AS WE NOTED IN OUR LAST POSTING, THE GREEKS WERE ENCUMBERED by a particularly strong social inheritance of Vergeltungsdenken, "repayment thinking." Their culture is not the only one that suffered from it; it is rather common corruption in the moral make up of man. Indeed, it was found alive and well in Palestine well after Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle engaged with it in battle in ancient Greece. Jesus himself mentions this common, popular norm of morality only to reject it: "You have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thy enemy. But I say to you, Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: and pray for them that persecute and calumniate you: That you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven, who maketh his sun to rise upon the good, and bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust." Matt. 5:43-44.
But the Word of God made flesh did not walk about in ancient Athens or Sparta to combat their Vergeltungsdenken. But there did come a time where the Greeks, using reason, questioned their cultural and religious inheritances, and the values they presupposed. All things were subjected to the reasoning, the Socratic method of unremitting questioning (elenchus) by the Philosopher. The writings of the poets, in particular Homer, were considered quasi-scriptural. Positively, the Greeks had the system builders Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle who, though critical of convention, believed that reason, at least in a limited way, could come to grips with objective truth. Negatively, the Greeks had the relativistic attackers of conventional morality: the Cynics and their cousins, the Sophists. Though both Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, in their way, and the Sophists, in their way, tried to overcome or at least challenge the popular Vergeltungsdenken, their influence was insufficient to fully reverse the moral inertia they faced. As Jeffrey Wattles summarizes Albrecht Dihle's view of it in Die Goldene Regel, despite some success at ameliorating the worst of this ethic, "the Greek golden rule remained captive to repayment thinking." Wattles, 197, n. 5.
The Sophists are painted poorly by Socrates and Plato. Their insights (for example their distinction between law as convention, nomos, and nature, physis) were poisoned by their relativist ethic founded on a skeptical view of the world. They distinguished between convention and nature, and so contributed to progress in the notion of the natural moral law, but their rejection of objective truth, and their dishonesty with words, is what makes even today the term "sophistry" full of negative connotations:
Bust of Isocrates (Pushkin Museum)
Aegineticus: At the close of his argument to the jury in his Aegineticus Isocrates pleads the jurors before whom he argues, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ δίκαια ψηφίσασθαι, καὶ τοιούτους μοι γενέσθαι δικαστάς, οἵων περ ἂν αὐτοὶ τυχεῖν ἀξιώσαιτε, "to give a just verdict, and prove yourselves to be for me such judges as you would want to have for yourselves." (George Norlin, trans.) Isocrates, Aegineticus, 51. Though limited to the external forum of a lawsuit, the plea sounds very like at least a shade of the principle behind the Golden Rule.
To Demonicus: This speech, which appears to be a moral exordium of sorts, is addressed to the Cyprian Demonicus, son of Hipponicus. Amidst, his hotchpotch of advice and moral maxims, Isocrates makes the following statement.
To Nicocles:, This oration was given in honor of Nicocles, son of the King of Salamis Cyprus, Evagoras. It aims at giving advice to the prince who would be king regarding the duties of a monarch to his subjects. Here, Isocrates extends beyond the familial economy and the relationship between parent and child, to the larger forum of relationships between states.
Perhaps the strongest phrasing of the Golden Rule is in Isocrates's Nicocles or the Cyprians. This is a speech aimed at the aristocracy of Cyprus, apparently following the accession of Nicocles to the thrown of that island. Its purpose is, in a sense, the opposite of the earlier speech, as it seeks to give advice to the subjects in their relationship to their king.
