Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 15

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Heraclitus from the Villa dei papiri, Herculaneo

E. HERACLITUS (536-470 B.C.)

The Stoic teachings regarding the Logos koinos rest at their final end upon the Heraclitean world logos (Weltlogos). Augustine's teaching regarding the eternal law therefore goes back to Heraclitus. We shall investigate now what Heraclitus taught regarding the Logos.

1. Concept of the Logos

According to Heraclitus there is no lasting being. All being flows or is in flux (panta rei).(1). The Logos, the common law (gemeinsame Gesetz), rules in the flow and change of things. All things fulfill themselves in accordance to the Logos. This divine law rules all things; what it wills is sufficient for all things; and it excels all things. This Logos is the common law. In addition to logos, Heraclitus also used the terms: nous, phronesis, gnome, heimarmene, kraunos, pyr, and Zeus. Heraclitus says, for example, "when one wants to talk with reason, one must base himself on the common reason.(3) On this mind is everything common. But Heraclitus places the common reason of the mind above the mind of the individual.(4) To know the know One, from which all things stem, is Wisdom, gnome.(5) Fate therefore is to be accepted.(6) Lightning, which symbolizes the divine fire, is endowed with reason and is the first cause of the governance of the All.(7)

This one and only way is, and is not, to be named with Zeus.(8) Their will of individual should be to follow the law.(9) Heraclitus identifies the expressions logos, nous, phronesis, heirmarmene, pyr, and Zeus. These termini parallel those of Augustine, which shows the relationship between both men's thought:

HERACLITUS	AUGUSTINE
1. λόγος ὁ κοινός. ὁ λόγος ὁ κοινός. S. 57, Anm. 2 and 3.	1. lex est aeterna, lex universalis. S. 5, Anm. 18 and 19.
2. ἑιμαρμένη. S. 57, Anm. 5.	2. ordo causarum, necessitas . S.7, Anm. 8.
3. νους ξὺνος. S. 57, Anm. 1. φρονεῖεν ξυνόν. S. 57, Anm. 3. γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυϐέρνησε πάντα. S. 57, Anm. 4.	3. ratio divina. S. 5, Anm. 19. Voluntas Dei ordinem naturalem conservari iubens et perturbaris vetans.

2. Characteristics of the Logos.

Heraclitus calls this law divine. "All human laws nourish themselves from the One, the divine."(10) The Logos is furthermore eternal and all-encompassing.(11) It is the universal law of the world (Weltgestz).(12) All things happen in accordance with this law.(13) It is the cause of the governance of the world.(14) This law branches out only so far as it wills, and it is sufficient for all things, and overcomes all things.(15) It binds all things, in that whoever intends to speak, must be armed with the common law of all, just like a city defends itself with the law, and, indeed, even more strongly so.(16) Even the unjust stands under this law. Dike will straighten injustice; the perjurer and his compurgator will have to contend with Dike.(17)

Heraclitus places upon the Logos the same characteristics as Augustine does upon the eternal law.

HERACLITUS	AUGUSTINE
1. νόμος θεος. S. 58, Anm. 10. πῦρ αἰώνιον. S. 58, Anm. 11. λόγος ὥν ἀεὶ. S. 58, Anm. 11.	1. lex ineffabilis, aeterna, sempiterna. S. 6, Anm. 1 and 2.
2. γινομένων πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.. S. 58, Anm. 11. Δίκη κατὰ­λήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας. S. 58, anm. 17.	2. lex universlis. S.7, Anm. 8. bona et mala ordine regi. S. 8, Anm. 10 and 12.

3. The Logos is the Fundamental Source of all Law

a) Out of the Logos stems forth the law of nature, than all things in nature develop themselves in accordance with the law of the Logos.(18) The stars circle in the paths that has been foreordained by the law of the Logos. The sun does not exceed its boundaries, and should it do so, so would the messengers of Justice (the Erinyes of Dike) put it back in its place.(19) The same law rules in the world of the living. The wild and tame animals, the birds, the fish, and the beasts of the land become, flourish, and leave so as the law of God has predetermined.(20) They must follow it as a matter of necessity. Everything that lives is with the whip of God put into pasture.(21)

Man has little understanding regarding this law through which all exists, whether before he begins to question its existence, or after he has learned of it.(22) This law ties together the opposites of in the world into the most beautiful harmony.(23) Such ties are: the whole and the not whole, unity and discordance, consonance and dissonance, and out of all one, and out of all one.(24) The law of nature therefore go right back to the Logos as its source. Augustine follows the same path back to the eternal law.

b) The common law is the norm for the activities of mankind. It is his duty to follow the common Logos. Although the Logos is common, most live as though they have their own knowledge.(25) All must follow this law, but unfortunately not all do. The Logos lives in man.(26) All are given it, so as to know it and to be able to reason.(27) Thinking is the greatest benefit, and Wisdom consists in this: to tell the truth, and to act in accordance with nature, and to listen to it.(28) The Logos in man is therefore the measure of morality. Most men confront the Logos daily, as it is the guide of the All, and still they divide themselves from it. The things with which they daily interact appear to them for that reason foreign.(29) Morality consists therefore in acting in accordance with nature, in acting in accordance with reason, and in acting in congruity with the eternal Logos. The Logos always is in integrally in accordance with itself, therefore all things are good, beautiful, and right. Men, however, do not always act in integrity with the Logos. Therefore, they are divided into those who are just or righteous, and those who are not just or not righteous.(30). The Logos is therefore, according to Heraclitus, the foundational norm of the moral law. With Augustine the lex aeterna is the foundational norm of the moral law.

c) According to Heraclitus, human laws obtain their authority and their binding force from the divine law. Heraclitus writes: "All human law are derived from the one, the divine."(31) The same viewpoint is found in Augustine. Nihil est iustum atque legitimum, quod non ex aeterna lege homines sibi derivaverint.

4. Conclusion of Heraclitus's Teaching on the Logos.

The concept of the Logos governs the Heraclitean philosophy. Heraclitus identifies the logos koinos with the nomos koinos, the nous, the gnome, the heimarmene, the pyr, the keraunos, and with Zeus. Heraclitus indicates the Logos to be some eternal, divine, and universal. The evil themselves are beneath the Logos. The Logos is the foundational norm of all temporal laws, the law of nature, the moral law, and the law of the State.

We have seen how the lex aeterna of Augustine in part corresponds to the Heraclitean world logos. The fact that these two use same or similar terminology and the same or similar ways of thinking shows that in the fundamental root shows that Augustine's teaching on the lex aeterna is to be found in Heraclitus. The Stoa, Plotinus, and Cicero are the bridges between Heraclitus and Augustine.

CONCLUSION

We are now at the end of our investigation. Let us look one more time to the back to the entire issue.

In the first part we saw what Augustine taught by the eternal law. We learned its definition, its characteristics. We saw how it was that the eternal law was the foundational norm of all temporal laws, the law of nature, the moral law, the law of the State. Finally, we were made familiar with the knowability of the eternal law.

In the second part we investigated the sources of Augustine which impressed themselves upon Augustine's teaching, and upon which it was dependent. Cicero, Plotinus, St. Paul, St. John, the Stoa, and Heraclitus were identified as sources. The investigation revealed a direct reliance of Augustin in his teaching upon Cicero, Plotinus, St. Paul, and St. John, and an indirect reliance upon the Stoa and Heraclitus.

The same or similar terminology, the same or similar ways of thinking in the development of the temporal law from the eternal law, the familiarity that Augustine had with Cicero, Plotinus, St. Paul, and St. John, as well as his knowledge of the Stoa and Heraclitus through Cicero and Plotinus are the sources as well as grounds upon which Augustine relied upon and left their impressions upon his teaching on the Lex aeterna.

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(1) Vgl. Fr. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. Bd. I, S. 66-75. Ausgabe Praechter, Berlin 1920.
(2) Diels, H., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin 1903, S. 82, No. 114. ξὺν νῶι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. Diels 66, No. 1. γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε
(3) Diels, 82 No. 114. ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων.
(4) Diels, 82, No. 113, Ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν.S. 66, No. 2. ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.
(5) Diels, 73, No. 41. εἶναι γὰρ ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυϐέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.
(6) E. Kl. I 178 n. Anathon Aall. S. 51, Anm. 2.
(7) Cf. Diels S. 75, No. 64.
(8) Diels S. 72, No. 32. ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγ­εσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.
(9) Diels S. 72, No. 33. νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἑνός.
(10) Diels S. 82, No. 114. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.
(11) Diels S. 75, No. 64. τὰ δὲ πὰντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός, τουτέστι κατευθύνει, κεραυνὸν [τὸ πῦρ λέγων τὸ αἰώνιον]. Diels S. 66, No. 1. (τοῦ δὲ) λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος (ἀεὶ).
(12) Diels S. 66, No. 2. διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ (ξυνῷ, τουτέστι τῷ) κοινῷ· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ.
(13) Diels S. 66, No. 1. γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.
(14) Diels S. 75, No. 64. [εἶναι] τὸ πῦρ καὶ τῆς διοικήσεως τῶν ὄλων αἴτιον.
(15) Diels S. 82, No. 114. κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περὶγίγνεται.
(16) Ibidem. ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὃκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέ­ρως.
(17) Diels S. 71, No. 28. καὶ μέντοι καὶ Δίκη κατὰ­λήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας.
(18) Diels S. 66, No. 1. γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.
(19) Diels S. 79, No. 94. Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερϐήσεται [τὰ] μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.
(20) Diels S. 68, No. 11. τῶν τε ζώιων τά τε ἄγρια καὶ ἥμερα τά τε ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ἐν ὕδατι βοσκόμενα γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀκμάζει καὶ φθείρεται τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ πειθόμενα θεσμοῖς.
(21) Ibidem. πᾶν γὰρ ἑρπετὸν (θεοῦ) πληγῇ νέμεται, ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος.
(22) Diels S. 16, No. 1. (τοῦ δὲ) λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος (ἀεὶ) ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον.
(23) Diels S. 67, No. 8. τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ᾽ ἔριν γίνεσθαι.
(24) Diels S. 68, No. 10. συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα . . .
(25) Diels S. 66, No. 2. διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ (ξυνῷ, τουτέστι τῷ) κοινῷ· . . . τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.
(26) Diels S. 52, No. 115. ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος.
(27) Diels S. 82, No. 116. ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ φρονεῖν.
(28) Diels S. 81, No. 112. τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας.
(29) Diels S. 77, No. 72. ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, τούτῳ διὰ­φέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ΄ ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται.
(30) Diels S. 82, No. 114. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 14

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Bust of the Stoic Philosopher Chrysippus of Sol (ca. 278-206 B.C.)

