Stoics: Kathēkon or Officium: Our Duty to Nature

IN OUR LAST POSTING, we noted how the Stoics branded as "indifferent" or pre-moral a number of goods which Plato, but particularly Aristotle, had labeled as part of the good life.  The Stoics were not, however, blind that humans gravitated to those supposedly indifferent goods.  Why was it most men preferred wealth (a supposedly "indifferent" good) than poverty?  Why did most men prefer fame (another supposedly "indifferent" good) than being ignored?  It would seem that the Stoic adiaphora were often proēgmena.

To explain why there was this apparent desire for the adiaphora, the Stoics cleverly coined some neologisms--some new words--and so developed an entirely new moral vocabulary and moral category.  They recognized that all animals, including humans, have impulses (hormē [ὁρμή] in Greek, appetitio animi, in Latin), and these latched on to the supposedly indifferent things, the adiaphora.

The Stoics recognized that the animal impulse shared by man perceived these adiaphora as have some sort of value or worth: they were estimable (axion [ἀξιον], in Greek, aestimabile, in Latin).  This perceived value or worth is what made them preferred (proēgmenon [προηγμένον] in Greek, praepositum or selectum, in Latin).  On the other hand, some of these adiaphora were seen as having a dis-value (apaxion), and were therefore dis-preferred (apoproēgmenon, in Greek, reiectum, in Latin).

Depiction of the Stoa Poikile (Painted Stoa) 

from which the Stoics derived their name

To avoid a lapse into subjectivism--to avoid the preferred and dis-preferred to being mere whim, mere wants, arbitrary desires--the Stoics sought to put some sort of objective (though not moral) reason or ratio behind these impulses.  They found the objective guide in nature (physis).  Impulses that were in accord with nature (kata physin) were preferred; those against or contrary to nature were dis-preferred.  Above and beyond my nature was a cosmic logos (in Latin, ratio) that provided the sort of common or universal law behind the natural law specific to particular animals.

Those actions that were in accord with nature (kata physin) were considered proper (oikeion [οἰκεῖον]), while those that were contrary to nature were considered alien (allotrion [ἀλλότριον]. These proper actions were also called dutiful or appropriate (kathēkon [καθῆκον], a word that became in Latin as officium.  Whenever we see, as, for example in Cicero, the use of the term officium (often translated as "duty"), it has the meaning of kathēkon or a duty arising from or based upon one's nature.  This notion of duty to one's nature was, of course, a principle that would have a profound effect on moral philosophy and would eventually (with important modifications) be incorporated into Christian thought and given Scriptural dignity via reference by St. Paul in his epistle to the Romans.

The Stoics and Virtue: Introduction

THE STOICS ARE THE NEXT group of philosophical thought that might profitably be looked at in terms of the development of virtue theory.  The Stoics looked not towards Plato or Aristotle for inspiration, but rather turned to Socrates, from whom, like their philosophical adversaries the Skeptics and the Epicureans, they sought answers to the question of "how should we then live?" as a title to a famous book once put it.

Skeptics took their inspiration from the Socratic aporia, the puzzlement, the "the only thing I know is that I do not know" tradition of Socrates.  This deconstruction by Socrates, of course, was a sort of intellectual unraveling of conventional knowledge so as to be put in a place where real thinking could begin.  However, what Socrates intended as a new beginning, the Skeptics apparently saw as an end.  All knowledge, the Skeptics held, is unknowable.  We are condemned not to know.  Translated into the moral life, this leads to a vicious relativism.

The Epicureans also sought inspiration from Socrates.  The Epicureans here focused on the elitism which was implicit in the Socratic manner.  It was not the many, the hoi polloi, that could be counted to provide us enlightenment as to how we should live.  The rabble is not the source of the good.  Rather, the Epicureans "found in Socrates' preference for the views of 'the few' inspiration for preferring the cultured pleasure brought by wisdom over the baser pleasures of 'the many.'"

When Christian thinkers came on the scene, they found both the Skeptic and the Epicurean schools unpalatable and not consistent or synthesizeable with the truth of the Gospel and the moral teachings of Jesus.  At root, a Christian cannot be a skeptic, for he believes in the sure footing of faith and reason.  Nor can a Christian be an epicurean or hedonist, for he would never adopt a pleasure principle as his moral pole star.

It was the last Socratically-inspired school--the Stoics--which Christians thought sufficiently aligned with their  teachings to make it an attractive complement to the teachings of Christ.

Stoicism, of course, takes its name from "painted porch," stoa poikile, the place alongside the marketplace of Athens where Socrates had spent so much time as philosophical gadfly to the consternation of the Athenian leaders who eventually found the need to condemn him to death for impiety and supposed corruption of youth.  When Plato and Aristotle founded their own schools (the Academy and the Lyceum, respectively), they abandoned to Stoa.  By re-appropriating the original teaching locus of Socrates, the Stoic philosophers manifest an intent to go back to the sources: a Socratic ressourcement.

Zeno of Citium, founder of the Stoic School

Unfortunately, much of the material of the early Stoic founders and thinkers has been lost to us.  Zeno of Citium (ca. 334-262 B.C.) has been generally honored as the founder of the Stoic school.  He authored a new Republic as a short of challenge-piece to the Platonic original.  Chrysyppus (ca. 280-226 B.C.), Zeno's disciple, carried this tradition on, authoring his own critique of Plato's Republic in his On the Republic.

One of the teachings of the Stoics that the Christians ultimately found attractive as analogous to the moral teachings of Jesus to which they were heir was the notion of Socrates's personal impetus--his daimon--a sort of spirit of universal reason that inspired Socrates, which warned him, which urged him on.  This Socratic daimon was identified by the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes (died 232 B.C.) with the universal reason (logos) which was further tied to Zeus (God), the author of nature.  One can see in Cleanthes' interpretation of the Socratic daimon a compatibility with the Christian notion of a God who creates a world through the Word (Logos) and which therefore displays in some manner in that world a truth about how we should then live.  Here, a notion of created order and the notion of an inspiration that acts in accord with that created order (reason, conscience, Holy Spirit).

