Evangelium vitae: Reconciling Tradition, Part 2

THERE IS AN ORDER OF JUSTICE, and there is an order of mercy. St. Thomas speaks of an order of justice and an order of mercy in God,* both arising from God who is absolute Good. This notion of these two orders operating as one in the Word of God is intensely Scriptural. Justice and mercy are qualities of God, qualities of the Word, qualities of man, and indeed qualities of all creation.

Misericordia et veritas occurrerunt iustitia et pax deosculatae sunt. "Mercy and truth have met each other: justice and peace have kissed," says Psalm 85(84):10. What is true in God is true for man, the image of God who is called to imitate his maker. The prophet Micah makes the justice-cum-mercy a mark of God's will, for what else does God want from us but facere iudicium et diligere misericordiam, to do justice and to love mercy? (Micah 6:8) Indeed, as St. Thomas makes clear in his Summa Theologiae, in all God's works there is truth, mercy, and justice. [S.T., I, q. 21, art. 4, c.] And nowhere is there more truth to this joinder of justice and mercy than on the Cross, where Jesus was the brute physical expression, as it were, of the mysterious reconciliation of God's Justice and God's Mercy.

"Mercy differs from justice, but is not in opposition to it," says John Paul II in his encyclical on mercy, Dives in misericordia (No. 4). Indeed, meditating on Christ crucified leads to no other conclusion. And in his encyclical on mercy, John Paul II is very Anselmian, for as St. Anselm reflected in his meditations on God's mercy and God's justice: "For, though it is hard to understand how your mercy is not inconsistent with your justice; yet we must believe that it does not oppose justice at all, because it flows from goodness, which is no goodness without justice; nay, that it is in true harmony with justice. For, if you are merciful only because you are supremely good, and supremely good only because you are supremely just, truly you are merciful even because you are supremely just. Help me, just and merciful God, whose light seek; help me to understand what I say."**

Iustitia sine misericordia crudelitas est, misericordia sine iustitia mater est dissolutionis, says St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. "Justice without mercy is cruelty, and mercy without justice is the mother of dissolution."*** Pope John Paul II echoes this sentiment: "In no passage of the Gospel message does forgiveness, or mercy as its source, mean indulgence towards evil, towards scandals, towards injury or insult. In any case, reparation for evil and scandal, compensation for injury, and satisfaction for insult are conditions for forgiveness." DM, 14. "Thus the fundamental structure of justice always enters into the sphere of mercy. Mercy, however, has the power to confer on justice a new content, which is expressed most simply and fully in forgiveness" DM, 14.

Evangelium vitae is John Paul II's reminder to us that in the area of capital punishment, justice without mercy is cruelty, and mercy without justice is the mother of dissolution. It is his effort "to confer on justice" of the death penalty "a new content," one informed by mercy.

Mercy--like justice--is a virtue. This "movement of the mind" which is mercy, "obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded." [S.T. IIaIIae, q. 30, a. 3, ad. 1. De Civ. Dei, ix.5] Again, Evangelium vitae is John Paul II's effort to think about the death penalty within the order of mercy, yet safeguarding the order of justice.

It is within this great respect for human life and his great regard for God's mercy, that John Paul II addresses the relationship of the Fifth Commandment to the "problem of the death penalty" which is handled in paragraphs 56 and 57 of Evangelium vitae.

In understanding John Paul II's treatment of it, it is important to recognize its placement in the encyclical. His handling of the "problem of the death penalty," which addresses the relationship of the Fifth Commandment to malefactors guilty of capital offenses, is a preamble to handling the issue of the "innocent person." In other words, John Paul II focuses on the non-absolute force of God's commandment when malefactors are involved,† before moving forward to those instances where an innocent person is involved, when such commandment becomes absolute. EV, 57. Thus, Pope John Paul II addresses the order of mercy (which applies to how we handle the life of a malefactor guilty of a capital offense and not worthy, in justice, to life but worthy, instead, to the extreme punishment of death) before he goes into the order of justice (which applies to how we handle violations of the life of the innocent).

The basic thrust of this part of the encyclical is therefore rhetorical. It is the preamble intended to strengthen Pope John Paul II's main argument and the burden of the encyclical: the absolute inviolability of the right to life of innocent human beings. Essentially, Pope John Paul II is arguing that if a malefactor's life is to be treated with such regard, with such great care, what sort of absolute regard should be shown the innocent? If the guilty--those who in the order of justice deserve to die, those who by their crimes have yielded their right to life--are, in the order of mercy, given such concern, what should be our moral attitude of those who have not so yielded their right to life, those who, in the order of justice are innocent and not only do not deserve death but cannot even defend themselves? The whole force of the encyclical's argument is lost if the distinction between the order of mercy and the order of justice is ignored.

Significantly, John Paul II does not ever suggest that the execution of a malefactor guilty of a capital offense violates the Fifth Commandment or is unjust. This is very important in understanding the encyclical. He suggests that staying the execution of a malefactor through clemency is preferable if "bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect the public order and safety of persons." In such cases the "public authority must limit itself to such [bloodless] means," not because it would be unjust to do otherwise, but "because such bloodless means better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person." EV, 56.

The language which I have highlighted, in particular the comparative phrases ("better correspond" and "more in conformity") suggests several things. First, it suggests that public authority's use of the death penalty instead of bloodless means still corresponds to the common good, but, in the Pope's view, not as well in some particular "concrete" circumstances. One has to have two goods for one to be better than another. This is true also with respect to the death penalty's conformity to the dignity of the human person. Using bloodless means are "more in conformity with the dignity of the human person" which suggests that the death penalty is still in conformity with the dignity of the human person, but less so than the bloodless means. Again for something to be more in conformity with an end than another thing suggests that both are in relative conformity with that end. In other words, we are working with two goods or two just actions, one better and one less good. We are not dealing with evil on the one hand, and good on the other.

Second, this better correspondence of bloodless means of punishment to the common good is based upon "concrete conditions" and so it is not in each and every instance true. It is not true generally or absolutely in the Pope's mind (or he would have said so). This leads to the possibility that there may be "concrete" instances where the opposite is true, where the death penalty better corresponds to the needs of the common good.

Contrast the Pope's comparative language when dealing with the malefactor with the language when dealing with the innocent. When it comes to the killing of an innocent, it always "contradicts the fundamental virtues of justice and charity." EV, 58. The Pope never says that justice is contradicted by the application of the death penalty.

The Pope has been criticized for seeming to ignore the retributive or vindicative purpose of the death penalty and link justification of the death penalty to an unjust aggressor analysis. But such criticism is, in my mind, erroneous because it presumes that John Paul II is arguing the justice of the death penalty when he is not. He is handling the "problem of the death penalty" not within the order of justice, but within the order of mercy.

The reason why John Paul II does not address the notion of the retributive or vindicative justification of the death penalty in his encyclical is not because it has no relevance to the death penalty analysis, but rather because he presupposes it. In other words, he assumes in this part of the encyclical that the malefactor may justly be put to death. For his argument, the Pope supposes that the order of justice is met. If the order of justice were not met by the imposition of the death penalty, he would condemn the death penalty outright, which he does not.

