Excursus on Romans: Exegesis on 2:14, Part 2

IN PART ONE OF THIS SERIES, we reviewed the Greek text in Romans 2:14 and concluded that there is no way to determine the difference between a adjectival dativus actoris and an adverbial dativus modi or dativus instrumenti. A dativus actoris relates to a "who"? A dativus modi relates to an "in what manner"? A dativus instrumenti relates to a "by what means"? Whatever kind of dativus the word physei is, it cannot be learned from the form of the noun: they all are the same.

Since we don't have commas to help us in Greek, we look at the syntax. What about syntax? Is the fact that the word φύσει located after the phrase ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα mean that it does not refer to ἔθνη (gentiles who do not have the law)? Since φύσει precedes the phrase τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν (those who do the law) does that mean that it refers to that phrase that follows?

St. Paul Writing an Epistle

The argument supporting the majority interpretation seems to have the upper hand when syntax is considered. The argument is that if Paul or any writer of Greek had intended to say that the Gentiles by nature lacked something, namely the law, the term "by nature" (physei) would not have been placed at the end of the phrase he was modifying, but would have been placed before the noun it was modifying, such a construction being the more natural construction. What seems quite clear is that physei is never used in any instance in the New Testament in a manner where it modified a noun (i.e., as a dativus auctoris or in an adjectival sense) and was placed post-positively, that is after the noun. There is, however, no instance where the term physei was used pre-positively when it was used adverbially in the sense of a dativus modi or dativus instrumenti. In fact, there is no instance in the New Testament where the term physei was used as a dativus modi or dativus instrumenti, i.e., adverbially at all. So the argument by syntax is not absolutely conclusive, but it leans heavily in support of the traditional understanding.***

St. Paul uses the term physei three other times in his epistles: Galatians 2:15, 4:8, and Ephesians 2:3. Do these provide any instruction as to St. Paul's usage of the dative noun physei?

ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί

We are Jews by nature and not sinners from among the Gentiles

Ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν οὐκ εἰδότες θεὸν ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσιν θεοὶς

However at that time, when you did not know God, you were slaves to those which by nature are not gods

ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἀνεστράφημεν ποτε ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν ποιοῦντες τὰ θελήματα τῆς σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν διανοιῶν, καὶ ἤμεθα τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποί

Among them we too all formerly lived in the lusts of our flesh, indulging the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest

In each of these instances, physei is used as a dativus auctoris, since in each instance it is clear that the term "by nature" refers to a noun, and not a verb (Jews, Gods, children of wrath). It is adjectival, not adverbial. Now, what is apparent is that, when used in this sense, St. Paul places the dativus auctoris before the modified noun, between a definitive article and the noun (and so also before the noun), and between a noun and its genitive modifier. In no instance does St. Paul place the dativus acutoris post positive, after the noun it modifies. This would suggest that Paul is not using the term physei as a dativus auctoris in Romans 2:14, as, if he followed his habit in these other verses, one would anticipate the term physei to be before the noun it modifies, so that St. Paul would have said placed φύσει either before the word Gentile (ἔθνη) or somewhere before ἔχοντα. He would not have placed a dativus auctoris, a dative used adjectively, post-positively.

Since in none of these other instances is physei used in a dativus modi or dativus instrumenti (i.e., in an adverbial sense modifying a verb), we cannot use these instances to help inform us as to whether St. Paul would have placed a dativus modi or instrumenti pre-positively, that is, before the verb he was intending to modify.

While we are at it, we might as well review the only other instance of the use of physei in the New Testament, namely in the Epistle of James (3:7):

πᾶσα γὰρ φύσις θηρίων τε καὶ πετεινῶν, ἑρπετῶν τε καὶ ἐναλίων δαμάζεται καὶ δεδάμασται τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ

For every nature of beasts, and of birds, and of serpents, and of the rest, is tamed, and hath been tamed, by the nature of man (Douay Rheims)

St. James uses a dativus auctoris pre-positively, not post-positively. Following St. Paul's practice, St. James place the term physei when used as a dativus auctoris before the noun it was modifying, and never after that noun.

So it seems that those who want to read St. Paul's words and construe them to mean something along these lines--"For when the Gentiles who have no law by nature do the things of the law, these having no law, are a law unto themselves"--have no warrant.