Wrested from their context, these maxims appear to advance noble thoughts, but Isocrates's moral advice also seems at time shallow and opportunistic. As a whole, as a moral teacher, Isocrates pales before the sages Confucius and the Buddha, and the religious leader Rabbi Hillel, and, a fortiori, the Man-God Jesus. One perceives the truth of Wattles's observation regarding the Golden Rule:
Finally, let us turn to Isocrates's Panegyricus. This political speech to be given within the context of a great public festival (hence the name, Panegyreis = public festival) was designed to persuade the warring Greek city-states, at a time when Sparta and Athens and their allies were at odds, to unify against their common Persian enemy. During the course of his speech, Isocrates praises the great statesmen of Athens who, in the exercise of their power held back their hand against the weaker, and he praises that virtue in terms clearly redolent of a "Golden Rule" ethic:
While Isocrates applies a "Golden Rule" type thinking to praise the Athenians in the exercise of their political power over the other Greek poleis, one must keep in mind the context of his speech. That very context suggests that the moral principle he advises is limited by his intense parochialism, albeit one that looks beyond the polis of Athens and the polis of Sparta, or any other Greek polis, and advocates a larger pan-Hellenism. "I am here," he says, "to advise you concerning war against the barbarians, and harmony among ourselves." Panegyricus, 3. In other words, his Golden Rule applies within Hellas, but not outside of it. In this sense, Isocrates's formulation of the Golden Rule is as limited as any Golden Rule may be within traditional or fundamentalist Islam, which distinguishes between the moral treatment of the Muslim, the "People of the Book" (the ′Ahl al-Kitāb أهل الكتاب), and those outside those two categories.
In summary, if one expects to find a "Golden Rule" in any real sense in Isocrates, one will be disappointed. At best, we have a "blending of the golden rule with the pursuit of personal or factional advantage." Wattles, 31. We should remember, further, in assessing Isocrates, that he is comrade to sophists Callicles and Thrasymachus, who (in Plato's dialogue Gorgias and the first book of his Republic) advanced the rule law of might over right, which is nothing but amoralism. One wonders if such an ethic, though remaining suppressed in his speeches on the grounds of rhetoric, may not have been present in the heart of hearts of Isocrates. For the Greeks, any real effort at overcoming the Vergeltungsdenken, "repayment thinking" must wait until Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and even there, such teaching is fraught with inconsistency.
But the Word of God made flesh did not walk about in ancient Athens or Sparta to combat their Vergeltungsdenken. But there did come a time where the Greeks, using reason, questioned their cultural and religious inheritances, and the values they presupposed. All things were subjected to the reasoning, the Socratic method of unremitting questioning (elenchus) by the Philosopher. The writings of the poets, in particular Homer, were considered quasi-scriptural. Positively, the Greeks had the system builders Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle who, though critical of convention, believed that reason, at least in a limited way, could come to grips with objective truth. Negatively, the Greeks had the relativistic attackers of conventional morality: the Cynics and their cousins, the Sophists. Though both Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, in their way, and the Sophists, in their way, tried to overcome or at least challenge the popular Vergeltungsdenken, their influence was insufficient to fully reverse the moral inertia they faced. As Jeffrey Wattles summarizes Albrecht Dihle's view of it in Die Goldene Regel, despite some success at ameliorating the worst of this ethic, "the Greek golden rule remained captive to repayment thinking." Wattles, 197, n. 5.
The Sophists are painted poorly by Socrates and Plato. Their insights (for example their distinction between law as convention, nomos, and nature, physis) were poisoned by their relativist ethic founded on a skeptical view of the world. They distinguished between convention and nature, and so contributed to progress in the notion of the natural moral law, but their rejection of objective truth, and their dishonesty with words, is what makes even today the term "sophistry" full of negative connotations:
But all was false and hollow; though his tongueSo Milton, in his Paradise Lost (II.112). There is a certain irony, then, the Golden Rule was first ushered into the Greek intellectual scene by the Sophist Isocrates (436-335 B.C.). It was Isocrates "who, more than anyone else, was responsible for the burst of golden rule thinking that entered the fourth-century Greek culture." Wattles, 27.
Dropp’d manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsels.
Not particularly convincingly, Wattles suggests that there are glimmers of the Golden Rule in Calypso's promise to Odysseus in Homer's Odyssey [V.184-91[, in Thales's teachings as found in Diogenes Laertius [Lives, IX.1], and in the story of King Maendrius of Samos in Herodotus [III, c. 142]. But the first seems an individual promise, not a general principle of morality. The second appears to be an injunction against hypocrisy, and not a rule of behavior in the treatment of others. The last appears to be an expedient political principle, less moral than civil or political in nature.