Given that the order of justice is met, Pope John Paul II then goes a step beyond it into the order of mercy. Given that the malefactor deserves to die in the order of justice, what does the order of mercy say about it?

The order of mercy does not focus on the retributive or vindicative aspects of justice. It has to get beyond those aspects. But the order of mercy is not for all that without boundaries. And it is those boundaries precisely which John Paul II has focused on in his encyclical and which is his unique contribution to the Church's doctrine on capital punishment. What John Paul II is saying is that mercy cannot be exercised, and the life of one justly condemned to die cannot be spared, if to spare his life would result in harm against other human lives, would not protect the public order, or the safety of persons. Mercy's limits are set by the same sort of analysis that is used when determining the use of force against an unjust aggressor. It would be unmerciful and against charity (and, indeed, also against justice) for public authority to have a misguided sense of mercy which exposes others to harm from the malefactor, or which fails to comply with one's duty to preserve others from the harm that might be caused by a malefactor.

In the encyclical, Pope John Paul II reaffirms the traditional view that the "primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is 'to redress the disorder caused by the offense.'" EV, 56. In other words, death penalty, like all punishment, must be understood within its retributive or vindicative purpose, for it is there that it finds its principal justification. "Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime." This is clearly a recognition that the retributive or restorative aspect of punishment is a moral good, and the principal one in justifying any punishment.

However, the notion of retribution or vindication is strongly tinged by the perception of the people over whom the public authority has governance and whose common good has been harmed by the malefactor. When a population has lost faith in the death penalty as an expression of justice, it loses some of its subjective retributive or vindicative qualities. Simply put, if a significant majority of the population of a state find the death penalty offensive, it loses some of its subjective retributive or vindicative qualities in that it is perceived by the population as not an appropriate expression of justice. This is separate and apart from whether it is objectively appropriate.

The Pope also recognizes that there are other goods involved in punishment, some of which clearly may be negated by actually executing the malefactor guilty of a capital offense, e.g., his rehabilitation or conversion. An unrehabilitated man, a man who does not repent of his crime, and who is put to death in a state of mortal sin cannot be rehabilitated and cannot be saved.

Another good of punishment is that it protects society from future acts of the malefactor, and therefore protects the common good. In modern societies, given the state of penal technology, it is the Pope's prudential judgment that, in the context of malefactors guilty of a capital offense, this particular good of punishment can be equally achieved through "bloodless means." In other words, under modern penal science, the common good would be equally protected if such criminals were put to death or were properly confined.

All human beings--be they innocent or be they sinners and malefactors--"in as much as they are created in the image of God, have the dignity of a person." All men are endowed with a spiritual and immortal soul, intelligence and free will, and are ordered to God and call in both soul and body to eternal destiny, eternal beatitude with God. St. Dismas, who suffered with Christ in the neighboring cross, is the Scriptural attestment to this fact that even those who may be justly put to death have the opportunity to receive the grace of conversion. The last shall be first. Granted, this wonderful dignity can be "marred" through sin which "deforms the image of God in his own person." EV, 36. And yet that divine image can be "restored, renewed, and brought to perfection" in those who "commit themselves to following Christ." EV, 36. There is not one man who is excluded from this "Word of life," and therefore it includes the malefactor justly condemned to die who we might hope obtains God's grace of conversion and repentance.

Punishment of a malefactor is a physical evil, but a moral good because it is restorative of justice. This is true even when it pertains to the death penalty. If the death penalty were not a moral good it would have to be condemned outrightly, which it is not. The Pope's teaching is that, given the conditions of: (i) a population that does not view capital punishment favorably, and (ii) penal technology sufficiently advanced as to assure that the common good is protected, then certain judgments concrete judgments can be made about the death penalty.

Assuming the common good can be equally protected from potential harm of the malefactor as a result of penal technology, the Pope's concrete judgment is that the marginal increase in moral good obtained from putting a malefactor to death (instead of punishing him with a life sentence) is less than the moral good obtained from exercising mercy and sparing his life because it leads to greater respect for the dignity of man, the right to life, and it holds out the prospect of conversion.

To be sure, unlike justice, mercy is not something that can be compelled. It can only be urged. And yet Christians are obliged to show mercy. We might recall Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice when Portia entreats the Jew Shylock to show mercy in his case against Antonio for his pound of flesh. "On what compulsion, must I? Tell me that."

To which Portia responds in words that are timeless:

The quality of mercy is not strained.
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blessed:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest. It becomes
The thronèd monarch better than his crown.
His scepter shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings,
But mercy is above this sceptered sway.
It is enthronèd in the hearts of kings.
It is an attribute to God himself.
And earthly power doth then show likest God’s
When mercy seasons justice. Therefore, Jew,
Though justice be thy plea, consider this—
That in the course of justice none of us
Should see salvation. We do pray for mercy,
And that same prayer doth teach us all to render
The deeds of mercy.
Act IV, sc. 1. 191

It is within this great tradition of mercy that Shakespeare places in the words of Portia that we must place ourselves in order to understand John Paul II's hortatory plea that the moral law which allows that the malefactor who, in the order of justice may merit the death penalty as his just deserts--ought to seasoned with mercy by those who hold the dreadful and fearful power of the sword. And when so seasoned, the death penalty ought be something "very rare, if not practically non-existent."

But Pope John Paul II's plea is hortatory and is based upon prudence, and so his plea that the death penalty be "very rare, if practically non-existent" does not bind under penalty of mortal sin which would be the case if we had an act of injustice or an intrinsic evil. At most, failure to exercise mercy under the circumstances the Pope recites, if they in fact exist, would be a venial sin, or perhaps a positive imperfection, and unseeming lack of mercy and harshness for a Christian who should know far better than others not of the household of faith, that "in the course of justice none of us should see salvation," and who prays, in the prayer the Lord gave him, that same prayer wherein the Lord "doth teach us all to render the deeds of mercy." The fact that one may stand with justice and refuse mercy and still be in good standing with the Church and even worthy of communion,†† of course, does not make the plea for mercy any less incumbent upon us or those who govern us.

We might recall the words of St. Anselm: "He who is good to the wicked by both punishing them and sparing them is better than he who is good to the wicked only by punishing them." And sparing the life of a malefactor who justly can be put to death gives God the room to exercise his marvels. "God spares the wicked out of justice," St. Anselm continues, "for it is just that God, than whom none is better or more powerful, should be good even to the wicked, and should make the wicked good." Proslogion, IX.

In closing, in dealing with the "problem of the death penalty" we should recall the words, indeed the prayers, of St. Anselm, which would serve us well as a motto:

"Spare, in mercy;
avenge not, in justice."