D. THE STOA (336-207 B.C.)
(continued)

2. Attributes of the Common Law According to the Stoa.

a) Cleanthes calls this law the eternal applicable law. He writes in his hymn: "For the entirety of existence there is an eternal and subsisting law."(16) This law governs the things of the world and is eternal, just like Zeus himself.(17)

b) This law is, further, unchanging, in that it stays always one and the same.(18) It is right Reason which impresses itself upon and rules all things.(19)

c) This law is ultimately universal. Zeus rules the All by this law.(20) Even the evil are rejected and are confined back to it. The disorderly he brings into order, and the unlovely he makes lovely. You, O Zeus, sings Cleanthes, lead the law, the common, which impresses upon all things. You reign in your greatest power as the highest Lord of the entire world. Without you, Ruling Lord, nothing in the All occurs.(21) Even the deeds of the sinners, evil, you know, in your wisdom, how to even. The disorderly you place back into order, and the unlovely you make lovely."(22) Therefore everything, the orderly and disorderly, good and evil, is under the common law. It is therefore universal in the widest sense of that term.

Note well: the Stoics did not teach that the evil were destroyed by the common law. By this clarification they generally drew back to theodicy. Compare Anathon Aall in his The History of the Logos Idea (Die Geschichte der Logosidee) [Leipzig 1896].

The Stoa placed on the Logos the same qualities as Augustine did on the eternal law. Even here Augustine stands under a stoic influence.

STOA	AUGUSTINE
1. λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα. S. 52, Anm. 16. λόγον καὶ ἐόντα ἀΐδιον	1. lex est aeterna, sempiterna, perpetua. S. 63, Anm. 1 and 2.
2. νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν. S. 52, Anm. 20.	2. lex est universalis. S.7, Anm. 8 and S. 8, Anm. 10 and 12.

3. The Logos koinos is the Fundamental Norm of all Laws

The Stoics linked justice upon the natural law. They taught that justice or right has its wellspring not as a result of any human warrant, but as an outflow of reason be that from nature.(22) According to Chrysippus, there is no other wellspring for right that may be found, no other path other than that of Zeus and the common nature. From there must all human law find its source if we want to talk in terms of good and evil.(24) This common law is the king of all divine and human things, the dominant ruler of the good and the ugly, the most-high guide from which nature commands what things are permitted, what prohibited, and what is allowed in terms of political custom, and thereby is the norm and measure of justice and injustice.(25) The measure for good and evil, for the just and unjust is also the common law. All right and law, the law of nature, the moral law, and the law of the state all point backwards to the Logos orthos. Looking at these individually, we get the following picture:

a) The Law of Nature stems from the Logos koinos

The Logos impresses itself upon all things of this world.(26) Certainly, the Logos is but one.(27) It divides itself, however, in myriad subordinated rational individuals, the logoi spermatikoi. These rational seeds are the cause of the always renewing individuals, the never corrupting forms, the measure of propriety, the measure, the relationship, the beauty, the order, and the security of all earthly things.(28) The Logoi spermatikoi are the primary moving powers for the Stoic diakosmesis, the world environment (Weltausstattung). The Logos koinos can appropriately divide itself into are myriad of appropriate displays of its power. Through this principle the world is created and holds together.(29) The innumerable laws of of individual things run together into the one eternal law. Felicitously, there is preserved in an Armenian text alone some of the writing of the Stoic Poseidonius which deals with the role of the Logoi spermatikoi in the underlying law of things. In that text it says: "The earth does not stop in bringing forth the same plants. The heavens continues in its unending order. Sun, moon, and the stars overhead do not vary from their joint paths. The sea does not overstep its indicated boundaries. The creatures of the waters, the creatures of the air, the creatures of the land live in fidelity to their tasks; only man, that has authority over all things, is entrusted with the quality of freedom, and is able to disregard Providence and neglect the law of what is right."(30) The Logoi spermatikoi express themselves as the power that holds together all inorganic things, (hexis) as the physis of organic things, as psyche in the things that live, and as nous in mankind.(31) These laws run together into the one Logos orthos to the most high God.(32) In this manner the Stoics the natural law upon the eternal law. The Stoic manner of thinking about the derivation of the temporal law, especially the natural law, is the same as that in Augustine.

STOA	AUGUSTINE
1. The Stoa derived all right and law back to the Logos koinos: οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν εύρεΐν της δικαιοσύνης ἄλλης ἄρκὴν . . . ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως. S. 53, Anm. 24	1. Augustine derived the inner order of things (the natural law) from the divine wisdom and righteousness. S. 9, Anm. 3 and 4.
2. The Stoa derived the Logoi spermatikoi back to the Logos koinos tes physeos. Οἱ Στωικοί νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεκνικον ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τους σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ’οὓς ἕκαστα καθ’ ειρομένην γίνεται. Diels, Doxographi Graeci 1879, S. 305.	2. Augustine derived the rationes seminales (the literal translation of Logoi spermatikoi) upon the divine power and wisdom. Aug., PL 34, lib. 9, 17. Potestas creatoris habet apud se posse de his omnibus aliud facere, quam eorum quasi seminales rationes habent. Aug., De gen. ad lit. PL 34, lib. X, 20; lib. X, 21. Vgl. Hans Meyer, Geschichte der Lehre von den Keimkräften, Bonn 1914, S. 63ff. Aug. in Heptat, II, 21. Insunt enim corporeis rebus per omnia elementa mundi quaedam occultae seminariae rationes, quibus cum data fuerit opportunitas temporalis atque causalis, prorumpunt in species debitas suis modis et finibus.

b) The Logos koinos is the principal source of the moral law.

Chrysippus teaches expressly: "There is simply no other source and background for justice that may be found other than Zeus and the common nature.(33) Nature and reason are the only measure for good and evil. Reason tells everyone what he should do and what he ought to avoid.(34) The highest morality is equivalent to living according to nature, that is reason."(35) Ergo the famous Stoic canon: "One must live according to Nature, that is to say Reason."(36) Living a life in accordance with reason is, at the final end, life in accordance with the Logos koinos. From this Logos, man takes a part in through reason, which he obtains by nature. The part of him that is reason lives in him as Logos andiathetos.(37) According to the Stoics, the moral law also is based upon the Logos koinos. Augustine holds that the moral law is innate. God writes it in the heart of man. The Stoa and Augustine both trace back the moral law to the divinity.

c) The Logos koinos is the Fundamental Norm of the Laws of the State.

The common law ties both the gods and men. Both use the world as a common home.(38) Cleanthes prays to Zeus from there: "Your progeny are we and part of your form, all which lives and is composed to die on earth."(39) Man and God are bound by the same law, and so it naturally follows that human laws, the laws of the State, must be arranged to conform to the One, the divine one. This is so because justice has its source, not in human law, but in the outflow from reason, that is nature.(40). Augustine derives in the same way the law of the State from the eternal law. Nihil esse iustum atque legitimum quod non ex aeterna lege homines sibi derivaverint.

d) Conclusion regarding the Stoic teaching on the Logos.

The concept of the Logos is at the center of the Stoic philosophy. The concepts of taxis, heimarmene, pronoia, physis koine, logos orthos, nomos koinos become in many cases synonymously used. The Stoics name the Logos eternal and universal. The evil are under the law of the Logos. The law of nature, the moral law, the law of the State all are derived from that source. The same or similar termini and manners of thinking in Augustine show the reliance of Augustine on the Stoa. Cicero and Plotinus are Augustine's bridge to them.

