How Liberalism Cuts Out the Natural Law: John Rawls's Sleight of Hand, Part 3

JOHN RAWLS USES THE ISSUE OF ABORTION to illustrate how his "political liberalism" based upon "public reason" is supposed to lead to "strictly political conception of justice." It is perhaps fortunate that Rawls chose this issue, which is darling among the liberals, as it shows that the Rawlsian "justice as fairness" is hardly fair. Rather, the formula touted as neutral is in fact calculated always to hush the natural law in favor of comprehensive liberalism. There is something rotten in a conception of justice that allows for the killing of one group of human beings for the benefit of another, which prevents the state from interfering to protect a group of human beings, and which, moreover, has the audacity to suggest that this result is morally compelled.

The Unapologetic Advocate of Political Liberalism: John Rawls

Rawls's suggestion that "any reasonable balancing" of "political" values of the respect for human life, the "ordered reproduction of political society over time," and women's equality would necessarily result in giving "a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester," and maybe even beyond that boundary. (George, 93 (citing PL, 243). In this area, to suggest (as the natural moral law, science, inherited cultural traditions would suggest, and the law, at least until 1973, itself suggested) that reason would require there to be a law that must protect human life from the moment of conception, and so exclude any law that would leave that life unprotected and subject to private assault with impunity, is, in the Rawlsian construct, to import a "comprehensive doctrine" into the debate. And this, Rawls would insist, defies the fundamental ground rules of political realism, and violates political justice. George, 93.

It is all very convenient for the liberal. Rawls need not even listen, much less answer, the dissenting voices, the voices that cry out that a fundamental injustice is being carried out upon the unborn. They are voices crying in the political wilderness, a desert caused by Rawls's refusal to allow the waters of "comprehensive doctrines" to rain upon the political landscape. These voices are therefore the voces clamantes in deserto Rawlsianorum. (Rawls does not only want to not listen to these natural-law voices of the victims' advocates, he apparently is deaf to the voices of his slaughtered brothers and sisters, whose voices cry out to heaven for vengeance, and this only after the liberals have failed to hear their voices pleading for justice, and when justice was denied them, for mercy. All they wanted was a chance to live, a chance denied them by the bloodthirsty liberal Huitzilpochtli of whom Rawls is such a devotee.)

St. John the Baptist: Vox clamantis in deserto

The Rawlsian formula is a very convenient cover for the liberal partisans of abortion "rights." They need not even answer the reasonable arguments of their political opponents. In other words, the Rawlsian "political liberalism" construct allows the liberal to insist that the political process, and hence laws passed during the course of that political debate, be unreasonable. And, of course, an unreasonable law is a bad law, in fact, if Sts. Augustine and Thomas are to be followed, no law at all, and certainly no law worthy of the name, ranking as it does with immorality. And a political process that is calculated to promulgate bad laws is a bad political process. As Robert P. George summarizes it:

Rawls offers no argument as to why the developing human being should or even may be excluded from the laws' protection on the basis of age, size, stage of development, or condition of dependency. He does not offer reasons to rebut those "secular" (i.e., scientific and philosophical) arguments and fully "public" reasons offered in defense of the rights to the unborn prof-life citizens--Catholic and non-Catholic alike.

Rawls even admits that what is involved in this issue is his opinion and not reasonable argument. George, 93 (citing PL, lv). Rawls believes, nevertheless, that the person who believes, based upon sound reason, that a law that fails to protect the life over a substantial portion of human beings is execrable is compelled to support that law. True, Rawls magnanimously allows that such a person need not personally participate in an abortion, and need not avail himself of that right. Rawls also allows for free speech, even political speech on the issue. But the thought may never be put into law. Rawls insists that that person recognize the law that allows abortion as not only legitimate but just and demanding obedience. So the Rawlsian construct is clearly anti-Theaetetian: he stresses political opinion (doxa) over political knowledge (episteme). Both Plato and St. John the Baptist are given cold shoulder by Rawls. Instead of spirit and right reason governing law, we have the naked and arbitrary will of Rawls and those that think alike him: Rawls advocates the tyrannous enforcement of liberal dogma.

