Morality's Hold: Authority and Power

THE POET HORACE WROTE in one of his poems:

Power without wisdom falls by its own weight:
The gods themselves advance temperate power:
And likewise hate force that, with its whole
Consciousness, is intent on wickedness.*

Power must be tempered, guided by something, and in the Catholic Church's view, the fundamental order under which authority's power is to be exercised is the moral law that was established by God, the creator of heaven, earth, and man. Therefore, the Compendium states succinctly the principle that is forever the bane of tyrants: "Authority must be guided by the moral law." (Compendium, No. 396) From the moral order, authority obtains its power to impose obligations and its moral legitimacy.

There is no moral law without regard to God, since the moral order has God as the fons et origo and the finis ultimus:

All of its [authority's] dignity derives from its being exercised within the context of the moral order, "which in turn has God for its first source and final end."

(Compendium, No. 396) (quoting Pope John XXIII, Pacem in terris, No. 270) In fact, recognition of the existence of God is absolutely necessary to prevent the advent of tyranny, because the moral order upon which authority relies "has no existence except in God; cut off from God it must necessarily disintegrate." (Compendium, No. 396) (quoting Pope John XXIII, Mater et magistra, 450) The modern loss of the sense of God therefore suggests not freedom, but oppression.

The moral order precedes authority, and is the basis of authority, which is to say that authority is nothing but tyranny without it. Authority--which is a moral concept--should therefore be distinguished from power--which is a legal, political, social, historical, or practical concept. Tyrants wield power--a legal, political, or practical reality--arbitrarily, without regard to the moral law, and hence they undermine their own foundation. Sic semper tyrannis!

Since power exercised without regard to authority is tyranny, denial of a moral order and of a natural moral law is tantamount to tyranny. And this is true whether the form of tyranny is in the form of one (monarchy or dictator) or the form of many (democracy). Tyranny is not based on form, but on substance. Tyranny exists whenever power--wherever it is to be found and in whatever manner exercised--acts without reference to an objective moral law.

Since authority flows from the moral law, it follows that authority will "recognize, respect, and promote essential human and moral values." These human and moral values are built in human nature so to speak, and, as John Paul II felicitously phrased it in his encyclical Evangelium vitae, "flow from the very truth of the human being and express and safeguard the dignity of the person." These human and moral values, the great Pope continues, are such that "no individual, no majority, and no State can ever create, modify, or destroy." (Evangelium vitae, 71).

The collapse of moral consensus in the West caused by the rejection of an objective moral order--the natural moral law--which leads to a vicious skepticism or relativism in morality therefore forebodes a frightening return of tyranny. This, of course, has been famously referred to as the "tyranny of relativism" by Pope Benedict XVI.

The inability to appreciate an objective moral order is also tied to the increased secularization of social, political, and legal life. We act as practical atheists. We act as if God did not exist.

If, as a result of the tragic clouding of the collective conscience, skepticism were to succeed in casting doubt on the basic principles of the moral law, the legal structure of the State itself would be shaken to its very foundations, being reduced to nothing more than a mechanism for the pragmatic regulation of different and opposing interests.

(Compendium, No. 397)

The world has groaned, and finds itself in this "tragic cloud" were all moral truths are denied and God's providence no longer offers guidance. Our moral vision thus obscured we walk lemming-like right into the pit of tyranny.

Since it is properly anchored in the moral law, authority properly exercised will enact just and moral laws. As the Compendium summarizes the relationship between the natural moral law, authority, and positive laws, citing back to the principles so well-stated by St. Thomas Aquinas:

Authority must enact just laws, that is, laws that correspond to the dignity of the human person and to what is required by right reason. "Human law is law insofar as it corresponds to right reason and therefore is derived from the eternal law. When, however, a law is contrary to reason, it is called an unjust law; in such a case it ceases to be law and becomes instead an act of violence."

(Compendium, No. 398) (quoting S.T. IaIIae, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2)

When human laws conform to the natural law--which is a participation in the eternal law of God--then they bind in conscience. That is why the Compendium states the traditional teaching:

Authority that governs according to reason places citizens in a relationship not so much of subjection to another person as of obedience to the moral order and, therefore, to God himself who is its ultimate source. Whoever refuses to obey an authority that is acting in accordance with the moral order "resists what God has appointed" (Rom. 13:2).

(Compendium, No. 398)

Not only must human laws conform to reason, they must also promote the common good. Indeed, it is the same thing to say that a human law is unreasonable, does not promote the common good,** is against the natural law, or is against God's law, since these are all different ways of saying the same thing.

When human laws do not conform to the natural law, when they are unreasonable, or when they act against the common good, then any tie between God's eternal law and human law is severed, and human law flails in the winds of moral chaos, like some kite that has lost its anchoring string. Such laws have lost their authority, are acts of raw will not reason, and in fact are hand in glove with the central law of the Devil: "Evil, be thou my good!"***

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*Horace, Odes III.4.65-70 (Vis consili expers mole ruit sua; / Vim temperatum di quoquo provehunt / In maius; idem odere vires / omne nefasanim moventis.)
**As the Compendium notes: "[W]henever public authority--which has its foundation in human nature and belongs to the order pre-ordained by God--fails to seek the common good, it abandons its proper purpose and so delegitimizes itself." (Compendium, No. 398) By rejecting the natural moral law and the objective moral order, this seems to be increasingly applicable to most Western governments.
***John Milton, Paradise Lost, IV, 108.

On God and Government: Yahweh Malak

SCRIPTURE, WHETHER THE OLD COVENANT OR THE NEW, does not purport to be a political document, a political constitution. There is no normative political institution which is required by Scripture as revealed truth, and so the Church has never theoretically advocated a particular form of government for political society, though perhaps it has historically or prudentially supported one regime over another.

There is however much to be learned tangentially as it were from Scripture regarding political governance, since the truths of God which it reveals provide a real constraint upon earthly authorities--what their responsibilities are, what they may advocate, and what they may do. These constraints exist upon any political form of government, whether we are dealing with a monarchy and a king and his court or a democracy and its president or prime minister and the people.

One huge gift that God, through his chosen people the Jews, revealed is that political power is not to be absolutized. It is not the end of all things. It is not the most important of things.

In fact, it was not the nation, or the city, but Yahweh that was recognized as the source of ultimate political power. It is Israel's gift to the world that the earthly powers are not absolute, but that they are answerable to something greater. This principle was expressed through the notion of Yahweh as king: Yahweh malak.

