Property is Yours, Mine, and Ours

WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY, the Church's social doctrine balances two principles: the universal destination of goods and the right to private ownership. As a matter of natural law, the Church recognizes that there is such a thing as private property, that property may be divided into "mine" and "yours." How else, for example, could one justify the divine Commandments which are at the same time one of natural law, "You shall not steal" and "You shall not covet your neighbor's goods"?

At the same time, all property, whether it is "mine" or "yours," is in a different and yet real sense also "ours," or, in the words the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, has a "universal destination" to the common good. Ultimately, the notion of the "universal destination" of all goods comes from the Lord's dominion over all property, including that property which is "mine" and "yours." "The earth is the Lord's, and everything in it." (Psalm 24:1; 1 Cor. 10:26) "The principle of the universal destination of goods is an affirmation of God's full and perennial lordship over every reality and of the requirement that the goods of creation remain ever destined to the development of the whole person and of all humanity." (Compendium, No. 177)

The right to private property, though "sacred and inviolable" as Leo XIII stated,* is not therefore absolute. If it were absolute, private property could be owned and used in complete disregard of obligation to God and to our neighbor. And if that were true, no one could complain of the inhumanity, not to mention the injustice and lack of charity, of the rich man who sits on his hoard of bread while those around him starve. Yet to chastise that sort of behavior is exactly what St. John and St. James and most of us would naturally do. "He who has the goods of this world and sees his brother in need and closes his heart to him, how does the love of God abide in him?" (1 John 3:17) "If a brother or a sister be naked and in want of daily food and one of you say to them, 'Go in peace, be warm and filled,' yet you do not give them what is necessary for the body, what does it profit?" (James 2:15-16) Who but the Midases of this world would not add their voices to this?

The Parable of Dives and Lazarus
Codex Aureus Epternacensis (Goldenes Evangeliar) ca. 1035-40 A.D.

Both James and John seem implicitly to be referring to Jesus' parable of the relationship between the rich man and the beggar Lazarus. Aren't their complaints against the rich for their misuse of property in disregard of the poor the same fault that Jesus placed upon the rich man who disregarded Lazarus? None of the statements of Sts. John and James or nothing of Jesus' parable would make sense to us if we did not already recognize that the poor have some moral claim upon our private property. This moral claim comes from our implicit awareness of the "universal destination" of goods.

Private property must never be absolutized, for it then becomes an idol, an end, and not a means. "Those people and societies that go so far as to absolutize the role of property end up experiencing the bitterest type of slavery. . . . Owners who heedlessly idolize their goods. . . become owned and enslaved by them. Only by recognizing that these goods are dependent on God the Creator and then directing their use to the common good, is it possible to give material goods their proper function as useful tools for the growth of individuals and peoples." (Compendium, No. 181)

Private ownership of property does not absolve us from using that property in a morally right way. "The universal destination of goods entails obligations on how goods are to be used by their legitimate owners." (Compendium, No. 178) There are obvious moral duties associated with private ownership, and these moral duties have reference to the common good, and in particular the poor. Because of these moral duties, the right to private property is relative, not absolute, and the common good has a claim on it. Yet again the existence of these moral duties attendant to property ownership does not mean that all property is owned in common, and we have no right to private ownership.

Some ways to understand the interaction between private ownership of property and property's "universal destination" are along the lines of thinking of the latter as a sort of mortgage, claim, limitation, or trust. Private property has a sort of covenant or limitation that runs with it, what John Paul II in his Encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis--drawing from prior teaching even as far back as St. Ambrose and the Apostle John**--called a "social mortgage." Private property, while truly owned by individuals, is held in trust for the common good. Though the property may be "mine," it never quite loses its tie to the common good, to its "universal destination" to which the "mine" is answerable.

The notion of the universal destination of goods is based upon the notion that in its original grant to mankind of the world, "God gave the earth," not to any one man or group of men to the exclusion of others, but "to the whole human race for the sustenance of all its members, without excluding or favoring anyone." (Compendium, No. 171) There is therefore an original "universal right to use the goods of the earth," a "right to common use," which leaves its imprint on all property, even that property privately owned. This original grant survives the matrix of private property. There is therefore always a residue of claim, this "social mortgage," in any property privately owned that requires all property to be "shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of justice tempered by charity." (Compendium, No. 171) It is this residue of a claim that is the source of moral obligations we may have--above that of pure self interest--in the use of our property.

But one should not understand this notion of the universal destination of goods as a denial of the the natural right to private ownership of goods, of which the Church has been a great defender against the ideologies of Communism and Socialism. Pope Leo XIII could not have been more clear: "The fact that God has given the earth for the use and enjoyment of the whole human race can in no way be a bar to the owning of private property." (Rerum novarum, No. 8)

The Church has made it clear that the universal destination of goods is not a right to common ownership. "Universal destination and utilization of goods does not mean that everything is at the disposal of each person or of all people, or that the same object may be useful or belong to each person or of all people." (Compendium, No. 173) The Church "excludes recourse to forms of 'common and promiscuous dominion.'"*** (Compendium, No. 176) In other words, it is wrong to think that this universal destination of goods allows one to disrespect the natural right of private ownership and the human institutions and variety of positive laws that govern or clarify those rights.