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(16) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα . . .
(17) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 300. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς (= τῆς ύλης) δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα.
(18) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. λόγον αἰέν ἐόντα . . .
(19) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 162. ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος . . .
(20) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν, χαῖρε . . .
(21) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
φοιτᾷ, μιγνύμενος μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε φάεσσιν ᾧ σὺ τόσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός. οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον . . . πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέραισιν ἀνοίαις . . .
(22) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν .
(23) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 308. φύσει δὲ τὸ δίκαιον είναι καὶ μὴ θέσει ὡς καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον καθάφησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ. . .
(24) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III 326. Χρύσιππος ἐν τῴ περί θεῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν εὑρείν τὴς δικαιοσύνης ἀλλην ἄρκὴν, οὐδέ ἀλλην γένεσιν ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
(25) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 314. ὁ νόμος παντων ἐστί βασιλεὺς ϑείων τε καὶ ἀνϑρωπίνων πραγμάτων, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον . . .
(26) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 162. ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος . . .
(27) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 1128. ὡς μέν οἱ Στωϊκοί λέουσιν εἰς τε ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἤ αυτή πάντως διανοίησις.
(28) Vgl. Anathon Aall, Geschichte der Logosidee, Bonn 1914, S. 129.
(29) Stobaeus, Ecl. I 374 and Anathon Aall S. 129. καὶ ὥσπερ τίνες λόγοι των μερών εις σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνονται καὶ αύθις διακρίνονται γινομένων των μερών οὗτος ἐξ ενόζ τε πάντα γίνεσθαι και εκ πάντων εις ἐν συγκρίνεςθαι.
(30) Anathon Aal, Geschichte der Logosidee, Bonn 1914, S. 129. Sol et luna ceteraeque stellae a cedenti cursu non cessant, mare regulam mandati non excedit, aquatilia, volatilia et terrestria debitis officiis non desunt, solus libertate praeditus mundi civis homo, cui etiam principatus imperialis concessus fuit, talis, inquam, providentiam, dimisit, legemque iustitiae neglexit.
(31) Cf. v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 708, nos. 773-911, I nos. 134-151, nos. 518-526.
(32) St. v. fr. I 537. Ζεῦ φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν. St. v. f. III 326. οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν εύρεΐν της δικαιοσύνης ἄλλης ἄρκὴν ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως.
(33) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 326. Χρύσιππος ἐν τῴ περί θεῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν εὑρείν τὴς δικαιοσύνης ἀλλην ἄρκὴν, οὐδέ ἀλλην γένεσιν ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως .
(34) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 314. [νόμον] κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.
(35) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 179. Διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλοςεἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν·ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις.
(36) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 179. τὸ δε τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οΰτως ἀπέδωκεν τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν τούτο δ' εστί καθ' ένα λόγον ζῆν καὶ σύμφωρον ζῆν.
(37) De plac. phil. III 11. 900 B. Οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς. St. v. fr. II 837. ἡγεμονικόν δὲ εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς.
(38) Stobaeus, Ecl. I 444. Χρύσιππος κόσμον ἔναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ σύστημα τῶν ἕνεκα τοῦτον γεγονότον. . . cf. Cicero, De finibus bon. et mal. III 20, 27.
(39) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. Έκ σου γάρ γένος είσ' ήχου μίμημα λαχόντες. μούνοι, όσα ζώει τε και έρπει θνήτ' έπί γαίαν.
(40) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 308. φύσει δὲ τὸ δίκαιον είναι καὶ μὴ θέσει . . .

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 13

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Bust of the Stoic Philosopher Chrysippus of Sol (ca. 278-206 B.C.)

D. THE STOA (336-207 B.C.)

In his teaching on the eternal law, Augustine is further reliant on the Stoa and Heraclitus. Nowhere do we find any evidence to establish that Augustine directly drew from Stoic sources. Doubtlessly, he learned about the Stoa from knowing Cicero and Plotinus.

Cicero himself witnessed that his philosophical works relied upon Greek sources. "Apographa [Aπόγραφα] sunt, minore labore fiunt, verba tantum affero, quibus abundo."(1) [They are copies, and are but little trouble. I only supply words, and of these I abound."]

Cicero's writings De re publica and De legibus are in the form of imitations of Plato's works Politeia and Nomoi.(2) In substance, the work De re publica most especially relies upon Panaetius and Polybius. With respect to his work De legibus we come particularly close to certain sources, especially Panaetius and Antiochus present themselves as sources. In the Academica priora et posteriora Cicero used Antiochus and Philo. In his work De finibus, he was assisted by the following: Zeno, Philodemus, and Antiochus of Ascalon. The Tusculan Disputations rely in part on Posidonius, and in part on other sources. The first book of De natura deorum bases itself on the writing of the Epicurean Phaedrus called Peri Theon, and on Carneades and Posidonius. The second book is based upon Posidonius's Peri Theon. The third book goes back to Cleanthes. The first book of De divinatione is reliant upon the the writing of Cleitomachus called Peri mantikes. The second books is based upon the work of Cleitomachus and Panaetius, perhaps his Peri pronoias. For the first two books of Cicero's De officiis, Panaetius is the main source, for the third book, Posidonius.

Plotinus was familiar with all the Greek philosophical systems. He also knew the Stoa well.(3)

Augustin learned also the Stoa through his familiarity with Cicero and Plotinus. We will investigate now what the Stoa understood under the notion of the eternal law, the Logos.

1. What did the Stoa Understand by the Logos?

The Stoa understood the Logos to be the right Reason impressed upon all things. This Reason is Zeus himself, the ruler of the actions of all things.(4) The Logos is here right Reason, and it is identified even with Zeus, the ultimate governor of the All. Chrysippus praises this law as King of all the divine and human things, as head over all the good and the ugly, as the highest leader of all nature, of political matters, and therefore also the norm and measure of the just and the unjust, and ordering of what ought to be done and what ought to be left alone.(5) This common law is further regarded as the necessity behind fate. Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno teach that this necessity is the fundamental cause of Being, and of Reason under which all things fall.(6) Zeno understands this fundamental cause further as a kinetic power of things. He calls it Nature and Providence. In reality, these are different names for the same thing.(7) The heimarmene [Fate] stands surely with the inner cause of all things, as long as the impression of the pronoia [Providence] imports the control and concern of God into the ruling of the world. Again, Zeno names the Logos or Physis the fiery, artistic, working world reason.(9) He means thereby that nature itself the artistic, constructive fire that purposefully advances the formative path of the world.(10) This fire is depicted as artistic to distinguish it from a consuming fire.(11)

The fundamental fire flows in the fullness of art in the becoming of things. This art lies in the underlying order and the purpose of things. The entire world knows that this same nature is equivalent to the reason of the world, the necessity of fate, Providence, even Zeus himself. This is especially heralded by the Stoics.(12) Cleanthes speaks of Zeus as father of the world order. He prays to him: "You, O Zeus, know in your Wisdom, to make even that which is crooked. You order what is without order, and that which is not beautiful you make beautiful. You also make into one the many, and bring good out of evil, so that the entire stands forth in the eternal and sure Logos."(13)

The thinking regarding order is impressed upon us even more sharply by the Stoic view of the cosmos as a living organism (zoon). Just as in the microcosmos all is law and order, so also in the macrocosmos. The world reason lives, is ensouled, and in measured order manages the cosmos.(14) Chrysippus calls the heimarmene [fate] a kinetic power, one that arranges all things in order (taxei). This requirement he also calls the world law, truth, first cause, nature, fate, and other things.(15) So in fact is the concept of the Stoa of taxis, heirmarmene, ananke, pronoia, aitia, aletheia, physis, logos orthos, and nomos koinos [fate, destiny, providence, cause, truth, nature, right reason, eternal law]. These names all refer to that law, which, at its ultimate basis, is the Reason of the omnipotent Jupiter.

The Stoic termini: order, law, are the same that Augustine used. By comparing the two, we get the following picture:

STOA	AUGUSTINE
1. τάξις. S. 52, Anm. 15	1. ordo. S. 3, Anm. 1
2. αἰτία εἰρομένη. S. 50, Anm. 6. εἱμαρμένη. S. 50, Anm. 6.	2. ordo causarum, causa suprema. S. 7, Anm. 8.
3. ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. S. 50, Anm. 4.	3. summa ratio, recta ratio. S. 5, Anm. 14. .
4. ὁ κοινός τὴς φύσεως λόγος. S. 51, Anm. 12.	4. ratio divina. S. 5, Anm. 19.
5. πρόνοια. S. 51, Anm. 7.	5. providentia. S.8, Anm. 14
6. ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός. S.50, Anm. 4.	6. lex aeterna. S. 9, Anm. 2.

____________________

(1) Cicero ad Atticum XII 52, 3.
(2) Fr. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. I. Bd., S. 497, Ausgabe Praechter, Berlin 1920.
(3) Fr. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. I. Bd., S. 497, Ausgabe Praechter, Berlin 1920.
(4) V. . Arnim, Joh. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Bd. 1-3, Leipzig 1905, I, No. 162. νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνιτούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι
(5) V. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 314. ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ϑείων τε καὶ ἀνϑρωπίνων πραγμάτων˙ δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον . . .
(6) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 175. καθ’ ειμαρμένην δε φασιν τα πάντα γίγνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, . . . καὶ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ Ζήνων . . . ἔστι δὲ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἤ λόγος καθ΄ον ο κόσμος διεξάγεται.
(7) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 176. Ζήνων, ὁ Κιττεὺς, δύναμιν κέκληκε τὴν εἱμαρμένην κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν ὠνόμασεν.—St. v. fr. I, No. 102. Ἕν τ' εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία πολλαῖς τ' ἑτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι λέγει Ζήνων ἐν περὶ τοῦ ὅλου . . .
(8) Cf. Überweg I, Berlin 1920, S. 446.
(9) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 1027. πνεῦμα διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου πῦρ τεκνικόν.
(10) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 171. τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἱναι πῦρ τεχνικόν ὁδω βαδίζον είς γένεσιν.
(11) Cf. Überweg I, S. 446, Berlin 1920.
(12) Plutarch, De Stoic. repug. 34, 5 nach Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen 31.2 S. 72, Anm. 2, Tübingen 1857. v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 171. ὅτι δ' ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινός τὴς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἔστι ὅυδὲ τοὺς αντίποδας λέληθεν παντακοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν . . .
(13) Mohnike, Gottl. Fr. Chr., Kleanthes der Stoiker, Greifswald 1914 and Überweg I 1920, S. 447. ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, / καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν. / ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν, / ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα . . .
(14) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 633. ὅτι δε καὶ ζώον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικόν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν καὶ Χρύσιππος φησιν ἐν πρώτω περί προνοίας ... Ποσειδώνιος ζώον ζωον μεν ούτως όντα οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν. . .
(15) Stobaeus, Ecl. I 180 and Anathon Aall S. 133. Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν . . .Εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων, μεταλαμβάνει δε ἀντι τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην προστιθείς καὶ ἕτερας ὄνομασίας . . .