Excursus on Romans: Exegesis on 2:14, Part 1

THERE IS SOME CONTROVERSY regarding St. Paul's teaching of the natural law in his epistle to the Romans, specifically involving Romans 2:14. The controversy revolves around which of two general ways that verse should be interpreted. Specifically, the controversy involves the term "by nature" (φύσει), and whether it refers to the things that Gentiles do (that are in conformity with the Mosaic law) or to the Gentiles (who do not have the Mosaic law) themselves. Another way of looking at the problem is whether the term "by nature" (φύσει) is used adverbially (modifying a verb) or adjectivally (modifying a noun). More technically, the word φύσει is a noun in the dative case. But that noun is not used in its nounal sense, that is, as a dativus, an indirect object of any verb. Rather the question is whether it is being used as a dativus instrumenti or dativus modi, a dative of instrument or a dative of manner which refers to the action of "doing the things of the law," or whether it is used as a dativus auctoris, a dative of agent that refers to the "Gentiles."*

The traditional way of looking at the matter, and certainly the majority view, is one that views the verse as saying that the Gentiles by nature do the things of the law (which implies the existence of a natural law which the Gentiles follow). The majority view is found summarized in Bertke:

In the Greek text φύσει ([by] nature) belongs grammatically to ποιῶσιν [doing]. In other words, the Gentiles do by nature the things of the law. Had Paul wanted the word φύσει to modify the phrase "who have not the law" [τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα] thus excluding the concept of a natural law, then perforce φύσει would have had to be placed either before the article τὰ or between τὰ and ἔχοντα. In the actual construction φύσει can only belong to ποιῶσιν. The identity of the Gentiles in the passage is clearly determined by the appositional phrases used in the description. The phrases τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα [which have not the law] and οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες [these not having the law] in verse 14 can mean only that Paul is speaking of pagans in the strict sense of the word, i.e., people with, at best only primitive revelation.**

The second way, out of the mainstream, is to construe the verse as referring to Gentiles who by nature have not the law (which does not imply a natural law). Those who interpret the verse in the latter sense, are perhaps impelled to do so in an untoward and mistaken zeal to make everything sub gratia (under grace), and nothing sub lege (under law).

St. Paul by El Greco

The Greek text, along with various English variants, followed by the Latin Vulgate, is provided below:

ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος.

For when the Gentiles which have not the law do by nature the things contained in the law these having not the law are a law unto themselves. [King James]

For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves. [New American Standard]

For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these having not the law are a law to themselves. [Douay Rheims]

For when Gentiles which have no law do by nature the things of the law, these, having no law, are a law unto themselves. [English Revised Version]

Cum enim gentes quae legem non habent naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt eiusmodi legem non habentes ipsi sibi sunt lex. [Vulgate]

Manifestly, the most common translations follow the notion that the term φύσει (by nature) is being used adverbially, not adjectivally, or as a dativus modi or dativus instrumenti and not a dativus acutoris.

The transliteration and direct translation of the Greek may is as follows:

ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος.

hotan gar ethnē ta mē nomon echonta physei ta tou nomou poiōsin, houtoi nomon mē echontes eautois eisin nomos.

When for (the?) gentiles the not law having by nature the [things] of law they do, these the law not having to themselves are law.***

The problem, of course, is lack of punctuation in the Greek text. The lack of punctuation can add vagaries to the text, and, without the added benefit of punctuation, the relationships between the words can result in ambiguity, as it does in this case. The word by nature (φύσει) straddles the two possible phrases it can modify. It either modifies the phrase before it--ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα--or it modifies the phrase that comes after it--τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν. Punctuation, had it been part of the Greek text, would have helped clarify whether the term "by nature" modified what comes before it or what comes after it. Since there is no comma, we have to imply one. We have to ask ourselves where the implied comma should go in the text: "Gentiles who do not have the law by nature do what the law requires." Does it come before or after the phrase "by nature"? Does the verse read: "Gentiles, who do not have the law by nature, do what the law requires"? Or rather does the verse read: "Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires"? This is another way of asking whether the term φύσει is a dativus auctoris or a dativus modi or dativus instrumentali.

Without punctuation, we have to have recourse elsewhere. For help, we have to resort to syntax, grammar, vocabulary, customary usages, context, etc.