It was the Stoic doctrine of the Logos that drew the early Christian thinkers toward Stoicism as a possible philosophical source with which to buttress the teachings they had received from Jesus and his apostles.  After all, it would have seemed as if the Apostle John had already given them the directive.  In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God.  It was this Logos that became flesh, and had dwelt in the world, full of grace and truth.

What was the relationship between the Logos of the Stoic and the Logos-made-Flesh of the Gospel of John?

To answer that question, of course, we have to understand what the Stoics thought about the Logos, and we shall spend the next few postings on just this issue.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 15

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Heraclitus from the Villa dei papiri, Herculaneo

E. HERACLITUS (536-470 B.C.)

The Stoic teachings regarding the Logos koinos rest at their final end upon the Heraclitean world logos (Weltlogos). Augustine's teaching regarding the eternal law therefore goes back to Heraclitus. We shall investigate now what Heraclitus taught regarding the Logos.

1. Concept of the Logos

According to Heraclitus there is no lasting being. All being flows or is in flux (panta rei).(1). The Logos, the common law (gemeinsame Gesetz), rules in the flow and change of things. All things fulfill themselves in accordance to the Logos. This divine law rules all things; what it wills is sufficient for all things; and it excels all things. This Logos is the common law. In addition to logos, Heraclitus also used the terms: nous, phronesis, gnome, heimarmene, kraunos, pyr, and Zeus. Heraclitus says, for example, "when one wants to talk with reason, one must base himself on the common reason.(3) On this mind is everything common. But Heraclitus places the common reason of the mind above the mind of the individual.(4) To know the know One, from which all things stem, is Wisdom, gnome.(5) Fate therefore is to be accepted.(6) Lightning, which symbolizes the divine fire, is endowed with reason and is the first cause of the governance of the All.(7)

This one and only way is, and is not, to be named with Zeus.(8) Their will of individual should be to follow the law.(9) Heraclitus identifies the expressions logos, nous, phronesis, heirmarmene, pyr, and Zeus. These termini parallel those of Augustine, which shows the relationship between both men's thought:

HERACLITUS	AUGUSTINE
1. λόγος ὁ κοινός. ὁ λόγος ὁ κοινός. S. 57, Anm. 2 and 3.	1. lex est aeterna, lex universalis. S. 5, Anm. 18 and 19.
2. ἑιμαρμένη. S. 57, Anm. 5.	2. ordo causarum, necessitas . S.7, Anm. 8.
3. νους ξὺνος. S. 57, Anm. 1. φρονεῖεν ξυνόν. S. 57, Anm. 3. γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυϐέρνησε πάντα. S. 57, Anm. 4.	3. ratio divina. S. 5, Anm. 19. Voluntas Dei ordinem naturalem conservari iubens et perturbaris vetans.

2. Characteristics of the Logos.

Heraclitus calls this law divine. "All human laws nourish themselves from the One, the divine."(10) The Logos is furthermore eternal and all-encompassing.(11) It is the universal law of the world (Weltgestz).(12) All things happen in accordance with this law.(13) It is the cause of the governance of the world.(14) This law branches out only so far as it wills, and it is sufficient for all things, and overcomes all things.(15) It binds all things, in that whoever intends to speak, must be armed with the common law of all, just like a city defends itself with the law, and, indeed, even more strongly so.(16) Even the unjust stands under this law. Dike will straighten injustice; the perjurer and his compurgator will have to contend with Dike.(17)

Heraclitus places upon the Logos the same characteristics as Augustine does upon the eternal law.

HERACLITUS	AUGUSTINE
1. νόμος θεος. S. 58, Anm. 10. πῦρ αἰώνιον. S. 58, Anm. 11. λόγος ὥν ἀεὶ. S. 58, Anm. 11.	1. lex ineffabilis, aeterna, sempiterna. S. 6, Anm. 1 and 2.
2. γινομένων πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.. S. 58, Anm. 11. Δίκη κατὰ­λήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας. S. 58, anm. 17.	2. lex universlis. S.7, Anm. 8. bona et mala ordine regi. S. 8, Anm. 10 and 12.

3. The Logos is the Fundamental Source of all Law

a) Out of the Logos stems forth the law of nature, than all things in nature develop themselves in accordance with the law of the Logos.(18) The stars circle in the paths that has been foreordained by the law of the Logos. The sun does not exceed its boundaries, and should it do so, so would the messengers of Justice (the Erinyes of Dike) put it back in its place.(19) The same law rules in the world of the living. The wild and tame animals, the birds, the fish, and the beasts of the land become, flourish, and leave so as the law of God has predetermined.(20) They must follow it as a matter of necessity. Everything that lives is with the whip of God put into pasture.(21)

Man has little understanding regarding this law through which all exists, whether before he begins to question its existence, or after he has learned of it.(22) This law ties together the opposites of in the world into the most beautiful harmony.(23) Such ties are: the whole and the not whole, unity and discordance, consonance and dissonance, and out of all one, and out of all one.(24) The law of nature therefore go right back to the Logos as its source. Augustine follows the same path back to the eternal law.

b) The common law is the norm for the activities of mankind. It is his duty to follow the common Logos. Although the Logos is common, most live as though they have their own knowledge.(25) All must follow this law, but unfortunately not all do. The Logos lives in man.(26) All are given it, so as to know it and to be able to reason.(27) Thinking is the greatest benefit, and Wisdom consists in this: to tell the truth, and to act in accordance with nature, and to listen to it.(28) The Logos in man is therefore the measure of morality. Most men confront the Logos daily, as it is the guide of the All, and still they divide themselves from it. The things with which they daily interact appear to them for that reason foreign.(29) Morality consists therefore in acting in accordance with nature, in acting in accordance with reason, and in acting in congruity with the eternal Logos. The Logos always is in integrally in accordance with itself, therefore all things are good, beautiful, and right. Men, however, do not always act in integrity with the Logos. Therefore, they are divided into those who are just or righteous, and those who are not just or not righteous.(30). The Logos is therefore, according to Heraclitus, the foundational norm of the moral law. With Augustine the lex aeterna is the foundational norm of the moral law.

c) According to Heraclitus, human laws obtain their authority and their binding force from the divine law. Heraclitus writes: "All human law are derived from the one, the divine."(31) The same viewpoint is found in Augustine. Nihil est iustum atque legitimum, quod non ex aeterna lege homines sibi derivaverint.