Yahweh Malak

To the Israelites, Yahweh the Lord was king or was become king, Yahweh malak (יְהוָ֣ה מָלָךְ֮) or malak elohim.* This concept is found in a particularly striking way in the so-called "Enthronement Psalms," identified as Psalms 47, 93, 96-99. These Psalms all acknowledge God's sovereignty over heaven and earth and over all peoples and their kings. They were perhaps used in liturgical enthronement ceremonies, and enjoy a rich breadth of kingship arising from the vagueness of the term Yahweh malak which could mean, Yahweh reigns (or is king), or Yawweh has become king, or Yahweh will reign. The language thus points to an ontological reality, to a temporal circumstance or idealization, and to an eschatological reality or fulfillment. Yahweh is king--whether the earthly powers recognize him to be so. All the earth is his footstool. Yahweh is king--and it is meet and right that the judges and kings that ruled the Jews, and indeed all earthly powers, recognize him to be so. Yahweh is king--when at the end of the world, all things will be placed under his direct rule.

Psalm 47, for example, clearly calls upon all nations--the gentiles as well as Israel--to acknowledge Yahweh, enthroned as the King of Israel, as the universal God, whose universal rule encompasses all nations and is superior to all earthly kings. Yahweh is the King of kings, the Lord of Lords. The Psalm recalls the presence of God in the midst of his people Israel in the Ark of the Covenant, which was placed in the Holy of Holies of the Jewish Temple.

All you peoples, clap your hands;
shout to God with joyful cries.
For the LORD [Yahweh], the Most High, is to be feared,
the great king [melek]over all the earth,
Who made people subject to us,
nations under our feet,
Who chose our heritage for us,
the glory of Jacob, whom he loves.

God has gone up with a shout;
the LORD, amid trumpet blasts.
Sing praise to God, sing praise;
sing praise to our king, sing praise.

For God [elohim] is king [melek] over all the earth;
sing hymns of praise.
God rules over the nations;
God sits upon his holy throne.
The princes of the peoples assemble
with the people of the God of Abraham.
For the shields of the earth belong to God,
highly exalted.

The same notion is repeated in Psalm 93, another of the Enthronement Psalms. Here, the kingship of God is less related to his revelation to Israel; rather, the kingship of God is linked to his status as creator of the cosmos, the one to whom all natural creation is ultimately answerable, as alpha, its source, as omega, its end. He is the one who brings order out of chaos. Like several of the Enthronement Psalms, this Psalm begins with the invocation Yahweh malak! The Lord is King!

The LORD is king [Yahweh malak], robed with majesty;
the LORD is robed, girded with might.
The world will surely stand in place,
never to be moved.
Your throne stands firm from of old;
you are from everlasting.
The flood has raised up, LORD;
the flood has raised up its roar;
the flood has raised its pounding waves.
More powerful than the roar of many waters,
more powerful than the breakers of the sea,
powerful in the heavens is the LORD.
Your decrees are firmly established;
holiness befits your house, LORD,
for all the length of days.

The universality of God's reign is repeated in Psalm 96. Israel's God is not God over only Israel. He is God--and hence King--over all peoples. It is recognition of God as King that will lead to fairness and justice in the political realm. Here we have a particularly strong hint of the coming of the Messianic King, Jesus, and of the Kingship of God's eschatological fulfillment at the end of time:

Sing to the LORD a new song;
sing to the LORD, all the earth.
Sing to the LORD, bless his name;
proclaim his salvation day after day.

Tell his glory among the nations;
among all peoples, his marvelous deeds.

For great is the LORD and highly to be praised,
to be feared above all gods.
For the gods of the nations are idols,
but the LORD made the heavens.
Splendor and power go before him;
power and grandeur are in his holy place.

Give to the LORD, you families of nations,
give to the LORD glory and might;
give to the LORD the glory due his name!
Bring gifts and enter his courts;
bow down to the LORD, splendid in holiness.
Tremble before him, all the earth;
declare among the nations: The LORD is king [Yahweh malak].
The world will surely stand fast, never to be shaken.
He rules the peoples with fairness.

Let the heavens be glad and the earth rejoice;
let the sea and what fills it resound;
let the plains be joyful and all that is in them.
Then let all the trees of the forest rejoice
before the LORD who comes,
who comes to govern the earth,
To govern the world with justice
and the peoples with faithfulness.

Psalm 97, which, like Psalm 93, opens with the declaration "The Lord is King," Yahweh malak, repeats the same theme, stressing God's ontological kingship and linking it with his status as creator of heaven of earth, of lightning and thunder, of light, of mountains, of the seas and the islands in it. There is a hint of the darkness of God's mystery, and a praise of God being the fiery source of all justice and right, and the consolation of those who do justice.

The LORD is king [Yahweh malak]; let the earth rejoice;
let the many islands be glad.
Cloud and darkness surround him;
justice and right are the foundation of his throne.
Fire goes before him,
consuming his foes on every side.

His lightening illumines the world;
the earth sees and trembles.
The mountains melt like wax before the LORD,
before the Lord of all the earth.

The heavens proclaim his justice;
all peoples see his glory.

All who serve idols are put to shame,
who glory in worthless things;
all gods bow down before him.

Zion hears and is glad,
and the daughters of Judah rejoice
because of your judgments, O LORD.
For you, LORD, are the Most High over all the earth,
exalted far above all gods.
You who love the LORD, hate evil,
he protects the souls of the faithful,
rescues them from the hand of the wicked.

Light dawns for the just,
and gladness for the honest of heart.
Rejoice in the LORD, you just,
and give thanks at the remembrance of his holiness.

Psalm 98 continues the enthronement theme, stressing the liturgical celebration, in which even inanimate creation joins, of the God who, not only has historically intervened in the life of Israel, but will come at the end of time to set all things right. The eschatological concept is particularly stressed in this Enthronement Psalm. Earthly Israel is but a sign of the heavenly Israel. There are also images of God as a warrior, one who, like some sort of divine Achilles with his military prowess or a young David with his simple slingshot, accomplishes marvelous deeds with his right hand and his holy arm:

Sing a new song to the LORD,
for he has done marvelous deeds.
His right hand and holy arm
have won the victory.

The LORD has made his victory known;
has revealed his triumph in the sight of the nations,
He has remembered his mercy and faithfulness
toward the house of Israel.
All the ends of the earth have seen
the victory of our God.

Shout with joy to the LORD, all the earth;
break into song; sing praise.
Sing praise to the LORD with the lyre,
with the lyre and melodious song.
With trumpets and the sound of the horn
shout with joy to the King, the LORD [hammelek Yahweh].

Let the sea and what fills it resound,
the world and those who dwell there.
Let the rivers clap their hands,
the mountains shout with them for joy,
Before the LORD who comes,
who comes to govern the earth,
To govern the world with justice
and the peoples with fairness.