The question, one would hope, would be resolved by grammar. Is there any way to tell whether the word φύσει, a noun in dative form, is being used as a dativus auctoris, a dative with reference to the actor, adjectivally? Or is it rather being used as a dativus modi or dativus instrumenti, a dative with reference to an action, i.e., adverbially? Unfortunately, grammar does not yield an absolute answer. There is no way to distinguish between dativus auctoris and dativus modi or dativus instrumenti, at least that I have found.

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*See Systematische Grammatik der griechischen Sprache Syntax - Kasuslehre, Dativ.
**Rev. Stanley Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1941), 3-4 (Quirmbach, Joseph, Die Lehre des Hl. Paulus von der naturlichen Gotteserkenntnis und dem naturlichen Sittengestz, in Strassburger Theologische Studien, Band VII, Heft 4, 1906, p. 67.) Bertke also cites to M. J. Lagrange, O.P., Épître aux Romains, Paris: J. Gabalda et Fils, 1914, p. 49 ("Paul ne s'inquiète pas ici principe des action, mais de leur norm exterieure. La nature, c'est-a-dire la lumière de la raison naturelle, à défaut de la Lois, a dit aux gentil ce qu'ils devaient faire et éviter.") [My translation: Paul does not concern himself with the principle of action here, but with its external standard. Nature, that is to say the light of natural reason, in the absence of the Law, informed the Gentiles that which they had to do and [that which they had to] avoid.]
***See Table below:

ὅταν	when: conjunction.
γὰρ	for: conjunction, postpositive.
ἔθνη	(the) Gentiles: noun, neuter gender, nominative case, plural. The definitive article is implied.
τὰ	the: definitive article (neuter, plural), referring to ἔχοντα which refers to the gentiles.
μὴ	not: negative particle, negates, the phrase "τὰ . . . . νόμον ἔχοντα."
νόμον	law: noun, singular, masculine gender, accusative case.
ἔχοντα	(they) who have/hold/possess: verb, present, active, participle, used in a nounal form of the verb, ἔχω (I have, hold possess).
φύσει	(by) nature: noun (φύσις), dative case, singular, female gender.
τὰ	the:(see above)
τοῦ	(of) the: definite article in genitive, singular, masculine case, refers to the noun law, νόμου.
νόμου	(of) law: noun, masculine gender, genitive case, singular.
ποιῶσιν	do: verb, present, active, subjunctive mood, third person plural form of ποιέω, I make or do.
οὗτοι	these: noun, plural, masculine, in dative case.
νόμον	law: noun, accusative case, singular, masculine.
μὴ	not: see above.
ἔχοντες	(they) have: verb, present, active, participle, used as noun in nominative case, plural, masculine.
ἑαυτοῖς	(to) themselves: 3rd person plural reflexive pronoun, female gender and dative case.
εἰσιν	(they) are: verb, present, active, indicative, third person plural form of εἰμί, (I) am.
νόμος	law: nominative case.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 12

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Bust of St. Paul the Apostle by El Greco

C. PAUL (3-67 A.D.)

Without doubt, Apostle Paul had a controlling influence upon St. Augustine's teaching on the eternal law. Augustine had expansive knowledge of St. Paul's epistles. The bishop himself states that he read Paul above all others.(1) He cites the Pauline epistles often in his works.(2) Paul speaks in his Epistle to the Romans about law, the law which the Gentiles have by nature. "So although the Gentiles have no law, even so, they by nature (physei) do the work of the law. They, who have no law, are themselves law. They evidence that the wok of the law is written upon their hearts. Their conscience gives them minds instruction, so that it either accuses them or confirms them."(3) Paul states here that the Gentiles act by means of the natural moral law which is written upon their heart. This law is to them the norm and measure of good and evil. Augustine interprets this provision extensively. He asks from whence it is that the Gentiles have this law, and he answers: "God gave the Gentiles this law. He has written it in their hearts with his finger, with the Holy Spirit."(4) Men have this law by nature, since they are created in the image of God.(5) Since God has written the moral law in man's heart, it follows that it is a divine law, and it also flows that it is the eternal law. Similarly, St. Paul leads back the laws of the State to God, in that he says: "There is no power save from God."(6) Augustine cites and confirms these words of the Apostle.(7) So do both Paul and Augustine lead the moral law and the law of the State back to God.

