courage is tied to the last Lucan beatitude: "Blessed are you when people hate you, and when they exclude and insult you, and denounce your name as evil on account of the Son of Man.  Rejoice and leap for joy on that day!  Behold, your reward will be great in heaven."  Woe when, because you renounced the Son of Man for lack of courage, you are well-spoken of.   The crown of suffering is the "consummation of courage" for the Christian.

While the Lucan four-fold version of the beatitudes in the Gospel of Luke fit nicely with the four-fold scheme of the cardinal virtues, the beatitudes of the Gospel of Matthew did not fit so nicely.  Yet Ambrose managed to find a parallel even here, largely through the use of allegory.  He insisted that the eight beatitudes of the Gospel of St. Matthew were reducible to the four of the Gospel of Luke and therefore also the four cardinal virtues.  "The four are in the eight, and the eight in the four," sed in istis octo illae quattuor sunt et in his quattuor illae octo.  (Exp. ev. sec. Lucam, 5.49)

The Matthean beatitudes are found in Matthew 5:3-10, and are part of the Sermon on the Mount:

• Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. (5:3) 
• Blessed are those who mourn: for they will be comforted. (5:4) 
• Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. (5:5) 
• Blessed they who hunger and thirst for righteousness: for they will be satisfied. (5:6) 
• Blessed are the merciful: for they will be shown mercy. (5:7) 
• Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. (5:8) 
• Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called children of God. (5:9) 
• Blessed are those who are persecuted for the sake of righteousness: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. (5:10)

There are numerous ways where the Beatitudes in the Gospel of Matthew and the Beatitudes in the Gospel of Luke may be reconciled or synthesized.  One way is to expand each Lucan beatitude into two Matthean beatitudes, so that two Matthean beatitudes correlate to one of Luke's beatitudes.  The other method--which was the method chosen by St. Ambrose--is to see all the beatitudes are contained within one another.

It was a Platonic nostrum that all the virtues had to be had together, so that the virtues while "ontologically distinct, are unified operationally."  One will recall that for Socrates the union of virtue was even more unified as "essentially one while operationally many."  Houser, 36.  So we find in St. Ambrose a Platonic, even a Socratic notion of one overarching virtue, a binding together of beatitude to beatitude, of virtue to virtue in a circular chain of virtue:

Therefore, the virtues are so connected and chained together, that whoever has one seems to have them all; and there accrues to the saints one virtue.

Conexae igitur sibi sunt concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet plures habere videatur, et sanctis una conpetit virtus.

Exp. ev. sec. Lucam, 5.62-3.  It was this synthesis of St. Ambrose that was to influence the teachings of the Fathers and the medieval "masters" or magistri.

St. Ambrose and the Cardinal Virtues

SAINT AMBROSE, THE REDOUBTABLE bishop of Milan, is the first of the sancti that we will look at in the issue of virtues.  St. Ambrose is particularly notable for his moral teachings.  With regard to virtues in particular, he is to be regarded as the one who "invented the term 'cardinal virtues' because he was an inveterately allegorical thinker."  Houser, 32.  As Peter Lombard put it in his Sentences: primus autem qui eas cardinales vocat est Ambrosius.  "The first therefore who called them [the four principle virtues] cardinal was Ambrose."  (2:188, n.3).*

An example of St. Ambrose's allegorical style is his On Paradise, written circa 377 A.D.  As Houser summarizes it:

[T]he fertile land of paradise is like a fertile soul; Adam is like its intellect and Eve like its senses. The four rivers in Eden are in reality the four great rivers of the earth. These rivers in turn are analogous to the four Platonic virtues within the soul, because each is 'principal' within its own realm.  Platonic analogy turned into Christian allegory when Ambrose connected the two sides of the comparison--the four rivers with the four virtues--through a common point of reference, namely, through God, who is at once the cosmic artisan who created the rivers of paradise, and, in the person of Jesus Christ, the wisdom producing virtue in individual men.