Finally, we may look at the last of the Enthronement Psalms, Psalm 99. Like Psalm 97, the opening words set the theme: Yahweh malak: The Lord reigns. Here, God's historical intervention in the life of Israel is recalled. And though God has historically intervened in time--to rule the germ of the twelve tribes of Israel in Jacob, to bring his people out of the slavery of Egypt through the acts of Moses the great lawgiver, and sanctify them through the priestly ministry of Aaron, and to rule them through the great Judge Samuel--he is altogether separate from the world--Holy is he! He is hard on those who violate his just precepts, but forgiving to those who turn back.

The LORD is king [Yahweh malak], the peoples tremble;
he is enthroned on the cherubim, the earth quakes.

Great is the LORD in Zion,
exalted above all the peoples.
Let them praise your great and awesome name:
Holy is he!

O mighty king, lover of justice,
you have established fairness;
you have created just rule in Jacob.
Exalt the LORD, our God;
bow down before his footstool;
holy is he!

Moses and Aaron were among his priests,
Samuel among those who called on his name;
they called on the LORD, and he answered them.
From the pillar of cloud he spoke to them;
they kept his decrees, the law he had given them.
O LORD, our God, you answered them;
you were a forgiving God to them,
though you punished their offenses.
Exalt the LORD, our God;
bow down before his holy mountain;
holy is the LORD, our God.

This theme of enthronement is not abandoned by the Christians, and indeed, Christ is he who is enthroned in the manner of Yahweh. These Enthronement Psalms are recalled in in words of the Angel Gabriel in the Gospel of Luke (1:32-33) with specific reference to Jesus: "He will be great and will be called Son of the Most High, and the Lord God will give him the throne of David his father, and he will rule [or reign as king] (βασιλεύσει) over the house of Jacob forever, and of his kingdom there will be no end."** It reverberates in St. Paul's statement in his first letter to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 15:25): Jesus "must reign (βασιλεύειν) until he has put all his enemies under his feet." It is perhaps recalled most vividly in St. John's Apocalypse (11:15, 17-18; 19:6), where the eschatological fulfillment of God's reign at the end times and at final judgment is linked with these enthronement Psalms and with Jesus as Lord and Messiah:

The kingdom of the world now belongs to our Lord and to his Anointed, and he will reign (βασιλεύσει) forever and ever. . . . We give thanks to you, Lord God almighty, who are and who were. For you have assumed your great power and have established your reign. The nations raged, but your wrath has come, and the time for the dead to be judged, and to recompense your servants, the prophets, and the holy ones and those who fear your name, the small and the great alike, and to destroy those who destroy the earth. . . . . Alleluia! The Lord has established his reign (ἐβασίλευσεν), (our) God, the almighty.

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*There can be some confusion between malak (melek)as "king" and malak as "angel" or "messenger." In Hebrew the words are very similar, yet are different words. The word מֶ֫לֶך (mlk) is "king." The word מַלְאָך (ml'k) is angel or messenger. The root for king is mlk (mem, lamed, kaf: מלך). The root for send is l'k (lamed, alef, kaf: לאכ). (Alef is a glottal stop.) It is from this root that the word for angel or "one sent" (malak or מלאך)is derived.
**Notably, the Greek word ἐβασίλευσεν (he reigns) was used by the translators of the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew word malak in the Enthronement Psalms. For example, in Psalm 93:1, 97:1, and 99:1, Yahweh malak (יְהוָה מָלָךְ) is translated as ὁ κύριος ἐβασίλευσεν. The Gospel of Luke and St. Paul seem clearly to point to the enthronement Psalms as well through their similar words.

Natural Law's Modern Cousin Germain: Authority

HOW IS IT THAT SOME LEGITIMATELY AND MORALLY claim to to have and exercise authority over others? And what is the extent, the boundaries beyond which that authority cannot go? Why does someone else have the right to pass laws that frustrate, nay even prohibit my choice in the exercise of practical reasonableness and selection of basic human values, or that punish me by loss of goods, loss of freedom, even loss of life if I act in a manner that the authority sees fit to proscribe? Why is it that some statements or propositions (say laws) are authoritative, and what, precisely, does that mean? For Finnis, authority and what is authoritative find their source in practicable reasonableness with particular reference to the common good. It is the common good that justifies both authority and its exercise and justifies those statements (laws) that are authoritative in providing guidance to our actions or in prohibiting certain actions. Finnis, we will see, rejects all "legal fictions" that are used to justify authority (e.g., transference from the people, social contract, general will, whatever it may be). He finds authority to be justified in nothing other than the common good's need of it and the common good's recognition of authority as effective for that end.

In the life in common with others, authority, it may be observed, is not only required to prevent against the stupidity, the incompetence, or the ill will and wrongful act of those within its boundaries (although the existence of stupid, incompetent, or morally bad actors may certainly justify its exercise). But even in the company of the intelligent, bright, and morally responsible authority is required as, for example, some scientific or religious community or fraternity. Even angels need authority, as do the devils. Authority is required to order a community, whether that community is composed of angels, devils, or a creature hovering somewhere in between as man seems to be. It follows that authority is something more than merely guarding against wrong, something more than just restriction or punishment. Authority is not only needed to guard against harm to common good, but it is required to enable any group of people to achieve its common purpose and common good. It has an affirmative role to play, not just a negative role. Indeed, the negative role is a reflection of its basic affirmative coordinating, instrumental role. Authority, moreover, may be positively required so that certain things can be decided upon and acted upon, e.g., the use of commonly held resources or the imposition and fair allocation of commonly-owed obligations, or the handling of disputes among its various members. The decisions that have to be made and the coordination that is required for a life in common requires authority, if for no other reason than that the only other possibility--unanimity of action--are, for any large group, impracticable and even impossible to attain.

John Fortescue (1394-1476)

Recognizing the need for authority, Finnis provides us a rather comprehensive definition of authority, focusing on its central case:

A person treats something . . . as authoritative if and only if he treats it as giving him sufficient reason for believing or acting in accordance with it notwithstanding that he himself cannot otherwise see good reason for believing or acting, or cannot evaluate the reasons he can see, or sees some countervailing reason(s), or would himself otherwise (i.e., in the absence of what it is that he is treating as authoritative) have preferred not so to believe or act.

NLNR, 233-34. Borrowing from the concepts of authority used by Joseph Raz, Finnis encapsulates this notion of authority by characterizing it as an "exclusionary reason," that is, a reason that substitutes for our own judgment or acting in the absence of, or in opposition to, our own reasons. This sort of thinking is redolent of the comment of Edward Coke, who defined law as "artificial reason." Authority, in this view, then is "artificial reasonable choice" that is recognized as somehow binding.

