Ignorance of the Wrong, Development of an Idea, St. Bonaventure

THE FRANCISCAN SAINT BONAVENTURE, the Doctor Seraphicus, addressed the issue of ignorance and responsibility and sin. We will start with his treatment of it in his Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences.* In addressing the seeming conflicting authorities on the question, St. Bonaventure concludes that the ignorance of things that are essential for salvation (which, of course, includes the natural law**) may or may not be sinful.

Ignorance is a privation of knowledge, and "since privations are cognized through possessions" or habitus (privationes cognascantur per habitus), the cognition of ignorance depends upon the cognitition of its opposite, namely knowledge (cognitio ignorantiae pendet ex cognitione scientiae). Some of our knowledge does not relate to matters of salvation. The mechanical or liberal arts, for example, are not strictly speaking part of the moral life, and an engineer can got to heaven equally as can a painter. Knowledge of these practical sciences do not touch and concern "the 'being' of virtue," nec est virtus nec de esse virtutis. It follows that ignorance of these sorts of sciences, even if voluntary do not relate to moral fault.

But this is not so with respect to other matters. There are some things that all men must know, for all men are called to do good and to act rightly, and so knowledge that relates to this is required of all men:

Another is the cognition of (things) able to be believed and done, which is necessary for salvation in the adult; and this is the cognition of faith and prudence; and we are bound to have this cognition, because without it no one can live uprightly.

Alia est cognitio credibilium et operabilium, quae ad salutem necessaria est in adulto; et haec est cognitio fidei et prudentiae; et ad hanc cognitionem habendam tenemur, quia sine hac nullus potest recte vivere.

II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 2, c.

Ignorance of this knowledge or privation may be said to exist in two ways according to St. Bonaventure, in one way excusing and in another way not excusing. Thus in some situations, the obligation continues despite the lack of knowledge or ignorance. In other situations, the obligation ceases with the lack of knowledge. If the obligation remains regardless of knowledge, then there is moral fault in such ignorance.

If with the obligation remaining, then there is a fault in this, because, when one is bound to something and does not fulfill it, he is faulted on this very account and is worthy of punishment. But if there is a privation in us, with the obligation not remaining, such as when one cannot know, the impotence also excuses from the obligation [ab obligatione]; in this manner5 the privation of this cognition is not a fault, such as in the mad [in furiosis].

Id.

St. Bonaventure by Domenico Morone (1503)

An alternative way of looking at this matter (which leads to the same conclusion) is by looking at whether the lack of knowledge (i.e., the ignorance) is "in us, but not from us" (in nobis, sed non a nobis) or whether it is "in us and from us" (in nobis et a nobis).

That ignorance which is "in us, but not from us" is not a moral fault (i.e., we are blameless for it). We are not the principle or source of that ignorance, and so we neither obtain merit or demerit from its presence. (It may be the result of punishment, however.)

But that ignorance which is "in us and from us" may be imputable to us as moral fault, although a three-fold distinction must be made:

Moreover this can be in a threefold manner: either when standing forth [existentes] on the way of truth we voluntarily recede from it and precipitate ourselves into the ditch of error, and this privation can be said (to be) the “erroneous ignorance”, which is in heretics; and/or when, being strong enough [valentes] to attain to the way of truth, we desire to walk in shadows, and this can be said (to be) “affected ignorance”; or because out of a certain niggardliness and negligence we do not care to learn the truth, and this is said (to be) “crass and supine ignorance”. — And any of these is a fault, though the first (is) a greater (fault) than the second, and the second (more) than the third.

Id.***

Though all men, even the wisest, live in a state of ignorance (being that their knowledge is never complete), that ignorance is not counted as sin unless the matter or the man is under a duty to know, in which case that ignorance is imputable to him as sin:

[T]hat ‘to be ignorant’ is not said to be a fault except to the extent, by which one is bound to know what one is ignorant of. And for that reason, even if one is ignorant in every instant and is bound in every instant, yet because an affirmative precept does not oblige at all times [pro semper], but according to place and time [pro loco et tempore]; the one ignorant by being ignorant does not sin except in that instant and time, in which he is bound to know and/or learn what he is ignorant of; for that reason, even though he is always said “to be ignorant”, yet he is not always said “to sin”.