Houser, 32 (citing to De par. 3.18)

We have a similar allegorical notion of the four virtues in St. Ambrose's funeral oration for his brother Satyrus (ca. 378).  In this funeral oration--where St. Ambrose first appears to have applied the term "cardinal virtues"--St. Ambrose praised his brother for having lived the four-Platonic virtues, but in a manner which exceeded the limits placed upon these virtues by the philosophi.  After recalling emotionally past rememberances of life with his brother and regarding him as a true friend, an "other self," Ambrose launches into an analysis of his brother's life by framing it within the four cardinal virtues.

After handling prudence, courage, and temperance, St. Ambrose addresses justice:

What remains, in order to complete the cardinal virtues, is that we also show the parts of justice in him [referring to Satyrus]. For even though the virtues are born together and perfected together, nevertheless one desires to know the form and outline of each one of them, and especially of justice.

Superest, ut ad conclusionem cardinalium virtutum etiam partes in eo debeamus advertere. Nam etsi cognatur sint inter se concretaeque virtutes, tamen singularum aquedam form et expression desideraturs maximeque iustitiae.

Houser, 3 (quoting De excessu fratris Satyri 1.57).

The Four Virtues

St. Ambrose tied the cardinal virtues to his brother's life and its culmination in his death.  It was these four cardinal virtues that helped his brother Satyrus face death, and, in particular, that great confrontation after death of judgment.  This is the "cardinal" moment of one's life, and it is the "cardinal" virtues that are aimed at not only living life well here on earth, but preparing for the ultimate "crisis" of one's life: one's judgment before God.  For St. Ambrose, therefore, the cardinal virtues are directly tied to God, to a life that is consecrated to God, to a life which is lived with an eye to the summum bonum, the Almighty God of Jesus Christ.

Ambrose turned to Plato to explain his brother's life, not his death, because Plato's four virtues are designed for living, for living the whole of life with an eye to the good. Ambrose simply replaced the abstract Platonic good with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and in so doing he gave Plato's four virtues a more concrete end than the philosophers ever had. This teleological orientation toward God would always be maintained by Ambrose's patristic and medieval descendants.

Houser, 35.  "In Ambrose's conception," Houser summarizes, "three features make the four virtues 'cardinal': they  involve death, judgment, and orientation toward God."  It was in this manner that St. Ambrose effectively transformed the four Platonic virtues that had already been developed by the Stoics into something entirely different.  As Professor Colish puts it in her book, The Stoic Tradition, "Ambrose seeks to bring the Stoic sage into the fullness of being through Christian redemption."  Houser, 35 n. 70.

St. Ambrose therefore transformed the virtues from philosophical concepts to theological concepts, from natural virtues to virtues that were engraced.  They become Christian virtues; indeed, they become the principal virtues of the Christian life.  Et omnes quidem virtutes ad spiritum pertinent, sed istae quasi cardinales sunt, quasi principales.  De off. min., 1.29.142.  After St. Ambrose treats of the philosophical virtues, they become baptized, and they arise from the water as if reborn into the cardinal virtues.  They thus become something that is intrinsically part of life in the Holy Spirit.

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*In Latin, of course, the term cardo (pl., cardines; the adjectival form is cardinalis) or term "cardinal" is most frequently said to mean hinge-like.  In light of St. Ambrose's allegorical viewpoint, we can see the cardinal virtues as being the four hinges upon which the doors of the moral life swing.  However, the term cardo also can mean the tenon and mortise which dovetail to form a door's frame.  In Roman surveying, the term cardo mean the baseline or datum for the surveyor's measurement of the field.  The terms was also extended to include more comprehensively an entire geographical district, region, or boundary.  Houser, 33-34.  The term cardo was used by numerous Latin authors (Varro, Pliny, Cicero, Ovid, Statius, and Seneca) to refer to the poles of the earth or the points of a compass.  It was used by Pliny to refer to those days when the seasons would change.  Quintilian used the term to refer to the points on an ecliptic.  Servius, who was a contemporary of St. Ambrose, used the word to refer to the four winds.  Houser, 34 n. 67.  The allegorical possibilities of the word cardo are therefore quite rich.  As Houser summarizes it: "These meanings, however, are not haphazard but are united by he notion of something which is extraordinarily important, in no small part because it is a point of transition."  Indeed, Seneca used the term cardo to refer to that very important transition, death.

