Origen on the Natural Law: Contra Celsum, Part II

WHEN IN ROME ACT AS THE ROMANS DO, and when in a country that worships and tends to crocodiles, one ought to worship and tend to crocodiles. So argued Celsus, the consummate positivist, who never met a human law he did not like, and never met a divine law he liked. Celsus demanded the comfort and the ease of the relative, and shunned the discomfort and discipline that came with belief in the Absolute. For Celsus, there was nothing greater than human law, and so he invoked Pindar's old saw:

Νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς
θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων
ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί.

Law, the king of all,
of mortals and immortals,
guides them as it justifies the utmost violence
with a sovereign hand.

[Pindar, fragment 169a] "Pindar," Celsus said, "appears to me correct in saying that law is king of all things." "Let us proceed to discuss this assertion," Origen enjoins. "What law do you mean to say, good sir, is 'king of all things?'"

If you mean those which exist in the various cities, then such an assertion is not true. For all men are not governed by the same law. You ought to have said that "laws are kings of all men," for in every nation some law is king of all. But if you mean that which is law in the proper sense, then it is this which is by nature "king of all things;" although there are some individuals who, having like robbers abandoned the law, deny its validity, and live lives of violence and justice.

Contra Cels., 5.40. Christians do not find themselves in Celsus's quandary. "We Christians," Origen states in a twist of Pindar's poetry, "have come to the knowledge of the law which is by nature 'king of all things,' and which is the same with the law of God, endeavor to regulate our lives by its prescriptions, having bidden a long farewell to those of an unholy kind." Contra Cels., 5.40.

Origen depicted in Parchment

Origen re-addresses this theme in the eighth book of his work against Celsus. In Chapter 26 of Book VIII, Origen discusses the laws that require the worship of demons, laws which Celsus insists the Christians ought to recognize. Origen resists such a demand, and once against invokes the natural moral law as his justification.

[W]hat are the laws in accordance with which Celsus would have us propitiate the demons? For if he means laws enacted in states, he must show that they are in agreement with the divine laws [Εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, κατασκευαζέτω ὅτι συνᾴδουσι τοῖς θείοις νόμοις]. But if that cannot be done, as the laws of many states are quite inconsistent with each other, these laws, therefore, must of necessity either be no laws at all in the proper sense of the word, or else the enactments of wicked men; and these we must not obey, for 'we must obey God rather than men.' [εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ δύναται οὐ γὰρ κἂν ἀλλήλοις ταὐτὰ λέγουσιν οἱ τῶν πολλῶν πόλεων νόμοι, δηλονότι οὐδὲ κυρίως νόμους ἢ φαύλων νόμους, οἷς οὐ πιστευτέον·πειθαρχεῖν γὰρ δεῖ μᾶλλον θεῷ ἢ ἀνθρώποις.]

Contra Cels., 8.26 (quoting Acts 5:29)

Origen recognizes that for many reasons, including prejudice, there are many that will not listen to the Christian Gospel, and the divine verities therein contained. He however invokes the natural law as a means of dialog with the pagan of good will.

[O]n the common principles of humanity, we endeavor to the best of our ability to convince them of the doctrine of the punishment of the wicked, and to induce even those who are unwilling to become Christians to accept that truth. And we are thus anxious to persuade them of the rewards of right living, when we see that many things which we teach about a healthy moral life are also taught by the enemies of our faith. For you will find that they have not entirely lost the common notions of right and wrong, of good and evil [τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ δικαίων <καὶ ἀδίκων>].

Contra Cels., 8.52. Celsus himself, indeed, does recognize the desirability of a common law that bound all men of Asia, Europe, Libya, Greeks, and Barbarians, "all to the uttermost ends of the earth." But he judges this impossible, and those who would advance the possibility of a universal law reaching across all men are living a pipe dream. "Any one who thinks this possible, knows nothing," Celsus insists. Origen disagrees, but to disabuse Celsus of this opinion would require lengthy argument. Origen, however, tries to put the argument in a nutshell.

Medallion Possibly Depicting Origen

Origen again begins with the notion that all men are endowed by reason, and will therefore come under one law. The Stoics, Origen notes, say that the strongest element, that is, fire, prevails. For the Christian, the strongest element is the Word. And "our belief is that the Word shall prevail over the entire rational creation, and change every soul into his own perfection." Contra Cels., 8.72. There is no evil that the divine Logos cannot overcome, as "in the mind there is no evil so strong that it may not be overcome by the Supreme Word and God. For stronger than all the evils in the soul is the Word, and the healing power that dwells with him." Contra Cels., 8.72. With respect to the restauration of all things, in Christ, the instaurare omnia in Christo, Origen is exceedingly optimistic and ebullient, and the words that follow seem almost to suggest a universal salvation, that notion of apokatastasis which has been discountenanced by the Church.

For stronger than all the evils in the soul is the Word, and the healing power that dwells in Him; and this healing He applies, according to the will of God, to every man. The consummation of all things is the destruction of evil, although as to the question whether it shall be so destroyed that it can never anywhere arise again, it is beyond our present purpose to say. Many things are said obscurely in the prophecies on the total destruction of evil, and the restoration to righteousness of every soul . . . .