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 12

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Bust of St. Paul the Apostle by El Greco

C. PAUL (3-67 A.D.)

Without doubt, Apostle Paul had a controlling influence upon St. Augustine's teaching on the eternal law. Augustine had expansive knowledge of St. Paul's epistles. The bishop himself states that he read Paul above all others.(1) He cites the Pauline epistles often in his works.(2) Paul speaks in his Epistle to the Romans about law, the law which the Gentiles have by nature. "So although the Gentiles have no law, even so, they by nature (physei) do the work of the law. They, who have no law, are themselves law. They evidence that the wok of the law is written upon their hearts. Their conscience gives them minds instruction, so that it either accuses them or confirms them."(3) Paul states here that the Gentiles act by means of the natural moral law which is written upon their heart. This law is to them the norm and measure of good and evil. Augustine interprets this provision extensively. He asks from whence it is that the Gentiles have this law, and he answers: "God gave the Gentiles this law. He has written it in their hearts with his finger, with the Holy Spirit."(4) Men have this law by nature, since they are created in the image of God.(5) Since God has written the moral law in man's heart, it follows that it is a divine law, and it also flows that it is the eternal law. Similarly, St. Paul leads back the laws of the State to God, in that he says: "There is no power save from God."(6) Augustine cites and confirms these words of the Apostle.(7) So do both Paul and Augustine lead the moral law and the law of the State back to God.

St. John the Evangelist by Donatello (Detail)

D. JOHN (100 A.D. †)

In his prologue to his Gospel, John the Evangelist depicts his "Gospel of the Logos."(1) He calls the Logos eternal, the maker of all things, the life and light of all mankind. Augustine interprets this part of St. John's Gospel. He writes: "The Logos has created all things, all things without exception, that we find in nature, everything from angel to the littlest worm.(2) There is no form, no structure, no harmony of the parts, no substance, whether in weight, in measure, in number, that has its existence except through the Logos.(3) The Logos is uncreated form of all things.(4) The inner ground for the constitution and organization of all the things of the world. So do both Augustine and John lead all things back to the Logos, the Verbum, the divine Wisdom, which is nothing other than the eternal law.

__________________

(1) Aug., PL 32, col. 747. Paulum prae ceteris legit Augustinus . . .
(2) PL 44, col. 227, No. 44 and PL. 35, col. 1381.
(3) Rom. 2:14-16. ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος. οἵτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων . . .
(4) Augustin, PL 44, col. 227, No. 44. Deus dat leges in mentem ipsorum et in cordibus eorum scribit eas digito suo, spiritu sancto. [De spir. et lit. 26.46]
(5) Aug., PL 32, col. 229, No. 47. Imaginem Dei, in qua facti sumus.
(6) Rom. 13:1. . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξουσία εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ οὖσαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ . . .
(7) Aug., Epist. 93, PL 33, col. 331.

(1) John 1:3. πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν.
(2) Aug., PL 32, col. 1358. Quaecumque naturaliter facta sunt, quaecumque sunt in creaturis, omnia omino quae in coelo fix sunt, quae fulgent desuper, quae volitant sub coelo, quae moventur in universa natura rerum, omnis omnino creatura ab angelo usque ad vermiculum facta sunt per verbum (logos). [Conf., VIII, 3]
(3) Aug., PL 32, col. 1386. Nulla enim forma, nulla compages, nulla concordia partium, nulla qualiscumque substantia, quae potest habere pondus, numerum, mensuramm, nisi per illud verbum . . . cui dictum est omnia in mensura numero et pondere (Sap. 11:21).
(4) Aug., PL 38, col. 662. Verbum Dei est forma quaedam non formata, forma sine tempore et loco, form omnium formatorum, forma incommutabilis sine lapsu, sine temore, sine loco, superans omnia . . . hoc verbum dicitur sapientia. [Sermo 117, 2, 3]

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 11

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Sculpture of the Philosopher Plotinus

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

3. According to Plotinus, the Nous is the First Source of the Temporal Law, the Natural Law, the Moral Law, and the Law of the State .

In Plotinianism, the emanation of the world is unique. All things stem from the Nous, the Nous from the Hen. Being that things stem from the Nous through emanation, so also do their organization, their conformity to law stem from the Nous through emanation.

a) In individuals there are forms that are followed. The Nous surrounds the world of Ideas. It is embodied in the things that are. It covers all things, whether genera or species, or the whole or any part.(32)

The Nous, which is plenary and without flaw, shows itself as soul.(33) This is movement and life. It moves and lives in matter.(34) The Logos flows from Nous. (35) It is neither pure Nous nor pure Soul. It is neither pure Nous nor pure Soul. It is the emanation of both. It unifies both in their fullness.(36) As the principle of all the arrangement of things, the Logos stands above the Nous and the Psyche. It generates reality, the individual things of the world.(37) It gives matter its form and content; it constitutes and individualizes all things in the world. It provides the foundation of their inner organization and the laws which they follow.(38) The Logos is the plan and the form of all power. It acts in matter through the logoi spermatikoi or gennetikoi, the rational seeds of power (vernüftigen Keimkräfte).(39) It forms through the rational seeds of power all individual things as a world in miniature, a mikrokosmos.(40) The forming elements in these seeds is not the seminal fluid (Samenflüssigkeit) (hygoron), but the ideal measure, the figure of the rational Logos.(41) This law works throughout the entire cosmos as the natural law.(42) So is the natural law derived by means of the Nous from the Logos. Placing therefore the most important points in the derivation of the natural law from the eternal law in Augustine by those of Plotinus we obtain the following summary:

AUGUSTINE	PLOTINUS
Augustine leads the inner order of things back to the divine Wisdom and Power. S. 9, Anm. 4.	Plotinus leads the order of things back to the Logos by means of the Nous. ἐξ ἑνὸς νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀνέστη τόδε τὸ πᾶν . . . τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου. Enn. III, 2, 2.
2. Augustine leads the rationes seminales back to the Wisdom and Power of God. S. 10, Anm. 5, 6, and 7.	Plotinus leads the logoi spermatikoi or gennetikoi back to the Logos. evil in the same manner: οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι τὰ ζῶια. ἐξ ἑνὸς νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀνέστη τόδε τὸ πᾶν . Enn. IV 3, 10 and Enn. III 2, 2.
3. Augustine sings a song of praise on the natural order of things and its creator. S. 10, Anm. 13.	3. Plotinus praises the inner and outer harmony of things, the beauty of the world, and the Logos as its artisan. S. 41, Anm. 16.

The manner of thinking and the termini show that Augustine relies upon Plotinus.

b) The Nous is the First Source of the Moral Law. The Hen is according to Plotinus the absolute good. The Logos orthos informs men what is good and what is evil. Only those acts are moral which the Logos itself does through the resolutions of men, through free and rational measure.(43) The scale of morality is the Logos orthos. It speaks through the entire law of Providence to us, as the Providence considers men who live in accordance with that law and Providence, that is, who do all things which the law of Providence says, in particular regard. He says, further, that whoever become good, will have a good life. The evil, however, confront the opposite.(44) The law of providence, the Logos, also states what is good and evil. It promises both reward and punishment. The moral goal is found in the becoming similar to the divinity.(45) In the divinity the mind of man sees the source of life, the first source of the mind, the principle of being, the ground of good, the root of the soul.(46) Given that the standard of morality in the Logos orthos comes, in its ultimate end, from the Hen, so does the moral law flow from that source.

Plotinus leads the moral law back to the Logos orthos. Augustine leads it back to the eternal law, as we have seen.

c) The Nous is the First Source of the Law of the State. Plotinus equates the world reason with the human reason of the lawgiver that firmly maintains an orderly State. This reason knows the behavior of its citizens and their motivation. This reason applies accordingly appropriate rules. It knows to take stock of all its laws to adjust those laws to the inclinations of its citizens, to their activities, both honorable and dishonorable, so that all things, as if by themselves, are guided into balanced unit.(47) For that reason, the law of nature can be made present by the law of the State because it goes back to divinity. So was Minos the lawgiver through contact with divinity qualified to issue laws. In forming his laws, he aimed at what he had learned from his relationship with Zeus. The laws of men are therefore nothing less than reflection of the heavenly statutes.(48) So does Plotinus lead the laws of the State back to the divinity.

This same reliance is found in Augustine.