Parce per clementiam,
ne ulciscaris per iustitiam.
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*St. Thomas Aquinas, IV Sententiarum dist.15 q.4 art. 7 qcula 3a. The context is regarding merit and prayer.
**St. Anselm, Proslogion, IX. (Nam etsi difficile sit intelligere, quomodo misericordia tua non absit a tua iustitia, necessarium tamen est credere, quia nequamquam adversatur quod exundat ex bonitate, quae nulla est sine iustitia, immo vere concordat iustitiae. Nempe si misericors es, quia es summe bonus, et summe bonus non es, nisi quia es summe iustus: vere idcirco es misericors, quia summe iustus es. Adiuva me, iuste et misericors Deus, cuius lucem quaero, adiuva me, ut intelligam quod dico.)
***St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Matthaeum, Cap. V, l. 2.
†I say non-absolute,but I don't mean without limit. The death penalty is not automatically just; it cannot be meted out without limit. Not only must the offense be one which, in justice, merits death, but the procedures involved in adjudication must give rise to moral certainty of guilt. Moreover, these have to be applied fairly and not selectively or with an aim against a particular group. Additionally, the inner attitude of the trier of fact, the judge, or the executioner must be proper. In other words, there are requirements of justice that must be met for the death penalty to be just. The ordo juris, the legal order, which results in the death penalty must comply with the requirements of the ordo justitiae, the order of justice.
††This is, of course, the opinion given by Cardinal Ratzinger in an instruction or memorandum to the U.S. Bishops concerning when one is worthy of receiving Holy Communion. In the memorandum (dated July 3, 2004), the future Pope gives the following clarification: "3. Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of capital punishment . . . he would not for that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities . . . to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible . . . to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about . . . applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia." To be worthy of presenting oneself to receive Holy Communion, one cannot be in a state of mortal sin, which would be the case is one had sinned against justice by putting a malefactor to death. A member of a jury, a judge, a governor, an executioner who participate in the conviction and execution of a man are therefore not sinning mortally.
†††One can beneficially recall that even the damned are shown mercy. "Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved." [S.T., I, q. 21, art. 4, r.1] If God shows mercy to the justly damned, can we do any less in showing mercy to those justly condemned to die?

Evangelium Vitae: Reconciling Tradition, Part 1

JOHN PAUL II'S ENCYCLICAL Evangelium vitae raised significant consternation among Catholics on the matter of the death penalty. To the death penalty abolitionists, who seemed insensitive to, or disdainful of, the Church's traditional teaching, the Pope did not seem to go far enough. To the death penalty advocates who were jealous to preserve the Church's tradition regarding the death penalty in the order of justice, the Pope seemed to go too far and contradict the Church's traditional teaching by appearing to reject the retributive or vindicative justification for the death penalty and limiting its use under a unjust aggressor-type analysis.*

In my reading of the encyclical Evangelium vitae, Pope John Paul II does neither of these. Pope John Paul II navigates deftly between the two extremes. Nowhere in the encyclical does he teach that the death penalty is intrinsically unjust, and that teaching ought not to be imputed to him. Nor does he sever the justice of the death penalty--that is, its moral good--from its retributive or vindicative roots. John Paul II leaves what I have called the tradition of justice of the death penalty untouched. What John Paul II does, rather, is to recall what I have called the tradition of mercy in the application of the death penalty and develop that particular tradition.

In this post we will discuss the notion that Pope John Paul II laid the groundwork for a future development in Catholic doctrine that the death penalty is intrinsically evil, in a manner that abortion, euthanasia, intentional suicide are intrinsically evil. In other words, we address the possibility that the Pope set in motion that Fifth Commandment's absolute prohibition against the intentional killing of an innocent human being applies, in all its rigor, to the killing of malefactors by public authority. In the next few blog postings after this one, we will address the difference between the order of justice and the order of mercy, my view of what John Paul II in his encyclical addressed as the limits on the imposition of the death penalty, what role the order of mercy has on the application of that penalty, how John Paul II leaves the Church's traditional teaching on the death penalty in the order of justice undisturbed, and how he develops the Church's teaching on the death penalty in the context of the order of mercy.

Nowhere in the encyclical does Pope John Paul II teach that the death penalty is intrinsically evil. Nor does John Paul II set up any sort of legitimate foundation for development in Catholic moral doctrine that would lead to finding the death penalty to be intrinsically evil. There is no basis in the encyclical for abolition of the death penalty on the grounds that it is intrinsically evil or per se against justice. None. In my view, to suggest such a thing is a grievous wrong and intellectually dishonest reading of the encyclical in the light of tradition. It is a reading based upon ideology.

Second, Pope John Paul in this encyclical does not change the traditional doctrine of the Church regarding the death penalty for the simple reason that he does not even address the question.** In my reading of the encyclical, he presupposes the validity of prior teaching. His teaching is perfectly compatible with prior tradition that the death penalty is an "exception" to the general doctrine that innocent human life is untouchable applicable to public authority alone, and that this exception applies for extremely grave and very specific and proven crimes. He does not touch traditional teaching which justifies all punishment, including the death penalty, as just on the grounds of of vindication or retribution, that is, as a means to re-establish and restore the order of justice which has been disrupted by a gravely wrongful act against God and the common good. As such, John Paul II presumes (and certainly does not deny) that the death penalty when justly applied--while a great physical evil, particularly for the individual involved--may, for all that be a justified by its retributive or vindicative aspect.

To show that Pope John Paul II does not change the traditional teaching of the Church on the moral liciety in justice of the death penalty is easy if the entire encyclical is looked at and compared to the short section on the death penalty. First, Pope John Paul makes it clear that the Church's constant tradition as it relates to the Fifth Commandment is that "the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral." EV, 57. Pope John Paul II declared that "direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always constitutes a grave moral disorder since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being." EV, 62. He confirms that "euthanasia is a grave violation of the law of God, since it is the deliberate and morally unacceptable killing of a[n innocent] human person."*** EV, 65. Pope John Paul II speaks of the "inviolable right to life of every innocent human being." EV, 71. Clearly, the gravamen of the encyclical, and the absolute and exceptionless protection of life it teaches, applies to innocent human beings, and not malefactors.

One has to conclude that malefactors (those who are not innocent of capital offenses) are excluded from the exceptionless, absolute norms that bind in both justice and charity and protect the innocent. An innocent human being may never intentionally be put to death by private or public authority. This leaves the Church's traditional teaching that a malefactor can justly be put to death by public authority entirely untouched.

That this is John Paul II's intendment is made even more clear when the language used by John Paul II in the context of the death penalty is compared to that used when addressing the life of innocent human beings. The absolute and exceptionless moral principles that relate to innocent human beings do not apply to "criminals and unjust aggressors." EV, 57. While "great care must be taken to respect every life, even that of criminals and unjust aggressors, the commandment 'You shall not kill' has absolute value only when it refers to the innocent person." The inescapable implication of this statement is that the absolute prohibition against killing an innocent human life does not apply when confronting "criminals and unjust aggressors." The life value of the criminal condemned of a capital offense, while still worthy of "great care" and "respect," is not absolute, and this can only be because the public authority retains the right to put him to death under the Church's traditional doctrine.