Contra Cels., 8.72. Origen relies upon the prophetic testimony of the Jewish prophet Zephaniah and his eschatalogical vision: "Prepare and rise early . . . ." The confusion of tongues, and the pluriformity and the cacophony of religion and law, that came with Babel shall be undone.

Let them also carefully consider the promise, that all shall call upon the name of the Lord, and serve Him with one consent; also that all contemptuous reproach shall be taken away, and there shall be no longer any injustice, or vain speech, or a deceitful tongue. And thus much it seemed needful for me to say briefly, and without entering into elaborate details, in answer to the remark of Celsus, that he considered any agreement between the inhabitants of Asia, Europe, and Libya, as well Greeks as Barbarians, was impossible. And perhaps such a result would indeed be impossible to those who are still in the body, but not to those who are released from it.

Contra Cels., 8.72. Origen next takes up Celsus's suggestion that the Christians bind with the entire community, including the king, to help maintain justice, to defend the community against its internal and external foes. This is something Origen is willing to do. Christians are enjoined by their doctrine to contribute to their community, to render reasonable obedience to those in authority, and even offer prayers for their rulers. The contribution of the Christian, by prayer, by piety, by manner of living adds more in fact to the health and welfare of the state than if he fought the king's battles. "And we do take our part in public affairs, when along with righteous prayers we join self-denying exercises and meditations, which teach us to despise pleasures, and not to be led away by them. And none fight better for the king than we do. We do not indeed fight under him, although he require it; but we fight on his behalf, forming a special army—an army of piety—by offering our prayers to God." Contra Cels., 8.73. "Christians are benefactors of their country more than others. For they train up citizens, and inculcate piety to the Supreme Being; and they promote those whose lives in the smallest cities have been good and worthy, to a divine and heavenly city, to whom it may be said, 'You have been faithful in the smallest city, come into a great one,' where 'God stands in the assembly of the gods, and judges the gods in the midst;' and He reckons you among them, if you no more 'die as a man, or fall as one of the princes.' Contra Cels., 8.75.

Finally, Celsus criticizes the Christians because they seem to have a loyalty to the Church which divides their loyalty to the State, and prevents them from taking offices of the government. Origen insists that the Church is a supranational organization, a society "founded by the Word of God, and we exhort those who are mighty in word and of blameless life to rule over Churches." Contra Cels., 8.76. The ambitious are rejected as leaders in the Church, and efforts are made to encourage those who through excess modesty avoid positions of power. Whoever rules the Christians has knowledge of under whose authority he acts, and so recognize that he is "under the constraining influence of the great King, whom we believe to be the Son of God, God the Word." Contra Cels., 8.76. The leaders of the Christians do not follow the sirens of worldly policy, but rule in accordance with divine command. Understanding all this,

it is not for the purpose of escaping public duties that Christians decline public offices, but that they may reserve themselves for a diviner and more necessary service in the Church of God— for the salvation of men. And this service is at once necessary and right. They take charge of all— of those that are within, that they may day by day lead better lives, and of those that are without, that they may come to abound in holy words and in deeds of piety; and that, while thus worshipping God truly, and training up as many as they can in the same way, they may be filled with the word of God and the law of God, and thus be united with the Supreme God through His Son the Word, Wisdom, Truth, and Righteousness, who unites to God all who are resolved to conform their lives in all things to the law of God.

Contra Cels., 8.76.

Unquestionably, Origen's notion of the natural moral law is both philosophically and Scripturally based. It borrows from Stoic and Platonic elements where they complement the essential Scriptural foundation of his thought. Though the Scripture gives witness to the natural moral law, it is something that is recognized by all men regardless of belief. The natural moral law contains within it, and may be said to be expressed by, the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule. It is however to be found within man, written in his heart, part of his reasonable nature. It is administered by human conscience, and it is able to point out good from evil. Though the natural law is therefore a first grace, a natural grace, the natural moral law has its limit. Though derived from God as part of our created nature, its witness is natural, not supernatural. The righteousness of God, the merciful forgiveness for the law's violation, and the supernatural life and the promise of heaven that God offers in the Word of God made flesh is outside its auspices. Faith and grace must supplement the lack. In short, grace presupposes nature, and the supernatural life presupposes the natural law. The word (logos) of law, needs the Word (Logos) of God. The Word of God did not disdain the word of law. Indeed, the Word of God is the word of law as much as he his the Word of love.

Origen on the Natural Law: Contra Celsum, Part I

IN HIS GREAT APOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN'S refusal to participate in the pagan ethos of the Roman empire, and responsive to the missive of the philosopher Celsus—Origen, in his Contra Celsum (Against Celsius or Κατά Κέλσου) addresses the distinction between human law and the natural moral law. Finding it amenable to his vision of the Christian life, Origen adopts the Stoic distinction between the law of the polis and the universal law, the natural law. The distinction between human law and the divinely-promulgated natural law, and the insistence that there is a higher law than human law, de-divinizes or de-absolutizes the human law. The existence of a natural moral law allows for human law to be criticized, both by reason and by the Gospel. The existence of such a standard also resists the pull of relativism, a relativism which demands tolerance of the truth that falsehood is many, but intolerance of the truth that truth may be one.