One immediately sees a problem with the definition. It is subjective and not objective. Cannot something be authoritative even though I do not recognize it to be so? If I be an atheist, can I really say that the Ten Commandments are not authoritative just because they are not in my perception authoritative? If I am a rapist, can I say that the criminal laws are not authoritative if I treat those laws that way? If I am a revolutionary, a rebel, acting against constituted authority based upon some Marxist ideology that makes be convinced in the illegitimacy of the regime to which I am opposed, does that mean that there is no authority? These propositions seem dubious and expose the weakness of Finnis's definition of what is authoritative. His definition fails to consider sufficiently any notion of objective authority, an authority that pends, remains, or binds even if the subject refuses to recognize it or obey it. There is an element of authority that remains unaddressed by his theory. This is not to say that his theory of authority is wrong, but perhaps it is not entirely complete.

Finnis then divides the definition of authority into three broad categories. These are based upon the perspective of the person who may say, "X is authoritative." The first, most full sense would be when the statement is made by one who recognizes that he is subject to that authority as, e.g., a citizen of the United States may say when he says that the "Constitution is authoritative." We might call this a statement of what the speaker subjectively holds to be valid authority. The second sense would be by one who does not himself consider himself bound by the authoritative statement, but reports that there are others who who are bound to see X as authoritative. So, e.g., a Russian professor may, in another sense from the first sense, tell his students that the U.S. Constitution is authoritative over the American citizen. He does not see himself bound by the authoritative statement, but reports that others are bound to the statement (that is, the Constitution) as authoritative.* He is reporting on what others see as valid authority. The third way of making that statement is more subtle. In this last sense, the speaker neither sees himself under the authority nor claims that others are under that authority, but states that there are some who from their perspective, whether they are making the claim of authority or subjecting themselves as authority, see the statement as authoritative. The difference between the second and third way is that in the second way the authoritativeness is endorsed as real or existing, whereas in the third way the perception of authoritativeness is neither endorsed nor rejected but simply reported as prescribed by someone or accepted by someone. The first two ways may be said to be "basic" or "primary" senses of reports of authority.

The distinction between authority as valid, authority as what others see as valid, and authority as what some, whether those in authority or those under that authority, claim to be valid is important to maintain against the positivist, who would focus only upon the first sense in devising his "concept" of what is law or what is authoritative. If a certain law is claimed to be authoritative in the first sense, but that law is against the common good, a positivist would claim that it makes no sense to talk about the proposition of law as being on the one hand authoritative (in the sense of it being valid) and yet on the other hand as not being authoritative (because it is against the common good). This is the same thing as saying that a law is valid and yet invalid, which would present a clear contradiction. But this is not what the advocate of natural law is doing. The advocate of a natural law jurisprudence when confronted with an unjust law would be criticizing something as authoritative in the second or the third sense and saying that though others may see the unjust law as valid or make the claim that it is valid, it in fact is not valid because it is against the common good. There is no contradiction when the sense of authoritative is used in the second or third senses. Something claimed as valid or viewed as valid may not in fact be valid if against the common good. The distinctions are obvious, and it is curious how the positivists miss the point.

Skipping over Finnis's laborious analysis of custom, we shall complete this review of Finnis's treatment of authority in his book Natural Law and Natural Rights by looking at his brief treatment of authority and its legitimacy. Finnis criticizes theories of authority that are based upon such legal fictions as transmission, contract, or custom (and, it goes without saying, divine right). He begins his analysis by observing that there is a practical need for authority, that the common good requires it, and that therefore it is a requirement of practical reasonableness:

The need for somebody, or some body, to settle coordination problems with greater speed and certainty [than custom] is apparent in any community where people are energetic and inventive in pursuit of their own or of common goods, not to mention any community threatened with military, economic, or ecological disaster.

NLNR, 245-46.

Authority and the responsibility for its application are thus based upon practical need, and their efficacy is an important aspect of its existence and justification. However, effectiveness "is not the last word on the requirements of practical reasonableness in locating authority." Nevertheless, effectiveness "is the first and most fundamental" part of authority and its exercise. An ineffective authority is no authority, and has lost its legitimacy. Efficiency or efficacy, it would appear, is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition.

The fact that that the statements (laws) of some body that is exercising authority are complied with and acted upon by a large number of people (i.e., that the statements are recognized as binding) is an important consideration in assessing their legitimacy and the moral obligation to obey. Clearly, when there is a large portion of the community of which one is part that recognizes certain pronouncements by someone or some body claiming authority as authoritative that fact is an important factor in practical reasonableness in establishing that authority's legitimacy. The moral issue of whether obedience is demanded and owed clearly comes into play when a large part of the community views obedience as owed. "These normative consequences derive from a normative principle--that authority is good (because required for the realization of the common good)." NLNR, 246. Again, however, this is not an absolute rule. The fact that obedience to some exercised authority is commonly accepted and therefore makes a claim to normativeness, does not make the "normative consequences" "indefeasible." There may be a presumption of legitimacy and moral normativity, but that presumption is rebuttable. For one, if the body that is exercising practical power that is recognized even by a large proportion of the common body is exercising it a manner that is against the common good--say a usurping tyrant who enriches himself and his family, or a Hitler who is using his power against the good of a certain segment of the community)--the fact that a large portion of the population accepts the authority does not translate to moral legitimacy. (One may call the fact that the authority is recognized or accepted by a large part of the population the empirical reality of authority.) The substance behind the exercise of authority (one may call this the moral reality of authority), and not the exercise of authority alone and its consent by others, is also factor in considering whether authority is legitimate or morally binding or not.

Finnis makes a distinction between "acquiescence" and "consent." In assessing the legitimacy of any authority, the fact that a large number "acquiesce" because of fear of sanction or other reason (such as personal gain, the leader's charisma, ideology) is substantially different from the fact that a large portion of the populations "consent" to the authority as good. External acquiescence versus internal consent is important to consider. A tyrant who has a cowering population acquiescing to his rule is different from a leader who has a willing population consenting to his rule.

What role does reference to prior authority have to that authority's legitimacy? Is authority like a land title or deed, whose claim may be assessed by investigation into the chain of title from grantor to grantee back to the conveyance to the sovereign? In other words, does the "legalistic" argument have any application to the issue of authority, or is it just a question of effective rule? If confronted with two claimants to the papacy, say and Urban VI and Clement VII, do I ask the question, "Which of the two men who claim to be pope is more effective?" Or do I ask the question, "Which of the two men who claim to be pope has the best claim to legitimacy under canon law?" How would I determine the pope from the antipope?

That question is more difficult than the issue of civil or secular authority because the papacy is of divine foundation, and is not one whose authority is obtained from the common consent of the Church members as secular authority is generally held to be. But, in any event, the example helps to formulate the question and see the issue involved, that being that efficiency is not the sole determination of legitimacy.