II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 2, ad 5.†

All ignorance excuses sin, in some manner (ignorantia aliquo modo excusat peccatum). Ignorance lessens (though it might not entirely erase) both the voluntary nature of an act and the contempt against God related to that act. "For with all other (things being) equal , he who sins out of industry contemns more, than he who sins ignorantly." II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 3, c. "[I]f [the ignorance] is so great, that it deprives entirely the reckoning of the voluntary and the reckoning of contempt, it excuses from the whole (sin)." Id.

In his discussion of the various authorities, St. Bonaventure treats the issue of ignorance of fact and ignorance of law:††

To that which is asked, “Which ignorance excuses and how much?”; it must be said, that there is ignorance of fact and ignorance of law. — Ignorance of fact can be in a twofold manner: either with due diligence employed, or not. If due diligence (has) been employed, it excuses from the whole (sin); if (it has) not been employed, it does not excuse from the whole (sin), but from as much as (it would have been).

But if the ignorance be of a law, this can be in a twofold manner: either it is vincible, or invincible. If vincible, then it is an ignorance, which is a fault. And this either is out of a true consent, such as (in) affected ignorance, and this excuses thus on one side, that it aggravates more on the other side; or it is out of negligence and idleness [ignavia], just as crass and supine ignorance (does), and thus, even if it excuses in some manner, yet it does not «excuse so much, that one will not burn in sempiternal fire», just as (St.) Augustine says, and Master (Peter) in the text.

But if the ignorance be invincible, this can be in a twofold manner: either this ignorance has been introduced into us through a preambulary fault, or apart from all fault. If apart from all fault, it either deprives a cognition of the law simply, as in infants and in the mad, who entirely lack the use of reason; and this excuses from the whole (sin) — wherefore (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux) says, «that to infant and sleeping children nothing, which they do, is imputed». — Or it does not take away entirely the use of reason, but the full (use of reason); and then it does not excuse from the whole (sin), but from as much as (it would have been), just as is among those who are not fully mad, but have in some manner lucid intervals, and in children, who in some manner are capable of (knowing) the precept, though not fully. — But if the ignorance has been introduced through one’s own fault, just as it is the inebriated and the mad, each of whom has precipitated himself into this through his own fault; in this manner it does not excuse from the whole (sin), but from as much as (it would have been), because, just as the Philosopher says, «the inebriated will have a twofold malediction, namely a malediction for the preceding fault and a malediction for the subsequent fault».

II Sent., d. 22, a. 2, q. 3, ad 5.

A review of St. Bonaventure's teaching makes it clear that he has "abandon[ed] the earlier narrow views of the Franciscan to advance a milder doctrine," more in keeping with the early Dominicans.†††
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*Commentaria in Qutuor Libros Sententiarum, available on the Internet in English/Latin at http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/sent.html.
**As we have noted before, obedience to the natural law is essential for salvation. In the words of Cardinal Archbishop Raymond Burke, "Obedience to the demands of the natural law is necessary for salvation." See Compliance with the Natural Law is Essential for Salvation.
***Hoc autem potest esse tripliciter: vel cum in via veritatis existentes voluntarie ab ea recedimus et in erroris foveam nos praecipitamus, et haec privatio potest dici ignorantia erronea, quae est in haereticis; vel cum, ad viam veritatis valentes pertingere, cupimus in tenebris ambulare, et haec potest dici ignorantia affectata; aut quia ex quadam pigritia et negligentia non curamus veritatem addiscere, et haec dicitur ignorantia crassa et supina. — Et quaelibet istarum est culpa, licet prima maior quam secunda, et secunda quam tertia.
†[I]gnorare non dicitur esse culpa nisi eatenus, qua quis tenetur scire quod ignorat. Et ideo, etsi in quolibet instanti ignoret et in quolibet teneatur, quia tamen praeceptum affirmativum non obligat pro1 semper, sed pro loco et tempore; ignorans ignorando non peccat nisi in illo instanti et tempore, in quo tenetur nosse vel addiscere quod ignorat; ideo, quamvis semper dicatur ignorare, non tamen semper dicitur peccare.
††Here, Bertke is just plain wrong when he says that the "expression ignorantia iuris is not found in this exposition." Bertke, 56.
†††See Ignorance of the Wrong--Development of an Idea, Part 1

Ignorance of the Wrong-Development of an Idea, St. Albert the Great

IN OUR LAST POSTING WE ENDED our review of the historical development of the role of ignorance of the law, the ignorantia iuris, by exploring the concept from Gratian through William of Auxerre and then its division into the Franciscan rigorist school (which maintained William of Auxerre's exceptionless dictum that any ignorance of the natural law was inexcusable) and the less rigorous Dominican school (which soft-pedaled but did not retract or contradict William of Auxerre's dictum).