Therefore, the universal destination of goods does not justify the wrongful taking of private property--whether by individuals or governments--even if it be purportedly for the common good. It is, rather, depending upon the circumstances, a sort of more or less loose or strict limitation, burden, "mortgage," or claim upon the private owner's use of the property he owns. In making use of his property, the private owner cannot disregard this universal destination. Ultimately, private property has something more than a mere private function: it has a social function, a social role.

At the same time, private property should not be viewed as an end, but it is a means--and by all measures the most efficient means--to implement the universal destination of goods. "Private property, in fact, regardless of the concrete forms of regulations and juridical norms relative to it, is in the essence only an instrument for respecting the principle of the universal destination of goods; in the final analysis, therefore, it is not an end but a means." (Compendium, No. 177)

The notion of the universal destination of goods includes not only natural goods, such as land, minerals, and their fruit and products, but derived goods: those obtained through our labor or our ingenuity. It includes what the Compendium calls "new goods," goods engendered by "knowledge, technology, and know-how." (Compendium, No. 179) Therefore, it also includes credit, financial instruments and money, intellectual property such as technology and scientific knowledge, which too often is overly protected by positive laws giving rise to monopolies and other barriers that prevent this knowledge from being being fairly at the disposal of all mankind. When, for example, does a huge pharmaceutical company's right to charge an exorbitant price for the formula of a drug that can cure the ills of mankind end? Do the sick not have some claim upon it? There is something unpalatable about having the the secret to reduce our neighbor's suffering, and refusing to share it unless someone puts a lot of money in one's pocket.

It is this social mortgage which justifies, for example, taxes on private property by the public authorities so that it may be used to assure that all citizens have access to basic social services such as food, shelter, healthcare, education, security, and so forth, to the extent that they are unable to provide these for themselves from the property that they have or the labor of their bodies. It is also what is behind the justification for eminent domain powers or what justifies the State's right to regulate the use of our property.

The universal destination of the goods has a particular force when it pertains to the poor, the hungry, the needy, the homeless, those without adequate health care, and those whose life seems hopeless for want of any goods requisite for human flourishing. "The principle of the universal destination of goods requires that the poor, the marginalized, and in all cases those whose living conditions interfere with their proper growth should be the focus of particular concern." (Compendium, No. 182)

Poverty, however, is not only material poverty. It includes cultural, religious, and spiritual poverty. (Compendium, No.184)

While it may be true that the poor will, until Christ's second coming, always be with us, the poor are to be viewed as a sacred trust. Our treatment of the world's poor will be a standard by which we will be judged. (Compendium, No. 183; cf. Matt.25:31-46) The poor are to be loved, and they exert a "special form of primacy" in the exercise of our charity and in our considerations of what is just. (Compendium, No. 182)

The preferential option for the poor and the urgent claim it has on our conscience, in both charity and justice, and in the proper use of our goods is perhaps best summarized by the 6th century Pope St. Gregory the Great (ca.540-604):

When we attend to the needs of those in want, we give them what is their, not ours. More than performing works of mercy, we are paying a debt of justice.

Nam cum qualibet necessaria indigentibus ministramus, sua illis reddimus, non nostra largimur; iustitae potius debitum solvimus.

Regula Pastoralis, 3,21: PL 77,87.


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*Leo XIII, Rerum novarum, No. 40.
**St. John and St. Ambrose are quoted by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Populorum progressio: "He who has the goods of this world and sees his brother in need and closes his heart to him, how does the love of God abide in him?" [1 John 3:17] Everyone knows that the Fathers of the Church laid down the duty of the rich toward the poor in no uncertain terms. As St. Ambrose put it: 'You are not making a gift of what is yours to the poor man, but you are giving him back what is his. You have been appropriating things that are meant to be for the common use of everyone. The earth belongs to everyone, not to the rich.' [De Nabute, c. 12, n. 53: PL 14. 747] These words indicate that the right to private property is not absolute and unconditional."
***The Compendium erroneously cites to Leo XIII's Rerum novarum, 11, for this phrase. In fact, the phrase shows up in section 7 of the Italian version of Rerum novarum (poiché quel dono egli lo fece a tutti, non perché ognuno ne avesse un comune e promiscuo dominio, bensì in quanto non assegnò nessuna parte del suolo determinatamente ad alcuno, lasciando ciò all'industria degli uomini e al diritto speciale dei popoli.). In the English translation, it is found in paragraph 8, not translated as "common and promiscuous," but translated thus: "For God has granted the earth to mankind in general, not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they like, but rather that no part of it was assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man's own industry, and by the laws of individual races." The Latin text of this phrase is found in Paragraph 7: "Deus enim generi hominum donavisse terram in commune dicitur, non quod eius promiscuum apud omnes dominatum voluerit, sed quia partem nullam cuique assignavit possidendam, industriae hominum institutisque populorum permissa privatarum possessionum descriptione." I would translate the Latin thus: "For God granted the earth to humankind in common, that is to say, not in the sense that it may be promiscuously handled by all as they desire, but rather that no part was assigned to any one in particular, leaving the assignment and limits of private possession to be determined through man's industry and and through the various people's institutions and laws."