One possibility of legitimizing authority is to pin it upon prior authority, whether as a sort of inheritance from prior authority (e.g., a King's appointment of his heir or the dictator of his successor), or transference from the people through some sort of legal fiction, social contract, or custom. Finnis is critical of the received answers for determining properly constituted or legitimate authority. The standard answer is found, for example, in Cardinal Bellarmine's "transmission theory" as may be found in his Controversiarum de membris ecclesiae and which he translates as follows:

[Political] power is of divine right, but divine right did not give it to any particular man; therefore it gave it to the multitude. Apart from positive law, there is no greater reason why, out of many equals, one rather than another should dominate; therefore power belongs to the whole multitude.

Nam haec potestas est de jure divino. At jus divinum nulli homini particulari dedit hanc potestatem: ergo dedit multitudini. Praeterea sublato jure positivo, non est major ratio cur ex multis aequalibus unus portius, quam alius dominetur. Igitur potestas totius est multitudinis.

NLNR, 257 (quoting Bellarmine, Controversiarum de membris ecclesiae, III, c. 6 as translated by Yves Simon)

One may also find a similar idea in Francisco de Vitoria:

For divine and natural law require that there be some power to govern the commonwealth, and, in the absence of any positive or human law, there is no convincing reason that power should in one person versus another, and it is necessary that the power should reside in the community so that it may be able to govern itself.

Nam cum de iure naturali et divino sit aliqua potestas gubernadi rempublicam, et sublato communi iure positivo et humano, non sit maior ratio ut potestas illa sit in uno quam altero, necesse est ut ipsa communitas sit sibi sufficiens et habeat potestate gubernandi se.

NLNR, 257 (quoting De Potestate Civili, c. 7)**

Finnis rejects Bellarmine's transmission theory and finds it the result of a fallacy, specifically one arising from the notion that the community has authority over itself. If it has authority over itself it is because it is exercising unanimity, in which case it does not need a leader. If there is no unanimity (and it has no authority over itself, and so needs a leader), then it has no power to transfer to another. So when authority is needed the commonality has no authority to transfer, and when the commonality has unanimity and therefore plenary power, it has not need for authority. In Finnis's view, legal fictions such as social contract, custom, etc. are not required.

[T]he required state of facts is this: that in the circumstances the say-so of this person or body or configuration of persons probably will be, by and large, complied with and acted upon , to the exclusion of any rival say-so and notwithstanding any differing preference of individuals about what should be stipulation and done in the relevant fields of co-ordination problems.

NLNR, 249.

Finnis therefore adopts a functional view or test of authority, though he admits that perhaps people make take it as a "scandalously stark principle." That authority then passes laws, recognized by the population, for the transference or continuation of such authority. "[T]his tendency of political thinkers to utter legalistic fictions about the original location of authority has its excuse, and perhaps it occasion (but not a justification), in the urgent need to legalize the devolution of undevolved authority." NLNR, 250.

Finnis does enunciate two "riders" or caveats to his "scandalously stark principle" of authority. The first is that once the rules for devolution of power are fashioned, the population must--as a mandate of practical reasonableness--acquiesce (or withhold acquiescence) or comply (or withhold compliance) to the extent the person or body is (or is not) designated as the lawful holder of authority through the laws that handle the devolution of power. The second "rider" is that consent has a role: when a person or body's statements will be taken as authoritative "when a practical reasonable subject, with the common good in view, would think that he ought to consent to them." NLNR, 251.

These, Finnis observes, are riders, not fundamental principles. The fact is that most governments did not obtain the consent of the governed until after they first usurped the prior government, and obtained practical acquiescence.† Finnis quotes the jurist Sir John Fortescue, who stated that "amongst nearly all peoples, realms have come into being by usurpation, just as the Romans usurped the government of the whole world."†† And so whether it is the "law of nature" such as Sir John Fortescue would have it, or the "principles of practicable reasonableness that call for co-operative life in the wide 'political' community, and for the authority that alone makes that life practicable," as Finnis would have it, the fact that we live under a functioning government is reason alone to give it--subject to the riders mentioned by Finnis--legitimacy. The fictions of transference from the people, social contract, etc. are simply not needed. A functional or pragmatic sanction is good enough; a sanction through sufferance is sufficient. Whether the authority was originally acquired through adverse possession or through legitimate title is immaterial: if it's working at the present, the common good and principles of practical reasonableness require that we respect it as legitimate and worthy of support and obedience.

Once the legitimacy and foundations of authority are established, Finnis turns to law. And that is where our attention shall now turn.
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*A professor in the U.S. could also say to his law students that the "U.S. Constitution" is authoritative over the citizens of the United States," in the sense of the Russian professor if he abstracts himself or brackets himself from his position as citizen.
**The translation is mine. Curiously, the Cambridge translation of Vitoria's work On Civil Power translates "iure positivo et humano" as "human elective franchise (suffragium)," but unless there is a variance in the underlying texts, the Latin quoted by Finnis has nothing to say about elective franchise or suffragium.
***Belarmine's works in Latin are available at Sydney Penner's web page: see Bellarmine's Works.
†This is true even of the U. S. Constitution which most scholars recognized went far beyond the original mandate given to the Constitutional Convention to amend the Articles of Confederation and not to draft an entirely new Constitution, and so, in some ways, could be argued as a product of an illegal convention. But in light of the overwhelming consent to its legitimacy, it would be foolish at best to suggest that it was not, in fact, binding on the conscience of any American. And that does not even consider the fact that it was the result of a rebellion against legitimate authority, perhaps one (that at least in the loyalists' eyes, and certainly in the eyes of King George and his advisors) illegitimate and treasonous.
††John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, c. 12: Sic et Romani orbis imperium usurparunt, qualiter fere in omnibus gentibus regna inchoata sunt.

Magisterial Invocation of Natural Law: Leo XIII and Diuturnum Illud, Part 3

COMPLETING OUR REVIEW of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Diuturnum illud in this posting, we turn to Leo XIII's solutions. The rise of false theories of the State and revolutionary movements spawned by such false theories provide the State with serious threat, threats it has a certain extent the right to counter. But power alone will not remedy the problem giving rise to or stemming forth from such erroneous theories of the State. "[N]o power of punishment can be so great that it alone can preserve the State." DI, 24. Fear of punishment is simply too weak a reed upon which to build a civil society and upon which to found a governing organ. To base order on fear of punishment, in fact, tends to brew discontent and incite rebellion. "It is therefore necessary," says St. Leo:

to seek a higher and more reliable reason for obedience, and to say explicitly that legal severity cannot be efficacious unless men are led on by duty, and moved by the salutary fear of God.

obediendi altiorem et efficaciorem causam adhibere necesse est, atque omnino statuere, nec legum esse posse fructuosam severitatem, nisi homines impellantur officio, salutarique metu Dei permoveantur.

DI, 24. The desire for obedience must be internalized, and the only way to do this is through an understanding of the religious foundation of the State, as this "enters into the souls and bends the very wills of men causing then not only to render [external] obedience to their rulers, but also show their affection and good will." DI, 24. It would do good, therefore, for the State to "defend religion, and to consult the interest of their Lord to defend religion, and to consult the interest of their States by giving that liberty to the Church which cannot be taken away without injury and ruing to the commonwealth." DI, 25.

