Democracy: Separation of Powers, Rule of Law, Representation, and Bureaucracy

THE CHURCH IS LESS CONCERNED about form than substance when it comes assessing any kind of government, including democracy. However, there are some natural procedural components of democracy and some which through history have been found to be valuable. In the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church mentions some of these institutions.

One important principle is the division of powers in a State. As John Paul II states in his encyclical Centesimus annus, "it is preferable that each power [legislative, executive, judicial] be balanced by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep it within proper bounds." The check and balances caused by the separation of powers promotes the rule of law. (Compendium, No. 408) (quoting Centisimus annus, 46)

The "rule of law" is also an important feature of democratic systems. The notion of the "rule of law" is the notion that "law is sovereign, and not the arbitrary will of individuals." (Compendium, No. 408) (quoting Centisimus annus, 46) Of course, the law here must be based upon reason--as Coke called it, "artificial reason and judgment of law"--yet one not repugnant to the natural moral law. It "rule of law" was famously described by Chief Justice John Marshall who, in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison stated that there ought to be "a government of laws and not men."

But the branches of government are not only limited by checks and balance and the rule of law. They ought also to be answerable to the people in a democracy. In this case, particularly the legislature, the representative body, "must be subjected to effective social control." The principal means by which such "social control" is exercised is through elections. These must be free and meaningful in that they allow "the selection and change of representatives." Thus the representatives are to be held accountable to their constituents for their work.

Legislators are not merely passive agents of their constituents. Nor are they independent agents entirely unresponsive to their constituents. As John F. Kennedy summarized it in his Profiles in Courage, a legislator must "on occasion lead, inform, correct and sometimes even ignore constituent opinion, if [he is] to exercise fully that judgment for which [he was] elected." The Compendium recognizes this tension in the role of the legislator:

Those who govern have the obligation to answer to those governed, but this does not in the least imply that representatives are merely passive agents of the electors. The control exercised by the citizens does not in fact exclude the freedom that elected officials must enjoy in order to fulfill their mandate with respect to the objectives to be pursued.

(Compendium, No. 409)

They therefore have duties to the common good above and beyond their specific constituents:

In their specific areas (drafting laws, governing, setting up systems of checks and balances), elected officials must strive to seek and attain that which will contribute to making civil life proceed well in its overall course.

(Compendium, No. 409)

There is always the danger of special interests. While the concerns of special interests are something that must considered, these must be assessed--not based upon the needs of the special interest as against the common good--but in relation to the common good. As the Compendium puts it, the mandate and objectives to be pursued by legislators "do not depend exclusively on special interests, but in a much greater part on the function of synthesis and mediation that serve the common good, one of the essential and indispensable goals of political authority." (Compendium, No. 409)

The Church reminds politicians that they must engage in their "art of the possible" in a virtuous, moral way. Here there is an insistence of personal morality.

Those with political responsibilities must not forget or underestimate the moral dimension of political representation, which consists in the commitment to share fully in the destiny of the people and to seek solutions to social problems. In this perspective, responsible authority also means authority exercised with those virtues that make it possible to put power into practice as service (patience, modesty, moderation, charity, efforts to share), an authority exercised by persons who are able to accept the common good, and not prestige or the gaining of personal advantages, as the true goal of their work.

(Compendium, No. 410)

This notion of a virtuous legislator of course would exclude any notion of political corruption, something which the Compendium recognizes as being a deformity, a blight on the democratic process:

Among the deformities of the democratic system, political corruption is one of the most serious because it betrays at one and the same time both moral principles and the norms of social justice. It compromises the correct functioning of the State, having a negative influence on the relationship between those who govern and the governed. It causes a growing distrust with respect to public institutions, bringing about a progressive disaffection in the citizens with regard to politics and its representatives, with a resulting weakening of institutions. Corruption radically distorts the role of representative institutions, because they become an arena for political bartering between clients' requests and governmental services. In this way political choices favor the narrow objectives of those who possess the means to influence these choices and are an obstacle to bringing about the common good of all citizens.

(Compendium, No. 411)

Whether we are dealing with the executive, legislative, or judicial branch, any organ of public administration--national, regional, or municipal--must recognize that they are "oriented towards the service of citizens." They are the "steward of the people's resources, which [they] must administer with a view to the common good." (Compendium, No. 412)

One evil which seems to be endemic and which must always be fought against is the problem of excessive bureaucratization. Excessive bureaucratization occurs when "'institutions become complex in their organization and pretend to manage every area at hand.'" (Compendium, No. 412) (quoting Christifidelis laici, 41). Excessive bureaucratization works against the common good and against efficient stewardship of public resources. "In the end," excessively bureaucratic agencies of government "'lose their effectiveness as a result of an impersonal functionalism, an overgrown bureaucracy, unjust private interests, and an all-too-easy and generalized disengagement from a sense of duty.'" (Compendium, No. 412) (quoting Christifidelis laici, 41).