Cicero: The Cardinal Virtues and their Subparts

CICERO HAS NEVER BEEN regarded as a philosophical innovator; rather, he was a philosophical conservative: a traditionalist who handed down, we may assume quite faithfully, the teachings of the Stoics which he regarded as important, especially in his early works, which is where we should place his De inventione.

We might expect Cicero then faithfully to hand down the Stoic teaching of the four cardinal virtues, and he does not disappoint.  He also appends to the four cardinal virtues, the Chryppian sub-parts that were ordered underneath these four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.  The entire virtue taxonomy of Cicero is of course under the umbrella of living in agreement with the law of nature, a law which is ultimately founded upon a cosmic reason.

Cicero defines prudence using the characteristic Stoic categories of the morally good, the morally evil, and the morally indifferent.  "Prudence is knowledge of things that are good or bad or neither.  Its parts are memory, understanding, and foresight."  Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia.  Partes eius: memoria, itnelligentia, providentia.  De inv., 2.160.

Justice for Cicero is "the habit of mind (habitus animi) that preserves the common utility while also giving to each what is his due."  Jusititia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem.     De inv., 2.160.  Justice, of course, is the most extrinsic of the virtues since it is concerned with those other than the subject: the common good or the private good of another person.  Yet even here , in the most extrinsic of the virtues, we find the characteristic Stoic interiorization of virtue.  While concerned with externals, the focus is on the interior disposition, the habitus animi, of the virtuous person.  "In this way, the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian matter of Cicero's definition--concern for the common good and the private good of others--is given a Stoic form."  Houser, 27.

Cicero further explores justice and finds species or sub-parts of justice.  However, he divides these into to general categories depending upon whether the "law of nature" (ius naturae) or the "law of custom" (consuetudine ius) is involved.

Under the rubric of the law of nature, Cicero finds six sub-parts or species of justice: religion (religio), piety (pietas), consideration (gratias), retribution (vindicatione), honor (observantia), and truth (veritas). These sub-parts will be adopted and developed by St. Thomas Aquinas.

Under the rubric of the law of custom, Cicero finds three sub-parts: agreements (pactum), equity (par), and written judgments (iudicatum).  The notion of equity will be used by St. Thomas Aquinas, but the other two sub-parts--agreements and written judgments--are too legally-focused for St. Thomas Aquinas to be concerned with.

Houdon's Cicero inveighing against Cataline. 1803. Louvre Museum

Courage or fortitude is next.  Courage is defined as the "considered undertaking of dangers and endurance of hardships."  Fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpersio.  De inv., 2.163.  To some extent, the Ciceronian notion of fortitude is broader than the Aristotelian notion of fortitude.  The latter saw it as resolve in the face of death.  The sub-parts of fortitude or courage are identified by Cicero as magnificence (magnanimitas), confidence (fidentia), patience (patientia), and perserverance (constantia).*

Temperance Cicero defines as the "domination of reason over desire and over other incorrect inclinations of the mind, domination that is firm and attains the mean."  Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio.  De inv., 2.164.  Here is the characteristic Stoic ratio or logos.  An interesting feature of the definition is that we have here not the "political" rule of Plato of reason over the passion, but more of a "tyrannical" rule of reason over passion.  Reason dominates over desire and passion in the Stoic view of things.**  Another interesting feature is the broadening of this virtue relative to the Aristotelian notion.  While Aristotle limited temperance to sex and nutrition, Cicero clearly extends it to cover any potentially improper inclination (libido).  Cicero does, however, adopt the Aristotelian notion of "mean."