Duns Scotus: On Property and Social Contract

SCOTUS DID NOT WRITE A POLITICAL TREATISE, nor did he comment on anyone's prior political work such as St. Thomas commented on Aristotle's Politics. However, Scotus addresses the issue of private property during the course of his discussion of confession, specifically, the issue of whether someone needs to make restitution of property to receive absolution from the sin of theft or unjust taking of property. In addressing this question, Scotus goes into a brief excursus on private property, its fons and origo, and this takes him briefly into the origin of human government which he sees as the origin of private property. Succinctly, Scotus appears to depart from the common teaching that private property arises out of a natural law right. Rather, for Scotus, the right to private property is entirely one of positive law.

Scotus's treatment of private property and human government is found in distinctio 15 of the Ordinatio IV (q. 2). It is also mentioned in the parallel section of his Paris Lectures (qq. 2-4).

Blessed Duns Scotus Contemplating the Immaculate Conception

Scotus accepted the common teaching that, prior to the Fall of man, all things were owned in common, there being, under the natural law at the time, no such thing as private property. It was this state of original justice that drove the communal aspect of ownership in the early Christian Church and the shunning of private ownership by his own religious order, the Franciscans. After the Fall, however, private ownership as a general rule seems to have become the norm, and even common ownership such as in the early Church or among the religious, derives, not as a matter of natural law, but as a matter of common consent or religious doctrine, and Scotus asks why this is:

I ask: What is the source of distinct ownership such that this may be called "mine" and that "yours"? For all injustice through misappropriation derives from this as well as all justice through restitution.

Ordinatio IV, dist. 15, q.2 (Wolter, 219)

The answer to that question leads Scotus to a series of six conclusions. They are of significance because of their departure from ordinary teaching that private property is part of the natural law. Equally significant is Scotus's early social contractism or government by consent as it relates to the origin of human government.

The notion that prior to the Fall, ownership of property among humankind was in common rather than in the form of private property (Scotus's first conclusion) is adopted by Scotus both as a matter of authority (he cites to Gratian's Decrees, dist. 7, ch. 1, his causa 12, q. 1, and to St. Augustine's Commentary on the Gospel of John). But he also seeks to understand the rationale behind this belief. Given the purpose of property (to contribute to human flourishing) and the lack of disorder in paradisaical man, it seems that no one would have taken more than he needed from the commonality, and no one would have used force to take from others. However, "after the Fall of man, this law of nature of holding all things in common was revoked." Ordinatio IV, dist. 15, q. 2 (Wolter, 220). This is Scotus's second conclusion.

The reason behind the post-lapsarian revocation of common ownership is, for Scotus, two-fold. First, contrary to matters prior to the Fall, common ownership after the Fall would not have lead to peace, but would have acted against it. Covetousness raised its ugly head, and common ownership would have led to warfare as the covetous man sought to take more from the commonality than he required, and would have defended against others' use of it. The result would have been unequal distribution of goods, with the powerful obtaining more than their fair share. In such circumstances, private property is a superior institution than communism.

The revocation of the natural law of common ownership after the fall meant that something else had to replace that law. The revocation does not necessarily imply that a certain system is compelled. Thus, the revocation allowed merely "permission . . . to appropriate and divide up what had been common," and no particular form of private property or division was required either by natural or divine law other than a broad requirement of justice. Since the source of private property does not seem to come from either divine or natural law, Scotus believes it comes from positive human law. "[I]t seems more plausible to say this [the division of common property] was effected by positive law than the law of nature [and] the first division of property was brought about by some positive legislation." Ordinatio IV, dist. 15, q. 2 (Wolter, 221) (This is Scotus's third conclusion.)

Any positive law that parcels out property and creates private property requires both authority and the exercise of prudence or practical right reason, and so Scotus addresses those issues. Scotus's fourth conclusion is that the just division of common property into private property, and institution of human positive law, "requires of its legislator" "prudence and authority." The prudence is required of the legislator so that "he might dictate what ought to be established for the community according to practical right reason." Id.

This requires just authority, and Scotus asks the question where such just authority may be found. This leads him to the question of the origin of civil or political authority. First, Scotus distinguishes between two kinds of authority: paternal authority and political authority. Political authority he further divides into two general divisions: political authority vested in one person and political authority vested in a group.

Paternal authority is of natural law institution, and it remains unaffected by the Fall as a source of authority:

[P]aternal authority is just be natural law in virtue of which children are bound to obey their parents. Neither was this revoked by any positive Mosaic or Gospel law, but rather it was confirmed.