4. The Knowability of the Eternal Law.

"Plato's image of the Sun," writes Hessen, "is by Plotinus heightened in meaning. Through amplification of the theory of emanations it is developed. The Good, the basic principle from all things, is equated with Light, the Nous with the sun, and the soul with the moon. The first being is for Plotinus Light. It is called the great Light by him. (Enn. IV 3, 17). According to him, the intelligible is in all respects a kind of light. The concept of radiation is the intellectual means by which he more closely understands the emanation."(49) The world soul has its effect, says the Enneads, in accord with Ideas. It receives these ideas from the Nous and furthers them on. The Nous gives these to the world soul, and the world soul, for itself, is charged with giving them to the subordinate souls through individual radiation and individual shaping.(50) The rational part of the soul is always filled and enlightened from above.(51) The images of the things in the mind, which is nothing less than true knowledge, are those, that come over to it from the Nous. The Nous guides the soul to the concepts, as Art puts the concepts in the soul of the artist.(53) Like the radiating sun enlightens the moon and the earth, so does the Nous enlighten the reason of man.(54) Man thereby knows the eternal law upon the way of enlightenment and irradiation.

Plotinus uses the same termini and images as Augustine.

AUGUSTINE	PLOTINUS
illustrari. S. 19, Anm. 15 imprimis. S. 17, Anm. 2 The simile of the sun and the moon and the earth. S. 19, Anm. 17.	ἐλλάμπεσθαι. S. 46, Anm. 49. περιλάμπεσθαι, S. 46, Anm. 49. τυποῦν, S. 46, Anm. 49. The simile of ἡλίος. S. 47, Anm. 53.

5. Conclusion of the Teaching of the Logos of Plotinus.

Plotinus teaches the order in the All. He calls this order taxis, syntaxis, harmonia, hemarmene, pronoia. He identifies this order with Law, with Logos. Plotinus expresses this law as eternal, measured in reason, and all-encompassing. Even the evil themselves are under this law. The Logos , and accordingly the Nous, are the foundational grounds for the temporal laws: the law of nature, the moral law, the law of the State. The knowledge of the eternal law, the Logos, is given man by means of enlightenment. This is, in a nutshell, the Plotinian teaching of the Logos.

The above similarities with the teaching of Augustine, in the part of its concordance, in the part of its similarity of terminology and its essential thought, bespeak of the reliance of Augustine upon Plotinus.


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(27) Enn. III, 2, 5. ἡ δὲ κακία εἰργάσατό τι χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ὅλον παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχομένη.
(28) Enn. III, 2, 5. Τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμεως μεγίστης, καλῶς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς χρῆσθαι δύνασθαι.
(29) Enn. II, 3, 8. καὶ [ἕπεται] τοῖς δρωμένοις ἐν τῶι παντὶ δίκη, εἴπερ μὴ [λυθήσεται] (= τὸ πᾶν). Μένει δ᾽ ἀεὶ (Δίκη) ὀρθουμένου τοῦ ὅλου τάξει καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ κρατοῦντος . . . [E.N. word replaced from original]
(30) Enn. III 2, 9. (νόμος προνοίας) λέγει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἀγαθὸν βίον ἔσεσθαι καὶ . . . τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς τὰ ἐναντία . . .
(31) Enn. III 2, 13. αὕτη γὰρ ἡ διάταξις Ἀδράστεια ὄντως καὶ ὄντως Δίκη καὶ σοφία θαυμαστή.
(32) Enn. V 9, 6. Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὑτῶι . . . [ὁ] δὲ πᾶς νοῦς περιέχει ὥσπερ γένος εἴδη καὶ ὥσπερ ὅλον μέρη.
(33) Enn. V 1, 7. ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾶι νοῦς, [νοῦς] ὢν τέλειος. [E.N. bracketed text not in original]
(34) Enn. II 3, 8. ψυχὴ γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀρχῆς ἔχουσα λόγον.
(35) Enn. III 2, 2. οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ῥυείς. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νοῦ λόγος . . .
(36) Enn. III 2, 16. τίς ὁ λόγος . . . ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς οὐδ᾽ αὐτονοῦς οὐδέ γε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος, ἠρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς . . . . Ἥκων τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ζωῆς μιᾶς (= ψυχῆς) πλήρους ὄντος ἑκατέρου.
(37) Enn. III 2, 2. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀνέστη τόδε τὸ πᾶν. Cf. Enn. V 1, 2. Here does the development of the individual get told.
(38) Enn. III, 2, 2. τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς (= μέρεσι τοῦ παντός) τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου.
(39) Enn. IV 3, 10. Ἐκοσμεῖτο δὲ κατὰ λόγον ψυχῆς δυνάμει ἐχούσης ἐν αὐτῆι δι᾽ ὅλης δύναμιν κατὰ λόγους κοσμεῖν·
(40) Enn. IV 3, 10. οἷα καὶ οἱ ἐν σπέρμασι λόγοι πλάττουσι καὶ μορφοῦσι τὰ ζῶια οἷον μικρούς τινας κόσμους.
(41) Enn. V 1, 5. ἀριθμὸς δὲ ὡς οὐσία· ἀριθμὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχή . . . . Οὐδὲ ἐν σπέρμασι δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν τὸ τίμιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρώμενον τοῦτο δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος.
(42) Enn. IV 6, 3. Λόγος γάρ ἐστι πάντων, καὶ λόγος . . . πρῶτος δὲ τῶν ἐν τῶι αἰσθητῶι παντί.
(43) Enn. III 1, 10. Πραττούσας δὲ ψυχὰς ὅσα πράττουσι κατὰ μὲν λόγον ποιούσας ὀρθὸν παρ᾽ αὑτῶν πράττειν, ὅταν πράττωσι . . .
(44) Enn. III, 2, 9. . . . τοῦτο δέ ἐστι νόμωι προνοίας ζῶντα, ὃ δή ἐστι πράττοντα ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει. Λέγει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἀγαθὸν βίον ἔσεσθαι . . . τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς τὰ ἐναντία.
(45) Enn. I 2, 1. θεῶι, [φησιν,] ὁμοιωθῆναι. [Bracketed words not in original]
(46) Enn. VI 9, 9. Ἐν δὲ ταύτηι τῆι χορείαι καθορᾶι πηγὴν μὲν ζωῆς, πηγὴν δὲ νοῦ, ἀρχὴν ὄντος, ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν, ῥίζαν ψυχῆς.
(47) Enn. IV 4, 39. Ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἂν ἐοίκοι ὁ λόγος τοῦ παντὸς κατὰ λόγον τιθέντα κόσμον πόλεως καὶ νόμον, ἤδη εἰδότα ἃ πράξουσιν οἱ πολῖται καὶ δι᾽ ἃ πράξουσι, καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα νομοθετοῦντος καὶ συνυφαίνοντος τοῖς νόμοις τὰ πάθη πάντα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας, πάντων ὁδῶι οἷον αὐτομάτηι εἰς συμφωνίαν χωρούντων.
(48) Enn. VI 9, 7. οἵαν ἴσως καὶ Μίνως ποιούμενος ὀαριστὴς τοῦ Διὸς ἐφημίσθη εἶναι, ἧς μεμνημένος εἴδωλα αὐτῆς (= συνουσιας Διὸς) τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθει τῆι τοῦ θείου ἐπαφῆι εἰς νόμων πληρούμενος θέσιν.
(49) Johannes Hessen, Beiträge aur Geschichte der Philosphie des Mittelalters, Mänster 1916, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 64-67.
(50) Enn. II 3, 17. Κατ᾽ εἴδη ἄρα ποιεῖ. Δεῖ τοίνυν καὶ αὐτὴν παρὰ νοῦ ἔχουσαν διδόναι. Νοῦς δὴ ψυχῆι δίδωσι τῆι τοῦ παντός, ψυχὴ δὲ παρ᾽ αὐτῆς ἡ μετὰ νοῦν τῆι μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ἐλλάμπουσα καὶ τυποῦσα, ἡ δὲ ὡσπερεὶ ἐπιταχθεῖσα ἤδη ποιεῖ. Cf. Enn. I 1, 8.
(51) Enn. III 8, 5. Τὸ πρῶτον. [Τὸ λογιστικὸν] οὖν αὐτῆς ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀεὶ πληρούμενον καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενον μένει ἐκεῖ . . .
(52) Enn. V 8, 7. αἳ δὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστῆμαι, παρὰ νοῦ εἰς λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθοῦσαι . . .
(53) Enn. V 1, 6. Περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 10

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Sculpture of the Philosopher Plotinus

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

2. Attributes of the World Order.

Plotinus calls the order in the All eternal, in that the world is, to Plotinus, eternal.(20) The Nous brought forth the All. It is in the Mind of the enlightening Logos. That which is emitted by the Nous is the Logos. It emanates constantly forth. The eternal Logos determines the eternal order and harmony.(21)

The order is further measured by reason; in that the world soul conducts and administers the All following the laws of the Logos.(22) The order in the Cosmos is ultimately universal. It binds all things. Providence is the great guide beneath which all things stand. What could be disordered and draw away from the well-designed hanging together of all things?(23) There exists a Providence that sees all things through, from the beginning to the end, and which advances, not in numerical precision, but in a certain proportion. The evil themselves operate within this order. The evil act out their ways, their ways lacking good,(25) absent of good. "The difficulties associated with order are only possible because order exists. But it is not because of disorder that order exists, or because of unlawfulness that law exists. Rather, it is because of order that disorder exists, and because of law that reason exists, and from this there is lack of abiding in law and lack of reason.(26) According to Plotinus, order is not disturbed as a result of evil, as evil brings out in the view of the whole something useful, in that it can lend itself to be a pattern of lawfulness and something useful.(27) Yes, it is evidence of the highest power that from evil good can also be derived.(28) Providence demands that that which is evil be placed within the confines of the boundaries of order. It is with this that Dike (Δίκη), the Adrasteia (Ἀδράστεια) are concerned. Every bad action is followed by the judgment in the world, because it is not otherwise allowed. Right (Gerechtigkeit) triumphs in the All, because the Cosmos is ruled by the order and power of the highest governor.(29) The law of Providence is concerned with that: that the good are recompensed, and the evil are punished.(30). This order is in truth Adrasteia (the inescapable), in true justice and wonderful wisdom.(31) So is the order of the world according to Plotinus eternal, rational, and all-encompassing. Even the evil are dragged long under its influence, as it knows how to use it all for good.