Origen depicted in Parchment

Celsus's first point against the Christians is to accuse them of violating the public laws in entering into "secret associations with each other contrary to law." Celsus propounds this accusation in an effort to discredit the law-abiding nature of the Christians, and to bring them into disrepute on account of their "agape feasts" of the Christians (ἀγάπην Χριστιανῶν)." Since . . . he babbles about the public law (τὸν κοινὸν νόμον)," alleging its violation, Origen responds by insisting that truth is above all human law. Thus, if a man "were placed among Scythians, whose laws were unholy (νόμους ἀθέσμους), and having no opportunity of escape, were compelled to live among them, such an one would with good reason, for the sake of the law of truth (τῆς ἀληθείας νόμον), which the Scythians would regard as wickedness, enter into associations contrary to their laws, with those like-minded with himself." Contra Cels., 1.1. The laws that require worship of images, or those that relate to atheistical polytheism (τῆς ἀθέου πολυθεότητος), such as those Celsus complains the Christians violate, are "Scythian" laws, or perhaps even more impious than the Scythian laws. "It is not irrational, then, to form associations in opposition to existing laws, if done for the sake of truth." Οὐκ ἄλογον οὖν συνθήκας παρὰ τὰ νενομισμένα ποιεῖν τὰς ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας Contra Cels., 1.1. At the inception of his work against Celsus, it is clear that Origen unapologetically makes reference to a "higher law," a law of "truth" which trumps human law to the extent that human law is in direct violation of it. Human law must bow to truth. Clearly, this alludes to a notion of the natural moral law which ought to govern the laws of men. It also clearly raises the threat the the State and its law may have to be disobeyed.

Origen also attacks the suggestion by Celsus that Christian morals are bizarre or out of the ordinary, and are not commonly accepted by any "venerable or new branch of instruction." Specifically, Celsus appears to be directing his complaints on "what the Greeks regard as a myth," namely God's writing of the Ten Commandments. Origen rejects the pagan philosopher's slight against the Ten Commandments. These, Origen observes, are consonant with the natural law, and so are not weird or predicated upon myth. The universal belief that we are punished or receive reward for our behavior suggests the existence of a standard.

[U]nless all men had naturally impressed upon their minds sound ideas of morality, the doctrine of the punishment of sinners would have been excluded by those who bring upon themselves the righteous judgments of God. It is not therefore matter of surprise that the same God should have sown in the hearts of all men those truths which He taught by the prophets and the Savior, in order that at the divine judgment every man may be without excuse, having the 'requirements of the law written upon his heart.'

Contra Cels., 1.4 The Christian system of morals is therefore not parochial; on the contrary, it is universal, as its basis is in those sound ideas of morality that are shared by all men. It is precisely this natural law that prohibits the worship of idols, as Celsus himself admits. Celsus cites Heraclitus as an example of how the Greeks disdained idolatry. It is as sensible to pray to images as if they were gods, says Heraclitus, as it is to "enter into conversation with houses." But Origen counters that the Heraclitean disdain of image worship is more ancient then Heraclitus, because it finds its basis "in the minds of men like the principles of morality (τῷ ἄλλῳ ἠθικῷ), from which not only Heraclitus, but any other Greek or barbarian, might be reflection have deduced the same conclusion." Contra Cels., 1.5 This very opinion is evidentiary "that there has been engraven upon the hearts of men by the finger of God a sense of the duty that is required (τοῦ δόγματος γέγραπται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων γράμμασι θεοῦ τὸ πρακτέον)." Contra Cels., 1.5.

Later on in his defense against Celsus's invective against the Christians, Origen once again refers to the natural law and distinguishes it from the "written law of cities." There are, Origen begins, "generally two laws presented to us, the one being the law of nature, of which God would be the legislator [τῆς φύσεως νόμου, ὃν θεὸς ἂν νομοθετήσαι], and the other being the written law of cities [πόλεσι γραπτοῦ]." Contra Cels., 5.37.

[I]t is a proper thing, when the written law is not opposed to that of God, for the citizens not to abandon it under pretext of foreign customs (ξένων νόμων); but when the law of nature, that is, the law of God, commands what is opposed to the written law (ἔνθα δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τῷ γραπτῷ νόμῳ προστάσσει ὁ τῆς φύσεως τουτέστι τοῦ θεοῦ), observe whether reason (ὁ λόγος) will not tell us to bid a long farewell to the written code, and to the desire of its legislators, and to give ourselves up the legislator God (τῷ θεῷ νομοθέτῃ), and to choose a life agreeable to His word (τὸν τούτου λόγον), although in doing so it may be necessary to encounter dangers, and countless labors, and even death and dishonor.