Id.

Political authority ought to be distinguished from paternal authority:

Political authority, however, which is exercised over those outside [the family], whether it resides in one person or in a community, can be just by common consent and election on the part of the community. [This authority] has to do with those who live together, even though there is no consanguinity or close relationship between them. Thus, if some outsiders banded together to build a city or live in one, seeing that they could not be well governed without some form of authority, they could have amicably agreed to commit their community to one person or to a group, and if to one person, to him alone and to a successor who would be chosen as he was, or to him and his posterity. And both of these forms of political authority are just, because one person can justly submit himself to another or to a community in those things which are not against the law of God and as regards which he can be guided better by the person or persons to whom he has submitted or subjected himself than he could by himself.

Id. (Wolter, 221-22)

This teaching of Scotus is historically significant. As C. R. S. Harris puts it:

Scotus is important in the history of political science as one of the pioneers of modern social theory. His doctrines [on social contractism] bear a strong resemblance to the late teachings of Locke. Scotus' account of the social contract is a philosophical analysis of the origin of society. Society, he held, was naturally organized into family groups; but when paternal authority was unable to enforce order, political authority was constituted by the people. Accordingly, [for Scotus] all political authority is derived from the consent of the governed.

(quoted in Wolter, 74)

This civil or political authority, justly originated in common consent, would therefore be authorized to pass just laws. (Fifth conclusion.) This conclusion sets Scotus up to address the issue of the source of private property.

From the institution of civil or political authority and its authority to pass just laws, private property is justified:

The first division of ownership could have been just by reason of some just positive law passed by the father or the regent ruling justly or by a community ruling or regulating justly, and this is probably how it [the regulation of property into private ownership once the natural law of common ownership was revoked] was done.

Id. (Wolter, 222)

The source of private property, then, is from human positive law, and is the result of the lacuna, or absence, of either natural or positive divine law after the revocation of the natural law of common ownership occurred after the Fall of mankind (sixth conclusion).

Pope Leo XIII on Socialism: Quod apostolici muneris

THE NATURAL LAW ALSO PROVIDED the foundation for Pope Leo XIII's encyclical on socialism, Quod apostolici munerus which was issued in 1878. In that encyclical, Leo XIII set himself against "that sect of men, who under various and almost barbarous names, are called socialists, communists, or nihilists." QA, 1. Socialists, communists, and nihilists "leave nothing untouched or whole which by both human and divine laws (quod humanis divinisque legibus) has been wisely decreed for the health and beauty of life." Spurning, then, the influence of natural and divine law, socialists "proclaim the absolute equality of all men in rights and duties." shunning any differences between the ruler and the ruled. On the domestic, familial front, they "debase the natural union of man and woman," naturalem viri ac mulieris unionem . . . dehonestant, and weaken its bond, vinculum . . . infirmant. They therefore weaken if not altogether sever the authority of the father as head of the family, and relationship between husband and wife, and between parents and children. Driven by their materialistic philosophy, they "assail the right of property sanctioned by natural law," jus proprietatis naturali lege sanctitum impugnant, which leads them "seize and hold in common whatever has been acquired either by title of lawful inheritance, or by labor or brain and hands, or by thrift in one's mode of life." QA, 1. It is these three errors--a false egalitarianism, a false notion of marriage and family life, and the rejection private property--that Leo XIII addresses in his encyclical Quod apostolici munerus. It is these three errors that come in the wake of the "plague of socialism," pestis Socialismi advanced by this "abominable sect," secta abominata. Cf. QA, 10, 11.

Fundamental Tenets of Socialism Against the Natural Law

As with much of our modern philosophical ills, Leo XIII finds the seed of socialism in the 16th century, specifically in the error of philosophical rationalism. Socialism (with which term we will use to include communism and political nihilism) is nothing less that a form of political rationalism. Rationalism, which entails a false, materialistic notion of reason, is intended to subvert revelation and to "overthrown the supernatural order." QA, 2. Disdaining religion and disdaining God, rationalism in the political realm has sought to found political institutions on the will of the people alone, without regard to God or his order. Under the guise that supernatural truths are hostile to reason, political rationalists have sought to remove from any public institution--including universities, the lyceums, the gymnasia--any mention of God and the supernatural order. Their view of life is entirely here-and-now, "limited to the bounds of the present," and gives utterly no weight to the concept of eternity or to "the rewards and punishments of a future and eternal life." QA, 2. In fine, they live sub specie temporis, under the light of the here-and-now, and not sub specie aeternitatis, under the light of eternity. And this they do even while "stealing the very Gospel itself with a view to deceive more easily the unwary." QA, 5. Like the devil who quoted scripture to tempt Christ, so do socialists frequently invoke alleged evangelical values while actually subverting them.