Three subordinate virtues are identified by Cicero as being ordered under temperance: continence (continentia), clemency (clementia), and modesty (modestia).  Clemency is defined as "sympathy of the higher ranks for the lower," and "it seems a peculiarly Roman virtue and original with Cicero."  Houser, 29.  On the other hand, the other two notions, continence and modesty, are clearly Stoic in origin.  We find these for example, in Stobaeus, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius.

For Cicero, continence is defined as "that by which cupidity is ruled by the governance of good counsel."  Continentia est per quam cupiditas consili guvernatione regitur. De inv., 2.164.  The extent of continence is, of course, directly tied to the understanding of what cupidity comprehends.  If cupidity is understood to be limited to nutritional or sexual desires (as was largely understood to be the case by the medieval schoolmen, then continence will likewise be limited by this understanding).  It appears that Cicero had a broader notion of continence than was later to be the case with the scholastic understanding of the term, which limited it to nutritional and sexual desires.

Cicero was again not an original thinker.  "Cicero himself tended toward syncretism."  Houser,30.  But he was the link or bridge as it were between the original Greek Stoic thinkers and the later medieval thinkers.  "The main challenge for the scholastic masters was to try to bring a millenium-old Stoick skeleton present in lists of virtues they found in old books like Cicero's."  Houser, 30.
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*Houser observes: "Cicero's definition of magnificence shows he actaully had magnanimity in mind, and with this emendation the list of virtues subordinate to courage is thoroughly Stoic, and all four will be adopted by Philip [the Chancellor], Albert [the Great], and Aquinas."  Houser, 28.
**The Stoic conception of the passions and desires as being slave to reason is, of course, totally the opposite of Hume's famous formulation that reason is the slave to the passions.

The Virtues of Cicero: The De Inventione

MOST OF THE WORKS OF THE STOIC philosophers have been lost. What we do have is mainly fragmentary evidence and the secondary sources of Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, and Stobaeus. However, the Stoic doctrines were popular with the Romans, and we find their doctrines, we may assume faithfully expressed, in the works of the Roman stoics, Cicero and Seneca being perhaps the most important.

One of the works of Cicero (106-43 B.C.) to which we may turn for discussion of the virtues based upon Stoic principles is his De inventione.  That youthful work was written (in Latin) circa 87 B.C.  In it, as in his other works, Cicero adopts the Chrysippian model of the four principal or cardinal virtue (we might view them as the genera), with a whole panoply of subordinate virtues that are species of the four genera.  The four principal virtues--prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice--together constitute the sum total of duty (kathēkon (καθήκον), officium), but they are filled out, as it were, with these subordinate virtues.

Although Cicero wrote of the virtues in other works, in particular his De officiis, a work whose very title incorporates the sum total of the virtuous life and the product of the virtues, the De inventione is important because it, more than any other work,* is the source that fed the medieval writers and their virtue taxonomy.  From Cicero's lips, as it were, to the ears of Philip the Chancellor, St. Albert the Great, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Bust of Cicero

Cicero's De inventione is a manual of rhetoric,** and it is only as an aside that it handles the virtues.  Cicero distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic goods.  The intrinsic good is called the "honorable good," the bonum honestum.  Ultimately, the bonum honestum is the fruit of virtue.  Extrinsic goods or bona utilia are things that are extrinsically good (such as money) or things that are intrinsically neutral but useful.  These extrinsic goods or intrinsic but neutral goods are the handmaidens as it were of the intrinsic good, the bonum honestum.

For Cicero, virtue is "a habit of the mind in agreement with the way of nature and reason."  Nam virtus est enim habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus.  (De inv., 2.159)  This is a classic Stoic definition.  It stresses the interior component (habit or habitus), being something of the mind, something interior, and unconcerned with consequences or external actions.  The notion of "agreement" (consentaneus)   coincides with the Greek Stoic Zeno's famous formula of harmonious living with nature, the "to live in agreement" ( to homologoumenos zēn ).  The standards to which the habit conform are nature (natura) and  that reason (ratio) which lies behind nature.  Here, the natura-ratio notion is a direct adoption of the physis-logos formula of the Greek Stoics.