Contra Cels., 5.37. The theme announced by Origen here is as old as Acts 5:29-30: "We must obey God rather than men!" It is as grating to the ear of the ancient tyrant, as it is to the ear of the modern secularist who bristles at the name of Jesus, or the the modern relativist who tyrannizes anyone who believes in objective truth or in objective good. Origen's appeal to the natural law is not, however, a cry for antinomianism or moral or legal anarchy. Quite the contrary, it is the cry of supernomianism, of a law above law which defines an end to human law, a reason or ordo by which it may be measured and critiqued, and a challenge to human law that we shall never allow it to utter the words non serviam. Origen continues:

For when there are some laws in harmony with the will of God, which are opposed to others which are in force in cities, and when it is impracticable to please God (and those who administer laws of the kind referred to), it would be absurd to contemn those acts by means of which we may please the Creator of all things, and to select those by which we shall become displeasing to God, though we may satisfy unholy laws (οὐ νόμοις νόμοις), and those who love them.

Contra Cels., 5.37 It is therefore reasonable to refuse allegiance to a law that contradicts the natural moral law. A fortiori, Origen continues, it is reasonable to refuse allegiance to a law that contradicts the positive law of God or that relates to his worship.

But since it is reasonable in other matters to prefer the law of nature, which is the law of God, before the written law, which has been enacted by men in a spirit of opposition to the law of God, why should we not do this still more in the case of those laws which relate to God?

Εἴπερ δὲ εὔλογον ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν τῆς φύσεως προτιμᾶν νόμον, ὄντα νόμον τοῦ θεοῦ, παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐναντίως τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ νενομοθε τημένον, πῶς οὐχὶ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ νόμοις ποιητέον

Contra Cels., 5.37. So Christians will reject all parochial and national gods: Jupiter and Bacchus of the Ethiopians, Urania and Bacchus of the Arabians, Osiris and Isis of the Egyptians, Athena as the Saïtes are wont to worship, or Serapis as the modern inhabitants of Naucratis have seen fit to invoke. The God worshiped by the Christians is not novel. Nor is He of local import. He was in the beginning, though only recently become incarnate. "For the holy Scriptures know him to be the most ancient of all the works of creation; for it was to Him that God said regarding the creation of man, 'Let Us make man in Our image, after our likeness.' Contra Cels., 5.37.

Medallion Possibly Depicting Origen

Origen on the Natural Law: The Pedagogue of the Soul

ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA, THE INCARNATION of the theology of the Alexandrian Catechetical School as it were, is an ecclesiastical figure that is truly sui generis. Intellectually, he is a prodigy, one of the colossi of Christian thought. His father, Leonides, was beheaded by order of Emperor Septimius Severus when Origen was still a teenager, a fact which had a deep influence on Origen's efforts to be a worthy successor to a martyr father. Origen himself was arrested during the Decian persecution, was tortured, and succumbed to his injuries a few years later, not yet seventy years of age.

Origen was, as one might expect from a student of Clement of Alexandria, deeply influenced by a neo-Platonist speculative philosophy. The combination of this speculative neo-Platonism with a Stoic practical philosophy, a deeply Scriptural Christian theology, and a mind of incredible inventiveness, makes Origen's work extremely delicate and nuanced, complex, even abstruse. As a result of his assertion of controversial speculative positions, and some, indeed, heretical doctrines (e.g, a hierarchical notion of the Trinity, the apokatastasis, the pre-existence of souls), Origen has never comfortably settled into the Church's Tradition, and never will. Indeed, some of his doctrines, at least as advanced by his disciples, and even he by name himself, were anathematized in a local council in Constantinople in 545 A.D., and then, more formally, in the so-called "15 Anathemas" against Origin in the Fifth Ecumenical Council, the Second Council of Constantinople, of 553 A.D. Though his texts are cited by Catholic theologians, and though he is recognized as a great theologian within that communion, he is not considered, nor ever will be, a Father of the Church. Similarly, though his life was driven with a great zeal of discipleship, even to martyrdom, it is tainted by such severity as his self-mutilation by castration. Given such intellectual and moral imbalance, erring perhaps on the side of zeal by excess, Origen has not been accepted as a model of balanced, integrated, yet heroic virtue, that is to say, a canonized Saint. In fine, Origen must be judiciously read, and followed only temerariously, as within the undeniable wheat of his work, there is some significant an unpalatable chaff.

Deeply steeped in the Scriptures, and armed with a knowledge of Hebrew, Origen interpreted Scripture in a highly-allegorical fashion. Origen's constructions were, however, tied to the Apostolic tradition, and tempered by allegiance to the teaching of the magisterial authority of the Church. Despite his problematic positions on some doctrinal issues, Origen tried to live as a faithful son of the Catholic Church. Origen's corpus of works was immense: perhaps as many as 320 books, including Scriptural Commentaries, his philosophical treatise, De principiis (On First Principles), a work of Scriptural textual criticism called the Hexapla, 310 homilies, and numerous letters. And though many of these works have not survived, the works that have remained extant are truly formidable. Thankfully, the works of Origen that address the issue of the natural law do not seem particularly tainted by any of his controversial positions, and where they are, I will try to point that out.

Origen depicted in Parchment

The two of Origen’s works that address the issue of the natural law are his Commentary on Romans and his Contra Celsum. We shall focus in this blog entry on Origen’s Commentary on Romans.* In the next we shall focus on Origen's Contra Celsum.