We shall now turn to St. Albert the Great and his Commentary on the Sentences, where he directly approaches the question of whether ignorance of the law, ignorantia iuris, is sinful or whether there may be mitigating circumstances that may offer excuse. In addressing this question, St. Albert appears to depart from the early Dominicans and lapses back into a more rigorist position. For example, St. Albert opines that ignorance of those moral truths that are necessary for life in common and those necessary for salvation--the precepts against fornication, murder, and so forth--is always sinful and is inexcusable. Similarly treated is ignorance of that knowledge necessary for one's state or office in life, the ignorance of which is sinful and without excuse.

St. Albert the Great
(Sanctus Albertus Magnus)

[E]t est privatio habitus regentibus in moribus necessariis ad salutem: et haec est duplex, scilicet quaedam est habitus privatio instruentis ad ea quae necessaria sunt vitae in communi, ut ignorantia juris divini ordinantis mores in praceptis, ut fornicationem esse peccatum mortale, et homicidium, et hujusmodi: et haec est peccatum in habentibus usum rationis. Alia est privatio habitus practici intellectus regentis in pertinentibus ad officium, ut Pontifex factas litteras ad fidem et mores instituentes tenetur scire, et sacerdos ea sine quibus actus sacerdotalis non valet exerceri, et hujusmodi: et haec ignorantia habitu officio etiam peccatum est, sed non habito, non est peccatus.

And it is the privation of a habit of morals the guidance of which is necessary for salvation: and this is of two kinds, namely, there is a certain privation of the habit of which instructs as to those things that are necessary for life in common, as, for example, ignorance of the divine law which which precepts of the manners of such life, such as that fornication, or murder, or the like are mortal sins: and this is a sin in those who have the use of reason. The other is the privation of a habit ruling the practical intellect in the things pertaining to their office [state in life], such as the obligation of the Pope to know matters of faith and morals, and that of the priest to know those things without which his priestly acts are invalid, and such like, and this ignorance in the habit of their office [or state of life] is a sin, but if it is not in the habit, it is not a sin.

II Sent., D. XXII, I, art. 7.*/**

St. Albert distinguishes further between affective or voluntary ignorance (i.e., involving an act of will) and intellectual ignorance. If the ignorance is affective or voluntary, then the consequent act is sinful and without excuse. However, if the ignorance is intellectual and not voluntary, there may be an excusing cause. If the ignorance is one of fact alone, there is a complete excuse because the act would be involuntary. (If the fact were known, the wrongful act would not have been done.) This is not the case is the intellectual ignorance is an ignorance of law. Ignorance of the law may or may not excuse, depending upon its level of crassness.

Dicendum, quod ignorantia secundum quod est peccatum, sive de se, sive de annexo, aliquid habet in affectu, secundum quod affectata dicitur: et habet aliquid in intellectu scilicet privationem habitus regentis in operabilibus pertinentibus ad vitam vel officium.

Dicendum igitur, quod quantum ad primum, peccatum est. Quantum autem ad secundum non est peccatum, et excusat vel a toto, si est particularis et facti: vel a tanto, si est juris vel universalis, quod idem est: quia ex illa parte facit ignorare circumstantias in quibus est actus, et ita est causa involuntarii quod meretur ignoscentiam et misericordiam aliquam.

It must be said, that ignorance insofar as it is a sin, whether of itself (de se), or collaterally (de annexo), is something had in the affection, according to which it said to be affected, and such a person has something in the intellect, that is, a privation in the habit which governs practical matters pertaining to life or one's office [or state] in life.

It must be said, therefore, that in regard to the former, it is sinful. As to the latter, it is not sinful, and one may be excused in part or entirely, if it is [a privation involving] something particular and of fact; but inasmuch as [the privation] is one of law or something universal, which is the same: for that part done when ignorant of the circumstances regarding the act is an involuntary cause done in ignorance which merits a certain mercy.

II Sent., D. XXII, I, art. 9 & ad. 1.