Plato in Athens

That is why . . . there is something scandalous in the self-styled "liberals" and "democrats" . . . to remove such issues from public debate by arbitrarily restricting the presentation or saliency of reasons and arguments on one side of debates over the nature, dignity, and destiny of the human person quite irrespective of their soundness, reasonableness, or truth. There is nothing "liberal," "democratic," "reasonable," "moral," or "ethical" about doing that.

George, 95. Indeed. It is manifest that the Rawlsian theory is rotten and anti-natural law and anti-natural rights at the core. We ought not be lulled by the Rawlsian calls to "political liberalism" (one recalls Barack Obama's great Rawlsian speech at Notre Dame), as ultimately these calls are neither calls to a reasoned public discourse nor calls for a non-partisan formula for fair political debate in a pluralistic society. Rather, the Rawlsian theory is a fancy theoretical muzzle designed to harness the minds and thoughts of its opponents. It is, in fine, a political filter designed and shamelessly proposed by Rawls. It is a political filter calculated to keep the natural law out of the political debate, to squelch its influence, and therefore shut it out from the process of fashioning of positive law. More ominously, it allows the silencing of the voices of liberalism's human victims. It virtually assures the continuing sacrifices to the liberal god Moloch or whatever else the liberal god's name may be. This liberal god is as bloodthirsty a god as ever there was, as ravenous a god as the Aztec's Huitzilopochtli. Rawls was one of this bloody god's servitors and great high priests. And when John Rawls died and faced the true God that he denied, he had stain of his brothers' blood on his hands, the smell of it on his breath, and the justifying thoughts of the crime in his head. May the Lord God have mercy on his soul, a mercy Rawls, in his liberal Havardian hubris, never gave to the diminutive victims of his comprehensive and political liberalism whose voices now accuse him.

The Bloodthirsty Aztec god Huitzilopochtli,
Demonic predecessor of Rawls's god of Liberalism

Note: In this series of blog entries relating to the Rawlsian critique, I have relied heavily on Robert P. George, "Restricting Reasons, Attenuating Discourse," in Human Nature in its Wholeness: A Roman Catholic Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2006), 80-94, cited here as "George."

How Liberalism Cuts Out the Natural Law: John Rawls's Sleight of Hand, Part 2

THE INVIDIOUS NATURE OF THE RAWLSIAN FORMULA stems from its demands that all comprehensive doctrines (and this would include the natural law, and a fortiori Catholicism) excuse themselves from the public square, at least if they want to try to bring in their comprehensive doctrine. It demands this irrespective of the question of the truth or even the reasonableness of those comprehensive doctrines. Confronted with "the fact of reasonable pluralism," Socrates, Cicero, and Jesus would be persona non grata in the chambers of Congress and the benches of the Courts. Only Pontius Pilates--men of the quid est veritas? "What is truth?" variety--are invited to the political party. This reciprocal abandonment of principle by all those who hold comprehensive doctrines, even if those are predicated upon reason, is the price that must be paid for a working egalitarian democracy in the face of pluralism. So Rawls says.

Quid est veritas? by Nikolai Nikolajewitsch Ge

In the Rawlsian construct, the strictness by which the "criterion of reciprocity" and the "liberal principle of legitimacy" are interpreted are inversely proportional to the breadth of "public reason" that is allowed in the public forum. The stricter the former are construed, the wider the latter. The broader the former are construed, the more limited the latter. It is sort of like a filter, if the holes are too large, not enough dirt is removed. The problem (at least for Rawls) is that Rawls is compelled to interpret the "criterion of reciprocity" and the "liberal principle of legitimacy" broadly so as to keep out comprehensive doctrines such as the natural law from invading his legislative chambers. Rawls's doctrine requires a very fine filter.