In his Commentary on Romans, Origen clearly uses the term natural law in a moral sense. Its use by him is fully compatible with both the Stoic notions of the natural law, as well as St. Paul's teachings of it in the Epistle to the Romans. It is however within the context of Scriptural exegesis that Origen uses the term. At the outset of his commentary on St. Paul's great epistle, Origen warns that St. Paul's use of "law" in his Epistle to the Romans can be confusing, as he refers variously to the Mosaic law and the natural law, and careful distinction must be made in construing St. Paul's text. Only rarely does Origen use the term natural law in a physical sense, such as it being part of the law of nature that we die. e.g., Com. Rom., 4.10(1). Essentially, Origen understands the natural law in an exclusively moral sense, as a law of practical reason, implanted by God, and which directs us, through the testimony of conscience, to do good and avoid evil. Origen ties in the natural law or the natural moral law with St. Paul’s “law of my mind” in Romans 7:23. Com. Rom., 5.6(3). His view of the natural law is therefore decidedly more than mere biological: it is both intellectual and moral, and ultimately spiritual.

Origen, like his master Clement of Alexandria, and like the Jewish Hellenistic philosopher Philo, equates the essence of the Mosaic law, specifically the Decalogue, with the natural moral law. Whether in its positive form and promulgated by Moses (i.e., the Decalogue) or as manifested in the natural law by the witness of conscience, that "pedagogue" to the soul, the natural law binds both Jew and Gentile, that is to say, all mankind. At the heart of this natural law is the Golden Rule. And while the Gospel did not supplant the natural moral law, the natural law is not the sum-total of man’s end, for man, who has sinned and fallen short of the natural moral law and thus stands condemned by it, is called to go beyond the natural moral law, to the Son of God who fulfilled the natural moral law, who is the end of that law (in the sense of its objective or culmination). Ultimately, then, the natural moral law is a necessary preamble, a foundation, as it were, to knowledge of the righteousness of God, to the law of Christ, the law of faith and of grace. Through Christ, God effects his merciful forgiveness for past violations of the natural law, and provides the strength and ability to follow it. More than that, Christ is the avenue to truth, to goodness, to justice, and to communion with God in supernatural life. This is a short summary of Origen's teachings.

Origen’s notion of the natural law is firmly based upon St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. According to Origen, the law “written in the heart” of the Gentiles referred to by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans (2:14-15) is not the Mosaic law in so far as it deals with rituals or sacrifice, but it would include all the precepts of the Decalogue: “The reference is instead to what they are able to perceive by nature, for instance, that they should not commit murder or adultery, they ought not to steal, they should not speak falsely, they should honor father and mother, and the like.” Com. Rom. 2.9(1) It is clear from this enumeration that Origen equates, as was common teaching at the time, the Decalogue revealed to the Jew with the natural moral law revealed to the Gentile. It is through the natural law that God has revealed his law to the Gentiles, albeit in an implied manner relative to the express revelation to the Jew in the form of the Mosaic law. Com. Rom., 2.7.5-6; 7.19.6. This natural law in the heart of the Gentiles, however, should not be construed as excluding the Jew: the natural law “is naturally innate within men, both Jews and Gentiles” Com. Rom., 3.6(2) It is thus universally binding upon all men.

One finds that God has in fact given to man every disposition and every drive by which he can press forward and advance toward virtue. Over and above the power of reason God has ensured that man should know what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid. One finds then that God has supplied these things universally to all men. But if a man who has received these things has disdained to advance upon the road of virtue, this man, to whom nothing was lacking from God, is found to be lacking in what is given to him by God. Deservedly, then, God is said to prevail in such a judgment and to be justified in his words.

Com. Rom., 3.6(2). Origen goes beyond the natural moral law as being just the tutor of good, and also suggests the possibility that “written in the hearts of the Gentiles” is the fact that “God is one and the Creator of all things.” Com. Rom. 2.9(1) The natural moral law would thus compel the recognition of our creaturehood, and the obligation to reverence the God who made us.

Medallion Possibly Depicting Origen

Origen advances the notion, common with the fathers and seen in Clement of Alexandria, St. John Chrysostom, and others, that not only is the natural law consonant with the Mosaic Decalogue, it is consonant with the “evangelical laws,” or the laws of the Gospel, “where everything is ascribed to natural justice,” the centerpiece of which is the Golden Rule. “For what could be nearer to the natural moral senses than that those things men do not want done to themselves, they should not do to others?” Origen asks rhetorically. Com. Rom., 2.9(1)

With respect to the particular, positive precepts of the Mosaic law, where reason is hard-pressed to find an explanation or justification, there remains, for Origen, even there a tenuous link between even those Jewish-specific rites such as circumcision, the prohibition of wearing wool woven with linen, or the prohibition of the use of yeast during the Passover. Cf. Gen.17:12; Lev. 12:3; Deut. 22:11; Ex. 12:15-20; 23-15. Here, however, we must go into allegorial construction of the laws, and interpret these provisions in a spiritual, not literal sense. “Natural law is able to agree with the law of Moses according to the spirit but not according to the letter.” Com. Rom., 2.9(1) Thus the Jewish rites and customs as revealed in the Old Testament, interpreted in a spiritual sense, may still have useful purpose in the life of the Christian.