Portrait of Leo XIII

The State ought not see the Church as a competitor for civil power, for the "things that are of a civil nature," are "under the power and authority of the the ruler," and those areas which belong "both to the sacred and to the civil power," such as marriage and its civil emoluments, should be exercised in harmonious manner. "Never opposed to honest liberty, the Church has always detested a tyrant's rule," atque honestae libertati nuspiam inimica tyrannicum dominatum semper detestari consuevit. DI, 26.

Leo XIII then ends his encyclical Diuturnum illus with a short litany of duties that a properly-ordered State would have:

1. Strive with all possible care to make men understand and show forth in their lives what the Catholic Church teaches on government and the duty of obedience;
2. Let the people be frequently urged by the State's authority and teaching to fly from the forbidden sects, abhor all conspiracy, have nothing to do with sedition, and understand that they who for God's sake obey their rulers render a reasonable service and a generous obedience.

God is the source of authority and power, and supplies both the reasons for and limits on the exercise of its power by the State, and the reasons for and limits to obedience by the people. This belief thus ennobles, without divinizing, the authority of the State, and gives reason other than fear of punishment for obeying the State.

And as it is God "who gives safety to kings," [Ps. 152:11] and grants to the people "to rest in the beauty of peace and in the tabernacles of confidence and in wealthy repose," [Isa. 37:18] it is to Him that we must pray, beseeching Him to incline all minds to uprightness and truth, to calm angry passions, to restore the long-wished-for tranquility to the world.

Quoniam vero Deus est, qui dat salutem regibus, et concedit populis conquiescere in pulchritudine pacis et in tabernaculis fiduciae et in requie opulenta. Ipsum necesse est orare atque obsecrare, ut omnium mentes ad honestatem veritatemque flectat, iras compescat, optatam diu pacem tranquillitatemque orbi terrarum restituat.

DI, 27.

Our states have gone a different way than what Leo XIII prayed for, have turned him a deaf ear, and the secular rulers and secular state have turned less and less to religion and more and more to process and to the thin veneer of "human rights," which, without God, also have little foundation. In the West, the theory of the modern State is built on sand, on the sands of social contractism, on the sands of moral relativism, on the sands of the will of man as if the will of the majority, which is so easily manipulated, is the cure for all ills. It is a recipe for either revolution or tyranny, not for peace or tranquillitas ordinis.

Our prayer may now be:

Usquequo Deus inproperabit inimicus inritat adversarius nomen tuum in finem?

How long, O God, shall the enemy reproach: is the adversary to provoke thy name for ever?

(Ps. 73:10)

Magisterial Invocation of Natural Law: Leo XIII and Diuturnum Illud, Part 2

CONTINUING ON OUR REVIEW of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Diuturnum illud which addresses the origin of government, and rejects social contractism, we ended our last blog posting with the notion that civil power is given to the ruler by God for the public good and for the purpose of promoting the common good of those assigned to his care. The ruler has not right to use the power he has been given by God for private gain. Government is thus a res publica, a public thing. In fact, its abuse by the ruler will expose him, as it does all men, to the judgment of God: "they are warned in the oracles of the sacred Scriptures, that they will have themselves some day to render an account to the King of kings and Lord of lords; if they shall fail in their duty, that it will not be possible for them in any way to escape the severity of God." DI, 16.

Portrait of Leo XIII

The other side of the coin of the concept that power and authority come from God is that the people have a duty to obedience to the State. The citizen is not to be seen as some sort of pawn or slave of the state, but one who submits himself to the divine will, thus fully retaining his dignity "even in obedience" and submission to their rulers because the rulers in a certain way "bring before them the image of God, "who to serve is to reign," cui servire regnare est.

This principle remains true even if "the Christian form of civil government may not dwell in the minds of men." DI, 18. Historically, the Church taught the faithful that they were obliged to give due obedience even to the Pagan emperors, as St. Paul states it "to be subject to princes and to powers, to obey at a word." DI, 18 (quoting Titus 3:1). Indeed, more than obedience was the practice, as Christians were enjoined to pray for "kings and all that are in a high station." DI, 18 (quoting 1 Tim. 2:1-3). And the early Christian obedience to the Roman authority was exemplary, and it provided a singular argument that laws against them were unjust. Thus the Christian lawyer Tertullian could argue:

The Christian is the enemy of no one, much less of the emperor, whom he knows to be appointed by God, and whom he must, therefore, of necessity love, reverence and honor, and wish to be preserved together with the whole Roman Empire.

Christianus nullius est hostis, nedum imperatoris, quem sciens a Deo suo constitui, necesse est ut et ipsum diligat et reuereatur et honoret et saluum uelit, cum toto Romano imperio, quousque saeculum stabit: tamdiu enim stabit.*

Yet though history shows that the obedience and docility of the Christians was exemplary, to the point that they could be a foundation for a plea for toleration, it is equally true that the obedience only went so far. The duty to obey properly constituted authority, even if secular or pagan, only goes as far as that authority--which comes from God--is used in accordance with the law of God. That is to say, no State has the authority to order any man to do something that contradicts the natural moral law or that contradicts divine positive law. DI, 20.

When Christians became head of States, there was cooperation between the Church and State, and the ends of both overlapped, both recognizing the Divine source of any power and authority, and hence the limits to it. "And, indeed, tranquility and a sufficient prosperity lasted so long as there was friendly agreement between these two powers." DI, 22. But the writings of recent political philosophers have injected into the mix a poison. That poison arises from "an unwillingness to attribute the right of ruling to God, as its Author," ius imperandi nolle ad Deum referre auctorem. Instead of finding the source of authority and power from God, they place it at the feet of the people, a doctrine which assures abuse and rebellions and dissatisfaction:

And they who say that this power depends on the will of the people err in opinion first of all; then they place authority on too weak and unstable a foundation. For the popular passions, incited and goaded on by these opinions, will break out more insolently; and, with great harm to the common weal, descend headlong by an easy and smooth road to revolts and to open sedition.

Quod autem inquiunt ex arbitrio illam pendere multitudinis, primum opinione falluntur; deinde nimium levi ac flexibili fundamento statuunt principatum. His enim opinionibus quasi stimulis incitatae populares cupiditates sese efferent insolentius, magnaque cum pernicie reipublicae ad caecos motus, ad apertas seditiones proclivi cursu et facile delabentur.

DI, 23.