4. Conclusion of Heraclitus's Teaching on the Logos.

The concept of the Logos governs the Heraclitean philosophy. Heraclitus identifies the logos koinos with the nomos koinos, the nous, the gnome, the heimarmene, the pyr, the keraunos, and with Zeus. Heraclitus indicates the Logos to be some eternal, divine, and universal. The evil themselves are beneath the Logos. The Logos is the foundational norm of all temporal laws, the law of nature, the moral law, and the law of the State.

We have seen how the lex aeterna of Augustine in part corresponds to the Heraclitean world logos. The fact that these two use same or similar terminology and the same or similar ways of thinking shows that in the fundamental root shows that Augustine's teaching on the lex aeterna is to be found in Heraclitus. The Stoa, Plotinus, and Cicero are the bridges between Heraclitus and Augustine.

CONCLUSION

We are now at the end of our investigation. Let us look one more time to the back to the entire issue.

In the first part we saw what Augustine taught by the eternal law. We learned its definition, its characteristics. We saw how it was that the eternal law was the foundational norm of all temporal laws, the law of nature, the moral law, the law of the State. Finally, we were made familiar with the knowability of the eternal law.

In the second part we investigated the sources of Augustine which impressed themselves upon Augustine's teaching, and upon which it was dependent. Cicero, Plotinus, St. Paul, St. John, the Stoa, and Heraclitus were identified as sources. The investigation revealed a direct reliance of Augustin in his teaching upon Cicero, Plotinus, St. Paul, and St. John, and an indirect reliance upon the Stoa and Heraclitus.

The same or similar terminology, the same or similar ways of thinking in the development of the temporal law from the eternal law, the familiarity that Augustine had with Cicero, Plotinus, St. Paul, and St. John, as well as his knowledge of the Stoa and Heraclitus through Cicero and Plotinus are the sources as well as grounds upon which Augustine relied upon and left their impressions upon his teaching on the Lex aeterna.

____________________

(1) Vgl. Fr. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. Bd. I, S. 66-75. Ausgabe Praechter, Berlin 1920.
(2) Diels, H., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin 1903, S. 82, No. 114. ξὺν νῶι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. Diels 66, No. 1. γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε
(3) Diels, 82 No. 114. ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων.
(4) Diels, 82, No. 113, Ξυνόν ἐστι πᾶσι τὸ φρονεῖν.S. 66, No. 2. ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.
(5) Diels, 73, No. 41. εἶναι γὰρ ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυϐέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων.
(6) E. Kl. I 178 n. Anathon Aall. S. 51, Anm. 2.
(7) Cf. Diels S. 75, No. 64.
(8) Diels S. 72, No. 32. ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγ­εσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.
(9) Diels S. 72, No. 33. νόμος καὶ βουλῇ πείθεσθαι ἑνός.
(10) Diels S. 82, No. 114. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.
(11) Diels S. 75, No. 64. τὰ δὲ πὰντα οἰακίζει κεραυνός, τουτέστι κατευθύνει, κεραυνὸν [τὸ πῦρ λέγων τὸ αἰώνιον]. Diels S. 66, No. 1. (τοῦ δὲ) λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος (ἀεὶ).
(12) Diels S. 66, No. 2. διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ (ξυνῷ, τουτέστι τῷ) κοινῷ· ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ.
(13) Diels S. 66, No. 1. γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.
(14) Diels S. 75, No. 64. [εἶναι] τὸ πῦρ καὶ τῆς διοικήσεως τῶν ὄλων αἴτιον.
(15) Diels S. 82, No. 114. κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περὶγίγνεται.
(16) Ibidem. ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων, ὃκωσπερ νόμῳ πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέ­ρως.
(17) Diels S. 71, No. 28. καὶ μέντοι καὶ Δίκη κατὰ­λήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας.
(18) Diels S. 66, No. 1. γινομένων γὰρ (πάντων) κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε.
(19) Diels S. 79, No. 94. Ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερϐήσεται [τὰ] μέτρα· εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν.
(20) Diels S. 68, No. 11. τῶν τε ζώιων τά τε ἄγρια καὶ ἥμερα τά τε ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ ἐν ὕδατι βοσκόμενα γίνεταί τε καὶ ἀκμάζει καὶ φθείρεται τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ πειθόμενα θεσμοῖς.
(21) Ibidem. πᾶν γὰρ ἑρπετὸν (θεοῦ) πληγῇ νέμεται, ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος.
(22) Diels S. 16, No. 1. (τοῦ δὲ) λόγου τοῦδ᾽ ἐόντος (ἀεὶ) ἀξύνετοι γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον.
(23) Diels S. 67, No. 8. τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα κατ᾽ ἔριν γίνεσθαι.
(24) Diels S. 68, No. 10. συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα . . .
(25) Diels S. 66, No. 2. διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ (ξυνῷ, τουτέστι τῷ) κοινῷ· . . . τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.
(26) Diels S. 52, No. 115. ψυχῆς ἐστι λόγος.
(27) Diels S. 82, No. 116. ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ φρονεῖν.
(28) Diels S. 81, No. 112. τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας.
(29) Diels S. 77, No. 72. ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, τούτῳ διὰ­φέρονται, καὶ οἷς καθ΄ ἡμέραν ἐγκυροῦσι, ταῦτα αὐτοῖς ξένα φαίνεται.
(30) Diels S. 82, No. 114. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 14

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Bust of the Stoic Philosopher Chrysippus of Sol (ca. 278-206 B.C.)