"The role of those working in public administration is not to be conceived as impersonal or bureaucratic, but rather as an act of generous assistance for citizens, undertaken with a spirit of service." (Compendium, No. 412).

Values and Democracy

THE CHURCH HAS TRADITIONALLY MAINTAINED that no form of civil government is imposed upon man by God. The traditional doctrine is found, for example, in Leo XIII who stated that "in truth it may be affirmed that each of [the forms of government] is good, provided it lead straight to the end--that is the common good, for which social authority is constituted,--and finally, it may be added that from the relative point of view, such and such a form of government may be preferable because of being better adapted to the character and customs of such or such a nation. In this order of speculative ideas, Catholics, like all other citizens, are free to prefer one form of government to another, precisely because no one of these social forms is, in itself, opposed to the principles of sound reason or to the maxims of Christian doctrine."*

In line with this traditional stance, the Church has not hesitated to point out the benefits of a democratic form of government, while yet pointing out the dangers of such a system.

The benefits of a democratic form of government are perhaps summarized best by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Centesimus annus, which the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, describes as containing "an explicit and articular judgment with regard to democracy." (Compendium, No. 406):

"The Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing them through peaceful means when appropriate.

Thus she cannot encourage the formation of narrow ruling groups which usurp the power of the State for individual interests or for ideological ends.

Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a correct conception of the human person. It requires that the necessary conditions be present for the advancement both of the individual through education and formation in true ideals, and of the ‘subjectivity' of society through the creation of structures of participation and shared responsibility."

(Compendium, No. 406) (quoting Centesimus annus, 46).

The Church distinguishes between "authentic democracy" and one that is not authentic. The most significant distinction between an "authentic democracy" and an inauthentic one relates to substance: does it promote the common good, the rule of law, the dignity of the human person properly understood? Does it recognize objectively-informed human rights based upon the natural moral law? Does it advance the good life? Or does it put right over the good?

If viewed as a mere procedure, devoid of substantive values, democracy may be more a hindrance to the good life than a benefit to it. So the Compendium warns:

An authentic democracy is not merely the result of a formal observation of a set of rules but is the fruit of a convinced acceptance of the values that inspire democratic procedures: the dignity of every human person, the respect of human rights, commitment to the common good as the purpose and guiding criterion for political life. If there is no general consensus on these values, the deepest meaning of democracy is lost and its stability is compromised.

(Compendium, No. 407) Democracy as a form of government, in fact, is no panacea. It can become intolerant, dangerous, even inhuman if it does not build upon the notion of an objective moral order. If democracy is built upon a people who have rejected an objective order--so that all morality is conventional, a matter of agreement only--then there is great danger of a form of tyranny.

In fact, the problem of "ethical relativism" is what presents democracies in the West with the greatest threat:

The Church's social doctrine sees ethical relativism, which maintains that there are no objective or universal criteria for establishing the foundations of a correct hierarchy of values, as one of the greatest threats to modern-day democracies. "Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation according to different political trends. It must be observed in this regard that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political action, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism."

(Compendium, No. 407) (quoting Centesimus annus, 46)

Like all other forms of government, democracy is a form of government. It is a means, and not an end in itself. Like all human government, democracy has been de-divinized by Christ. Democracy has no more claim to worship than did Caesar.

Democracy needs something extrinsic to it so that it may have an end. Though written constitutions and statements of rights attempt to impose such an extrinsic order, there has to be a law above these, what Thomas E. Cronin called the "Higher Law."

In fact, traditionally, the notion of this "Higher Law"--the natural moral law--was a central value held by all the signers of the Declaration of Independence and all the ratifiers of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The founders of our form of government recognized what the Compendium states is essential for democracy to recognize: that there is a law outside process, there is an objective realm of morality to which it must answer:

Democracy is fundamentally "a 'system' and as such is a means and not an end. Its 'moral' value is not automatic, but depends on conformity to the moral law to which it, like every other form of human behavior, must be subject: in other words, its morality depends on the morality of the ends which it pursues and of the means which it employs."