Plotinus places therefore the same attributes upon the eternal law as Augustine.

AUGUSTINE	PLOTINUS
Augustine calls this law a lex aeterna, sempiterna, ineffabilis. S. 6, Anm. 1 and 2. universalis S.7, Anm. 8; S. 8, Anm. 10	Plotinus says about the Logos: λόγος, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορρεῖ. S. 42, Anm. 21. πρόνοια ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος κατιοῦσα. S. 42, Anm. 24.
Augustine defines evil as the absence of good: malum non est nisi privatio boni. Aug. PL 46, col. 411. Mali causa est defectus boni. Aug. PL 46, col. 411.	Plotinus defines evil in the same manner: κακὸν είναι ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στέρησις, απουσία ἀγαθοῦ. S. 42, Anm. 25.
The good and evil stand under the divine order of the world according to Augustine. Bona et mal ordine regi. S. 7, Anm. 8.	ἡ δὲ κακία . . . παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη. S. 43, Anm. 27.

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(20) Enn. III [2], 1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ [καὶ τὸ οὔποτε μὴ τῶι κόσμωι] τῶιδέ φαμεν παρεῖναι. [E.N. corrected in brackets]
(21) Enn. III, 2, 2. Νοῦς . . . τὰ πάντα εἰργάζετο· οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ νοῦ ῥυείς. Τὸ γὰρ ἀπορρέον ἐκ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορρεῖ . . . τοῦ δὲ λόγου ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἁρμονίαν καὶ μίαν τὴν σύνταξιν εἰς τὰ ὅλα ποιουμένου.
(22) Enn. II 3, 13. ψυχῆς δὴ τὸ πᾶν τόδε διοικούσης κατὰ λόγον . . .
(23) Enn. III 3, 2. εἰ δὲ δὴ (= ἡ προνοίαι)ὁ μέγας ἡγεμὼν εἴη, ὑφ᾽ ὧι πάντα, τί ἂν ἀσύντακτον, τί δὲ οὐκ ἂν συνηρμοσμένον εἴη
(24) Enn. III, 3, 5. Γίνεται τοίνυν ἡ πρόνοια ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος κατιοῦσα ἄνωθεν οὐκ ἴση οἷον κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν ἄλλη ἐν ἄλλωι [τόπωι]. [E.N. word replaced in brackets]
(25) Enn. I 8, 5. [[ἔλλειψις]] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [στέρησις, απουσία ἀγαθοῦ]. [E.N. replaced quote in double brackets; single brackets in original, but not in my copy of Enneads]
(26) Enn. III, 2, 4. οὐ γὰρ μήποτε ἐκφύγηι μηδὲν τὸ ταχθὲν ἐν τῶι τοῦ παντὸς νόμωι. Ἔστι δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀταξίαν τάξις οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἀνομίαν νόμος . . . ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τάξιν ἐπακτὸν οὖσαν· καὶ ὅτι τάξις, ἀταξία, καὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ ὅτι λόγος, παρανομία καὶ ἄνο[μ]ια. [E.N. bracketed letter in original]
(27) Enn. III, 2, 5. ἡ δὲ κακία εἰργάσατό τι χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ὅλον παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχομένη.
(28) Enn. III, 2, 5. Τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμεως μεγίστης, καλῶς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς χρῆσθαι δύνασθαι.
(29) Enn. II, 3, 8. καὶ [ἕπεται] τοῖς δρωμένοις ἐν τῶι παντὶ δίκη, εἴπερ μὴ [λυθήσεται] (= τὸ πᾶν). Μένει δ᾽ ἀεὶ (Δίκη) ὀρθουμένου τοῦ ὅλου τάξει καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ κρατοῦντος . . . [E.N. word replaced from original]
(30) Enn. III 2, 9. (νόμος προνοίας) λέγει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἀγαθὸν βίον ἔσεσθαι καὶ . . . τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς τὰ ἐναντία . . .
(31) Enn. III 2, 13. αὕτη γὰρ ἡ διάταξις Ἀδράστεια ὄντως καὶ ὄντως Δίκη καὶ σοφία θαυμαστή.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 9

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Sculpture of the Philosopher Plotinus

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

B. PLOTINUS (204-270 A.D.)(1)

We shall now investigate the dependence of Augustine on Plotinus in the matter of his teaching on the eternal law. Augustine was very familiar with Plotinus. In his works he cites Platonists somewhere around 42 times.(2) He bears self-witness to the influence of the Platonists, especially Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus.(3) Augustine frequently cites Plotinus's Enneads.(4) The bishop knew the Enneads more via its Latin version as translated by Victorinus than he did its greek original.(5) He himself said: "I have read some books of the Platonists in Latin translation by Victorinus, who died a Christian. Ambrose congratulated me that I did not come upon other Philosopher's books which were full of error."(7) In his writing Contra academicos, Augustine uses expressions of great enthusiasm and wonder in describing Plotinus. He places Plotinus upon a level with the great master Plato.(8) In his Enneads, Plotinus handles the eternal law, the Logos. Now we shall look at what there is to find regarding the eternal law in the Enneads.

1. Concept of Order, Law, and the Eternal Law According to Plotinus.

Plotinus distinguishes between the intelligible world and the sensible world. The latter derives from the former (the to Hen, τὸ Ἕν) through emanation. Plotinus therefore ties the visible world to a living organism. In this organism abides a wonderful order and harmony of all parts together and as a whole.(9) He writes in this regard: "One can see how the One (to Hen) diffuses itself, in that it extends itself over all things, and holds all things together in its order, so that there is also the One is a variedly-dressed organism, in which every part is designed so that it is in accord with its nature, and thereby all things hang together into one whole."(10) Plotinus's emphasis here is that the order that is in all things is similar to the order in which one finds in a visible organism. The One is the ultimate end and reason for the order in the world (syntaxis mia, σύνταξις μία). Plotinus uses the word "order" in the sense of the natural order and order of the world. Tied up within the order of nature there are natural laws and in the order of the world there are world laws. Order is also manifested in the world of the stars. The planets help to form the universe. They hang tightly together with the universe. Within these one may find a sort of impulsion wherein they long for the interest of the universe, similar to what one finds in the parts of an organism. Only in this way is achieved a total and complete harmony.(11)

The science of divination is based upon the very order of the stars. In the stars are written heavenly signs, which move in unperturbed order, a revelation of eternal order.(12) This order can only be founded by a God, but they reveal themselves to the diviner.(13) Such revelation would not possible if the movements of the heaven did not occur in proper order.(14) Where is the foundation of this order? In that principle which makes a multifarious organism one despite the variety of its parts.(15)

Sometimes Plotinus ties in the concept of order with the concept of the beautiful. God has made all things beautiful. This beauty exists in the self-sufficiency and the consistency of the parts to the whole.(16)

The beauty is here considered as order and harmony of the parts. In referring to this order sometimes as necessity (Notwendigkeit), Plotinus ties this concept to the Stoic concept, heimarmene (εἱμαρμένη), a concept that we will later see again.(17) He understands thereby a natural cause of the hanging together of things in their becoming, in their waxing and in their waning (Ursachenzusammenhang der Dinge im Werden, Wirken und Welken). At the foundation of this foundational cause of the hanging together of things (Ursachenzusammenhangs) stands the the Hen, the Aitia kyriotate, the highest cause. Plotinus adjusts the Stoic conception in this manner, however: that this necessary order only in the lower realms is called heimarmene, but in the higher realms it is called pronoia (προνοια), Providence. The heimarmene relates to the lesser things. The higher is exclusively Providence. In the intelligible world only the Logos rules alone.(18) Ultimately, Plotinus names the order of all things a strategic order. Through this strategic Providence, all the world is ordered, irrespective of whether actions, suffering, demands are considered. When Providence is the great Guide under which all things stand, what could be disordered and what would could withdraw from the joinder and gathering of itself together?(19) The pronoia is here the strategy of the Guide that traverses through and over the All and is concerned with order.

Plotinus teaches therefore that a certain order dominates all things. He calls this order taxis, syntaxis, harmonia, pronoia, heimarmene. This order is identical with the law in All.