St. John the Evangelist by Donatello (Detail)

D. JOHN (100 A.D. †)

In his prologue to his Gospel, John the Evangelist depicts his "Gospel of the Logos."(1) He calls the Logos eternal, the maker of all things, the life and light of all mankind. Augustine interprets this part of St. John's Gospel. He writes: "The Logos has created all things, all things without exception, that we find in nature, everything from angel to the littlest worm.(2) There is no form, no structure, no harmony of the parts, no substance, whether in weight, in measure, in number, that has its existence except through the Logos.(3) The Logos is uncreated form of all things.(4) The inner ground for the constitution and organization of all the things of the world. So do both Augustine and John lead all things back to the Logos, the Verbum, the divine Wisdom, which is nothing other than the eternal law.

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(1) Aug., PL 32, col. 747. Paulum prae ceteris legit Augustinus . . .
(2) PL 44, col. 227, No. 44 and PL. 35, col. 1381.
(3) Rom. 2:14-16. ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόμος. οἵτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων . . .
(4) Augustin, PL 44, col. 227, No. 44. Deus dat leges in mentem ipsorum et in cordibus eorum scribit eas digito suo, spiritu sancto. [De spir. et lit. 26.46]
(5) Aug., PL 32, col. 229, No. 47. Imaginem Dei, in qua facti sumus.
(6) Rom. 13:1. . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξουσία εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ οὖσαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ . . .
(7) Aug., Epist. 93, PL 33, col. 331.

(1) John 1:3. πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ γέγονεν.
(2) Aug., PL 32, col. 1358. Quaecumque naturaliter facta sunt, quaecumque sunt in creaturis, omnia omino quae in coelo fix sunt, quae fulgent desuper, quae volitant sub coelo, quae moventur in universa natura rerum, omnis omnino creatura ab angelo usque ad vermiculum facta sunt per verbum (logos). [Conf., VIII, 3]
(3) Aug., PL 32, col. 1386. Nulla enim forma, nulla compages, nulla concordia partium, nulla qualiscumque substantia, quae potest habere pondus, numerum, mensuramm, nisi per illud verbum . . . cui dictum est omnia in mensura numero et pondere (Sap. 11:21).
(4) Aug., PL 38, col. 662. Verbum Dei est forma quaedam non formata, forma sine tempore et loco, form omnium formatorum, forma incommutabilis sine lapsu, sine temore, sine loco, superans omnia . . . hoc verbum dicitur sapientia. [Sermo 117, 2, 3]

Pietro Vermigli: Natural Law Makes us "Run to Christ"

(To see related posts, click on the title and scroll to the end of this post)

Pietro Vermigli by Hans Asper (1560)

THE REFORMER PETER MARTYR VERMIGLI presents us with a notion of the natural law that is more compatible with the Classical and Roman Catholic understanding of that doctrine. Far less pessimistic that his contemporary John Calvin, the Italian Reformer remained more faithful to his Aristotelian and Roman Catholic sources, at least in the area of the natural moral law, than Calvin. In the area of the natural law at least, he writes more in tune with the realism of the via antiqua than with the nominalism of the via moderna. In fact, contrary to so many of the Reformers, Vermigli did not disdain Aristotle, but even wrote a commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics. This stands in direct contrast with Luther, who claimed in his "Open Letter to the Christian Nobility" that "God has sent [Aristotle] as a plague upon us for our sins." Moreover, Vermigli's view in the area of natural theology is "broadly Thomistic with a strong Augustinian accent," thus assuring a more traditional bent. Grabill, 102.