Socialists advocate in a sense altogether false "that nature has made all men equal," and so reject any office or laws or relations that are not predicated on their radical egalitarianism. While Pope Leo XIII acknowledges that the Gospel teaches an equality among men, the Gospel's notion is different from the equality advocated by the socialist:

[I]n accordance with the teachings of the Gospel, the equality of men consists in this: that all, having inherited the same nature, are called to the same most high dignity of the sons of God, and that, as one and the same end is set before all, each one is to be judged by the same law and will receive punishment or reward according to his deserts.

Contra vero, ex Evangelicis documentis, ea est hominum aequalitas, ut omnes eamdem naturam sortiti, ad eamdem filiorum Dei celsissiman dignitatem vocentur, simulque ut uno eodemque fine omnibus praestituto, singuli secundum eamdem legem iudicandi sint, poenas aut mercedem pro merito consecuturi.

QA, 5. Outside of this equality among men--an equality of human nature and an equality of our supernatural calling--there are palpable inequalities among men: and indeed, the inequality among men in these other particulars is part of the plan of God, especially the inequalities arising out of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed.

The inequality of rights and of power proceeds from the very Author of nature, "from whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named." (Eph. 3:15)

Inaequalitas tamen iuris et potestatis ab ipso naturae Auctore dimanat, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelis et in terra nominatur.

QA, 5. Depending upon office, station, relation, and right order there may be various duties and rights, and so one person (for example a ruler, a bishop, or a father) will have rights over as well as duties to another (e.g., his subject, a layman, or a son), even while the latter (e.g., the subject, the layman, or a son) has rights over as well as duties to the former (e.g., the ruler, or a bishop, or a father).

For, He who created and governs all things has, in His wise providence, appointed that the things which are lowest should attain their ends by those which are intermediate, and these again by the highest. . . . [God] appointed that there should be various orders in civil society, differing in dignity, rights, and power (plures esse ordines, dignitate, iuribus, potestate diversos), whereby the State, like the Church, should be one body, consisting of many members, some nobler than others, but all necessary to each other and solicitous for the common good."

QA, 6.

Rulers are answerable to God for the use of their power. So does the book of Wisdom warn us: "For a most severe judgment shall be for them that bear rule," should they judge rightly or fail to keep the law of justice. Wisdom 6:6. Rebellion against even a rash and tyrannical ruler must not be countenanced ordinarily since to "allow an insurrection on private authority" results in greater ills not only because public order would be "only the more disturbed," but also because society would run the risk of taking "greater hurt therefrom." Therefore, even patience toward tyranny befits concern for the common good. Insurrection is not something to be engaged in lightly. There is, however, one exception:

But, if the will of legislators and princes shall have sanctioned or commanded anything repugnant to the divine or natural law, the dignity and duty of the Christian name, as well as the judgment of the Apostle, urge that "God is to be obeyed rather than man." [Acts 5:29]

Quod si legislatorum ac principum placita aliquid sanciverint aut iusserint quod divinae aut naturali legi repugnet, christiani nominis dignitas et officium atque Apostolica sententia suadent obediendum esse magis Deo quam hominibus.

QA, 7.

With respect to marriage and family life, Leo XIII insists that civil society, in particular the State, must recognize the importance of the family:

Even family life itself, which is the cornerstone of all society and government . . . . [T]he foundation of this society rests first of all in the indissoluble union of man and wife according to the necessity of natural law, and is completed in the mutual rights and duties of parents and children, masters and servants.

[E]tiam domestica societas, quae omnis civitatis et regni principium est . . . . Rectam hujus societatis rationem, secundum naturalis juris necessitatem in indissolubili viri ac miilieris unione primo inniti, et mutuis parentes inter et filios, dominos ac servos offîciis iuribusque compleri.

QA, 8.

The socialists "strive almost completely to dissolve this union," this fundamental cell of society. In particular they seek to remove any religious element from it, rejecting both its natural order and the Church's authority over it. This necessarily weakens the headship of the father over his wife and family, the authority of the parents over their children, and the reciprocal duties of the children to their parents. QA, 8. The family is a subtle instance of hierarchy within love and love within hierarchy.

Wherefore, as the Apostle has it, [Eph. 5:23] as Christ is the head of the Church, so is the man the head of the woman; and as the Church is subject to Christ, who embraces her with a most chaste and undying love, so also should wives be subject to their husbands, and be loved by them in turn with a faithful and constant affection. In like manner does the Church temper the use of parental and domestic authority, that it may tend to hold children and servants to their duty, without going beyond bounds. For, according to Catholic teaching, the authority of our heavenly Father and Lord is imparted to parents and masters, whose authority, therefore, not only takes its origin and force from Him, but also borrows its nature and character. Hence, the Apostle exhorts children to "obey their parents in the Lord, and honor their father and mother, which is the first commandment with promise"; [Eph. 6:1-2] and he admonishes parents: "And you, fathers, provoke not your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and correction of the Lord." [Eph. 6:4] Again, the apostle enjoins the divine precept on servants and masters, exhorting the former to be "obedient to their lords according to the flesh of Christ . . . with a good will serving, as to the Lord"; and the latter, to "forbear threatenings, knowing that the Lord of all is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with God." [Eph. 6:5-9] If only all these matters were faithfully observed according to the divine will by all on whom they are enjoined, most assuredly every family would be a figure of the heavenly home, and the wonderful blessings there begotten would not confine themselves to the households alone, but would scatter their riches abroad through the nations."