D. THE STOA (336-207 B.C.)
(continued)

2. Attributes of the Common Law According to the Stoa.

a) Cleanthes calls this law the eternal applicable law. He writes in his hymn: "For the entirety of existence there is an eternal and subsisting law."(16) This law governs the things of the world and is eternal, just like Zeus himself.(17)

b) This law is, further, unchanging, in that it stays always one and the same.(18) It is right Reason which impresses itself upon and rules all things.(19)

c) This law is ultimately universal. Zeus rules the All by this law.(20) Even the evil are rejected and are confined back to it. The disorderly he brings into order, and the unlovely he makes lovely. You, O Zeus, sings Cleanthes, lead the law, the common, which impresses upon all things. You reign in your greatest power as the highest Lord of the entire world. Without you, Ruling Lord, nothing in the All occurs.(21) Even the deeds of the sinners, evil, you know, in your wisdom, how to even. The disorderly you place back into order, and the unlovely you make lovely."(22) Therefore everything, the orderly and disorderly, good and evil, is under the common law. It is therefore universal in the widest sense of that term.

Note well: the Stoics did not teach that the evil were destroyed by the common law. By this clarification they generally drew back to theodicy. Compare Anathon Aall in his The History of the Logos Idea (Die Geschichte der Logosidee) [Leipzig 1896].

The Stoa placed on the Logos the same qualities as Augustine did on the eternal law. Even here Augustine stands under a stoic influence.

STOA	AUGUSTINE
1. λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα. S. 52, Anm. 16. λόγον καὶ ἐόντα ἀΐδιον	1. lex est aeterna, sempiterna, perpetua. S. 63, Anm. 1 and 2.
2. νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν. S. 52, Anm. 20.	2. lex est universalis. S.7, Anm. 8 and S. 8, Anm. 10 and 12.

3. The Logos koinos is the Fundamental Norm of all Laws

The Stoics linked justice upon the natural law. They taught that justice or right has its wellspring not as a result of any human warrant, but as an outflow of reason be that from nature.(22) According to Chrysippus, there is no other wellspring for right that may be found, no other path other than that of Zeus and the common nature. From there must all human law find its source if we want to talk in terms of good and evil.(24) This common law is the king of all divine and human things, the dominant ruler of the good and the ugly, the most-high guide from which nature commands what things are permitted, what prohibited, and what is allowed in terms of political custom, and thereby is the norm and measure of justice and injustice.(25) The measure for good and evil, for the just and unjust is also the common law. All right and law, the law of nature, the moral law, and the law of the state all point backwards to the Logos orthos. Looking at these individually, we get the following picture:

a) The Law of Nature stems from the Logos koinos

The Logos impresses itself upon all things of this world.(26) Certainly, the Logos is but one.(27) It divides itself, however, in myriad subordinated rational individuals, the logoi spermatikoi. These rational seeds are the cause of the always renewing individuals, the never corrupting forms, the measure of propriety, the measure, the relationship, the beauty, the order, and the security of all earthly things.(28) The Logoi spermatikoi are the primary moving powers for the Stoic diakosmesis, the world environment (Weltausstattung). The Logos koinos can appropriately divide itself into are myriad of appropriate displays of its power. Through this principle the world is created and holds together.(29) The innumerable laws of of individual things run together into the one eternal law. Felicitously, there is preserved in an Armenian text alone some of the writing of the Stoic Poseidonius which deals with the role of the Logoi spermatikoi in the underlying law of things. In that text it says: "The earth does not stop in bringing forth the same plants. The heavens continues in its unending order. Sun, moon, and the stars overhead do not vary from their joint paths. The sea does not overstep its indicated boundaries. The creatures of the waters, the creatures of the air, the creatures of the land live in fidelity to their tasks; only man, that has authority over all things, is entrusted with the quality of freedom, and is able to disregard Providence and neglect the law of what is right."(30) The Logoi spermatikoi express themselves as the power that holds together all inorganic things, (hexis) as the physis of organic things, as psyche in the things that live, and as nous in mankind.(31) These laws run together into the one Logos orthos to the most high God.(32) In this manner the Stoics the natural law upon the eternal law. The Stoic manner of thinking about the derivation of the temporal law, especially the natural law, is the same as that in Augustine.

STOA	AUGUSTINE
1. The Stoa derived all right and law back to the Logos koinos: οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν εύρεΐν της δικαιοσύνης ἄλλης ἄρκὴν . . . ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως. S. 53, Anm. 24	1. Augustine derived the inner order of things (the natural law) from the divine wisdom and righteousness. S. 9, Anm. 3 and 4.
2. The Stoa derived the Logoi spermatikoi back to the Logos koinos tes physeos. Οἱ Στωικοί νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεκνικον ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γένεσιν κόσμου ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τους σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ’οὓς ἕκαστα καθ’ ειρομένην γίνεται. Diels, Doxographi Graeci 1879, S. 305.	2. Augustine derived the rationes seminales (the literal translation of Logoi spermatikoi) upon the divine power and wisdom. Aug., PL 34, lib. 9, 17. Potestas creatoris habet apud se posse de his omnibus aliud facere, quam eorum quasi seminales rationes habent. Aug., De gen. ad lit. PL 34, lib. X, 20; lib. X, 21. Vgl. Hans Meyer, Geschichte der Lehre von den Keimkräften, Bonn 1914, S. 63ff. Aug. in Heptat, II, 21. Insunt enim corporeis rebus per omnia elementa mundi quaedam occultae seminariae rationes, quibus cum data fuerit opportunitas temporalis atque causalis, prorumpunt in species debitas suis modis et finibus.

b) The Logos koinos is the principal source of the moral law.

Chrysippus teaches expressly: "There is simply no other source and background for justice that may be found other than Zeus and the common nature.(33) Nature and reason are the only measure for good and evil. Reason tells everyone what he should do and what he ought to avoid.(34) The highest morality is equivalent to living according to nature, that is reason."(35) Ergo the famous Stoic canon: "One must live according to Nature, that is to say Reason."(36) Living a life in accordance with reason is, at the final end, life in accordance with the Logos koinos. From this Logos, man takes a part in through reason, which he obtains by nature. The part of him that is reason lives in him as Logos andiathetos.(37) According to the Stoics, the moral law also is based upon the Logos koinos. Augustine holds that the moral law is innate. God writes it in the heart of man. The Stoa and Augustine both trace back the moral law to the divinity.

c) The Logos koinos is the Fundamental Norm of the Laws of the State.