Aristotle

Born in Florence, Italy, Peter Martyr Vermigli (1500-1562), originally Piero Mariano, was admitted into the Augustinian order, and was named after St. Peter Martyr. He was educated at the Augustinian friary in Fiesole, and then transferred to St. John of Verdara near Padua. Graduating in 1527, he preached in Brescia, Pisa, Venice, and Rome. In 1530, Peter Martyr was elected abbot of the Augustinian friary at Spoleto, and in 1533, prior of the convent of St. Peter ad Aram in Naples. Exposed to the influence of Protestant theologians' works, including Martin Bucher and Huldrych Zwingli, and eventually succumbing to their views, Peter Martyr drew the ire of authorities, including those of the Spanish viceroy of Naples and the superiors of his order. Summoned to appear before a chapter of his order and facing likely disciplining, Peter Martyr instead escaped to Pisa and then to Zürich and Basel, ultimately settling at Strasbourg where, in violation of his vows, he married his first wife Catherine Dammartin of Metz, and was appointed professor of theology. As Grabill summarizes it, "he was forced to move every five years on average . . . . [a]s a result, his institutional gravitas was in a state of near constant flux." Grabill, 99. Accepting an invitation by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, Vermigli was appointed regius professor of divinity at Oxford where he was actively involved in a variety of theological disputes. When the Catholic Queen Mary assumed the throne, Vermigli returned to Strasbourg where he taught theology. Vermigli ultimately settled in Zürich accepting a chair of Hebrew, whence he spent the rest of his days. He participated in the Colloquy at Poissy, a failed effort in 1561 to reconcile the Calvinist Huguenots and Catholics in France. A prolific writer, Vermigli published Biblical commentaries and various treatises. He died in 1562.

Similar to Calvin, Vermigli did not undertake to fashion a synthetic analysis of the natural law in the manner of St. Thomas. Yet his attendance to the notion of a nature-based morality independent--yet consistent with--revealed morality was more focused than Calvin. Vermigli's treatment of the natural law is most manifest in his exegesis of the first two chapters of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. This is not unexpected, since the first two chapters of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans is the textus classicus when it comes to the Scriptural warrant for the natural law. In his treatment of this text, Vermigli shows marked differences from Calvin. "The fundamental differences between Calvin and Vermigli have to do with the latter's more extensive and disciplined use of natural theology/natural law. . . . While Vermigli acknowledges reason's post-lapsarian limitations, he is more sanguine than Calvin regarding its ability to grasp the precepts of the natural law through sense experience, moral intuition, and dialectics." Grabill, 102, 103-04.

St. Paul

Unquestionably, Vermigli believes in the existence of a natural theology: both the world and our minds are constructed so as to be able to glean from creation the existence of divinity. "God has planted prolepsis in our minds," Vermigli states, "that is, anticipations and notions through which we are led to conceive noble and exalted opinions about the divine nature." Grabill, 110 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 21r; CP, 1.2.3).

That natural knowledge outside of revelation is also found in the area of morality. Vermigli suggests that there is a natural moral theology that finds its roots in the imago Dei, the image of God, that is in man, and which persists, albeit in an attenuated or weakened fashion, in post-lapsarian man. Since our souls are akin to God their creator, they reflect "justice, wisdom, and many other most noble habits," and "also the knowledge of what is right and honest, and what is wrong and unclean." Grabill, 111 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 22v; CP, 1.2.4) Without doubt, Vermigli departs from Calvin's pessimistic assessment of man's ability to know of God and his law. Grabill, 113-14.

Following St. Thomas's commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Vermigli distinguishes between two types of knowledge of God. The first is "effectual," and second "frigid" or ineffectual. Effectual knowledge of God leads to spiritual transformation that is expressed by good deeds. Grabill, 114. Truth obtained through Faith, as distinguished from truth obtained through Reason or Nature, is "more likely to lead to action." Grabill, at 114. Therefore, he affirms with St. Thomas that, without Faith and the aid of God's grace, the "natural law is ineffective in leading human beings to the good." Grabill, 114. "Surely," states Vermigli,

this does not happen because one truth by itself and taken on its own is stronger than another. Truth has the same nature on both sides; the difference arises from the ways and means by which it is perceived. Natural strength is corrupt, weakened and defiled through sin, so that the truth that it grasps has no effect. But faith has joined with it the divine inspiration and power of the Holy Spirit so that it apprehends truth effectively. Hence the difference consists in the faculty by which truth is apprehended. This should not be taken to deny that more than we know through nature is revealed to us by the Scriptures, the New as well as the Old Testament. But we have drawn a comparison between the same truth when known by nature and when perceived by faith.

Grabill, 114 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, ff. 20r-21v; CP, 1.2.11) . To have effective knowledge of the natural law, that is, knowledge that results in an ability to follow that law, requires, in the ultimate analysis following the Fall, Faith and Grace in Christ. True: external compliance to the natural law may be found in other cultures and times:

[N]o nation is so savage or barbarous that it is not touched by some sense of right, justice, and honesty. . . . We might say instead that by this freedom our works may agree with the civil or economic law, which has regard to outward acts and is not so much concerned with the will.