(Compendium, No. 407) (quoting Centesimums annus, 46)

For a variety of reasons, the moral consensus of the good behind our democracy has collapsed. We no longer hold to a central core of objective moral truth. A radical individual autonomy--freedom for freedom's sake--where we define what we want to be and what is to be our good has replaced any notion of an objective moral order. Indeed, there has been a revolution of sorts, and it has infected even the highest institutions who have institutionalized this ethical relativism.

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the majority of the Supreme Court refused to overturn Roe v. Wade. In that case, Justice Anthony Kennedy defined the "heart of liberty" to be this radical autonomy where each individual defines his or her good, where each individual has "the right to define one's concept of existence, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." A few years later, that passage was referred to in the Supreme Court case which overturned all laws that criminalized homosexual sodomy. In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia referred to this "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage, as the "passage that ate the rule of law." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 575 (2003).

The liberal political philosopher William Galston--who was critical of John Rawls--insisted that there had to be a minimum level of consensus regarding the good--a minimal perfectionism--for a liberal democracy to function. Such a consensus had to disavow secular nihilism, Nietzschean irrationalism, and barbarism.** The "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage comprehends all three.

Let not be fooled by the "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage. It is nothing other than a pleasant way of saying: "Evil, be thou my good." And by these saccharine words we have justified as good--for the mere reason that they were chosen as good and for no other reason--and institutionalized such moral enormities as contraception, abortion, and sodomy, all of which are sins which cry to heaven for vengeance. (Gen. 4:10, 18:20).

Woe to those who call evil good and good evil. (Isaiah 5:20) It presents a real danger to our democratic way of life.

____________________________________
*Leo XIII, Au Milieu des Sollicitudes (On the Church and State in France), February 16, 1892), No. 14.
William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York: Cambridge University Press: 1991), 177.

Tolerance of Evil: Pope Leo XIII's Libertas praestantissimum

LEO XIII'S ENCYCLICAL LIBERTAS Praestantissimum addressed the notion of liberty from a traditional natural law perspective. It also addressed the errors of liberalism, a liberalism that either rejects, on the basis of theory or dogma, the natural and divine law or seeks, on the basis of practical politics, to minimize or altogether exclude its importance or relevance in the public forum.

Leo XIII was realistic enough to read the signs of the times, to recognize the direction the straws was blowing in the prevailing winds. Pope Leo XIII knew well "the course down which the minds and actions of men are in this our age being borne." LP, 33. He recognized that strict enforcement of the moral norms that related to such liberties of religion, of speech, of teaching, and of conscience could easily be viewed as imprudent, and so he felt the need to address the issue of tolerance. To what degree could the state, or those in authority, tolerate the modern errors of liberalism?

Portrait of Leo XIII

Without conceding moral principle, the Church recognized that public authority could "tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice." However, such a tolerance is warranted only for two reasons. First error and injustice could be tolerated if the common good demands it "for the sake of avoiding some greater evil." Similarly, error and injustice could be tolerated if, with respect to the common good, thre is cause for "preserving some greater good." LP, 33. "One thing, however, remains always true - that the liberty which is claimed for all to do all things is not ... of itself desirable, inasmuch as it is contrary to reason that error and truth should have equal rights."
--Pope Leo XIIIThis sort of toleration is, in fact, perceived to be in God who, in is providence, tolerates evil in the world so that greater good may not be impeded or greater evil may not result. "In the government of States it is not forbidden to imitate the Ruler of the world." In regendis civitatibus rectorem mundi par est imitari. LP, 33. Indeed, among the governments of men such tolerance is mandated as a matter of practical necessity, "as the authority of man is powerless to prevent every evil, it has (as St. Augustine says) to overlook and leave unpunished many things were are punished, and rightly, by Divine Providence."* LP, 33. But regardless if tolerance is purposefully pursued for a greater good or if practical limits demand tolerance, the evil must be tolerated only, and the state "may not and should not approve or desire evil for its own sake." LP, 33. In fact, evil, being a privation or lack of the good, "is opposed to the common welfare which every legislator is bound to desire and defend to the best of his ability." LP, 33. Therefore, "the tolerance of evil which is dictated by political prudence should be strictly confined to the limits which its justifying cause, the public welfare, requires." LP, 34. Indeed, if the common good or public welfare is injured by such tolerance, the justification for tolerance (avoidance of a greater evil or protection of a good) disappears, placing a duty on the state to suppress the evil. LP, 34.