QA, 8.

Controversial as it may modernly be, Pope Leo XIII clearly promotes the continuing validity of the so-called Haustafel, the "Domestic Code" found in St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians (5:22-6:5) and also in St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians (3:18-41) and in St. Peter's First Epistle (1 Pet. 2:18-3:7).*

From marriage and the family, Pope Leo XIII addresses the socialists' rejection of private property. Basing itself on "the precepts of natural and divine law," the Church's doctrine concerns itself with the public and private good regarding the duty of government and the distribution of the goods that are necessary for human life and its flourishing. Socialists reject the natural right to private property, finding it to be an invention of man, a mere convention:

For, while the socialists would destroy the "right" of property, alleging it to be a human invention altogether opposed to the inborn equality of man, and, claiming a community of goods, argue that poverty should not be peaceably endured, and that the property and privileges of the rich may be rightly invaded, the Church, with much greater wisdom and good sense, recognizes the inequality among men, who are born with different powers of body and mind, inequality in actual possession, also, and holds that the right of property and of ownership, which springs from nature itself, must not be touched and stands inviolate.

Cum enim Socialistae ius proprietatis tamquam humanum inventum, naturali hominum aequalitati repugnans, traducant et communionem bonorum affectantes pauperiem haud aequo animo esse perferendam, et ditiorum possessiones ac iura impune violari posse arbitrentur; Ecclesia multo satius et utilius inaequalitatem inter homines, corporis ingeniique viribus naturaliter diversos, etiam in bonis possidendis agnoscit, et ius
proprietatis ac dominii ab ipsa natura profectum, intactum cuilibet et inviolatum esse iubet.

QA, 9.

That private property is recognized by revelation is clear from the divine laws against stealing and robbery. But the right to private property ought not to be grounds or excuse for neglecting the poor. On the contrary, the Church insists that they ought to be cared for, and she is constantly enjoining upon the rich "that most grave precept to give what remains to the poor; and she holds over their heads the divine sentence that unless they succor the needy they will be repaid by eternal torments." QA, 9. There is, to be sure, "the old struggle between the rich and the poor," but it is not solved by rejecting private property. The best method would seem to be the Christian formula which demands that the rich, like Christ, become poor for the sake of their brothers, and the poor recognize the blessings that Christ has put upon the sufferings of the poor and the rewards of eternal life.

[I]f this method is rejected or disregarded, one of two things must occur: either the greater portion of the human race will fall back into the vile condition of slavery which so long prevailed among the pagan nations, or human society must continue to be disturbed by constant eruptions, to be disgraced by rapine and strife, as we have had sad witness even in recent times.

QA, 9.
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*The Church continues to insist on the paternal headship of the family and the complementarity of the masculine (paternal) and feminine (maternal) roles in the family, but, especially during the pontificate of John Paull II, has elaborated the radical Christian concept of subjection, making it clear that "subjection" must not be understood as the world understands it. A good discussion of the Scriptural, Patristic, and Magisterial teaching on the headship of the father in the family may be found in the article The Authority of the Husband According to the Magisterium by Rev. Paul N. Check.

Leo Strauss and Natural Law: Locke on Property and its Acquisition: Vice Turned Virtue

LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF PROPERTY is central to his political teaching, and is something that distinguishes his teaching from his predecessors. It is important to grasp Locke's notions on property, for they are deeply revolutionary in spirit. They are anti-conservative, or at least they are contrary to the best thinking of the pagan philosophers and the highest thought of the Christian moral theologians, which is what real conservatism is all about: the first things. As Strauss concludes his analysis of Locke's doctrine on property:

Locke's teaching on property, and therewith his whole political philosophy, are revolutionary not only with respect to the biblical tradition but with regard to the philosophic tradition as well.

Strauss, 248. Again, Locke's doctrine of property purports to be a "natural law" doctrine, and doing so "it partakes of all the complexities" of Locke's doctrine of natural law which, at best, could be called a doctrine of quasi-natural law or something altogether different disguised as a natural law. But it also suffers from what Strauss calls a "peculiar difficulty." Strauss, 234. This "Locke's teaching on property, and therewith his whole political philosophy, are revolutionary not only with regard to biblical tradition but with regard to the philosophic tradition as well."
--Leo Straussdifficulty arises out of Locke's theory which requires the transformation of a natural right to property (the "original law of nature") to a civil right to property, wherein the former essentially ceases to be valid. For Locke, the natural right to property arises from the natural right to self-preservation and the desire for happiness, i.e., the pursuit of happiness. Immediately, man in a state of nature confronts the problem of others of his kind with the same natural right who are in competition with him in taking the things from the earth. Neither begging nor stealing property is right; the only title to right to property arises from a man's labor as he appropriates the goods of nature. It is the mixture of labor and the goods of the earth which, combined, give rise to the right to property. "Labor is the only title to property which is in accordance with natural right." Strauss, 236.