It is within this notion of a greater law of reason that is found within nature that the virtues must be understood.  In the next posting, we shall look at the virtues as Cicero understood them in his De inventione.  But it should never be forgotten that the concept of virtues presupposed a natural law, a law found in nature which was ultimately based upon a reasonable order, an ordo rationis.

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*Other works that informed the medieval scholastics included lists by the Greek Aristotelian Andronicus of Rhodes (1st century B.C.) known as De passionibus and the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero by Macrobius. But these did not have the influence of Cicero's De inventione.
**"Invention" is the discovery of or coming upon (invenire) of arguments, one of the five traditional components that governed the rhetorician's art.  The others were arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.

Stoics: The Chrysippian Synthesis

THE STOICS NOT ONLY HAD a negative principle, the principle of apatheia, indifference to passions, but they also had a positive program that focused upon the Platonic four cardinal virtues, each ontologically  different, but all operationally connected so that if you had one you had all, and if you had all you had one.  For the Stoic, wisdom was the necessary and sufficient condition for acquiring moral virtue.  The Stoics therefore seemed to have adopted the Socratic formula that knowledge was virtue.

But there were different strands of thinking regarding the positive program.  Zeno, while maintaining the Platonic four-virtue schema, further described the interaction of these virtues as being interlaced.  Plutarch described Zeno's insight as being that the four virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice "as being not separate yet other and different from each other."  Virtue for Zeno according to Plutarch "is on, though it seems to differ in its actions in relation to its disposition relative to things."  The four virtues which seems in practical application to be one, worked hand in glove, with prudence being the chief virtue.  Thus justice could be described as prudence in distribution of goods.  Temperance could be defined as prudence in choices regarding goods.  Courage could be defined as prudence in endurance of evils.  Effectively, then, Zeno could say that all virtue is prudence.  Houser, 24.

Chrysippus

Chrysippus, while not rejecting the four-fold division of Plato and the operational unity of the virtues under the banner of prudence, yet believed that each virtue had its "peculiar quality."  The distinction between the virtues was real, not simply a distinction in the mind.  Chrysippus apparently expanded on the four-fold nomenclature since he was accused of building up a "swarm of virtues" both unusual and unknown."  Houser, 24.  Though Plutarch excoriated Chrysippus, Chrysippus' idea ultimately bore fruit.  As Houser expresses it:

[I]n truth, Chrysippus made a great contribution to virtue theory, by showing how to make room for more than Plato's four virtues, while keeping the four. He did so by inventing the distinction between four "primary" virtues and the other virtues "subordinate to them."

Houser, 24-25 (quoting Plutarch, De virtute morali, 440e-441d).

Ultimately, the Chrysippian taxonomy stuck.  It stuck because it had the merit of avoiding two extremes.  It avoided on the one hand the extreme of "too much reductionism, as found in Socrates, Plato, and Zeno," where the "four" virtues were really "one," the difference between them being almost virtual or nominal.  But Chrysippus also avoided the Aristotelian extreme where one had a "hodge-podge of virtues related only by prudence."  Houser, 25.  The Chrysippian model, therefore, took the insights of Aristotle and adapted them to the taxonomy of Plato and yielded a multiplicity of virtues, but all ordered under the four cardinal virtues.

It was this schema which ultimately became mainstream, and it would "come to dominate Stoicism and prove attractive to virtue theories from Cicero to Aquinas" and beyond.  Houser, 25.