Such a tolerance, of course, is not necessarily indicative of a healthy state of affairs. Indeed, "the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further it is from perfection." Finally, Leo XIII observes that the "tolerance" that Liberals demand is one essentially without moral boundaries, is in fact a tolerance that results in "boundless license," and ought to be condemned as "abandoned and criminal [in] character." LP, 35. The unbounded tolerance of the liberal seems to have one clear boundary: intolerance towards the Church: "[I]n spite of all this show of tolerance, it very often happens that, while they profess themselves ready to lavish liberty on all in the greatest profusion, they are utterly intolerant toward the Catholic Church." LP, 35.

At the conclusion of his encyclical Libertas praestantissimum, Leo XIII summarizes his teaching on liberalism: Broadly defined, liberalism is a denial, theoretical or practical, of God's authority:

To deny the existence of this authority in God, or to refuse to submit to it, means to act, not as a free man, but as one who treasonably abuses his liberty; and in such a disposition of mind the chief and deadly vice of liberalism essentially consists.

Quem quidem in Deo principatum aut esse negare, aut ferre nolle, non liberi hominis est, sed abutentis ad perduellionem libertate: proprieque ex animi tali affectione conflatur et efficitur Liberalismi capitale vitium.

LP, 36.

The forms of liberalism, and its sin, is manifold, "for in more ways and degrees than one can the will depart from the obedience which is due to God or to those who share in the divine power." LP, 36. It includes those who reject God wholesale, as well as those that reject only the role of "all laws of faith and morals which are above all natural reason, but are revealed by the authority of God." LP, 38. It also encompasses those who "impudently assert that there is no reason why regard should be paid to these [divinely revealed laws of faith and reason], at any rate publicly, by the State." LP, 38. Similarly, an advocacy of a clear separation of Church and State is mistaken "fatal principle" of political life. For Pope Leo XIII, it is "clear that the two powers, though dissimilar in functions and unequal in degree, ought nevertheless to live in concord, by harmony in their action and the faithful discharge of their respective duties."** LP, 38.

With respect to the liberals' coveted and overexapansive rights, Leo XIII summarizes his teaching thus:

From what has been said it follows that it is quite unlawful to demand, to defend, or to grant unconditional freedom of thought, of speech, or writing, or of worship, as if these were so many rights given by nature to man. For, if nature had really granted them, it would be lawful to refuse obedience to God, and there would be no restraint on human liberty.

Itaque ex dictis consequitur, nequaquam licere petere, defendere, largiri, cogitandi, scribendi, docendi, itemque promiscuam religionum libertatem, veluti iura totidem, quae hornini natura dederit. Nam si vere natura dedisset, imperium Dei detrectari insesset, nec ulla temperari lege libertas humana posset.

LP, 42.

Where necessary to the common good, such expansive notion of rights may be tolerated, but even so without conceding their validity or forgetting their essential immorality:

It likewise follows that freedom in these things may be tolerated wherever there is just cause, but only with such moderation as will prevent its degenerating into license and excess.

Similiter consequitur, ista genera libertatis posse quidem, si iustae caussae sint, tolerari, definita tamen moderatione, ne in libidinem atque insolentiam degenerent.

LP, 42.

Finally, when living in a country where such expansive rights are tolerated,and error and evil are around to usher about untrammeled, the Christian has an affirmative duty:

And, where such liberties are in use, men should employ them in doing good, and should estimate them as the Church does; for liberty is to be regarded as legitimate in so far only as it affords greater facility for doing good, but no farther.

Ubi vero harum libertatum viget consuetude, eas ad facultatem recte faciendi civos transferant, quodque sentit de illis Ecclesia, idem ipsi sentiant. Omnis enim libertas legitima putanda, quatenus rerum honestarum maiorem facultatem afferat, praeterea nunquam.

LP, 42.

Finally, rejection of the errors of the liberals, which cannot be accepted since they violate the natural law and the divine law does not mean the Catholic has to reject democracy as a form of government. "[I]t is not of itself wrong to prefer a democratic form of government, if only the Catholic doctrine"--that is to say the teachings of the natural law and divine Revelation--"be maintained as to the origin and exercise of power." LB, 44. The rights of men and the rights of the Church have to be respected regardless of the form of government a people choose. Catholics are encouraged to participate in public affairs, to contribute to the common good, and to do all he can "for the defense, preservation, and prosperity of his country." LP, 45.

___________________________________
*Leo XIII cites to St. Augustine's De libero arbitrio, I.6.14 (PL 32,1228)
**Though the issue of separation of Church and State are briefly addressed in Libertas praestantissimum, they are more completely handled in Leo XIII's encyclical Immortale Dei.