Koritansky points out the obvious in his book Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment:†

The fact remains that the Church, both in the 1997 [Catechism of the Catholic Church] and in [Evangelium vitae] could have simply stated that the death penalty is only justifiable as indirect killing, but has obviously stopped short of doing so. One indicator implying [that John Paul II did not intend to view the death penalty as intrinsically evil] is that [Evangelium vitae] itself, in the section following the discussion of capital punishment, makes the claim that the Fifth Commandment "has absolute value when it refers to the innocent person." . . . If capital punishment is only to be justified in terms of self-defense [and not as an expression of retributive or vindicative justice as in Catholic traditional teaching], there would be no reason for the pope to include the word "innocent" in this definitive statement. If justifiable instances of the death penalty are only indirect, he may have simply stated that it is always wrong directly to kill another human being period.

Pope John Paul II, however, does not rest satisfied with his clear statements of the absolute value of innocent human life. He is without question also solicitous of the life of the criminal guilty of a capital offense, even though the malefactor's right to life is not absolute. In his Evangelium vitae, John Paul II is at his most pastoral. From the Chair of Peter, he might be seen as having exercised his Galgen ministerium, his "gallows ministry" or death row ministry, preaching the Gospel to the spirits in prison, as it were. (Cf. 1 Pet. 3:19).

His is a ministry to Cain, to those like Cain who have violated the "'spiritual kinship uniting mankind in one great family," to Cain "'who was of the evil one and murdered his brother,'" to Cain who is punished by God himself since "the blood of the one murdered demands that God should render justice," to Cain who is "cursed by God and also by the earth." EV, 8, 9. And yet this is the Cain to whom God showed mercy, for God "is always merciful even when he punishes." This is the Cain--who despite his crime--has not lost his "dignity," a dignity which "God himself pledges to guarantee." With respect to Cain, it is not a matter of justice alone. With respect to Cain we are involved with "the paradoxical mystery of the merciful justice of God," the same God who punished him. EV, 9. There is even here, as John Paul II reminds us haling back to the words of St. Ambrose of Milan: even to the murderer "the divine law of God's mercy should immediately be extended."

In Evangelium vitae, we find John Paul II exercising a ministry to Cain, a ministry of mercy influenced by the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the "Word of life" and "Word of God," who was branded a criminal condemned to die unjustly by the laws of his time, and Who by His sacrificial death on the Cross, "expresses and requires a more radical 'justice,' and above all it implores mercy.'" EV, 25, 29, 30. He reminds us, that God does not delight in the death of the living, particularly the innocent, but not for all that excluding the malefactor. To the contrary, it is Satan who so delights in death. EV, 53. Clearly, Pope John Paul II, in addressing the death penalty question, leaves traditional notions of justice and enters into the order of mercy. He does not come as a judge ready to condemn to death in the name of Christ, but as a priest ready to forgive the criminal justly condemned to death in the name of Christ.

The Gospel of Life not only affects questions of justice (as it does in questions involving innocent human life, or the taking of the life of a malefactor by private authority outside of necessity resulting from self-preservation or duty to others when faced with an unjust agressor), but also questions of mercy. In exercising mercy upon a malefactor guilty of a capital offense and so justly executable by public authority, John Paul II recognizes: "Life is always a good." EV, 33. "Life is indelibly marked by a truth of its own." EV, 48.

What is this good? What is this truth? It is that "man's life comes from God; it is his gift, his image and imprint, a sharing in his breath of life." EV, 39; Gen 9:6. Man is "fearfully and wonderfully made." Ps. 139:14. Man's life is therefore not his own. "Human life and death are thus in the hands of God, in his power." EV, 39. Life is as a consequence sacred, and being sacred recognized as inviolable, absolutely when it comes to innocent human beings. EV, 40. That sacred nature and that inviolability "reverberates" in the "first place" in that commandment which prohibits murder: "You shall not kill," which tells us in no uncertain terms "Do not slay the innocent and righteous." (Ex. 20:13; 23:7)

It is this commandment, which already comprehends the "value of life," which is refined by the sublime ethic of the Sermon on the Mount, infused, as it were with the Commandment of Love: "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." (Le. 19:18) It is a commandment invoked by Jesus to the rich young man, and which he perfects with an even greater rigor, a new "force and urgency," preventing not only killing, but legislating to the very soul of man himself, prohibiting any motive of anger or vengeance. (Matt. 19:18; 5:21-22) Jesus extends this commandment of love to encompass even one's enemy. "Even an enemy ceases to be an enemy for the person who is obliged to love him." EV, 41. And this would include the malefactor justly condemned to die. So Jesus' commandment to love our brother, to have mercy upon him, imposes upon us "the requirement to show reverence and love for every person and the life of every person." EV, 41.

How could we expect the Pope to teach anything else? Is he to teach that we are to be irreverent with the life of malefactors? That we are to hate them? No. There is no one, nay not even one, whom the Lord excepts from the requirements of this commandment. Even the unfortunate executioner has to kill the condemned without irreverence and without hate, even with charity, when the demands of justice require it.†† And the Pope is right to remind us of it.