Cardinal Virtues: Introduction

MOST OF US ARE GENERALLY familiar with the cardinal virtues: prudence, courage, temperance, and justice. The virtues are fundamental features of a complete and adequate moral philosophy or moral theology. So long as man is not defined by one act, but a series of acts which both define who he is and how fitting he is with who he is, there must be a "rule" or a fixity, a habitus or hexis (ἕξις), that comes along with it. Since man acts discretely in matter, in time, the sort of continuity in discreteness that links the acts and gives them some sort of union--like pearls on a string--might be said to be these virtues.

Thankfully, there has been a sort of revival in virtue ethics in addition to the ethics of natural law, one that has perhaps been given the greatest push by the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and his 1981 book After Virtue.  One ought not to view the natural law ethics and the virtue ethics as opposed.  They are both features of a fully-developed and accurate portrayal of the moral life.  A virtue ethics bereft of natural law is as odd a creature as a natural law ethics bereft of virtue.  One can see the two strands brought together well in the excellent works of Fr. Romanus Cessario, O.P.

Within the Christian context, the cardinal virtues perhaps reached their greatest importance during the course of the middle ages.  Here, the doctrine of virtue generally, and the doctrine of the cardinal virtues, received a great emphasis.  Medieval artisans painted or sculpted depictions of the virtues, and so we find allegorical depictions of the virtues in medieval manuscripts, in stained glass windows, in paintings and frescoes, embossed on doors, and beckoning in statuary.

The Four Cardinal Virtues, Strassbourg Cathedral (13th Century)

Obviously, the doctrine of the cardinal virtues did not spring out of the head of the scholastic theologians such as St. Thomas Aquinas ready-made like Athena sprung out from the head of Zeus.  Rather, the synthesis or development achieved by the medievals regarding virtue clearly borrowed from prior traditions which we might conveniently divide into three groups: the philosophers (philosophi), the Church Fathers (sancti), and prior schoolmasters (magistri).  The central vein that brought these three sources together might be said to be that scriptural injunctions found in the Book of Wisdom:

She [Wisdom] teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life. (Wisdom 8:7)

It seems that the Book of Wisdom gave scriptural warrant for focus on the cardinal virtues and allowed use of the insights of the pagan philosophers just like the analogous reference of St. Paul to the natural law in his epistle to the Romans (Rom. 2:15-16) allowed use of the insights of the Stoics as it pertained to the natural moral law.  The notion of the cardinal virtues is therefore warranted by Scripture.  Here both revelation and reason seemed to be tightly bound into one strong moral rope.

During the next few postings, we will discuss the cardinal virtues, relying largely on the discussion contained in the book The Cardinal Virtues: Aquinas, Albert, and Philip the Chancellor by R. E. Houser (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2004).

Cardinal Mercier and the Natural Law, Part 10: The Moral Virtues

FROM LAW TO VIRTUE THE ROAD IS SHORT. The two are inextricably mixed. "The habitual qualities that result from the observance of the moral law are called moral virtues." [240(46)] The law leads to virtue, and virtue to good. Simply put, a virtue is "an habitual disposition, either received from God (infused virtue) or acquired by the individual (acquired virtue), which is added to the natural powers of the rational soul and makes the normal exercise of its activity easier." [24-41(40)] Moral virtues perfect or polish the will, as distinguished from intellectual virtues, which perfect or polish the intellect. Mercier adopts the classical division of the moral virtues into four "hinges," four "fundamental or cardinal virtues." And these are prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance.

The Four Moral Virtues by Giotto (Scrovegni Chapel, Padua)
From Left to Right: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance

The practical reason is used by man to distinguish between what is morally good and what is morally evil, between the affirmative commands and the negative prohibitions of the natural law. It is through a judgment of the practical reason that an act's conformity with any determined end, including the last end, is determined. From the subjective point of view, our practical judgment is what we use to tell us the goodness or badness of moral acts. Cardinal Mercier rejects those theories of morality that would place moral decisions in some sort of irrational faculty, some sort of instinctual or affective power separate and apart from the cognitive part of man (i.e., moral sense or organic morality theories).