As Robert George notes in addressing this problem, the Rawlsian formula, specifically its "criterion of reciprocity" and its "liberal principle of legitimacy," can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. If interpreted narrowly, then a comprehensive doctrine can be brought into the public fora so long as that doctrine can be expressed, or at least thought to be expressed, using reason. "The scope of 'public reason' under this narrow interpretation of reciprocity and legitimacy would be wide." George, 86. Thus, those who claim a special revelation or secret gnosis may have to check those and their overcoats with the clerk at the door. But outside of such fideistic doctrines, such comprehensive doctrines that are predicated upon reason or at least articulable in terms of reason (and the natural law is one of those par excellence) would not be prohibited from bringing in their view of human nature, dignity, and destiny as a basis for law. "It seems clear, however, that Rawls himself cannot accept the narrow interpretation of reciprocity and the correspondingly very wide conception of public reason." George, 87.

Rawls champions a broad interpretation of his "criterion of reciprocity" and its "liberal principle of legitimacy" and it therefore follows that he advocates a restrictive notion of what constitutes "public reason." He must champion such a broad interpretation of reciprocity and legitimacy because if he doesn't, then he cannot keep out those nonliberal comprehensive doctrines (such as the natural law) out of the public forum, and this is something Rawls (the inveterate, non-believing liberal that he is) seeks to do. Rawls does not want to deal with "rationalist believers who contend that [their] beliefs are open to and can be fully established by reason." PL, 152-53. For him, these are flies in the ointment of his political liberalism.

Notable among such [comprehensive] doctrines is the broad tradition of natural law thinking about morality, justice, and human rights. This tradition poses an especially interesting problem for Rawls's theory of public reason because of its integration into Catholic teaching. So it is, at once, a nonliberal comprehensive philosophical doctrine and part of a larger religious tradition that, in effect, proposes its own principle of public reason, namely, that questions of law and policy (including what Rawls has in mind when he refers to "constitutional essential and matters of basis justice") ought to be decided in accordance with natural law, natural right, natural rights, and/or natural justice . . . .

George, 87. And so Rawls and his fellow liberal Rawlsians find themselves in a quandary. They do not welcome the advocates of natural law. They do not want want these folks in the legislative chambers to spoil things by advancing public reasons against homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, fetal experimentation, or whatever else the liberals may be up to in advancing their secularist agendas. Just like they don't want those bitter people who cling to guns and religion to make laws or participate in the public discussions, they do not want folks to start claiming moral absolutes, even if they can articulate a reasonable basis for those absolutes. They do not want to go home after a long day's work in the House or Senate with their consciences chafing. Such illiberals and moral absolutists are not welcome since they frustrate the liberal legislative agenda, and upset the liberal apple cart of political sins. But the principles of Political Liberalism, at least if fairly applied, do not allow Rawls and Rawlsians to exclude them. Hence their quandary.

So here is the Rawlsian dilemma when confronting an advocate of the natural law. On the one hand, Rawls not want "rationalists believers who contend that [their] beliefs are open to and can be fully established by reason." On the other hand, Rawls's "methodological and moral commitments require him to avoid denying the soundness, reasonableness, or truth of the reasonable, if controversial, moral, metaphysical, and religious claims that his "political" conception of justice would exclude from political discourse and as grounds for political action." George, 88. The only way that Rawls could do so would be to modify his "political liberalism" into the "comprehensive liberalism," something which he specifically tried to avoid in correcting the apparent errors in his Theory of Justice by publishing his Political Liberalism.

Jesus Heals the Gadarene Demoniac

So what does Rawls do? Rawls seeks to avoid his quandary by waving away the flies that irritate his conception of political liberalism. He does so by accusing them of denying "the fact of reasonable pluralism." George, 88. He does so by the simple denial, in Harvardian lilt, that such claims "can be publicly and fully established by reason." PL, 153; George, 88. Those who advocate the natural law, then, are living in a dream world, and, until they come down to reality and face the fact that all is relative and all is plural, and what they are pushing for is not reasonable, they ought to be excluded from political discourse. "Face the fact," Rawls one may imagine insisting to the rationalist believer in words echoing those heard in the country of the Gadarenes, "our name is Legion for we are many." Rawls then dons the agnostic toga of Pilatus and scoffs at the suggestion that the natural law is truth based upon reason. Truth? What is truth? Quid est veritas? So to avoid the quandary, Rawls willingly becomes a possessed procurator and thus, like the liberal Roman pawn of Caesar, is blinded to the truth coram illo. He has refused to listen to St. Procula, and, like all liberals who refuse the role of natural law, has made a massive mistake in judgment.