The common law ties both the gods and men. Both use the world as a common home.(38) Cleanthes prays to Zeus from there: "Your progeny are we and part of your form, all which lives and is composed to die on earth."(39) Man and God are bound by the same law, and so it naturally follows that human laws, the laws of the State, must be arranged to conform to the One, the divine one. This is so because justice has its source, not in human law, but in the outflow from reason, that is nature.(40). Augustine derives in the same way the law of the State from the eternal law. Nihil esse iustum atque legitimum quod non ex aeterna lege homines sibi derivaverint.

d) Conclusion regarding the Stoic teaching on the Logos.

The concept of the Logos is at the center of the Stoic philosophy. The concepts of taxis, heimarmene, pronoia, physis koine, logos orthos, nomos koinos become in many cases synonymously used. The Stoics name the Logos eternal and universal. The evil are under the law of the Logos. The law of nature, the moral law, the law of the State all are derived from that source. The same or similar termini and manners of thinking in Augustine show the reliance of Augustine on the Stoa. Cicero and Plotinus are Augustine's bridge to them.

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(16) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα . . .
(17) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 300. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀΐδιον ὄντα διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς (= τῆς ύλης) δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα.
(18) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. λόγον αἰέν ἐόντα . . .
(19) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 162. ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος . . .
(20) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν, χαῖρε . . .
(21) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
φοιτᾷ, μιγνύμενος μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε φάεσσιν ᾧ σὺ τόσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντός. οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαῖμον . . . πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέραισιν ἀνοίαις . . .
(22) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν .
(23) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 308. φύσει δὲ τὸ δίκαιον είναι καὶ μὴ θέσει ὡς καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον καθάφησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ. . .
(24) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III 326. Χρύσιππος ἐν τῴ περί θεῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν εὑρείν τὴς δικαιοσύνης ἀλλην ἄρκὴν, οὐδέ ἀλλην γένεσιν ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὀρθῶς τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
(25) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 314. ὁ νόμος παντων ἐστί βασιλεὺς ϑείων τε καὶ ἀνϑρωπίνων πραγμάτων, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον . . .
(26) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 162. ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος . . .
(27) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 1128. ὡς μέν οἱ Στωϊκοί λέουσιν εἰς τε ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἤ αυτή πάντως διανοίησις.
(28) Vgl. Anathon Aall, Geschichte der Logosidee, Bonn 1914, S. 129.
(29) Stobaeus, Ecl. I 374 and Anathon Aall S. 129. καὶ ὥσπερ τίνες λόγοι των μερών εις σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνονται καὶ αύθις διακρίνονται γινομένων των μερών οὗτος ἐξ ενόζ τε πάντα γίνεσθαι και εκ πάντων εις ἐν συγκρίνεςθαι.
(30) Anathon Aal, Geschichte der Logosidee, Bonn 1914, S. 129. Sol et luna ceteraeque stellae a cedenti cursu non cessant, mare regulam mandati non excedit, aquatilia, volatilia et terrestria debitis officiis non desunt, solus libertate praeditus mundi civis homo, cui etiam principatus imperialis concessus fuit, talis, inquam, providentiam, dimisit, legemque iustitiae neglexit.
(31) Cf. v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 708, nos. 773-911, I nos. 134-151, nos. 518-526.
(32) St. v. fr. I 537. Ζεῦ φύσεως ἀρχηγέ, νόμου μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν. St. v. f. III 326. οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν εύρεΐν της δικαιοσύνης ἄλλης ἄρκὴν ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως.
(33) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 326. Χρύσιππος ἐν τῴ περί θεῶν οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν εὑρείν τὴς δικαιοσύνης ἀλλην ἄρκὴν, οὐδέ ἀλλην γένεσιν ἤ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τὴς κοινὴς φύσεως .
(34) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 314. [νόμον] κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.
(35) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 179. Διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλοςεἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν·ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις.
(36) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 179. τὸ δε τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οΰτως ἀπέδωκεν τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν τούτο δ' εστί καθ' ένα λόγον ζῆν καὶ σύμφωρον ζῆν.
(37) De plac. phil. III 11. 900 B. Οἱ Στωϊκοί φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς. St. v. fr. II 837. ἡγεμονικόν δὲ εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς.
(38) Stobaeus, Ecl. I 444. Χρύσιππος κόσμον ἔναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ σύστημα τῶν ἕνεκα τοῦτον γεγονότον. . . cf. Cicero, De finibus bon. et mal. III 20, 27.
(39) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 537. Έκ σου γάρ γένος είσ' ήχου μίμημα λαχόντες. μούνοι, όσα ζώει τε και έρπει θνήτ' έπί γαίαν.
(40) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 308. φύσει δὲ τὸ δίκαιον είναι καὶ μὴ θέσει . . .

Schubert on St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law, Part 13

Augustine's Lex Aeterna Teaching
Its Content and its Source

by: P. Alois Schubert, S.V.D.

Part II
What Sources Inform St. Augustine's Teaching on the Eternal Law?

Bust of the Stoic Philosopher Chrysippus of Sol (ca. 278-206 B.C.)

D. THE STOA (336-207 B.C.)

In his teaching on the eternal law, Augustine is further reliant on the Stoa and Heraclitus. Nowhere do we find any evidence to establish that Augustine directly drew from Stoic sources. Doubtlessly, he learned about the Stoa from knowing Cicero and Plotinus.

Cicero himself witnessed that his philosophical works relied upon Greek sources. "Apographa [Aπόγραφα] sunt, minore labore fiunt, verba tantum affero, quibus abundo."(1) [They are copies, and are but little trouble. I only supply words, and of these I abound."]