The only limit to acquisition, that is, to title to property, is that the property acquired must remain useful to man. "Man may not appropriate things which through his appropriating them would cease to be useful." Strauss, 237. If a kind of property is not subject to waste (gold, silver, diamonds), then a man can acquire as much as his heart desires. On the other hand, he ought not acquire more perishable commodities that he can use without waste. Therefore, man is entitled to more nuts (which are less perishable) than, say, plums (which are perishable). Waste is for Locke, the mortal sin of property ownership, not covetousness, greed, or selfishness. As Strauss puts it: "The terrors of the natural law no longer strike the covetous, but the waster." Strauss, 237. In acquiring property, man "does not have to think of other human beings." Strauss, 237. Put proverbially, Strauss labels Locke's thought thus: Chacun pour soi et Dieu pour tous.* The fancy French may be roughly and vulgarly translated as "Screw everybody else." And this attitude Locke justified whether man, in a state of nature, had plenty or lived in want.

Labor, however, created title to property only under the "original law of nature" pertaining to property. In a state of civil society, "labor no longer creates a sufficient title to property," Strauss, 240, though it retains its role as "the origin of value or of all wealth." Strauss, 243. So the worker who yearns to labor so as to acquire not only what he needs, but what he wants, is "a greater benefactor of mankind than those who give alms to the poor." Strauss, 243. Amor habendi, amor nummi is greater than amor proximi.** Indeed, there appears to be no limitations to the acquisition of goods in civil society, other, perhaps, than the property must be acquired in a manner allowed by positive law. Locke seems, nay, does, turn the classical and Christian teaching on property entirely on its head.

How does Locke justify the right to untrammeled acquisition of property to the neglect of the fundamental law of law of neighbor? Locke was not foolish enough to emancipate acquisitiveness from moral law by arguing that it was a virtue per se. "He justifies the emancipation of acquisitiveness in the only way in which it can be defended: he shows that it is conducive to the common good." Strauss, 242. For Locke, then, "[u]nlimited appropriation without concern for the need of others is true charity." Strauss, 243. So similarly is the study of nature and knowledge treated by Locke. The study of nature and the acquisition of knowledge, too, is emancipated from the moral law through similar argument. "[T]he study of nature . . . may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary charity that have, at so great charge, been raised by the founders of hospitals and alms-houses." So he who discovered the medicinal properties of quinine did more than those who built hospitals. George Soros and Bill Gates more virtuous and greater philanthropists than Mother Theresa or St. Elizabeth Ann Seton. Virtue has nothing to do with the inside of a man. Money, money, money, money, and the love of it is apparently Ok with Locke.

So this is the great charge of government, to preserve property. "The great and chief end . . . of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property." Strauss, 245 (quoting Locke's Treatise) Madison in the Federalist No. 10, puts the Lockean notion of government succinctly: "The protection of [different and unequal faculties of acquiring property] is the first object of government." To protect the greedy? To sanction pleonexia?*** That's is the "first object," the "great and chief end" of government?

In Locke's notion of property, then, and in the civil government's role in protecting it, we have something very different, something highly revolutionary and anti-conservative and vicious. It is the formalization, the institutionalization, the invirtuation, of libido habendi. The rationalization: "Private vices" yield greater "public benefits." Virtue, after all is "unendowed," but vice is richly endowed. Wrong is thereby made right because it pays better. Since in the age in which Locke was writing most people still believed that the unlimited acquisition of wealth was unjust or morally wrong, however, Locke felt the need to "conceal" his doctrine, to justify unlimited acquisition by tying it to the common good, to appear to be "going with the herd," and further, to "so involve[] his sense, that it [would] not [be] easy to understand him." Strauss, 246. In a word, dissemble.

Locke, then, "is a hedonist," but a hedonist who advances a "peculiar hedonism." Strauss, 249. It is a Midasian hedonism, where the greatest pleasure is not in enjoying the greatest pleasures, but "in the having of those thing which produce the greatest pleasures." In short, "Locke says in effect that the greatest happiness consists in the greatest power." Strauss, 249. "Life" becomes what it seems to be for so many Ugly Americans who have swallowed the poison of Locke wrapped up in the sweet capsule in which he hid it and who frenetically pursue wealth, and not virtue, as the end of all ends: "the joyless quest for joy." Strauss, 251. One becomes as despairing as Midas, swallowed up in his greed, and bereft of any human consolation. He cannot love his wife, or his children, or give a piece of bread and hot soup to the poor, or clothe the naked, or perform any work of mercy, for everything is measured in, and therefore is transformed into, filthy lucre.