St. Albert distinguishes different kinds of ignorance, though the most basic division is vincible ignorance from invincible ignorance. There is ignorance which invincible in the nature of things (invincibilis ex natura), such as those who do not have the use of reason (stulti, morionibus, et melancholicis), and such ignorance totally excuses. There is ignorance which is accidentally invicible (invincibilis ex accidente), and this is two-fold, depending upon whether the accidental aspect is separable or inseparable (aut separabile, aut inseparabile), that is temporary or lasting, the former existing as a result of inebriation or drug-induced states, the latter being something as a result of an illness. Here the great division is based upon whether such accidental states are self-imposed. If one has no fault in the accidental loss of knowledge, one is entirely excused. However, if the accidental loss of knowledge is knowingly self-imposed, then it depends upon whether the state of ignorance was the result of a licit or illicit act. If the temporary loss of knowledge results as a collateral effect of some licit act, there is an excuse. If, however, the temporary loss of knowledge is something venially illicit, one is excused, but if it is mortally illicit, then one is not entirely excused.

Vincible ignorance can be divided into ignorance of fact and of law, which is the same distinction as the particular and the universal. Law is nothing but the universal rule that governs life or governs one's office or state (quia ius vocatur hic regulae universales et regentes vitam, vel officium). When it comes to particular matters, that is, contingent matters of fact, even the wise can be ignorant. And as to particular or contingent matters--which are matters of fact--ignorance of such matters may entirely excuse someone from sin. Ignorance of the law, however, is assessed differently:

Juris autem est duplex: quia quoddam est jus universale, quod omnimbus imponitur ad sciendum: et quoddam est particular, quod non scitur nisi per studium: et puto, quod prima est crassa et supona, non excusans. Secunda autem excusat, vel a tanto, vel a toto, si est casus multum dificilis.

[Ignorance of] law, however, is twofold: that which relates to the universal law, which is imposed upon all and of which all have knowledge: and that which relates to the particular, such that it is not known except by study: And I say that the first [kind of ignorance] is crass and supine, and inexcusable. The second kind [of ignorance] is subject to excuse, whether in whole or in part, depending upon whether the case is very difficult.

II Sent., D. XXII, I, art. 10.

Manifestly, for St. Albert, ignorance of the basic, universal natural moral law is never excused. Such ignorance is always crass and supine and blameworthy.

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*For St. Albert the Great's notion of habit, see our prior posting St. Albert the Great: Natural Law as Habitus.
**St. Albert's Commentaries are found at http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~albertus/pdfs/Borgnet-volumen%2027.PDF.

Ignorance of the Wrong-Development of an Idea, Part 1

IT IS COMMON TO SPEAK OF A DISTINCTION between ignorance of the law and ignorance of fact, ignorantia iuris and ignorantia facti. But it was not always common to make this distinction between law and fact, and the concept arose rather late and then went through a process of development. Rev. Stanley Bertke has a quick excursus on the development of this idea in pages 52 through 58 of his excellent little work, The Possibility of Ignorance of the Natural Law, and it merits being summarized here.

At the outset, the canonist Gratian (mid-12th century)* mentions the distinction between ignorance of fact and ignorance of law:

Est enim ignorantia alia facti, alia iuris. Facti alia quod non portuit eum scire quod oportuit cum scire . . . Quod oportuit eum scire . . . haec neminem excusat. Item ignorantia iuris alia naturalis, alia civilis. Naturalis omnimbus adulties damanbilis est; ius vero civile aliis permittitur ignorare, aliis non.

For there is one ignorance of fact, and another of law. The [ignorance] of fact may be that of which there was no need to know and that which was necessary to know. That which is is necessary to know. . . . [Ignorance] of that which is necessary to know excuses no one. There is also ignorance of the natural law and [ignorance] of the civil law. [Ignorance] of the natural law in adult is damnable; of the civil law, some are permitted to be ignorant, others not.

C.XII, C.1, q. 4. Gratian's distinction appears to be a common starting point for the scholastic theologians who reviewed and later systematized the matter over a period of time.

Simon of Tournai (1130-1201) focuses on Gratian's distinction, and, following the canonists, he advanced the view that ignorance of fact excused from sin. Thus, if someone unknowingly hurled a stone and it struck another and killed him, the lack of knowledge excuses from the thrower of the rock from sin. Simon of Tournai also distinguished between ignorance of the natural law and ignorance of positive law. A knowing violation of the positive law is, in addition to a legal infraction, also sinful. However, ignorance of the positive law excuses one from sin (though not necessarily from the legal infraction). Thus someone who travels through a foreign jurisdiction ignorant that a certain act is unlawful, is excused from sin even if he breaches the positive law. However, ignorance of the natural law never excuses from sin in Simon of Tournai's view. This is because natural law is so innate to human reason, and so readily known that noluit enim scire quod naturaliter posset, it is impossible for one not to know that which he naturally possesses.** "Simon of Tournai would therefore hold that ignorance of the natural law never excuses from sin for the very ignorance is a sin in itself." Bertke, 52. Simon of Tournai's view suffers from an excessive inatism as it relates to the natural moral law.