The Philosopher John Rawls

Rawls's theory thus suffers from an intrinsic bias against "rationalist believers." As is frequently the case, the liberal is liberal only to fellow liberals, and illiberal to everyone else. A Rawlsian simply cannot evade the question of truth:

It will not do for Rawls to claim that he is not denying the truth of "rationalist believers'" claims but merely their assertion that these claims can be publicly and fully established by reason. What makes a "rationalist believer" a "rationalist" is precisely his belief that his principles can be justified by rational argument and his willingness to provide just such rational argumentation. The argument he offers by way of justifying his principles and their applications to specific political issues will be either sound or unsound. If they are sound, then Rawls can give no reason for excluding the principles they vindicate on the grounds that they are illegitimate reasons for political action; if they are unsound, then they ought to be rejected precisely on that basis, and not because the principles in support of which they are offered are, in Rawls's sense, "nonpublic."

George, 89. Not only is the Rawlsian formula biased and evasive, it is founded upon a lapse in logic. Rawls insists that someone behind the "veil of ignorance" in the "original position" will not select any "comprehensive doctrine" as the basis for any political order because that person would not know whether he would accept that "comprehensive doctrine" in the fictive future. Views of justice based upon such "comprehensive doctrine" Rawls denominates as "perfectionist" principles of justice. Rawls therefore rejects any "perfectionist" principles of justice, and argues that the only "substantive principles of justice" are the "liberal principle of legitimacy" and the ideal of "public reason." George, 90. This suggests that "perfectionist" principles predicated upon "comprehensive views" about what is good and right are unjust. But this does not follow from the premises:

Rawlsians seem to suppose that from the proposition that principles that would be selected by such parties under such conditions are just (i.e., involve no injustice), it follows that perfectionist principles--which might very well be chosen by reasonable and well-informed persons outside the original position--are unjust. Non sequitur.

George, 91. (I would add, also, that even under a veil of ignorance, no one could reasonably choose any alternative other than the natural law as the basis for political action. How could anyone in the "original position" under a "veil of ignorance" want to be subject to a political system that is based upon something other than the natural moral law, that is, under a political system that is unreasonable? The liberal conception of justice is unreasonable, and so it would not ever be chosen by someone in the "original position.")

Rawls's bias against the natural law--proof that he has stacked the deck in favor of liberal dogma and against the doctrine of the natural law--is displayed in the "now famous footnote" in Political Liberalism. George, 93. Rawls descends from his highfalutin generalities into the area of detail, specifically abortion, and, lo and behold, he comes out smelling like the liberal he is. We will discuss that famous footnote in the next and last blog entry devoted to the Rawlsian effort and excluding the natural moral law from any role in the public square.



Note: In this series of blog entries relating to the Rawlsian critique, I have relied heavily on Robert P. George, "Restricting Reasons, Attenuating Discourse," in Human Nature in its Wholeness: A Roman Catholic Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2006), 80-94, cited here as "George."

How Liberalism Cuts Out the Natural Law: John Rawls's Sleight of Hand, Part 1

THE PHILOSOPHER JOHN RAWLS is a household name to most American law students. His books A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and Justice as Fairness are the regular staple of jurisprudence courses. Rawls is the great defensor and apologete of political liberalism and secular, pluralistic democratic civil society. In his various writings, his express goal is to put forth principles and norms--a political morality--that can be accepted, indeed, one that is morally incumbent on all people who live in a pluralistic society regardless of their particular religious or philosophical comprehensive commitments. More than that, he claims to have achieved this goal.