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*For those that advocate abolition of the death penalty, we might put in a large number of American bishops and such authors such as James Megivern and E. Christian Brugger. E. Christian Brugger, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital Punishment," The Thomist 68 (2004): 41-67. Many of these take the untenable position that capital punishment is a malum in se, in other words, everywhere and in all times, intrinsically evil. In my view, this clearly contradicts the natural law, the order of justice, divine Revelation and the Tradition of the Church. It is, moreover, not supported by Evangelium vitae. The belief is, in fact, probably heretical. As to those keen to preserve the traditional teaching of the Church on capital punishment, we might point to Stephen Long and Judge Antonin Scalia. Steven A. Long, "Evangelium vitae, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Death Penalty," The Thomist 63 (1999): 511-52. Antonin Scalia, "God's Justice and Ours," Speech at the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Nov. 18, 2002. Others--such as Avery Cardinal Dulles, Charles Rice, Janet Smith--seem to fall somewhere in between. Charles Rice, "Avery Cardinal Dulles and His Critics: An Exchange on Capital Punishment," First Things 115 (August/September 2001), 9. Avery Dulles, "The Death Penalty: A Right to Life Issue?" Laurence J. McGinley Lecture, Fordham University (17 October 2000), reprinted as "Catholicism and Capital Punishment," in First Things 112 (April 2001), 30-35. Janet E. Smith, "Rethinking Capital Punishment," Catholic Dossier 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1998): 49-50. For a discussion about the positions of Brugger and Long and one effort at reconciling St. Thomas Aquinas and Pope John Paul II, see Peter Karl Koritansky, Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment (Catholic University of America, 2012). Although I cannot claim to have read even a small proportion of the literature on the subject, I have never seen anyone make mention that there is a distinction between the order of justice (which Pope John Paul II is not addressing in the context of capital punishment in Evangelium vitae) and the order of mercy (which is what Pope John Paul II is addressing in Evangelium vitae). It is precisely for this reason that the Pope does not defend capital punishment on the grounds of retribution or vindication of the order of justice (though earlier in the encyclical he acknowledges that it is the primary justification for punishment generally). The concept of retribution or vindication is irrelevant in the order of mercy except with respect to the subject perception of the public. Conceded that the malefactor may justly (that is without moral fault) be put to death, what does mercy say? It is in the order of mercy, in the order of clemency, where Pope John Paul II imports the moral notion of necessity defense. The Pope suggests that the principles of the "necessity defense" are what define the outer limits of mercy. Indeed to exercise mercy upon a man guilty of a capital offense and allow him to live and threaten the lives of other innocents is not only foolish, it is merciless to the innocents who would suffer at the hands of the unrepentant criminal. Defining the outer limits of mercy is a development well in line with what I have called the Tradition of Mercy. It expresses the thinking of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom, St. Gregory Naziansus, Pope St. Nicholas the Great. With respect to those guilty of capital offenses, the Pope further urges that mercy go as far as its limits. In the order of justice, the death penalty can be frequently justified. In the order of mercy, the death penalty--in modern penal conditions where the common good can be protected from harm without death of the malefactor, and where the State has failed in protecting the innocent and is therefore as guilty as the criminal it would put to death, and where marginal increased in the retributive good between life imprisonment and death is, for a public negative toward the death penalty, small--can rarely be justified.
**For prior postings on capital punishment, see His Blood Shall Be Shed: Capital Punishment and Scripture, Capital Punishment and the Church: Magisterial Sources, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: St. Clement of Alexandria, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: Athenagoras, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: Origen, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: St. Hyppolitus of Rome, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: Tertullian, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: Lactantius, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: Sts. Chrysostom, Gregory Nazianzen, and Ambrose, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: St. Augustine--Justice and the Death Penalty, Church Fathers and Capital Punishment: St. Augustine--Mercy and the Death Penalty, The Papacy and Capital Punishment: Innocent I and Innocent III, Capital Punishment and St. Thomas Aquinas, Capital Punishment and Gratian's Decretum, Capital Punishment and the Church: The Roman Catechism, Capital Punishment and the Church: St. Alphonsus Liguori, The Papacy and Capital Punishment: Pius XII, and Capital Punishment and the Tradition of Mercy.
***The word innocent is clearly implied from the context.
†Koritansky, 176-77.
††The difficulty associated with this is, of course, notorious. As Aristotle said in his Politics: "The difficulty of this office [of executioner] arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law. Still the office is necessary . . . ."

The Papacy and Capital Punishment: Innocent I and Innocent III

IT IS WELL-NIGH INDISPUTABLE that the Church Fathers, even those prior to the Edict of Milan who confronted an enemy State, held fast to the moral liciety of the death penalty justly applied. This was seen both as a principle of the natural law and of the Scriptures, in particular the clear indication in the Old Testament which allowed for putting malefactors to death despite the prescriptions of the Fifth Commandment which prohibited murder. It was also the unanimous understanding of those portions of St. Paul's Letter to the Romans which might be called the Staatstaffel or summary of principles as it related to the Christians relationship to the State, namely Romans 13:1-7. The sword of justice included the sword of execution. There was no per se injustice in it, though it might be unjust per quod. This was recognized by Pope Innocent I (r. 401-17) put it in his letter to Exsuperium, the Bishop of Tolouse in 405:

About these things we read nothing definitive from the forefathers. For they had remembered that these powers [of judging a man on capital offenses and in application of the death penalty] had been granted by God and that for the sake of punishing harm-doers the sword has been allowed; in this way a minister of God, an avenger, has been given. How therefore would they criticize something which they see to have been granted to the authority of God. About these matters therefore, we hold to what has been observed hitherto, lest we may seem either to overturn sound order or to go against the authority of the Lord.

Quaesitum etiam est, super his qui post baptismum administraverunt, et aut tormenta sola exercuerunt, aut etiam capitalem protulere sententiam, nihil de his legibus a maioribus definitum. Meminerant enim a deo potestates has fuisse concessas, et propter vindictam noxiorum gladium fuisse permissum, et dei ministrum esse datum in huiusmodi vindicem. Quomodo igitur reprehenderent factum, quod auctore domino viderent esse concessum? De his ergo ita ut actenus servatum est sic habeamus, ne aut disciplinam avertere, aut contra auctoritatem domini venire videamur. Ipsis autem in ratione reddenda, gesta sua omnia servabuntur.

Innocent I, Epist. 6, C. 3. 8, ad Exsuperium, Episcopum Tolosanum.* The baptized who were in positions of legitimate authority could participate in judging capital cases and in putting others to death under the Rule of Law. In doing so, they could not be accused of injustice or of mortal sin. It was the law which received its authority from God and expressed the good of the common good, and not the individual himself, who was the agent of the killing.

The traditional teaching is accepted by all medieval Churchmen. Accordingly, we find it as received teaching in St. Thomas Aquinas or in Pope Innocent III. The few dissenting voices we hear about are heretical splinter groups such as the Waldenses. In fact, it is the Waldenses to which we now turn, because the interesting conditions imposed upon them for re-entry into the communion of the Church is a fascinating chapter in the Church's traditional teaching on capital punishment. As Brugger properly characterizes it, "Pope Innocent III's famous statement in the Waldensian oath that it is possible for civil authority to administer the death penalty without mortal sin is unquestionably the most influential ecclesiastical statement on the morality of capital punishment in the Middle Ages (and arguably in Church history)."**

Pope Innocent III

The Waldenses were an enthusiastic heretical group, similar to the Cathari and Albigenses, founded by a wealth Lyonnais merchant called Waldes (or Waldo). After experiencing a conversion, Waldes sold all he had, made provisions for the maintenance of his wife and children, and went about the land wearing sandals, preaching a message of evangelical poverty. He soon gathered about him a band of followers, and they soon pitted themselves against established Church authority. In fact, they seem to have developed a sort of an independent hierarchy or constitution of their own. Unfortunately, regardless of their sincerity, they were ill-educated and in much of their preaching they fell into heresy, denying the existence of purgatory, making the efficacy of sacraments dependent upon the spiritual state of the minister, teaching the immorality of taking of oaths so central the feudal civil society, and so forth. They also allowed any convert to dissolve his marriage without consent of his partner. They also condemned all war and held that any infliction of the death penalty was immoral. Their attachment to heresy and their belief that they were a movement willed by God soon led into disobedience of any authority. Convinced of their cause, they ignored all sorts of ecclesiastical and civil proscriptions, including the canons of the Third General Lateran Council. Eventually, they were excommunicated by a bull issued by Pope Lucius III in 1184.