The concepts of taxis, syntaxis, harmonia fit into Augustine's concepts of ordo, the covenientia partium; the concept of pronoia is known as providentia, and the heimarmene as the ordo causarum. (S. 3-5)

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(1) The sources are not chonologically, but by value addressed.
(2) Cf. Grandgeorge, St. Augustin et le Néoplatonisme, Paris 1896, p. 32.
(3) Aug., De civ. Dei VIII, 12. Ex quibus (Platonicis), sunt valde nobilitate Graeci, Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus.
(4) Vgl. die Zusammenstellung der Zitate bei Bouillet, Les Ennéades du Plotin, t. 2, p. 561, Paris 1859, t. 3, p. 661.
(5) Augustini vita PL 32, lib. 1, c. 2, col. 69. Augustinum mediocriter graecum scivisse constat. Litteras latinas amavit, graeces odit. Cogebatur ad haec studia. Augustinus ipse dixit: se leviter imbutum esse hisce litteris. Cf. Augu., Conf. 8, 2; 7, 9.
(6) Augustinus et Victorinus PL 46, col. 67, sub titulo Victorinus. Victoriunus vertit in linguam latinam libros platonicorum. PL 32, col. 750.
(7) Aug. Conf. 8, 2. Ubi autem commemoravi legisse me quosdam libros platonicorum, quos Victorinus, quondam rhetor urbis Romae, quem christianum defunctum esse audieram, in latinam linguam transtulisset, gratulatus est mihi Ambrosius, quod non in aliorum philosophorum scdripta incidissem, plean fallaciarum et deceptionum secundum elementa mund. Aug., Conf. VII, 9. Procurasti mihi . . . libros ex graeca lingua in latinam versos et ibi legi . . .
(8) Aug., Contra ac. III, 18. Osque illud Platonis, quod in philosophia purgatissimum et lucidissimum, dimotis nubibus erroris, emicuit maxime in Plotino, qui Platonicus philosophus ita eius similis iudicatus est, ut simul eos vixisse, tantum autem interesse temporis ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus est.
(9) cf. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums, I Bd., Berlin 1920, S. 620-637.
(10) Müller, Fr. Herm., Plotini Enneades, Berolini 1888. Enn. III, 3, 1. καὶ σκιδνάμενον τὸ ἓν ὁρῶν τῷ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ ὁμοῦ περιλαμβάνειν συντάξει μιᾷ, ὡς διακεκριμένον ἓν εἶναι ζῷον πολὺ ἑκάστου πράττοντος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅλῳ ὅμως ὄντος.
(11) Plotini Enn. II 3, 5. Πάντες (ἁστέρες) δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σύμφοροι, ὥστε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὕτως, ὡς τῷ ὅλῳ συμφέρει, ὡς ἐφ´ ἑνὸς ζῴου ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν ὁρᾶται . . . οὕτω καὶ ἓν καὶ μία ἁρμονία.
(12) Enn. III 3, 6. καὶ ἡ τέχνη (= τῆς μάντεως) ἀνάγνωσις φυσικῶν γραμμάτων καὶ τάξιν δηλούντων.
(13) Ibidem c. 6.
(14) Plotini Enn. II 3, 7. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσημαίνετο τεταγμένως μὴ ἑκάστων γιγνομένων.
(15) Ibidem. Τίς οὖν ἡ σύνταξις ἡ μία . . . καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἓν πολὺ ζῷον ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν.
(16) Enn. III, 2, 3. γάρ τι ἐποίησεν (θεός) πάγκαλον καὶ αὔταρκες καὶ φίλον αὑτῷ καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡσαύτως προσφόροις.
(17) Enn. III, 1, 2. [Οἱ δὲ Στωικοι] διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασαν αἰτίαν καὶ ταύτην οὐ μόνον κινοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιοῦσαν ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἱμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν θέμενοι, αὐτὴν οὖσαν . . . [Χρύσιππος . . . εἱμαρμένη φυσική σύνταξις τῶν ὅλων, ἐξ αιδίου τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις επακολουθουντων]. (E.N. I did not find the bracketed portion in the Enneads, III, 1, 2.]
(18) Enn. III 3, 5. εἱμαρμένη δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἀρξαμένη, τὸ δὲ ὑπεράνω πρόνοια μόνον. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῶι κόσμωι τῶι νοητῶι πάντα λόγος.
(19) Enn. III 3, 2. Ἐτάχθη δὲ τὸ πᾶν προνοίαι στρατηγικῆι ὁρώσηι καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἃ δεῖ παρεῖναι . . . εἰ δὲ δὴ (= ἡ προνοίαι) ὁ μέγας ἡγεμὼν εἴη, ὑφ᾽ ὧι πάντα, τί ἂν ἀσύντακτον, τί δὲ οὐκ ἂν συνηρμοσμένον εἴη.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 8

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Bust of Cicero

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

c) The Eternal Law is the Foundational Norm of all Human Law, Especially the Law of the State.

Cicero links all temporal law to the eternal law (cf. S. 29). Included within the temporal law is human law, such as family law, the law of the State, the law of Nations. It follows that these laws' ultimate end is the eternal law.

Cicero links the concerns of the law of the State with the concerns of the laws that govern families, and the law that governs families upon the law of nature, and the law of nature on the eternal law.

Cicero views the State as a living organism. He distinguishes between the unity of the entire body and the composition of limbs. Just like the soul rules over the limbs of the body, so do the princes and rulers govern the citizens of the State.(32) Under the term "people" (Volk), Cicero understands not merely the unification of individual men, which in some way are bound together, but rather the unity of the many (Vielheit), which through the conforming nature of the law and with respect of their common needs have bound themselves together.(33) The reason for the State, therefore, is based in a conformity with law and in a community of interests. The ground for which men bind themselves together is not based upon the insecurity of the weak, but rather the desire for social life that is implanted in the nature of man.(34) Whoever does not desire to live in a community of justice (Rechtsgemeinschaft) with other men and does not allow himself to be bound to such a community, ought not to be called a man.(35) Human nature is so designed that it has an inborn sense for establishing cities and social pacts, what the Greeks called politikon.(36) So lies in human nature in germ or seminally (Keime) the building of States.

How did the State come to be in nature? The human tendency to live in common and to produce their kind forced men to build families. The family is the first circle of life in common, the foundation and the beginning of the state and the seminary (Pflanzschule) of the State.(37) The family grows through its broadening: kinship, friendship, neighborship, are organic mediating institutions between an individual and the State. Families compose certain homes, places, cities, and states.(38) Any kind of peoples must be ruled by some sort of plan in order for it to stand. The government must always be aimed at the basic principle that has brought it to be in the first place (Nature),(39) so likewise must this government, whether it is held by one or is held by many, or even the entire people. If one person has the highest power, he will be called king, and his domain a kingdom. If the highest power is held by a presiding group, so will the state be ruled through the most noble (an aristocracy). A commonwealth (Democracy) is that in which the entire power is held by the people.(40) The ruling power rests therefore in the State, the State upon the family, and the family upon nature.(41) The laws of the State likewise refer back to the laws of the family, and these both to the natural law, with the latter linked to the eternal law.

Cicero teaches also directly that the laws of the State must be in accord with the eternal law. He writes with respect to that issue: "This is the law of distinguishing between what is just and what is unjust, the most ancient and plenary principle expressed in nature, upon which the laws of men are based, which punishes the sinner, and vindicates and protects the good."(41) But Cicero goes further than that. He speaks of the positive rules that have been given before the dawn of time, which he calls law. "These regulations relay more upon favor that objective reasons for the name of law."(42) At bottom there is only one law the recta ratio summi Iovis.

The ius gentium or law of nations (Völkerrecht) is tied to the natural law, and is viewed by Cicero as a development of it. The ius gentium contains nothing but the reasonable development of the natural law, insofar as the latter is drawn from and recognized by all peoples.(43) Cicero identifies therefore often the ius gentium with the us naturae.(44) Consequently, according to Cicero, the ius gentium is nothing other than a part of the natural law, and through the natural law finally drawn from the eternal law. So does Cicero tie the law of nations or ius gentium to the recta ratio summi Iovis. So it is that all human law, above all the law of the State, rest upon the eternal law.

Drawing now the similarities between the notion of the derivation of the law of the State from the eternal law discussed above with that of Cicero, we see the following important points of similarity.

AUGUSTINE	CICERO
The lex aeterna is the basic norm of the law of the State. 1. Nihil esse iustum atque legitimum quod non ex aeterna lege homines sibi derivaverint. S.14, Anm. 30.	The lex aeterna s the basic norm of the law of the State. 1. Constituendi vero iuris ab illa summa lege capiamus exordium, quae sacelis omnibus ante nata est. S. 29 Anm. 2. 2. Ad illam antiquissimam naturam ad quam leges hominum dirigintur. S. 29, Anm. 4.
2. The State is predicated upon the family, the family upon nature, and nature upon the Godhead. Civitas est rationabilium multitude unius societate devincta. S.15, Anm. 35. Singuli homines tanquam elementa semina civitatum. S. 15, Anm. 37. Domus est initium sive particula civitatis. S. 16, Anm. 42. Homo fertur naturae legibus ad ineundam societatem. S. 15, Anm. 39.	The State is founded upon the family, the family upon nature, and nature upon the Godhead. Res publica est res populi. S. 35, Anm. 33. Augustine adopts this definition. cf. Aug., De civ. Dei 19, 31. Homines seminarium rei publicae. S. 36, Anm. 37. In connubio est prima societas. S. 36, Anm. 37. Duce natura congregantur homines. S. 36, Anm. 38.
The desire for social life and to propagate are the driving forces of social union. Deus est omnium naturam sapientissimus conditor et iustissimus ordinator. S. 16, Anm. 44.	The desire for social life and to propogate are the driving forces of social union. Natura id est deus est huius legis inventor, deceptator et lator. S. 25, Anm. 19.
3. Non est potestas nisi a Deo. S. 17, Anm. 46-49.	3. Divina mens summa lex est. S. 37, Anm. 42.