Grabill, 117 (quoting Vermigli, "Free Will," f. 102, par. 4). While perhaps the natural law or even the Mosaic law may be followed externally and imperfectly or partially either as a result of natural goodness or the threat of human law, it is impossible for wounded, fallen man to follow the natural law perfectly, that is, with full internal assent. To follow the natural law with such full internal assent requires us to love God with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength, clearly an act that requires Faith and Grace. Grabill, 116.

For Vermigli (and unlike Calvin), the natural law is not principally condemnatory, though it has a role in informing the conscience and the internal forum. "Vermigli contends that God did not reveal such natural knowledge for the sole purpose of establishing his wrath against the Gentiles," Grabill, 115, but rather to force us to "admit that they were too weak while knowing what they should do," and so to make then "run to Christ." Grabill, 116 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 23v; CP, 1.2.8 "proinde necessarium esse, ad Christum confugere").

For Vermigli, the natural law has a more positive role of prompting man towards God as he has revealed himself in Jesus Christ. This places him opposite Calvin. In almost a Kantian manner, Calvin appears to have maintained that although the natural law may be objectively manifest in the created order, since the Fall man had no ability subjectively to inform himself of that order. Thus, post-lapsarian man had no ability to know the moral Ding an sich that was vouchsafed us in the created order. Vermigli, on the other hand, contended that even after the Fall, man had the ability subjectively to comprehend and so to know the natural law manifest in the created order, but man's knowledge, though real, was not effectual without Faith and Grace. For Vermigli, the corruption of man, therefore, was more manifest in the will than in reason.

Vermigli properly insisted that the knowledge of moral good acquired by nature does not vitiate the need for revelation. "In Vermigli's judgment the phrase by nature [in Romans 2:14] should not be construed in such a way as to exclude divine revelation or assistance vis-à-vis the requirements of morality." Grabill, 117.

In sum,

Vermigli distinguishes two principal uses for why knowledge of the moral law was implanted in the human mind. The first, corresponding with a "frigid" knowledge of God, exists to nullify any excuse by providing objective and universally accessible knowledge of the moral law and the judgment to come. The second, corresponding with an "effectual" knowledge of God, exists to increase human "readiness" and "strength" to do that which is known to be just and honest. It is the second use, as Vermigli insists, that prods humanity to pursue true righteousness and that serves to renew God's image in us.

Grabill, 119-20.

To quote Vermigli:

The image of God in which man was created, is not utterly blotted out but obfuscated in the fall, and for that reason is in need of renewal by God. So natural knowledge is not fully quenched in our minds, but much of it still remains, which Paul now touches upon.

Grabill, 120 (quoting Vermigli, Romans, f. 44 r).

The contrast between Vermigli's teaching on the one hand with Calvin or Barth's teaching on the other hand is striking. If there is to be dialogue between the Classical and Catholic view of the natural law and the Reformed or Protestant tradition, it must be through the likes of someone like Vermigli, and not someone like Calvin or Barth. In the area of natural law, the latter two are simply too far down the path of error to allow for easy reconciliation or rapprochement.

Codex Sinaiticus on the Natural Law

The oldest copy of the Bible, known as the Codex Sinaiticus and dating back to the mid-fourth century, is online. You can look at the original text, along with a Greek transcription and an English translation at www.codexsinaiticus.org/en. Below is the locus classicus for the Scriptural reference to the natural moral law, specifically, St. Paul's letter to the Romans, 2:14-15.

14 οταν γαρ εθνη τα μη νομον εχοντα φυϲει τα του νομου ποιωϲιν ουτοι νομον μη εχοντεϲ εαυτοιϲ ειϲιν νομοϲ 15 οιτινεϲ ενδικνυνται το εργον του νομου γραπτο εν ταιϲ καρδιεϲ αυτων ϲυνμαρτυρουϲηϲ αυτων τηϲ ϲυνειδηϲεωϲ και μεταξυ αλληλω των λογιϲμων κατηγορουντων η και απολογουμενων.

(14 For whenever Gentiles, that have no law, do by nature the things of the law, these, not having law, are a law to themselves:

15 who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing testimony, and their reasonings between one another bringing accusation, or also making excuse.)