William of Auxerre (c. 1150-1231) was perhaps the first Scholastic theologian to handle in a systematic way the natural law (in his Summa Aurea). In his treatment of ignorance, William of Auxere elaborated a three-fold distinction in ignorance

[William of Auxerre] distinguished a triplex ignorance: ignorantia simplicis negationis, which is the absence of knowledge when there is no obligation to know; ignorantia privationis, which is the absence of knowledge one is obliged to possess; and ignorantia dispositionis qua quis aliter opinatur de re quam sit, which implies not only the absence of knowledge but a positive error to the contrary. Though the latter may excuse from win when it cannot be overcome, the former is always culpable.

Bertke, 53. For William of Auxerre ignorance of the natural law was always sinful--ignorantia iuris neminem excusat, and that without any exception. Although the speculative knowledge of the law might not be sinful without an act, the moment that speculative error was put into play in an erroneous practical judgment which, by definition, was against the virtue of prudence, that act (as long as it was free) was sinful. Bertke, 53. William of Auxerre thus advanced a rigoristic notion of ignorance of the natural law. It simply did not exist.

The Meeting of St. Dominic and St. Francis by Benozzo Gozzoli c. 1452

The first softening of this position was seen among the Dominicans. So Roland of Cremona (1178-1259), Hugh of Saint Cher (ca. 1200-1263), Richard Fishacre (or Fitzacre) (ca. 1200-1248), and John of Treves, while they follow William of Auxerre generally, they seem to reject the absolute principle that ignorance of the law never excuses one from fault. They do so, not by expressly rejecting that teaching, but by more or less suppressing the absolute formula of William of Auxerre. On the other hand, the Franciscan school, at least as it may be found in John of La Rochelle (also known as Jean de La Rochelle, or Johannes de Rupella, died 1245), appears to have maintained the original rigor of William of Auxerre. For John of La Rochelle, "[t]he natural law is written on the hearts of men; therefore, ignorantia iuris naturalis nullum adultum excusat, sicut dicit Decretum." Bertke, 54 (citing to Summa de Vitiis, 228, f. 11).

Similarly, Alexander of Hales (1185-1245) follows the rigoristic line. In answering questions on the issue of the levels of ignorance and the concomitant level of excuse, Alexander of Hales "holds that the more one is held to know the law, the less ignorance and excuse for transgressions." Bertke, 54. It follows from this that since all have the obligation to know the natural law, no one who is ignorant of the natural law can be said to be excused of it. Ignorance of the natural law is, in all cases, imputable to the actor and sinful, at least insofar as one has the use of reason and is not mad or lacking reason. "Ignorantia enim iuris naturalis neminem excusat qui usum potest habere sciendi, sicut dicitur, 'ignorantia iuris naturalis omnibus adultis damnabilis est,' adultis dico, qui habent usum rationis, propter furiosos et huiusmodi." Bertke, 54.

And so the issue seemed to be: the early Dominicans seemed sub silentio to soften William of Auxerre's rigorism, while the Franciscans "resolutely adopt it." Bertke, 54. Unlike St. Dominic and St. Francis, who so touchingly met and embraced as shown in Gozzoli's artwork, on the matter of ignorance of the natural law, there was no such embracing among the theologians.

In the next blog posting, we will see what effect the Aristotelian revolution had on development of this issue. We shall review the work of the great Dominicans, St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas, and the great Franciscan, St. Bonaventure.
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*Lex Christianorum has handled Gratian's contribution to the natural law and his Decretum before. See Gratian and the Natural Law: Concordance and Discordance in the Natural Law, Part 1 and Gratian and the Natural Law: Concordance and Discordance in the Natural Law, Part 2.
**Bertke, 52 (quoting Paris Nat. Lat. 14886, f. 29, cited by Lottin, D.O., "Le Probleme de Ignorantia Iuris," Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Medievale, Vol.5, 1933, p. 352.