The practical reason has its first principle just like the speculative reason has its first principle. With respect to the speculative reason, the first principle is the principle of non-contradiction: a thing cannot both be and not be in the same way. With respect to the practical reason the first principle is that good must be done, and evil avoided. This principle is self-evident, foundational. [242-43(50)] (quoting S.T. Ia-IIae, q. 94, a. 2).

Since the moral law, the natural law, is really law, it follows that it requires a sanction. A sanction, considered objectively, is "all the rewards and punishments attached to the performance or to the violation of it [a law]." Considered formally, the sanction is "the promulgation of this system of rewards and punishments reserved for those who observe or transgress the law." [244(51)] The natural law therefore should have both punishments and rewards and these should be promulgated. Mercier considers the objective and formal need for sanction, and he suggests that the moral law has sanction. Though the sanction of the moral law is seen in this life, it is not always sufficient, and so he argues that the moral law requires some sort of eternal reward or punishment.

During the present life, there is a sanction, albeit insufficient in all respects. Mercier distinguishes four kinds of sanction that are temporal: a natural sanction, an interior sanction, a legal sanction, and a public or social sanction.

Natural Sanction	The natural consequences of our action, including health, comfort, success, etc. which generally follow the exercise of moral virtues and the weakness, disease, suffering that follow from vice.
Interior Sanction	The internal sense arising from conscience, which includes joy of being good, and the shame, guilt arising from doing wrong.
Legal Sanction	The system of rewards and penalties from human law that supplements or supports the natural law
Public or Social Sanction	The praise, esteem, discredit, glory, infamy, etc. that others attach to our external actions.

Though the natural law has sanctions attached to it in this life, Mercier acknowledges that these are insufficient for three reasons. To be sufficient, sanction would have to be universal, proportionate, and efficacious. In other words, the sanction must leave no good act or actor unrewarded and no bad act or actor unpunished (universal); it must be precisely tailored to the individual merit and demerit of the act or actor (proportionate); it must be consistently applied so as to maintain the moral order (efficacious). Manifestly, this does not occur in this life. We all know that men that have escaped punishment, and men that have obtained reward far beyond their just deserts. It is a constant plaint of the virtuous:

These things also I saw in the days of my vanity: A just man perisheth in his justice, and a wicked man liveth a long time in his wickedness.

Haec quoque vidi in diebus vanitatis meae iustus perit in iustitia sua et impius multo vivit tempore in malitia sua.

There is also another vanity, which is done upon the earth. There are just men to whom evils happen, as though they had done the works of the wicked: and there are wicked men, who are as secure, as though they had the deeds of the just: but this also I judge most vain.

Est et alia vanitas quae fit super terram sunt iusti quibus multa proveniunt quasi opera egerint impiorum et sunt impii qui ita securi sunt quasi iustorum facta habeant sed et hoc vanissimum iudico.

(Eccl. 7:16; 8:14). We may also simply peruse the Book of Job.

Job by William Blake

"A sanction, then, to be adequate, must be found elsewhere, in a future life." [245(52)] So it would seem to be required by reason alone that there must be some sort of eternal settling of accounts, though clearly reason can only speculate beyond that much:

After a time of trial, the length of which we do not know, the virtuous will be eternally rewarded in a future life, and the wicked will be deprived for ever of their happiness." . . . . With regard to [this] proposition, philosophy can establish two points: (i) the idea of eternal punishment is not contrary to reason; God can inflict on man for certain grave or mortal delinquencies a supreme eternal damnation. (ii) if we consider the exigencies of the providential order of the universe, God must give a sanction to the moral law by inflicting on the guilty a supreme eternal punishment. If, therefore, He can and must punish grave transgressions with an eternal chastisement, it is a logical conclusion that the guilty will in fact be for ever unhappy.

[245(53)] (Mercier also provides support or proof of this by arguments from reason, or at least showing that it is not contrary to reason, which will not be summarized here simply for lack of space. See [245-47(53-54)])