The great sophist rhetorician and son of a flute maker, Isocrates (436-338 B.C.), appears, at least superficially, an exception. Isocrates enunciates the Golden Rule ethic implicitly in various of his works, including the Agineticus (Αιγινητικός), To Demonicus (Πρὸς Δημόνικον), and To Nicocles (Πρὸς Νικόκλεα). In one of his works in particular, his Nicocles or the Cyprians (Νικόκλης ἢ Κύπριοι), the formulation of the rule is particularly strong. But these should be understood within their context and in light of his master work, the Panegyricus published circa 380 B.C. Read as a whole, one has to agree with an early commentator and translator of Isocrates's works, J. H. Freese, made in reference to Isocrates's To Demonicus, but which is equally true of Isocrates's works as a whole.
[T]he standard of morality--at times not a very lofty one but curiously mixed-- adopted by the author, which may be assumed to have been at least on a level with the average standard of the age. Sagacious and worldly reflections worthy of Lord Chesterfield stand side by side with the precepts of an exalted moralityThe Orations of Isocrates, J. H. Freese, trans. (London: Forge Bell & Sons, 1894), 2. In other words, Isocrates the Sophist may, from a moral standpoint, be too practical to be ideal.
Aegineticus: At the close of his argument to the jury in his Aegineticus Isocrates pleads the jurors before whom he argues, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ δίκαια ψηφίσασθαι, καὶ τοιούτους μοι γενέσθαι δικαστάς, οἵων περ ἂν αὐτοὶ τυχεῖν ἀξιώσαιτε, "to give a just verdict, and prove yourselves to be for me such judges as you would want to have for yourselves." (George Norlin, trans.) Isocrates, Aegineticus, 51. Though limited to the external forum of a lawsuit, the plea sounds very like at least a shade of the principle behind the Golden Rule.
To Demonicus: This speech, which appears to be a moral exordium of sorts, is addressed to the Cyprian Demonicus, son of Hipponicus. Amidst, his hotchpotch of advice and moral maxims, Isocrates makes the following statement.
Conduct yourself toward your parents as you would have your children conduct themselves toward you.To Demonicus, 14. (George Norlin, trans.)
τοιοῦτος γίγνου περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς, οἵους ἂν εὔξαιο περὶ σεαυτὸν γενέσθαι τοὺς σεαυτοῦ παῖδας.
To Nicocles:, This oration was given in honor of Nicocles, son of the King of Salamis Cyprus, Evagoras. It aims at giving advice to the prince who would be king regarding the duties of a monarch to his subjects. Here, Isocrates extends beyond the familial economy and the relationship between parent and child, to the larger forum of relationships between states.
Whatever advice you would give to your children, consent to follow it yourself.To Nicocles, 38, 24. (George Norlin, trans.)
μιμοῦ τὰς πράξεις. ἃ τοῖς αὑτοῦ παισὶν ἂν συμβουλεύσειας.
Deal with weaker states as you would expect stronger states to deal with you.
οὕτως ὁμίλει τῶν πόλεων πρὸς τὰς ἥττους, ὥσπερ ἂν τὰς κρείττους πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀξιώσειας.
Perhaps the strongest phrasing of the Golden Rule is in Isocrates's Nicocles or the Cyprians. This is a speech aimed at the aristocracy of Cyprus, apparently following the accession of Nicocles to the thrown of that island. Its purpose is, in a sense, the opposite of the earlier speech, as it seeks to give advice to the subjects in their relationship to their king.
Do not do to others that which angers you when they do it to you. Practice nothing in your deeds for which you condemn others in your words.Nicocles or the Cyprians, 61. (George Norlin, trans.)