Cicero's writings De re publica and De legibus are in the form of imitations of Plato's works Politeia and Nomoi.(2) In substance, the work De re publica most especially relies upon Panaetius and Polybius. With respect to his work De legibus we come particularly close to certain sources, especially Panaetius and Antiochus present themselves as sources. In the Academica priora et posteriora Cicero used Antiochus and Philo. In his work De finibus, he was assisted by the following: Zeno, Philodemus, and Antiochus of Ascalon. The Tusculan Disputations rely in part on Posidonius, and in part on other sources. The first book of De natura deorum bases itself on the writing of the Epicurean Phaedrus called Peri Theon, and on Carneades and Posidonius. The second book is based upon Posidonius's Peri Theon. The third book goes back to Cleanthes. The first book of De divinatione is reliant upon the the writing of Cleitomachus called Peri mantikes. The second books is based upon the work of Cleitomachus and Panaetius, perhaps his Peri pronoias. For the first two books of Cicero's De officiis, Panaetius is the main source, for the third book, Posidonius.

Plotinus was familiar with all the Greek philosophical systems. He also knew the Stoa well.(3)

Augustin learned also the Stoa through his familiarity with Cicero and Plotinus. We will investigate now what the Stoa understood under the notion of the eternal law, the Logos.

1. What did the Stoa Understand by the Logos?

The Stoa understood the Logos to be the right Reason impressed upon all things. This Reason is Zeus himself, the ruler of the actions of all things.(4) The Logos is here right Reason, and it is identified even with Zeus, the ultimate governor of the All. Chrysippus praises this law as King of all the divine and human things, as head over all the good and the ugly, as the highest leader of all nature, of political matters, and therefore also the norm and measure of the just and the unjust, and ordering of what ought to be done and what ought to be left alone.(5) This common law is further regarded as the necessity behind fate. Chrysippus, Posidonius, and Zeno teach that this necessity is the fundamental cause of Being, and of Reason under which all things fall.(6) Zeno understands this fundamental cause further as a kinetic power of things. He calls it Nature and Providence. In reality, these are different names for the same thing.(7) The heimarmene [Fate] stands surely with the inner cause of all things, as long as the impression of the pronoia [Providence] imports the control and concern of God into the ruling of the world. Again, Zeno names the Logos or Physis the fiery, artistic, working world reason.(9) He means thereby that nature itself the artistic, constructive fire that purposefully advances the formative path of the world.(10) This fire is depicted as artistic to distinguish it from a consuming fire.(11)

The fundamental fire flows in the fullness of art in the becoming of things. This art lies in the underlying order and the purpose of things. The entire world knows that this same nature is equivalent to the reason of the world, the necessity of fate, Providence, even Zeus himself. This is especially heralded by the Stoics.(12) Cleanthes speaks of Zeus as father of the world order. He prays to him: "You, O Zeus, know in your Wisdom, to make even that which is crooked. You order what is without order, and that which is not beautiful you make beautiful. You also make into one the many, and bring good out of evil, so that the entire stands forth in the eternal and sure Logos."(13)

The thinking regarding order is impressed upon us even more sharply by the Stoic view of the cosmos as a living organism (zoon). Just as in the microcosmos all is law and order, so also in the macrocosmos. The world reason lives, is ensouled, and in measured order manages the cosmos.(14) Chrysippus calls the heimarmene [fate] a kinetic power, one that arranges all things in order (taxei). This requirement he also calls the world law, truth, first cause, nature, fate, and other things.(15) So in fact is the concept of the Stoa of taxis, heirmarmene, ananke, pronoia, aitia, aletheia, physis, logos orthos, and nomos koinos [fate, destiny, providence, cause, truth, nature, right reason, eternal law]. These names all refer to that law, which, at its ultimate basis, is the Reason of the omnipotent Jupiter.

The Stoic termini: order, law, are the same that Augustine used. By comparing the two, we get the following picture:

STOA	AUGUSTINE
1. τάξις. S. 52, Anm. 15	1. ordo. S. 3, Anm. 1
2. αἰτία εἰρομένη. S. 50, Anm. 6. εἱμαρμένη. S. 50, Anm. 6.	2. ordo causarum, causa suprema. S. 7, Anm. 8.
3. ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. S. 50, Anm. 4.	3. summa ratio, recta ratio. S. 5, Anm. 14. .
4. ὁ κοινός τὴς φύσεως λόγος. S. 51, Anm. 12.	4. ratio divina. S. 5, Anm. 19.
5. πρόνοια. S. 51, Anm. 7.	5. providentia. S.8, Anm. 14
6. ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός. S.50, Anm. 4.	6. lex aeterna. S. 9, Anm. 2.

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(1) Cicero ad Atticum XII 52, 3.
(2) Fr. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. I. Bd., S. 497, Ausgabe Praechter, Berlin 1920.
(3) Fr. Überweg, Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie des Altertums. I. Bd., S. 497, Ausgabe Praechter, Berlin 1920.
(4) V. . Arnim, Joh. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Bd. 1-3, Leipzig 1905, I, No. 162. νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνιτούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι
(5) V. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. III, No. 314. ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ϑείων τε καὶ ἀνϑρωπίνων πραγμάτων˙ δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον . . .
(6) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 175. καθ’ ειμαρμένην δε φασιν τα πάντα γίγνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, . . . καὶ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ Ζήνων . . . ἔστι δὲ εἱμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἤ λόγος καθ΄ον ο κόσμος διεξάγεται.
(7) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 176. Ζήνων, ὁ Κιττεὺς, δύναμιν κέκληκε τὴν εἱμαρμένην κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν ὠνόμασεν.—St. v. fr. I, No. 102. Ἕν τ' εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἱμαρμένην καὶ Δία πολλαῖς τ' ἑτέραις ὀνομασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι λέγει Ζήνων ἐν περὶ τοῦ ὅλου . . .
(8) Cf. Überweg I, Berlin 1920, S. 446.
(9) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 1027. πνεῦμα διῆκον δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου πῦρ τεκνικόν.
(10) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 171. τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἱναι πῦρ τεχνικόν ὁδω βαδίζον είς γένεσιν.
(11) Cf. Überweg I, S. 446, Berlin 1920.
(12) Plutarch, De Stoic. repug. 34, 5 nach Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen 31.2 S. 72, Anm. 2, Tübingen 1857. v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. I, No. 171. ὅτι δ' ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινός τὴς φύσεως λόγος εἱμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεύς ἔστι ὅυδὲ τοὺς αντίποδας λέληθεν παντακοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν . . .
(13) Mohnike, Gottl. Fr. Chr., Kleanthes der Stoiker, Greifswald 1914 and Überweg I 1920, S. 447. ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, / καὶ κοσμεῖν τἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν. / ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν, / ὥσθ’ ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα . . .
(14) v. Arnim, Joh. St. v. fr. II, No. 633. ὅτι δε καὶ ζώον ὁ κόσμος καὶ λογικόν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερόν καὶ Χρύσιππος φησιν ἐν πρώτω περί προνοίας ... Ποσειδώνιος ζώον ζωον μεν ούτως όντα οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν. . .
(15) Stobaeus, Ecl. I 180 and Anathon Aall S. 133. Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν . . .Εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων, μεταλαμβάνει δε ἀντι τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην προστιθείς καὶ ἕτερας ὄνομασίας . . .