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*Translation: "Every man for himself, and God for us all." In other words, let me take care of myself, and let God worry about others.
**Amor habendi = love of having or possessing. Amor nummi = love of money. Amor proximi = love of neighbor.
***Pleonexia (from Greek: πλεονεξια) is the Greek word for greed, covetousness, the inordinate grasping of more than one is entitled to. It is a concept that is both Biblical (cf. Col. 3:1-11, Luke 12:13-21) and classical Greek, found and described by both Plato and Aristotle as a disordered, vicious, and undesirable quality.

Cardinal Mercier and the Natural Law, Part 17, Respect of Property

PROPERTY IS AN IMPORTANT but not absolute right in Mercier's view. "Property, as synonymous with ownership, is the right to use and dispose of an animal or thing for a legitimate end without the interference of any other person." [279(82)] Mercier distinguishes between use and disposal, and is critical, from the perspective of natural law, of a notion of a right of absolute disposal of property. Essentially (at least in Mercier's time, it is certainly less true now), the positive law does not enforce, though it does not necessarily deny, the moral restrictions that may govern an individual's particular disposal of property. In some cases, restricting the disposition of property so as to conform to moral requirements would give rise to worse abuses. Yet here, as in many cases, "certain acts which the positive law refuses to punish may still be infringements of the moral law." [280(83)]

Two factors can limit the right to private property from a moral point of view. The first is the nature of the goods that are committed to our particular dominion. The second arises from our own nature as a rational and social being.

Private property is to be understood as existing under the design of divine Providence. Destruction of property out of mere caprice, with no purpose in view of oneself or others, disregards such aspect of property ownership. The abuse or poor treatment of animals, the infliction of unnecessary suffering, falls under that same limitation. Similarly, to use property to gratify illicit desires is an immoral use of property.

Because man is by nature a rational and social being, property ought not to be used in a way that contradicts those aspects of his nature. Thus, property use or disposition cannot be purely based on selfish motives. But this prohibition does mean that the only proper use of property is social.

Since the individual has a his personal life to consider, he can aim at furthering his own development and his own happiness by the disposal of his goods; only he must never forget that he is a social being as well. . . . If he possesses a superfluity, he will share with those who are in want of the bare necessaries of life.

[280-81(84)] This principle may also be used with respect to celebrity. One who enjoys the fruits of celebrity is to use his celebrity not to further his selfish whims, but is to recall that he must use that celebrity to exercise positive moral influence on others. It is not to be used as a platform for scandal or bad example.

Mercier explains the source or basis of the right to private property. Various theories have been advanced to explain its basis. Some base the right on mere convention (social contract) or positive law (e.g., Hobbes, Montesquieu). Others base it by extending it or tying it to the right of each man to the fruits of his labor (e.g., Locke, Adam Smith). Mercier rejects these theories as insufficient or self-defeating. With respect to the social contract theory of ownership, Mercier observes:

Men could never have set out to divide goods [by compact], if they had not previously the right to dispose of them, that is to say, the right of ownership . . . . Ownership must therefore logically precede the social compact.

[281(85)] The Lockean justification for private property is probably the most widely accepted contemporaneously. Mercier rejects its sufficiency as an explanatory basis for right to property:

[L]abour is not the foundation of ownership; it is an exercise of it and presupposes the general right to dispose of the goods of the earth. I cannot claim to transform anything by my labour if I do not first of all possess the right of making it serve my purpose, that is, the right of disposing it.

[282(86)] How can we claim the crops we, through our labor, have grown, if we do not first have the property right to land and the the fruit of our labor? Basing private ownership on labor begs the question.

Mercier finds the right to property to be based upon human nature.

The earth and its wealth were made for the use of man. . . . Man has the right to use and to dispose of things and of animals, because, as we have already said, he is a person. As such he has the [natural] right both to provide for his own preservation and to make use of his natural powers. Hence he may establish his dominion over things, since this is a necessary condition both for his existence and for his development. And it is clear that this dominion must not only look to the satisfaction of his present needs . . . . As a rational and free being capable of foreseeing the future and of restraining his appetites . . . he acts in conformity with his nature when he regulates his conduct with a view to his future needs. As the head of a family he is bound to some extent to provide for the future of those whom Providence has entrusted to his care.

[283(87)] However, this natural right to property may be exercised either privately or communally, for the justification of property may be viewed from either individual or communal perspective. Mercier believes that "what is due to man by virtue of his humanity does not belong simply to the race as a whole but to each individual member of it." As a result individual ownership is a legitimate expression of the natural right to property. Against this view is the communist and the collectivist (socialist) notion of property, which would deny the individual, at least to great extent, the individual right to property. Mercier engages the standard arguments brought by communist and collectivist theories of property, and disposes of them. He also addresses the typical objections to private property and capitalism, and offers responses or counterarguments against them. These will not be reviewed here. [284(89)-306(93)]

In the last three sections of his treatment of the right to property, Mercier discusses the various titles to property (by occupancy, by prescription) [307(94)-311(95)], the (natural) right to make a will [311-14(96)], and the (natural) right to inheritance [314-15(97)].

Mercier next addresses the rights of members of the family, a matter we will reserve for our next blog posting.