In his books he has offered a plausible basis for political dialogue and action among all people of good will, regardless of the various parties' comprehensive commitments. By following his brand of political liberalism, Rawls insists, even the most disparate voices in our pluralistic society can band together to achieve an "overlapping consensus," a moral agreement, about what is fair and what is just. Rawls tempts us with this plausible theory "that reasonable people of diverse faiths, including Catholics, are supposed to be able to endorse without compromising their faith." George, 81. Following the Rawlsian formula, we are assured that we can arrive at consensus as to matters relating to the good, it matters not what our moral, philosophical, or religious convictions may be as to "human nature, dignity, and destiny." George, 81. Rawlsian politics will save us from the divisions that beset us. Rawls stands like divinely-inspired Moses on Mount Pisgah, and he will usher us into a liberal promise land flowing with milk and honey. "Glory to Rawls wherever he is, in heaven, in hell, or in purgatory, and on earth peace to men of good will!"

What we will see, however, is that the Rawlsian "political morality" is not neutral; it is not even secular; it is decidedly secularist. More, it is, by design, hostile to the notion that the natural moral law, at least as it has been classicaly understood, ought to be part of the political debate. Indeed, the Rawlsian formula is in direct competition with the natural law, and fundamentally opposed to it. The natural law "can accomplish what secular writers such as . . . Rawls seek to accomplish. It can provide an accurate understanding of the moral principles and norms that should govern political life in the concrete circumstances of particular societies," including, and perhaps most especially, those that are pluralistic. George, 81. So the Rawlsian model is in competition with the natural law model. What Rawls has done in advancing his "political liberalism" model, however, is to stack the deck against the natural law and in favor of a secularist philosophical liberalism. In fact, insidiously, Rawlsian political morality practically excludes faithful Catholics (and also others, including Protestants, Jews, who adopt a natural law viewpoint) from political discourse.

It has been said: "If you want to understand President Obama's soul, read his books. But if you want to understand his beliefs, read John Rawls." (See Talk Left: The Politics of Crime, http://www.talkleft.com/story/2009/6/13/03244/1940.) But it is not only President Obama that is Rawlsian. In his Dialogue against the Luciferians, St. Jerome wrote: Ingemuit totus orbis, et Arianum se esse miratus est. "The whole world groaned and was astonished to find itself Arian." Dial. con. Luc., 19. 23 PL 181. We can echo St. Jerome and say that all America groaned and was astonished to find itself Rawlsian. The political climate is largely Rawlsian. In light of the Rawlsian prejudice against natural law and its affinity for a secular, philosophical liberalism, political participation by advocates of the natural law in the political process is rendered practically problematic if not impossible. Under the Rawlsian arrangement, the advocate of the natural law will always lose, as he is asked to join the fight with both hands tied behind his back, while the liberal has kept his free.

A little background is warranted. In his influential book published in 1971, A Theory of Justice, Rawls advanced a liberal philosophy of justice which he called, rather vaguely, "justice as fairness." In crafting his notion of secular justice, Rawls used a mind game, what he calls a method of "political constructivism." He suggested that we hypothetically situate ourselves in an "original position," one where we stand behind a "veil of ignorance," where "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like." Nor does one know what "comprehensive view" of reality he will have. Shrouded by such a "veil of ignorance," the basic principles of justice are those that would be chosen by people who, at the "original position" were equal and free, and were making decisions about what was fair without knowing where they would be, and what they would believe and hold fast to, in the political society they would be constructing. This yielded the so-called "liberal principle of legitimacy" and ideal "public reason" which had "the same basis as the substantive principles of justice." PL, 225; George, 90. Everything he proposes seems so plausible, and so wonderfully rational, so wonderfully fair.