Pope Innocent III's oath arises from his efforts to reconcile a branch of these Waldenses headed by Durand of Huesca (Osca), the reconciliation of which led to what were called the "Poor Catholics." During the series of efforts to effect reconciliation, Pope Innocent III required the Waldenses to abjure their opposition to capital punishment. They were made to swear to the following:

We declare that the secular power can without mortal sin impose a judgment of blood provided the punishment is carried out not in hatred but with good judgment, not inconsiderately, but after mature deliberation.

Concerning secular power we declare that without mortal sin it is possible to exercise a judgment of blood as long as one proceeds to bring punishment not in hatred but in judgment, not incautiously but advisedly.

De potestate saeculari asserimus quod sine peccato mortali potest judicium sanguinis exercere, dummodo ad inferendam vindictam, non odio, sed judicio, non incaute sed consulte procedat.

DS, 795 (425).***

Brugger attempts to circumvent this important Papal act by suggesting that this is a speculative (possibility only) proposition, without application in real or concrete reality. This, of course, is to explain away the entire oath and render it to something as inane saying "it is possible that a Tyrannosaur appear on my front lawn tomorrow morning."

Next, he tries to argue that the Waldenses did not in fact believe that a magistrate imposing the death penalty sinned mortally, but that this is essentially a gratuitous obiter dicta by the Pope having nothing to do with settling the controversy between the Church and the Waldenses.

Brugger is compelled to do engage in these somersaults because his burden is to explain away the entirety of Catholic tradition and Magisterial authority to try to come to the proposition that Pope John Paul II in his Evangelium vitae set the stage for an absolute prohibition of capital punishment on the grounds that it is intrinsically immoral. (He does this in Chapter 7, which is a tour de force that guts 2000 years of Tradition with unmatched sophistry. But here we might paraphrase St. Thomas More's discourse with his son in law William Roper as portrayed by Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons:

William Roper: So, now you give the Devil (i.e., capital punishment) the benefit of Tradition!
Sir Thomas More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the Tradition to get after the Devil?
William Roper: Yes, I'd cut down every Tradition to do that!
Sir Thomas More: Oh? And when the last Tradition was down, and the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the Traditions all being flat? This Church is planted thick with Traditions, from generation to generation. And if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of Tradition, for my own safety's sake)

I disagree with Brugger's position, and find it intellectually essential neither to minimize or deprecate traditional teaching on the liciety of capital punishment (which I think is irreformable), nor minimize Evangelium vitae (which I think is an exercise of the ordinary Papal magisterium), but to find a way to reconcile both or understand them together. I believe that the traditional teaching on the death penalty can remain entirely intact and Evangelium vitae given its full and plain construction by the simple expedient of recognizing that the traditional teaching relates to the order of justice, whereas Evangelium vitae relates to the order of mercy. What we will see is that Evangelium vitae, without deprecating the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, is very Ambrosian or Augustinian at heart.

Evangelium vitae's teaching on the death penalty is, in fact, highly traditional. It is the traditional teaching brought forth in the circumstances of the modern State built on a political philosophy that is contractarian, secular, and relativist, and which recognizes not its authority under God. It is how traditional Catholic teaching ought to be applied when the Church confronts a State which has largely lost the moral legitimacy to take the life of the guilty because of its wholesale failure to protect the life of the innocent. It is what ought to happen when the State is vastly more guilty and unjust with respect to the innocents than the guilty whom they purport, on the grounds of justice, to kill. For the modern State which subscribes not to the Gospel of Life, every execution meted out is a rank act of hypocrisy. It is the unjust slaying the unjust, and there's no Church that ought to bless that.

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*English translation from E. Christian Brugger, Capital Punishment and Roman Catholic Moral Tradition (Notredame Press 2003), 89.
**Brugger, 103.
***First English translation is from Brugger, 104. The second may be found here under the old number D 425. The Latin is found in DS 795. In an earlier correspondence between these groups, Pope Innocent III phrased it in a letter thus: "Let none of you presume to assert the following: that the secular power cannot carry out a judgment of blood without mortal sin. This is an error because the law, not the judge, puts to death so long as the punishment is imposed, not in hatred, but with deliberation." I think Brugger is correct when he states that the form of the oath contained in DS 795 is Innocent's authoritative teaching on the morality of capital punishment."

Capital Punishment and the Church: Magisterial Sources

IN OUR LAST POST, we addressed the issue of capital punishment from the perspectives of the Old Testament and the New Testament. Succinctly, reviewing these sources we should come to the only one conclusion as to the Old Testament: it teaches the moral liciety of capital punishment, and it does not view such punishment as a violation of the Fifth Commandment not to kill. Rather, it views it as supportive of that commandment. With respect to the New Testament, we find no abrogation of the Old Testament teaching. Here, we might adopt the conclusion of Cardinal Dulles that "No passage in the New Testament disapproves of the death penalty."

Let us now skip over 2000 years to the current state of teaching in the Catholic Church. For the official teaching, we turn to the Catechism of the Catholic Church and to Pope John Paul II's Encyclical letter Evangelium vitae. This latter has been described as "a watershed"* in the debate of the issue of the death penalty, and it is what informs to a large degree the former document in its editio typica. To be sure, the encyclical Evangelium vitae by virtue of its being an encyclical is a highly authoritative document, and it is "the first papal encyclical to deal specifically with capital punishment." It is, moreover, "the weightiest Magisterial statement on the subject to date."*

St. Nicholas stopping executions

The Church's official teaching is found in Article 5 of the Catechism, the article dealing with the Fifth Commandment, nestled in the part discussing legitimate defense:

Article 5

THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT

You shall not kill. [Ex 20:13; Cf. Deut 5:17.]

You have heard that it was said to the men of old, "You shall not kill: and whoever kills shall be liable to judgment." But I say to you that every one who is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment. [Mt 5:21-22.]

2258 "Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves the creative action of God and it remains for ever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end. God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: no one can under any circumstance claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being." [CDF, instruction, Donum vitae, intro. 5.]

The current Catechism (editio typica published in 1997) differs in various particulars from the original version which was written in French (published in 1992), and there are some notable differences in the two texts on the matter of capital punishment. Most significant is the influence of Pope John Paul II's encyclical Evangelium vitae (which relies on the 1992 version of the Catechism). To highlight the encyclical's influence on the Catechism on the issue of capital punishment, I place the editio typica text next to the original version.

The teaching between the two versions is not appreciably different except for the novel statement by Pope John Paul II that modernly ("today") the instances where the death penalty ought to be meted out are "very rare, if not practically non-existent." EV, No. 56.