Tertullian and the Natural Law: Christ not Chrysippus

NEQUE DEUS NEQUE NATURA MENTITUR, neither God nor nature lie. In this striking statement found in his De testimonium animae, Tertullian brings together both strands of the natural law and the divine law as components of our striving to comprehend the truth about what is, and what is good. Tertullian's theology was therefore informed by both nature and revelation. While he accepted the Christian revelation without reserve, he did not for all that disdain the testimony of natural theology and a natural moral law. Much of Tertullian's notion of a natural moral law was borrowed from the Stoic philosophy which Christians found so hospitable to their concept of the good. The notion of the natural moral law was complimentary, indeed, a necessary adjunct to, the Law of Christ. And yet in crafting their ideas of the natural moral law, the early Christians, including Tertullian, were not slavish, uncritical adopters of the Stoic moral philosophy. Tertullian was a follower of Christ, not of Chrysippus.

In light of Christ's abrogation of some of the Mosaic ceremonial and juridical laws, and under the divine commission to bring the Gospel to all men, Jew and Greek, the Christians sought to found their moral thinking upon those aspects of the divine law that remained binding, e.g., the Decalogue, and the law that was communicated by the natural moral law, that is, by reason and by conscience. Christ's redeeming death overcame the mankind's failure to obey both the Mosaic Law and the Natural Law. Christ was the end, the fulfillment, the telos of both the Mosaic Law and the Natural Law.

In deriving their synthetic position on universal morality, i.e., the existence of a natural moral law that bound all men, that governed their relationship with God, and by which they would be judged, the Christians both borrowed and added to the Stoic and Jewish concepts, and therefore enlarged both. "Broadly speaking," Michael Crowe states in his The Changing Profile of the Natural Law, "the Fathers seem to have been content with a conception of the natural law similar to that of Cicero. This conception was, of course, now put into a Christian setting; the impersonal deity or nature of the Stoics gives way to the Christian God, sovereign lord and lawgiver; and the knowledge of the the natural law and its precepts becomes more intimately a matter of conscience." (Crowe, at 59.) Tertullian followed this pattern. As Professor Marcia Colish puts it in her historical review of Stoicism:

By natural law, [Tertullian] means both the order of the universe and the moral bonds that unit all men, as well as man's natural capacity to know them, a distinctively Stoic amalgam although he does not name it as such. All men can know God and the good by natural law (naturale iuri), he avers, but this knowledge is by no means adequate to man's needs. It does not constitute the saving knowledge of god's ethical commandments or of God's transcendent power over nature, nor does it create a personal relationship between man and God. These vital epistemological and moral conditions are met only be revelation, first in the Mosaic covenant and consummately in the Gospel. In this instance, Tertullian rigorously deemphasizes any harmony that can be found between pagan truth and Christian truth in the light of the superiority of revelation.

Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), 16-17.

Mosaic Depiction of Tertullian

Though therefore not an uncritical advocate of Stoic ideas, and though clearly not seeing the Stoic conception of the good sufficient in the light of Christ, Tertullian readily employs Stoic philosophy, especially in the areas of natural theology and the natural moral law. "He draws freely on the Stoic argument for the existence of God and His primary attributes on the evidence of the created order and on the basis of man's natural rational capacity to perceive God's connection with the creation." Colish, 17. Tertullian naturally "correlates man's natural knowledge of God with revelation, observing that God provides a fuller and more authoritative knowledge of Himself and His moral law in Holy Scripture." Colish, 18. One can summarize Tertullian's treatment of Stoicism thus: Tertullian treats Stoicism "as an ancilla [ancillary or sevant] to Christian truth." Colish, 18. Obedience to the natural law is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of salvation. The natural law formula alone is insufficient. But though the revelation of Christ must be joined thereto, the natural moral law is not therefore without essential value.

Tertullian saw the universal basis of the natural law in God's creation, and in the natural brotherhood of man that arose from mankind's common nature. In Chapter II.4-5 of his Spectaculis, Tertullian found that our nature bespoke of its creation by a benevolent God, and so was the source of universal moral instruction. Tertullian found that belief nearly universal, indeed, almost self-evident, although subject to limitations arising from ignorance or lack of clarity:

No one denies, because no one is ignorant of, that which nature of herself suggests: that God is the maker of the whole universe, and that that universe is both good and placed under man's dominion. But because they [the Pagans] know not God thoroughly, except by the natural law (naturali iure), not as being also of his household, but from afar, not close by, they necessarily must be ignorant regarding the manner in which he administers what he made, that is, what he encouraged and what he prohibited with regard to them, as well as the rival force from the opposing side which acts in adulterating the uses of the creatures of God. For they cannot know either the will, or that which resists the will, of him of whom they know nothing.

Nemo negat, quia nemo ignorat, quod ultro natura suggerit, deum esse universitatis conditorem eamque universitatem tam bonam quam homini mancipatam. Sed quia non penitus deum norunt nisi naturali iure, non etiam familiari, de longinquo, non de proximo, necesse est ignorent, qualiter administrari aut iubeat aut prohibeat quae instituit, simul quae vis sit aemula ex adverso adulterandis usibus divinae conditionis, quia neque voluntatem neque adversarium noveris eius quem minus noveris.