Leo XIII places the fount and origin of these erroneous notions of authority at the feet of the "so-called Reformation." The attack by the Protestant Reformers on the foundations of religious and civil authority, particularly Luther, invited the Peasant Rebellion which required repression by the German princes. So also did it invite "an outburst of civil war and with such slaughter that there was scarcely any place free from tumult and bloodshed," DI, 23, which appears to be a reference to the Wars of Religion. It was from the Protestant heresy that there arose a philosophy that sought to justify civil authority, and which postulated its origin in the people, taking it away from God:

From this [Protestant] heresy there arose in the last century a false philosophy--a new right as it is called, and a popular authority, together with an unbridled license which many regard as the only true liberty.

Ex illa haeresi ortum duxit sœculo superiore falsi nominis philosophia, et jus quod appellant novam, et imperium populare, et modum nesciens licentia, quam plurimi solam libertatem putant.

DI, 23.

Placing authority at the feet of the people is not only wrong, but it leads to social and political horrors. And like a bad apple or an insidious lentivirus, this philosophy has led to a virtual wax house of political philosophies, where all philosophies are false, made of wax by human hands, and not are real, based upon nature and nature's God:

Hence we have reached the limit of horrors, to wit, communism, socialism, nihilism, hideous deformities of the civil society of men and almost its ruin. And yet too many attempt to enlarge the scope of these evils, and under the pretext of helping the multitude, already have fanned no small flames of misery.

Ex his ad finitimas pestes ventum est, scilicet ad communismum, ad socialismum, ad nihilismum, civilis hominum societatis teterrima portenta ac pene funera. Atqui tamen tantorum malorum vim nimis multi dilatare conantur, ac per speciem iuvandae multitudinis non exigua jam miseriarum incendia excitaverunt.

DI, 23.

(continued)
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*In the Encyclical, the cite is to Tertullian's Apologeticus, 35 (PL 1, 451), but I could not find this quotation in Tertullian's Apologeticus under this reference. Indeed, it is an apparent error, as the cite is to Tertullian's Ad Scapula, II.6.

Magisterial Invocation of Natural Law: Leo XIII and Diuturnum Illud, Part 1

THE RICHNESS OF THE NATURAL LAW shown forth in the thought of Pope Leo XIII, who "even more than Pius IX, based his teaching on the laws given by nature, meaning the Creator of nature." Fuchs, 5. Leo XIII's pontificate was a rich one indeed, and many things could be said of it. But with reference to the natural law, one has to focus on Leo XIII's contribution to Catholic social thought, in particular his groundbreaking encyclical on social questions, Rerum novarum, which fittingly means "On New Things." The world that Leo XIII confronted was saying new things, preaching new doctrines and new gods, based upon principles that were new, not perhaps in the sense that they were never known, for there is nothing new under the sun, and much of what was going under new thought was but paganism with a new sheen, but new in the sense that answers were being sought for new social and moral problems without reference to God or to the natural law. The number of Leonine encyclicals that address the applicability of the natural law and its principles to questions of government, slavery (In plurimis [On the Abolition of Slavery]) liberty and freedom (Libertas praestantissimum donum [On Liberty]), Christian democracy (Graves de Communi Re [On Christian Democracy], socialism (Quod Apostolici Muneris [On Socialism]), the relationship of Christianity to the State (Immortale Dei [On the Christian Constitution of the State], Sapientiae Christianae [On Christians as Citizens]), social justice [Rerum Novarum [On Capital and Labor]), marriage (Arcanum divinae sapientia [On Christian Marriage]), and so forth is remarkable.

Leo XIII, who was deeply influenced by the doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas, and in fact promoted their importance in the life of the Church through his encyclical on St. Thomas Aeterni Patris,* applied these traditional Thomistic methods, including those relating to the natural law doctrine, to these new questions and arrived at remarkable refreshing answers to the social questions of the day. Alas, freemasons, socialists, communists, liberals, secularists, even "Americanists,"** all turned a deaf ear, and the world, or at least the West, continued to unravel.

Portrait of Pope Leo XIII

Confronting the extreme positions of political nihilists and anarchists, which were ultimately founded upon the false philosophical and political principles of Protestantism, the "so-called Reformation," and the Enlightenment, and spurred by the murder of the Russian emperor Alexander II (1818-1881) by the political group called Narodnaya Volya (Народная воля, the "People's Will"), a political terrorist organization, Leo XIII addressed the issue of civil power, its source, and the role of the civil power relative to the people and the common good in an encyclical entitled Diuturnum illud (On the Origin of Civil Power). The encyclical Diuturnum illud combines both the insights of Christian revelation as well as principles of natural law philosophy to arrive at the ultimate notion that all power comes from God. It rejects the notion that power is derived from the people and assigned, through some sort of social contract, to the ruler. In rejecting the political philosophy based upon social contract notions, it, however, does not reject the democratic process and the people's role in choosing a ruler if it accords with the customs, social, and political institutions of a people. Regardless of the procedural vehicles that relate to the selection of one's leader or leaders, however, the fundamental teaching of the natural law (as well as Revelation) is that all power--this includes priestly power, paternal power, and civil power--comes from God and is given to men for the purpose, not of private gain, but of promoting the public good. There is no power in the individual that he can convey to the ruler, for no man has the authority over any other man by virtue of their fundamental equality in nature.

The heart of the Encyclical would seem to be the principle, attested to both by Scripture and the natural law, that civil authority, though required as a result of man's natural disposition to live in common and so to that degree is natural, does not arise out from the people to be conveyed to the ruler. Rather, the only explanation for political power and the possible source of it is that it comes from God. If this principle is not fastly held, then there is no limit to what the civil authority can do in the name of the people, and there is, ultimately, no basis for power except raw power.

11. And, indeed, nature, or rather God who is the Author of nature, wills that man should live in a civil society; and this is clearly shown both by the faculty of language, the greatest medium of intercourse, and by numerous innate desires of the mind, and the many necessary things, and things of great importance, which men isolated cannot procure, but which they can procure when joined and associated with others. But now, a society can neither exist nor be conceived in which there is no one to govern the wills of individuals, in such a way as to make, as it were, one will out of many, and to impel them rightly and orderly to the common good; therefore, God has willed that in a civil society there should be some to rule the multitude. And this also is a powerful argument, that those by whose authority the State is administered must be able so to compel the citizens to obedience that it is clearly a sin in the latter not to obey. But no man has in himself or of himself the power of constraining the free will of others by fetters of authority of this kind. This power resides solely in God, the Creator and Legislator of all things; and it is necessary that those who exercise it should do it as having received it from God. "There is one lawgiver and judge, who is able to destroy and deliver." [James 4:12] And this is clearly seen in every kind of power. That that which resides in priests comes from God is so acknowledged that among all nations they are recognized as, and called, the ministers of God. In like manner, the authority of fathers of families preserves a certain impressed image and form of the authority which is in God, "of whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named." [Eph. 3:15] But in this way different kinds of authority have between them wonderful resemblances, since, whatever there is of government and authority, its origin is derived from one and the same Creator and Lord of the world, who is God.