Editio typica	1994 Version
2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. To this end, those holding legitimate authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their charge.[66] [66 St. Thomas Aquinas, STh II-II, 64, 7, corp. art.]	2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the state.
2266 The State's effort to contain the spread of behaviors injurious to human rights and the fundamental rules of civil coexistence corresponds to the requirement of watching over the common good. Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime. The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense. When his punishment is voluntarily accepted by the offender, it takes on the value of expiation. Moreover, punishment, in addition to preserving public order and the safety of persons, has a medicinal scope: as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender.[67] [67 Cf. Lk 23:40-43.]	2266 Preserving the common good of society requires rendering the aggressor unable to inflict harm. For this reason the traditional teaching of the Church has acknowledged as well-founded the right and duty of legitimate public authority to punish malefactors by means of penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime, not excluding, in cases of extreme gravity, the death penalty. For analogous reasons those holding authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the community in their charge. The primary effect of punishment is to redress the disorder caused by the offense. When his punishment is voluntarily accepted by the offender, it takes on the value of expiation. Moreover, punishment has the effect of preserving public order and the safety of persons. Finally punishment has a medicinal value; as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender.
2267 The traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude, presupposing full ascertainment of the identity and responsibility of the offender, recourse to the death penalty, when this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor. If, instead, bloodless means are sufficient to defend against the aggressor and to protect the safety of persons, public authority should limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person. Today, in fact, given the means at the State's disposal to effectively repress crime by rendering inoffensive the one who has committed it, without depriving him definitively of the possibility of redeeming himself, cases of absolute necessity for suppression of the offender 'today ... are very rare, if not practically non-existent.'[John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 56.]	2267 If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority should limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.

Evangelium vitae:

Moreover, "legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the State". [Catechism of the Catholic Church, No. 2265 (1992).] Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason. [Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 64, a. 7; Saint Alphonsus De' Liguori, Theologia Moralis, l. III, tr. 4, c. 1, dub.3.]

56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice ever more in line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder caused by the offence".[Catechism of the Catholic Church, No. 2266 (1992).] Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated. [Cf. ibid.]

It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.

In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person". [Catechism of the Catholic Church, No. 2267 (1992).]

The requirement of "absolute necessity" before authorities may use capital punishment to defend society, and the opinion (theological or prudential only?) that, in modern contexts, such "absolute necessity" is "very rare, if not practically non-existent," seem to be a significant tightening of the screws on when legitimate authority may apply capital punishment to maintain order and defend itself against malefactors.

A helpful aid in determining the intent of the Pope and the bindingness of this teaching, is the opinion given by Cardinal Ratzinger in an instruction or memorandum to the U.S. Bishops concerning when one is worthy of receiving Holy Communion. In the memorandum (dated July 3, 2004), the future Pope gives the following clarification:

3. Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father on the application of capital punishment . . . he would not for that reason be considered unworthy to present himself to receive Holy Communion. While the Church exhorts civil authorities . . . to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing punishment on criminals, it may still be permissible . . . to have recourse to capital punishment. There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about . . . applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia.

Without question, then-Cardinal Ratzinger recognized a difference in bindingness between the Magisterium's teaching concerning abortion and euthanasia and the Magisterium's teaching concerning the application of the death penalty.

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*Thomas D. Williams, The World as it Could Be (Crossroads, 2011), 80.

Obama's Speech: "Repent and Deny the Gospel"

President Obama's speech at the University of Notre Dame was masterful and politically adept. There is much in the speech that simply is unimpeacheable, and what is impeachable is dressed, as it were, in velvet words of tolerance, pluralism, and peace and goodwill. When a popular politician's words float about as rich and luscious honey, mellifluous to the ear, and balmish to the soul, the critic is at a disadvantage. Anyone who complains at President Obama's grandiose eloquence seems but an extreme and crotchety misanthrope, a Debby downer, a grumpy pharisee. And the press was sure that it appeared that way.

Since the essential controversy surrounding Obama's invitation to Notre Dame involved his view on abortion and stem cell research, and the propriety of Notre Dame's honoring a President with such views with a doctorate of laws, I want to focus on that. It is interesting to see what, with respect to those issues, Obama's words really say.

On the life issues, Obama's approach is essentially to take, as given, a pluralistic society, with "soldiers" "lawyers," "gay activists," and "evangelical pastors" all going about doing good in their way incommensurably. In Obama's theory of political relativism, all values are relative and thus equally valid; thus, the activities of a "gay activist" cannot be measured unfavorably against the activites of a "pro-lifer." These folks play their role in a pluralistic society where there are no moral absolutes, and so serve equivalent and noble offices. They contribute, presumably, equally to the common good; perhaps some "invisible hand" results in the greatest freedom for the greatest number. In this sort of world, there must be no suggestion that the "gay activist," or for that matter a pro-choicer, is promoting vice, or that the pro-lifer or anti-gay marriage advocate is promoting virtue. To Obama, there is no such thing as "vice" and "virtue" in any classical or Christian sense. The only "vice" and "virtue" relate to whether a person is willing to abide by the rules of engagement in a secular political process that refuses to consider absolutes (unless they are liberal, secular absolutes). Rid yourself of your religious robes, strip yourself of the suit of a universal law, and don instead the freeing Bermuda shorts of relativism and secularism if you want to play in the rough-and-tumble of American political life. Shelve your moral absolutes; otherwise, you will be sidelined, ostracized. Absolutes are outside the rules of the game.

That is why Obama's apparent magnanimity and open mindedness is only just that: apparent. What is wrong with this magnanimity and open-mindedness? Why is this call, despite its humanitarian and civilized veneer, actually barbarian in substance? You have to wave past the smoke-screen to see what Obama is really proposing, and why his proposal is really just the silencing of the pro-lifers, or, for that matter, any other person who believes in moral absolutes. President Obama equates those "who speak out against stem cell research" with "the parents of a child with juvenile diabetes who are convinced that their son's or daughter's hardships can be relieved" and so press for that research. This is a false opposition. (One may put aside for the moment, the mischaracterization of the stem cell research debate.) In Obama's world, all politics, like all morality, is consequential, utilitarian, i.e., teleological. Good is measured by results, and, in a situation where there are goods in competition, some sort of social calculus has to be undertaken through the political process. Since all we are dealing with are the balancing of moral relatives, harsh language is unjustified and interferes with the process, and there is always room for compromise in political conflict because there is nothing that cannot be compromised. The end justifies the means.

President Obama invited the Notre Dame graduate to "open his mind" and "open his heart" to this siren call of the secular goddess, Moloch's bride. This is something intolerable to a person raised in the classical moral and Judaeo-Christian traditions. The disciple of Christ, like the virtuous Roman republican, or Socrates before the Boule, is called to have one mind and one heart, not listen to the voices that are legion. He must insist that the government whose authority over him comes from God must stay under God. And he is obliged to advance this cause, even at the cost of his life. To consent to the suggestion that civil society, and the rules of engagement of debate in the political process, should be based upon a relativistic ethic, one that fears no God nor knows no moral absolutes, is a call to commit spiritual suicide. It is, in fact, a call to the Christian to give up his faith and his God if he expects access to the annals of governmental power or legal debate. It is the exact opposite of what a Notre Dame graduate ought to be told. Instead of opening his heart and his mind to this relativistic sop, the Christian ought to be told to behave like Odysseus and his crew; he ought to tie himself to the mast, stuff his ears full of wax, batten down the hatches, hold steady the rudder, and steer past the call of the secular sirens towards the image of Christ, where, as Pope Benedict XVI recently reiterated: "[W]e must always remember that 'freedom itself needs to be set free. It is Christ who sets it free.'"