Augustine and Cicero trace the laws of the State, in their final source, upon the Godhead. The same or similar concepts and termini show that Augustine relies upon Cicero.

5. Conclusions regarding Cicero's Teaching on the Eternal Law.

Cicero travels from the concept of order to his analysis of the eternal law. He understands under the term order the inner direction of things, the hanging togetherness of things, the law-like course of the stars. Order is measure, beauty, equal measure in thought and in deed. Order is the harmony of the parts. Order is that the awareness that our acts must be done at the right time and right place. Cicero defines law as right reason in both command and prohibition. It indicates the eternal law as the understanding that all things are ordered and prohibited according to the reason of the Godhead. Cicero calls this law eternal, eternal, all-encompassing. It binds all creatures; even the evil are under that law. The eternal law is the fundamental source, the fundamental norm of the temporal law, the natural law, the moral law, and the law of the State. The eternal law is stamped upon the nature of man. This, in summary, is the teaching of Cicero on the eternal law.

The similarity of this teaching with Augustine, as indicated above, displays itself in the similar concepts, the similar understanding, and the similar terminology that exist between them. The similarity of Augustine to Cicero establishes the reliance of Augustine upon Cicero.

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(1) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 1, c. 6, § 19. A lege ducendum est iuris exordium, ea est enim naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula.
(2) Cic., De leg. lib. 1, c. 6. Constituendi vero iuris ab illa summa lege capiamus exordiu, quae saeclis omnibus ante nata est, quam script lex ulla aut quam omnino civitas constituta.
(3) Ibidem: Repetam stirpem iuris a natura.
(4) Cic., De leg. lib. 2, c. 4, § 25. Lex est ratio summi Jovis . . . § 13 lex est iustorum iniustorumque distinctio ad illam antiquissimam et rerum omnium principem naturam expressa, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quae supplicio improbos afficunt, defendunt et tuentur bonos.
(5) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 2, c. 39. Licet iam remota subtilitate disputandi oculis, quodammodo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum earum, quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas.
(6) Ibidem. c. 31, § 80. Omnia regi divina mente atque prudentia.
(7) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 11, c. 2, § 4. Sunt autem alii philophi et ii quidem magni atque nobiles, qui deorum mente atque ratione mundum administrari et regi censeat.
(8) Cic., De nat. deorum c. 22. Zeno igitur natura ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem in via. cf. Diels, Doxographi Graeci 1879, S. 305.
(9) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 1, c. 14. . . . rationem quandam per omnem naturam rerum pertinentem.
(10) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 2, c. 33. (Natura) gravidata seminibus omnia pareat et fundat ex se . . .
(11) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 2, c. 34. Omnium rerum quae natura administrantur, seminator et sator et parens, ut ita dicam atque educator et altor est mundus omniaque sicut membra et partes suas nutricatur et continet (mundus = natura = deus).
(12) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 2, c. 38. Licet iam remota subtilitate disputandi oculis quadammodo contemplari pulchritudinem rerum, quas divina providentia dicimus constitutas.
(13) Cic., De nat. deorum lib. 2, c. 53. Sic undique omni ratione concluditur, ment consilioque divino, omnia in hoc mundo ad salutem omnium conservationemque admirabiliter administrari. Mente divina constitutas esse . . .
(14) Cic., De harusp. resp. c. 9. Pietate ac religione atque una sapientia quod deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspexium omnes gentes nationesque superavimus.
(15) Cic., De off., 1, c. 4, § 14. Non vero illa prava vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quae aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit, quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat cavetque ne quid indecore effeminative faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid lubidinose aut faciat aut cogitet.
(16) Cic., De off. 1, c. 4, § 14. Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id, quod quaerimus honestum.
(17) cf. Cic., De off. 1, c. 4.
(18) Cic., De off. lib. 1, c. 5. Sed omne quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua . . .
(19) cf. Cic., De off. 1, c. 4 and c. 5.
(20) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 17. Ipsum enim bonum non est opinionibus, sed natura.
(21) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 17. Quare quam et bonum et malum natura iudicetur et ea sint principia naturae, certe honesta quoque et turpia simili ratione diiudicanda et ad naturam referenda sunt.
(22) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 18, § 49. Atque etiam si emolumentis, non suapte vi virtus expetitur, una erit virtus, quae malitia rectissime dicetur, ut enim quisque maxime ad suum commodum refert, quaecumque agit. Ita minime est vir bonus.
(23) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 16, § 44. Quodsi populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis iudicum iura constituerentur, ius esset latrocinari, ius adulterare, ius testamenta falsa supponere, si haec suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur.
(24) Ibidem. Atqui nos legem bonam a mala, nulla alia, nisi naturae norma dividere possumus, nec solum ius et natura diiudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta et turpia. Cic., De leg. 1, c. 15, § 42. Est enim unum ius quo divincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una . . . quae lex est recta ratio.
(25) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 16. Nam ut communis intelligentia nobis nostras res efficit easque in animis nostris inchoavit honesta in virtute ponunutr, in vitiis turpia, ea autem in opinion existimare, non in natura posita dementis est.
(26) cf. Schmekel, Philosophie der Stoa, Berlin 1892, S. 53. Vgl. Cic., Tuscul. disp. lib. 3, c. 1
(27) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 10, § 30. Quaeque in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, inchoatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur, interpresque mentis oratio verbis discrepat, sententiis congruens. Cic. De fin. bon. mal. lib. 5, c. 21, § 59. Natura ingenuit notitias parvas rerum maximarum, elementa virtutum.
(28) Cic. Tuscul. disp. lib. 3, c. 1, § 2. Natura nunc parvulos nobis dedit igniculos, quos celeriter malis moribus opinionisbusque depravati, sic restinguimus ut nusquam naturae lumen appareat. Sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret.
(29) Cic. Pro Mil, c. 4, § 10. Est igitur haec (lex iustae tutelae), iudices non scripta, sed nata lex, quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum a natura ipsa arribpuimus, hausimus, expressimus, ad quam non docti, sed facti, non insituti, sed imbuti sumus.
(30) Cic., De leg. 1, c. 6, § 18. Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria. Cic., De rep. lib. 3, c. 20. Est quidem vera lex recta ratio, diffus in omnes, quae vocat ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat.
(31) Cic., De leg. lib. 2, c. 40, § 10. Erat enim ratio profecta a rerum natura et ad recte faciendum impellens et a delicto avocans quae non tum denique incipit lex esse, quum scripta est, sed tum, quam orta est, orta autem simul est cum mente divina. Quam ob rem lex vera atque princeps apta ad iubendum et vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis.
(32) Cic., De rep. 3.25. Nam ut animus corpori dicitus imperare sic regum, sic imperatorum, sic magistratuum, sic patrum, sic populorum imperia civius sociisque praesunt. Cf. Aug., De civ. Dei 14, 32.
(33) Cic., De rep. 3, 25, § 29. Est igitur, inquit Africanus, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.
(34) Cic., De rep. 1.25, § 39. Eius autem prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas, quam naturalis hominum congregatio.
(35) Cic., De rep. 2, c. 26. Quis enim hunc hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi cum suis civibus, qui denique cum omnium hominum genere nullam iuris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem velit.
(36) Cic., De fin. bon. mal. c. 5, n. 23. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit ut habeat quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque populare quod graeci politikon vocant. (cf. Aristotle, Pol., I, 1. Anthropos physei politikon zoon.)
(37) Cic., De off. lib. 1, c. 17. Nam cum sit hoc natura communi animalium ut habeant lubidenem procreandi, prima societas in ipso connubio est urbis quasi seminarium rei publicae. Cic., De off. lib. 2, c. 21. Duce natura homines congregabantar.
(38) Cic., De rep. lib. 1, c. 17. Sequuntur fratrum coiunctiones post-consorbrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possunt in alias domos tamquam colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates . . . quae propogatio et sobulus origo est rerum publicarum.
(39) Cic., De rep. lib. 1, c. 26. Omnis populus, omnis civitas, omnis res publica consilio quodam regenda est, ut diuturna sit. Id autem consilium primum semper ad eam causam referendum est, quae causa genuit civitatem.
(40) Ibidem. Deinde aut uni tribuendum est aut delectis quibusdam aut suscipiendum est multitudini atque omnibus. Quare paenes unum est omnium summa rerum regem illum unum vocamus et regnum eius rei publicae statum. Cum autem est paenes delectos, tum illa civitas optimatium arbitrio regi dicitur. Illa autem est civitas popularis . . . in qua in populo sunt omnia.
(41) Cic., De leg. lib. 2, c. 5, § 13. Lex est iustorum iniustorumque distinctio ad illam antiquissimam et rerum omnium principem naturam expressa, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quae supplicio improbos adficiunt, defendunt et tuentur bonos.
(42) Cic., De leg. lib. 2, c. 5. Quae leges varie et ad tempus descriptae populis favore magis quam re legum nomen tenent . . . ergo illa divina mens summ lex est.
(43) Cf. Cic., De off. III, 17.
(44) Cf. Tusc. I, 13, 20; De off. III, 6, 27; De harusp. resp. XV, 32.