To his credit, years later, Rawls conceded in Political Liberalism published in 1993, that his "justice as fairness" principles advanced in A Theory of Justice had presupposed a "comprehensive doctrine," that is, as Robert P. George put it, "a worldview--an integrated set of moral beliefs and commitments reflecting a still more fundamental understanding of human nature, dignity, and destiny." George, 83. Namely, Rawls admitted that in fashioning his first theory he had assumed that all citizens held "the same comprehensive doctrine, and this includes aspects of Kant's comprehensive liberalism." PL, xlii. In other words, his Theory of Justice inadvertently, yet nevertheless arbitrarily, required that only Kantians could go behind the "veil of ignorance." All other "comprehensive doctrines" except for a comprehensive, secular Kantian-based liberalism were excluded from coming behind the curtain. This was an obvious flaw to his theory; it made his "justice as fairness" theory highly exclusionary, self-contradictory, and unfair. As a result, Rawls modified his theory in Political Liberalism. In Political Liberalism, Rawls sought to limit the implicit demand that one be comprehensively liberal, to a more restricted requirement that we only accept to be politically liberal. Rawls only required that one only need acknowledge "the fact of reasonable pluralism." By acknowledging this fact, and recognizing that the political process had to work with it, Rawls suggested that "political" (as distinguished from "comprehensive") liberalism was morally compelling. The ideal of political liberalism is that

citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional essential and matters of basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free and equal also might reasonable be expected to endorse.

PL, 1. By thus tinkering with his theory, Rawls thought that he had fixed the problems with it. All comprehensive doctrines, including the "comprehensive liberalism" that had been snuck in in his A Theory of Justice, would this way be effectively bracketed, and we could all effectively live and work together using "public reason." Public discourse, and as a consequence, the political process and public law, would therefore exclude these "comprehensive doctrines," and a "strictly political conception of justice" would be the result. Rawls insisted that this new, improved theory did not require any comprehensive doctrine to be espoused as a condition for public discourse. He eschewed the suggestion that "political liberalism" was just "Enlightenment liberalism, that is, a comprehensive liberal and often secular doctrine" under another moniker. No, political liberalism was:

a political conception of political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and non-religious, liberal and nonliberal, may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues. Emphatically, it does not aim to replace comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, but intends to be equally distinct from both and, it hopes, acceptable to both.

The Philosopher John Rawls

PL, xl. Rawls thought highly of his theory. For him, it was more than a pragmatic sanction. For him it was a matter of moral exigency, of moral affirmation. "Where constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at issue," Rawls insisted that "public constitution and debate must be conducted--for moral reasons and not as a mere modus vivendi--in terms of a 'strictly political conception of justice,' and not in terms of moral doctrines of justice associated with the various comprehensive views about which reasonable people disagree." George, 85 (emphasis added) (quoting PL, xvii). When people of different and competing comprehensive views affirm such a "political conception of justice," an "overlapping concensus" on matters of justice will be the result. "It is this concensus," as George explains Rawls's view, "that makes social stability in the face of moral pluralism not only possible, but but possible 'for the right reasons.'" George, 84 (citing PL, xlii, 388, 390, and 392.) This "political liberalism" touts itself as impartial, as neutral, as eminently fair with respect to the various comprehensive doctrines that are held by the citizenry. Political liberalism "does not attack of criticize any reasonable [comprehensive] view." PL , xxi. Rawls believed that those holding comprehensive doctrines, even those with nonliberal comprehensive doctrines, could endorse his "political liberalism." George, 85. More, they were really morally compelled to do so, since he saw it as acceptable to human reason regardless of reasonable comprehensive commitments. In the exercise of public discourse, public power, even the power to vote, the citizens were morally expected to abstain from "acting on the basis of principles drawn from their comprehensive views." George, 84. Further, such reciprocation from all groups is required as a principle of political legitimacy. George, 85.

That would be fair. That would give us justice. Or would it? Our next blog posting will try to answer that question.



Note: In this section, and in the next blog entry where we finish this Rawlsian critique, we have relied heavily on Robert P. George, "Restricting Reasons, Attenuating Discourse," in Human Nature in its Wholeness: A Roman Catholic Perspective (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2006), 80-94, cited here as "George."