The law that St. Paul speaks of, Origen clarifies, is not literally written in the heart; rather, it is a law of practical reason, as “one should realize that the soul’s rational power is normally called the heart.” Com. Rom., 2.9(2). This law of reason is made known to us through the testimony of conscience. The conscience of which St. Paul speaks of, and which condemns us and approves us is, in Origen’s view, “identical with the spirit, which . . . is with the soul.” “The conscience functions like a pedagogue to the soul, a guide and companion, as it were, that it might admonish it concerning better things or correct and convict it of faults.” Com. Rom., 2.9(3); see also 2.9(4). Thus conscience is part of man’s spiritual nature, and for Origen, is separate from the soul. [Note: This Origenist view is consistent with a Platonic or Pythagorean notion of a tri-partite or trichotomous view of human nature: body, soul, and spirit [soma, psyche, pneuma]. It may not be entirely consistent of a more proper dichotomous view of man [body and spiritual soul]. In a dichotomous view of man, conscience would, strictly speaking, be part of, or a component of, man's spiritual soul, and not a separate or different substance.] Upon reaching the age of reason, and coming to understand the natural moral law, faults or violations of that law are imputed to that person, and with such imputation spiritual death. Com. Rom., 3.2.(7)-(8); 5.1(23)-(26); 6.8(3)-(4). “Those who are at the time of life at which they have already received the ability to distinguish good and evil are under this law,” this “natural law, which is written in men’s hearts.” Because it requires the use of reason, it certainly excludes children, may exclude mentally incompetents, but includes all intelligent creatures, including the angels. Com. Rom., 3.6(1), (3), (4).

The natural law, however important it is in the life of man, is not an absolute end all. The natural law has limits to its witness. It does not, for example, witness to the righteousness of God. “God’s righteousness is disclosed apart from the law. For the law of nature was able to reveal the nature of sin and bring to light the knowledge of sin; but the righteousness of God surpasses and rises above whatever the human mind can scrutinize by natural senses alone.” Com. Rom., 3.7(5). Further, through both the natural moral law as well as the Mosaic law comes knowledge of sin. Com. Rom., 3.6; cf. Rom. 3:19-20. Yet in this regard, Origen is quick to defend both the Mosaic law and the natural law. The fact that sin is known through law does not impute evil on either the Mosaic law or the natural law. Knowledge of sin does not come “from the law,” but rather “through the law." Com. Rom., 3.6(9). Since the Fall, moreover, the “law in the members,” the fomes peccati, enters the world “under the cover of the natural law.” Com. Rom., 5.6.(1)-(4). Finally, the Jew, by his failure to comply with the jot and tittle of his law, stands condemned before his Mosaic law. The Gentile likewise stands condemned by his conscience before the natural moral law. Com. Rom., 3.2(7)-(9). The violation of the positive or natural law invites wrath. Com. Rom., 4.4; cf. Rom. 4:15. Most significantly, neither the Mosaic law nor the natural moral law offer a way out of the moral and soteriological problematic caused by the knowledge of sin, the existence of the law of the members, and the guilt associated with having violated them.

So it is that the natural law, despite the fact that it is good and of God, has limits. It does not and cannot save. Yet there is hope nevertheless, as man is called to go beyond the natural moral law. Alone, the natural law is an insufficient witness to the entire truth and the entire end of man. It is unable to testify to the revelation of God in Christ. The law of nature is not the law of Grace, and so it does not impel or draw a man to believe that Jesus is Lord, the son of God. Com. Rom., 3.7.8-10. The natural moral law is not equivalent to the “law of faith” that St. Paul speaks of in Romans 3:27. For fulfilment, we must also turn to the law that is Christ.

Christ is not under the law but is the fulfillment of law. And just as he himself is the righteousness through which all become righteous; and he is the truth through which all stand firm in the truth; and he himself is the life through which all live; so also he himself is the law through which all are under law. He comes to the judgment, then, not as one who is under law but as one who is law.

Com. Rom., 3.6(5). Both the Gentile and Jew, therefore, share a mutual need of Christ in addition to the Decalogue or natural moral law. Through the letter of the law, or the witness of conscience, and through obedience to the Decalogue or the natural moral law, Christ leads us to mystery, and in fact is that mystery. From the natural, we are lead to the supernatural. From the letter we are led to the spirit. From the law written to the heart, we are led to the very heart of God through the Word. There is the letter, which leads to law, and beyond all law is mystery.

The doctrine of the Law . . . at the school of Christ is like this, the letter is bitter, like the [green-covered] skin [of a walnut]; secondly, you will come to the shell, which is the moral doctrine; thirdly, you will discover the meaning of the mysteries, with which the souls of the saints are nourished in the present life and the future.

Hom. Num. 9, 7


*English translation of Origen's Commentary is from Scheck's translation, published by CUA as part of its Fathers of the Church series (2001).