Et sane homines in civili societate vivere natura jubet, seu verius auctor naturae Deus: quod perspicue demonstrant et maxima societatis conciliatrix loquendi facultas et innatae appetitiones animi perplures, et res nëcessariae multae ac magni momenti, quas solitarii assequi homines non possunt, juncti et consociati cum alteris assequuntur. Nunc vero, neque existere neque intelligi societas potest, in qua non aliquis temperet singulorum voluntates ut velut unum fiat ex pluribus, easque ad commune bonum recte atque ordine impellat: voluit igitur Deus ut in civili societate essent qui multitudini imperarent. — Atque illud etiam magnopere valet, quod ii, quorum auctoritate respublica administratur, debent cives ita posse cogere ad parendum, ut his plane peccatum sit non parere. Nemo autem hominum habet in se aul ex se, unde possit huiusmodi imperii vinculis liberam ceterorum voluntatem constringere. Unice rerum omnium procreatori et legislatori Deo ea potestas est: quam qui exercent, tanquam a Deo secum communicatam exerceant necesse est. Unus est legislator et judex, qui potest perdere et liberare. Quod perspicitur idem in omni genere potestatis. Eam, quae in sacerdotibus est proficisci a Deo tam est cognitum ut ii apud omnes populos ministri et habeantur et appellentur Dei. Similiter potestas patrumfamilias expressam retinet quamdam effigiem ac formam auctoritatis, quae est in Deo, ex quo omnis paternitas in cœlis et in terra nominatur. Isto autem modo diversa genera potestatis miras inter se habent similitudines, cum quidquid uspiam est imperii et auctoritatis, eius ab uno eodemque mundi opifice et domino, qui Deus est, origo ducatur.

The encyclical finds the first seeds of false doctrine in the ideas of the Protestant reformers which were amplified and carried through by the philosophes of the Enlightenment. It was from first the rift and misunderstanding of civil power and the power of the sword, and then the full rejection of the notion that civil power comes from God, that required some alternative theory of justification. Most common was the notion of social contractism, the Hobbesian/Rousseauian notion that power is conveyed to the ruler by the people, and finds its fount and origin, and therefore its limits, if any there be, in the people. God is thus removed from question of power, all power is secular, material, and ultimately without any limiting principle, and certainly no spiritual limiting principle.

12. Those who believe civil society to have risen from the free consent of men, looking for the origin of its authority from the same source, say that each individual has given up something of his right [an allusion to, among others Rousseau], and that voluntarily every person has put himself into the power of the one man in whose person the whole of those rights has been centered. But it is a great error not to see, what is manifest, that men, as they are not a nomad race, have been created, without their own free will, for a natural community of life. It is plain, moreover, that the pact which they allege is openly a falsehood and a fiction, and that it has no authority to confer on political power such great force, dignity, and firmness as the safety of the State and the common good of the citizens require. Then only will the government have all those ornaments and guarantees, when it is understood to emanate from God as its august and most sacred source.

Qui civilem societatem a libero hominum consensu natam volunt, ipsius imperii ortum ex eodem fonte petentes, de jure suo inquiunt aliquid unumquemque cessisse, et voluntate singulos in ejus se contulisse potestatem, ad quem summa illorum iurium pervenisset. Sed magnus est error non videre, id quod manifestum est, homines, cum non sint solivagum genus, citra liberam ipsorum voluntatem ad naturalem communitatem esse natos: ac praeterea pactum, quod praedicant, est aperte commentitium et fictum, neque ad impertiendum valet politicae potestati tantum virium, dignitatis, firmitudinis, quantum tutela reipublicae et communes civium utilitates requirunt. Ea autem decora et praesidia universa tunc solum est habiturus principatus, si a Deo augusto sanctissimoque fonte manare intelligatur.

The notion that rulers derive their power from God means that citizens have a duty to respect it and obey it. But with that dignity comes limitation. Since the power of the ruler comes from God, and his not his own, it comes with limits which may not be exceeded.

15. The one only reason which men have for not obeying is when anything is demanded of them which is openly repugnant to the natural or the divine law, for it is equally unlawful to command to do anything in which the law of nature or the will of God is violated. If, therefore, it should happen to any one to be compelled to prefer one or the other, viz., to disregard either the commands of God or those of rulers, he must obey Jesus Christ, who commands us to "give to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's," [Matt. 22:21] and must reply courageously after the example of the Apostles: "We ought to obey God rather than men." [Acts 5:29] And yet there is no reason why those who so behave themselves should be accused of refusing obedience; for, if the will of rulers is opposed to the will and the laws of God, they themselves exceed the bounds of their own power and pervert justice; nor can their authority then be valid, which, when there is no justice, is null.

Una illa hominibus causa est non parendi, si quid ab iis postuletur quod cum naturali aut divino jure aperte repugnet: omnia enim, in quibus naturae lex vel Dei voluntas violatur, aeque nefas est imperare et facere. Si cui igitur usu veniat, ut alterutrum malle cogatur, scilicet aut Dei aut principum iussa negligere, Iesu Christo parendum est reddere jubenti quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, quae sunt Dei Deo, atque ad exemplum Apostolorum animose respondendum: Obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus . Neque tamen est, cur abiecisse obedientiam, qui ita se gerant, arguantur; etenim si principum voluntas cum Dei pugnat voluntate et legibus, ipsi potestatis suœ modum excdunt iustitiamque pervertunt: neque eorum tune valere potest auctoritas, quae, ubi iustitia non est, nulla est.

The power of the ruler is not only limited by the natural law, it is also limited by the fact that it is ordered to the common good, and, by its nature, it is not ordered to any private good. It is a res publica, a public thing, and not a res privata, a private thing. Accordingly, any capture of that power by private interests is by definition an abuse of that power:

16. But in order that justice may be retained in government it is of the highest importance that those who rule States should understand that political power was not created for the advantage of any private individual; and that the administration of the State must be carried on to the profit of those who have been committed to their care, not to the profit of those to whom it has been committed.

Ut autem justitia retineatur in imperio, illud magnopere interest, eos qui civitates administrant intelligere, non privati cujusquam commodo politicam potestatem esse natam: procurationemque reipublicae ad utilitatem eorum qui commissi sunt non ad eorum commissa est, geri oportere.

(continued)

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*Leo XIII and his Aeterni Patris has been the subject of a prior post in Lex Christianorum. See The Disfigured Face: Pope Leo XIII to the Rescue.
**Americanism is a heresy that advocates, among other things, an extreme separation of Church and State, excessive notions of liberty and individualism, and particularism for the Church in America. Leo XIII addressed these issues in a letter in 1899 entitled Testem Benevolentiae.