ἃ πάσχοντες ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρων ὀργίζεσθε, ταῦτα τοὺς ἄλλους μὴ ποιεῖτε. περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατηγορῆτε, μηδὲν τούτων ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτηδεύετε.
Wrested from their context, these maxims appear to advance noble thoughts, but Isocrates's moral advice also seems at time shallow and opportunistic. As a whole, as a moral teacher, Isocrates pales before the sages Confucius and the Buddha, and the religious leader Rabbi Hillel, and, a fortiori, the Man-God Jesus. One perceives the truth of Wattles's observation regarding the Golden Rule:
Since the golden rule does not specify a particular moral standard, it can consort with social conventions whose mediocrity will evident only to a later age or another culture.Wattles, 27. The Golden Rule requires a companion or corollary foundation, either in virtue and rite (such as in Confucianism), or upon a sort of moral idealism, reason, or friendship (as in Plato or Aristotle and the Stoics), or upon Scripture (as in Hillel's formulation or in example, as in Christ). This quality of the Golden Rule also explains why the liberal philosopher John Rawls's (1921-2002) formulation of the Golden Rule (his "veil of ignorance" theory) can lead him blindly to believe that abortion falls within his version of the rule. Abortion, it may be observed, is a reassertion of the Vergeltungsdenken ethic. In this instance, the fetus is being viewed as an "enemy" which therefore allows harm to be done to it. The fetus is an "enemy" that threatens the convenience or whatever other good or apparent good the mother (or anyone else which is putting pressure on her to made the decision, including a culture that has invested too much in a sexual revolution and seeks to avoid the natural social costs of such lack of strictures on sexual behavior) seeks to advance.
Finally, let us turn to Isocrates's Panegyricus. This political speech to be given within the context of a great public festival (hence the name, Panegyreis = public festival) was designed to persuade the warring Greek city-states, at a time when Sparta and Athens and their allies were at odds, to unify against their common Persian enemy. During the course of his speech, Isocrates praises the great statesmen of Athens who, in the exercise of their power held back their hand against the weaker, and he praises that virtue in terms clearly redolent of a "Golden Rule" ethic:
[T]hey exulted less in the exercise of power than they gloried in living with self-control, thinking it their duty to feel toward the weaker as they expected the stronger to feel toward themselves.Panegyricus, 81 (George Norlin, trans.)
οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις μέγα φρονοῦντες, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ σωφρόνως ζῆν φιλοτιμούμενοι, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξιοῦντες γνώμην ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς ἥττους ἥνπερ τοὺς κρείττους πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς.
While Isocrates applies a "Golden Rule" type thinking to praise the Athenians in the exercise of their political power over the other Greek poleis, one must keep in mind the context of his speech. That very context suggests that the moral principle he advises is limited by his intense parochialism, albeit one that looks beyond the polis of Athens and the polis of Sparta, or any other Greek polis, and advocates a larger pan-Hellenism. "I am here," he says, "to advise you concerning war against the barbarians, and harmony among ourselves." Panegyricus, 3. In other words, his Golden Rule applies within Hellas, but not outside of it. In this sense, Isocrates's formulation of the Golden Rule is as limited as any Golden Rule may be within traditional or fundamentalist Islam, which distinguishes between the moral treatment of the Muslim, the "People of the Book" (the ′Ahl al-Kitāb أهل الكتاب), and those outside those two categories.
In summary, if one expects to find a "Golden Rule" in any real sense in Isocrates, one will be disappointed. At best, we have a "blending of the golden rule with the pursuit of personal or factional advantage." Wattles, 31. We should remember, further, in assessing Isocrates, that he is comrade to sophists Callicles and Thrasymachus, who (in Plato's dialogue Gorgias and the first book of his Republic) advanced the rule law of might over right, which is nothing but amoralism. One wonders if such an ethic, though remaining suppressed in his speeches on the grounds of rhetoric, may not have been present in the heart of hearts of Isocrates. For the Greeks, any real effort at overcoming the Vergeltungsdenken, "repayment thinking" must wait until Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and even there, such teaching is fraught with inconsistency.