Pietro Vermigli: Natural Law Makes us "Run to Christ"

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Pietro Vermigli by Hans Asper (1560)

THE REFORMER PETER MARTYR VERMIGLI presents us with a notion of the natural law that is more compatible with the Classical and Roman Catholic understanding of that doctrine. Far less pessimistic that his contemporary John Calvin, the Italian Reformer remained more faithful to his Aristotelian and Roman Catholic sources, at least in the area of the natural moral law, than Calvin. In the area of the natural law at least, he writes more in tune with the realism of the via antiqua than with the nominalism of the via moderna. In fact, contrary to so many of the Reformers, Vermigli did not disdain Aristotle, but even wrote a commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics. This stands in direct contrast with Luther, who claimed in his "Open Letter to the Christian Nobility" that "God has sent [Aristotle] as a plague upon us for our sins." Moreover, Vermigli's view in the area of natural theology is "broadly Thomistic with a strong Augustinian accent," thus assuring a more traditional bent. Grabill, 102.

Aristotle

Born in Florence, Italy, Peter Martyr Vermigli (1500-1562), originally Piero Mariano, was admitted into the Augustinian order, and was named after St. Peter Martyr. He was educated at the Augustinian friary in Fiesole, and then transferred to St. John of Verdara near Padua. Graduating in 1527, he preached in Brescia, Pisa, Venice, and Rome. In 1530, Peter Martyr was elected abbot of the Augustinian friary at Spoleto, and in 1533, prior of the convent of St. Peter ad Aram in Naples. Exposed to the influence of Protestant theologians' works, including Martin Bucher and Huldrych Zwingli, and eventually succumbing to their views, Peter Martyr drew the ire of authorities, including those of the Spanish viceroy of Naples and the superiors of his order. Summoned to appear before a chapter of his order and facing likely disciplining, Peter Martyr instead escaped to Pisa and then to Zürich and Basel, ultimately settling at Strasbourg where, in violation of his vows, he married his first wife Catherine Dammartin of Metz, and was appointed professor of theology. As Grabill summarizes it, "he was forced to move every five years on average . . . . [a]s a result, his institutional gravitas was in a state of near constant flux." Grabill, 99. Accepting an invitation by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, Vermigli was appointed regius professor of divinity at Oxford where he was actively involved in a variety of theological disputes. When the Catholic Queen Mary assumed the throne, Vermigli returned to Strasbourg where he taught theology. Vermigli ultimately settled in Zürich accepting a chair of Hebrew, whence he spent the rest of his days. He participated in the Colloquy at Poissy, a failed effort in 1561 to reconcile the Calvinist Huguenots and Catholics in France. A prolific writer, Vermigli published Biblical commentaries and various treatises. He died in 1562.

Similar to Calvin, Vermigli did not undertake to fashion a synthetic analysis of the natural law in the manner of St. Thomas. Yet his attendance to the notion of a nature-based morality independent--yet consistent with--revealed morality was more focused than Calvin. Vermigli's treatment of the natural law is most manifest in his exegesis of the first two chapters of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. This is not unexpected, since the first two chapters of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans is the textus classicus when it comes to the Scriptural warrant for the natural law. In his treatment of this text, Vermigli shows marked differences from Calvin. "The fundamental differences between Calvin and Vermigli have to do with the latter's more extensive and disciplined use of natural theology/natural law. . . . While Vermigli acknowledges reason's post-lapsarian limitations, he is more sanguine than Calvin regarding its ability to grasp the precepts of the natural law through sense experience, moral intuition, and dialectics." Grabill, 102, 103-04.

St. Paul

Unquestionably, Vermigli believes in the existence of a natural theology: both the world and our minds are constructed so as to be able to glean from creation the existence of divinity. "God has planted prolepsis in our minds," Vermigli states, "that is, anticipations and notions through which we are led to conceive noble and exalted opinions about the divine nature." Grabill, 110 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 21r; CP, 1.2.3).

That natural knowledge outside of revelation is also found in the area of morality. Vermigli suggests that there is a natural moral theology that finds its roots in the imago Dei, the image of God, that is in man, and which persists, albeit in an attenuated or weakened fashion, in post-lapsarian man. Since our souls are akin to God their creator, they reflect "justice, wisdom, and many other most noble habits," and "also the knowledge of what is right and honest, and what is wrong and unclean." Grabill, 111 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 22v; CP, 1.2.4) Without doubt, Vermigli departs from Calvin's pessimistic assessment of man's ability to know of God and his law. Grabill, 113-14.

Following St. Thomas's commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Vermigli distinguishes between two types of knowledge of God. The first is "effectual," and second "frigid" or ineffectual. Effectual knowledge of God leads to spiritual transformation that is expressed by good deeds. Grabill, 114. Truth obtained through Faith, as distinguished from truth obtained through Reason or Nature, is "more likely to lead to action." Grabill, at 114. Therefore, he affirms with St. Thomas that, without Faith and the aid of God's grace, the "natural law is ineffective in leading human beings to the good." Grabill, 114. "Surely," states Vermigli,

this does not happen because one truth by itself and taken on its own is stronger than another. Truth has the same nature on both sides; the difference arises from the ways and means by which it is perceived. Natural strength is corrupt, weakened and defiled through sin, so that the truth that it grasps has no effect. But faith has joined with it the divine inspiration and power of the Holy Spirit so that it apprehends truth effectively. Hence the difference consists in the faculty by which truth is apprehended. This should not be taken to deny that more than we know through nature is revealed to us by the Scriptures, the New as well as the Old Testament. But we have drawn a comparison between the same truth when known by nature and when perceived by faith.