Moreover, Obama's opposition of those against stem cell research with parents of diabetic children is a false opposition. First, pro-lifers are not against helping, with whatever moral means are available, the concerns of anyone suffering from any medical malady. The implied suggestion that they are is offensive. Second, the Church is not opposed to stem cell research per se, but is opposed to how that stem cell research is conducted. It insists that the research must respect human life. Accordingly, the Church opposes embryonic stem cell research, as distinguished from stem cell research on stem cells properly obtained from adults or from umbilical cords. In these latter instances, there is no destruction of human life. (See "Bioethics and the Catholic Church" and "On Embryonic Stem-Cell Research: A Statement of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.") The reason for the Church's opposition to embryonic stem cell research is because it involves the direct destruction of a human embryo, an embryo who has a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and whose life the State has the fundamental duty to defend and protect. Already, Obama has not used fair-minded words. He says we shouldn't "caricature" the opponents, but me thinks he speaks with a forked tongue.

There is no doubt that there is conflict, and there ever will be, between those who advocate a deontological ethic, and those who preach utilitarianism. There will always be conflict between Christ and Antichrist, between good and evil, between the politics of truth, and the politics of expediency. Now I agree that in areas where prudence carries the day, there ought to be no demonization of opponents, and there must be civility and room for compromise. But when your opponent expects you to hang up your well-founded moral absolutes (and is there any better founding that the ex cathedra pronouncement of the Church?), to "doubt" them, it may be time for demonization. Politically, should we embrace and be willing to compromise with "open hearts" and "open minds" an Aryan supremacist who advocates that non-Aryans should be enslaved? Politically, should we embrace and be willing to compromise with "open hearts" and "open mind" an anti-Semite who advocates the slaughter of Jews? There are some things simply beyond bargaining, beyond negotiation, beyond the political process, because the political process, like the State, and like each one of us, is under God. Abortion and embryonic stem cell research are just some of those moral absolutes. In light of the clear guidance of the Church, the natural law, and science, someone's sincere opinion that life does not begin at conception deserves as much respect as someone who opines that a Jew or an African-American is a non-person.



Listen well to Obama's recipe for working through the conflict:

The question, then, is how do we work through these conflicts? Is it possible for us to join hands in common effort? As citizens of a vibrant and varied democracy, how do we engage in vigorous debate? How does each of us remain firm in our principles, and fight for what we consider right, without demonizing those with just as strongly held convictions on the other side?

"Nowhere" President Obama observes, "do these questions come up more powerfully than on the issue of abortion." Obama continues:

As I considered the controversy surrounding my visit here, I was reminded of an encounter I had during my Senate campaign, one that I describe in a book I wrote called The Audacity of Hope. A few days after I won the Democratic nomination, I received an email from a doctor who told me that while he voted for me in the primary, he had a serious concern that might prevent him from voting for me in the general election. He described himself as a Christian who was strongly pro-life, but that's not what was preventing him from voting for me.
What bothered the doctor was an entry that my campaign staff had posted on my website - an entry that said I would fight "right-wing ideologues who want to take away a woman's right to choose." The doctor said that he had assumed I was a reasonable person, but that if I truly believed that every pro-life individual was simply an ideologue who wanted to inflict suffering on women, then I was not very reasonable. He wrote, "I do not ask at this point that you oppose abortion, only that you speak about this issue in fair-minded words."

Fair-minded words.

After I read the doctor's letter, I wrote back to him and thanked him. I didn't change my position, but I did tell my staff to change the words on my website. And I said a prayer that night that I might extend the same presumption of good faith to others that the doctor had extended to me. Because when we do that - when we open our hearts and our minds to those who may not think like we do or believe what we do - that's when we discover at least the possibility of common ground.
That's when we begin to say, "Maybe we won't agree on abortion, but we can still agree that this is a heart-wrenching decision for any woman to make, with both moral and spiritual dimensions.

Maybe I'm missing something, but is Obama saying that he'll quit calling pro-lifers right-wing ideologues if they surrender the battle, if they give up the ghost? What kind of trade off is that? If that's the opening offer, let me offer to President Obama that I'll quit calling him a left wing supporter of infanticide, if he'll appoint a strict constructionist on the Supreme Court, sponsor a federal law making abortion illegal in all 50 states, with prospective criminal penalties for any abortionist who violates the law, and earmarks in the billions of dollars to teach our youth about responsible, non-contraceptive sex and provide better social and medical services for those women facing unwanted pregnancy so they don't have to turn to illegal abortionists. What say you Mr. Obama?

Listen next to these honeyed words, which, to my chagrin, elicited hearty applause from the Notre Dame graduates there assembled.

So let's work together to reduce the number of women seeking abortions by reducing unintended pregnancies, and making adoption more available, and providing care and support for women who do carry their child to term. Let's honor the conscience of those who disagree with abortion, and draft a sensible conscience clause, and make sure that all of our health care policies are grounded in clear ethics and sound science, as well as respect for the equality of women.

Applause? Did no one recognize the code words? Obama was advocating that we "work together" to reduce "unintended pregnancies," "as well as respect for the equality of women." Of course, this means we must promote contraception (which frequently is abortion under another name) and continue to allow for abortion rights. And what's this? How can we even "make sure that all our health care policies are grounded in clear ethics and sound science," when the sine qua non of cooperation is that we yield on our anti-abortion stance, one which, by the way is (Obama's suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding) really based upon "clear ethics and sound science." But this is all part of what Obama--in his one slip of the tongue--wants to do. He admits that he wants to do all he can to "fudge" the terms of the debate. (Who else can he have in mind when he says "No matter how much we may want to fudge it [the debate surrounding abortion]"? Certainly, the pro-lifers aren't known for fudging things. In my experience, they call a spade a spade, and the liberal world always winces.)

Obama wants "fair-minded" words. Well here's some fair-minded words:

[B]y the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, in communion with the Bishops--who on various occasions have condemned abortion and who in the aforementioned consultation, albeit dispersed throughout the world, have shown unanimous agreement concerning this doctrine--I declare that direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being. This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written Word of God, is transmitted by the Church's Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.

No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.

Evangelium Vitae, No. 62.

Obama should not have received an honorary degree from the University of Notre Dame. It was a disservice to him, to Notre Dame, to the Catholic faithful, and to the United States. What he should have received is a copy of Pope John Paul II's Encyclical Evangelium Vitae, perhaps one bound in Moroccan leather of Madonna blue and papal gold. That may have done him and Notre Dame and our country some good. That would have made Notre Dame both a "lighthouse" and a "crossroads." That would have been "shining in the Catholic tradition," amidst the "differences of culture and religion and conviction" co-existing. And if I may not be presumptuous, I think it may be fair to say, that that would have made God--Benedictum Nomen Sanctum eius--well pleased.