Grabill, 114 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, ff. 20r-21v; CP, 1.2.11) . To have effective knowledge of the natural law, that is, knowledge that results in an ability to follow that law, requires, in the ultimate analysis following the Fall, Faith and Grace in Christ. True: external compliance to the natural law may be found in other cultures and times:

[N]o nation is so savage or barbarous that it is not touched by some sense of right, justice, and honesty. . . . We might say instead that by this freedom our works may agree with the civil or economic law, which has regard to outward acts and is not so much concerned with the will.

Grabill, 117 (quoting Vermigli, "Free Will," f. 102, par. 4). While perhaps the natural law or even the Mosaic law may be followed externally and imperfectly or partially either as a result of natural goodness or the threat of human law, it is impossible for wounded, fallen man to follow the natural law perfectly, that is, with full internal assent. To follow the natural law with such full internal assent requires us to love God with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength, clearly an act that requires Faith and Grace. Grabill, 116.

For Vermigli (and unlike Calvin), the natural law is not principally condemnatory, though it has a role in informing the conscience and the internal forum. "Vermigli contends that God did not reveal such natural knowledge for the sole purpose of establishing his wrath against the Gentiles," Grabill, 115, but rather to force us to "admit that they were too weak while knowing what they should do," and so to make then "run to Christ." Grabill, 116 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 23v; CP, 1.2.8 "proinde necessarium esse, ad Christum confugere").

For Vermigli, the natural law has a more positive role of prompting man towards God as he has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. This places him opposite Calvin. In almost a Kantian manner, Calvin appears to have maintained that although the natural law may be objectively manifest in the created order, since the Fall man had no ability subjectively to inform himself of that order. Thus, post-lapsarian man had no ability to know the moral Ding an sich that was vouchsafed us in the created order. Vermigli, on the other hand, contended that even after the Fall, man had the ability subjectively to comprehend and so to know the natural law manifest in the created order, but man's knowledge, though real, was not effectual without Faith and Grace. For Vermigli, the corruption of man, therefore, was more manifest in the will than in reason.

Vermigli properly insisted that the knowledge of moral good acquired by nature does not vitiate the need for revelation. "In Vermigli's judgment the phrase by nature [in Romans 2:14] should not be construed in such a way as to exclude divine revelation or assistance vis-à-vis the requirements of morality." Grabill, 117.

In sum,

Vermigli distinguishes two principal uses for why knowledge of the moral law was implanted in the human mind. The first, corresponding with a "frigid" knowledge of God, exists to nullify any excuse by providing objective and universally accessible knowledge of the moral law and the judgment to come. The second, corresponding with an "effectual" knowledge of God, exists to increase human "readiness" and "strength" to do that which is known to be just and honest. It is the second use, as Vermigli insists, that prods humanity to pursue true righteousness and that serves to renew God's image in us.

Grabill, 119-20.

To quote Vermigli:

The image of God in which man was created, is not utterly blotted out but obfuscated in the fall, and for that reason is in need of renewal by God. So natural knowledge is not fully quenched in our minds, but much of it still remains, which Paul now touches upon.

Grabill, 120 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 44 r).

The contrast between Vermigli's teaching on the one hand with Calvin or Barth's teaching on the other hand is striking. If there is to be dialogue between the Classical and Catholic view of the natural law and the Reformed or Protestant tradition, it must be through the likes of someone like Vermigli, and not someone like Calvin or Barth. In the area of natural law, the latter two are simply too far down the path of error to allow for easy reconciliation or rapprochement.

The Need for Revelation: "Pis-Aller" by Matthew Arnold

IN HIS POEM "PIS ALLER,"* the poet Matthew Arnold writes about the practical need we have for the natural law to be revealed in the divine positive law. Though in theory the natural law is available to all men, regardless of culture and time and place, most men have impediments--individual, cultural, religious, or intellectual--that may frustrate the ability to discern the natural law. Though Arnold would surely have disclaimed it, this practical difficulty also explains the need for the Magisterium, that is, the teaching Church or ecclesia docens, in teaching all men of the existence and the content of the natural law. It is part of the Church's competency to teach about the natural law, and to do so infallibly through God's own promise.

Man is blind because of sin,
Revelation makes him sure;
Without that, who looks within,
Looks in vain, for all's obscure.

Nay, look closer into man!
Tell me, can you find indeed
Nothing sure, no moral plan
Clear prescribed, without your creed?

No, I nothing can perceive!
Without that, all's dark for men.
That, or nothing, I believe.--
For God's sake, believe it then!

This is in accordance with St. Thomas Aquinas's teaching on the natural moral law and the practical need for revelation. In his Summa Theologiae (IaIIae, q. 91, art. 4), St. Thomas states:

Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons, . . . [the second being] because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err. [Ut ergo homo absque omni dubitatione scire possit quid ei sit agendum et quid vitandum, necessarium fuit ut in actibus propriis dirigeretur per legem divinitus datam, de qua constat quod non potest errare.]

Matthew Arnold

*"pis aller" is a French word meaning worse (pis) and to go (aller). It means the final recourse or expedient, the last resort, last device, a dernier ressort, or stop gap measure.