De spect., II.4-5. The natural law, therefore, found its source in the creation of the universe. This included man's nature, something that all men shared. So it was the common brotherhood of man, man created by the one God, that allowed for a common or universal notion of right and wrong, a univeral natural moral law. For example, in Chapter 39 of this Apologeticus pro Christianis, Tertullian dedected the natural law in the common humanity Christians shared with all men:

But we are also your brothers, by right of nature, the one mother, although you are little deserving of the name men, because you are evil brothers. But how much more worthily are those both called and considered brethren who have recognised one Father, namely God, who have imbibed one spirit of holiness, who from one womb of the same ignorance have quaked before one light of truth! (Souter, trans.)

Sed et quod fratres nos vocamus, non alias, opinor, insaniunt, quam quod apud ipsos omne sanguinis nomen de affectione simulatum est. Fratres autem etiam vestri sumus iure naturae matris unius, etsi vos parum homines, quia mali fratres. At quanto dignius fratres et dicuntur et habentur, qui unum patrem deum agnoverint, qui unum spiritum biberint sanctitatis, qui de uno utero ignorantiae eiusdem ad unam lucem expaverint veritatis!

Apol., XXXIX.8-9.

16th Century Woodcut of Tertullian

Stoic Precursor of the Natural Law: "Life in Agreement With Nature" in Zeno, Cleanthes, Posidonius, Hecato, Chrysippus

DIOGENES LAERTIUS, IN HIS LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS, Book VII, 87-89a, gives a good synopsis of the Stoic moral teaching that the highest purpose or good of human life was to live in accordance to nature (homologoumenos te physei zen). This was not an individual, idiosyncratic, subjective nature--a law of one--involving the rejection of reason like that of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Transcendentalists. Though Emerson states that "No law is sacred to me but the law of my nature" (R. W. Emerson, Essays, 1st Series, (Ticknor & Fields: Boston 1863), 44), he does not take nature in the manner of the Stoics. For the Stoics, the referenced nature is universal, common, objective, binding upon all men without exception; it is based upon reason, the distinguishing feature of man relative to the brute creation. That is why the motto of the Stoics was "follow nature," and the motto of the Transcendentalists, though Emerson attributed it to the Stoics but gave it a different twist, was "obey thyself."

The Stoa Poikile, the Painted Porch

Those who walked the Stoa Poikile, the Painted Porch, therefore believed they had a duty to something outside their whim and sentiment. The Stoic believed he had a duty, as Kierkegaard would later put it, to the universal. The Stoics taught the doctrine that the divine or eternal plan was reflected in divine law, and that law would be found in the nature of that being. Thus, life in accordance with nature meant conformity to the divine or eternal law and divine will. Ultimately, this conformity with nature resulted in virtue, which led to happiness, as the person would be directed to his true, authentic, and designed good.

As Michael Bertram Crowe puts it in his The Changing Profile of the Natural Law:

In a word, Stoicism is an eclectic system marked by a stern and practical moral bent. The real business of philosophy is the moral conduct of man . . . . Virtue is the primary object of philosophy; ethics, therefore, is the most important branch. . . . Specifically this knowledge is knowledge of the world-order or of the universal law to which the individual must submit himself--and here is the point of insertion of the natural law in the system. We must know nature in order to follow nature's law; the universal law is the law of nature and the Stock morality is epitomised in the maxim: "Live according to nature" (homologoumenos te physei zen).

To quote Diogenes Laertius on the Stoics and their standard, "life in agreement with nature,":

This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end "life in agreement with nature" (or living agreeably to nature) [τέλοςεἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν], which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in work On End. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature oftheindividual.

(R. D. Hicks translation, from http://www.molloy.edu/sophia/seneca/DL_stoicism.htm)

87 Διόπερ πρῶτος ὁ Ζήνων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως τέλοςεἶπε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν·ἄγει γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐντῷ Περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ Ἑκάτων ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τελῶν(Gomoll 1). πάλιν δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν τῷ κατ'ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων ζῆν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ 88 πρώτῳ Περὶ τελῶν· μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦὅλου. διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦνταςὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸςλόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί, καθηγεμόνιτούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι· εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦεὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὔροιαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰτὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἑκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλωνδιοικητοῦ βούλησιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Διογένης τέλος φησὶ ῥητῶς τὸεὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ. Ἀρχέδημος δὲ τὸπάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελοῦντα ζῆν. 89 Φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐξακούει, ᾗ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήντε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴνμόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν, ᾗ ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶμέρους.

(Greek text from http://www.mikrosapoplous.gr/dl/dl07.html)

To be sure, there were problems with the Stoic view both in theory and practice. To name a couple, the Stoic doctrine was pantheistic and advanced some questionable moral values (e.g., suicide, most notably). However, the Stoic concept of the natural law, despite its faults, was not fundamentally unsound, and, much like the Greek to whom St. Paul preached, could be baptized and infused with the spirit of the Gospel. The doctrine of the Stoa Poikile, the Painted Porch, found easy venue in the Ecclesia Christou, the Church of Christ. And so, as Crowe puts it,

The Stoic philosophy, then, has come to articulate the nature law in a new and systematic way, a way that will survive, not only in its phraseology but in a great part of its structure, into the Christian and later formulations of the doctrine. And not alone the explicit teaching on the natural law, but other Stoic moral doctrines, such as that of evident principles, common to all men and prior to experience, principles that include a certain knowledge of good and evil, the elements of the virtues, the recognition of the goodness and eternity of God, will be taken up, corrected and developed by Christians. And so the claim of the Stoics to be the founders of the doctrine of the natural law will be substantiated. This formative influence of Stoicism was transmitted to the Fathers and later to the scholastics by Cicero and by the Roman law.

(Michael Betram Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1977), 30-36.

The Ecclesia Christou, the Church of Christ

Mirabile Dictu: A Pagan Gets Marriage Right

The Roman Stoic philosopher, contempoary of Seneca and teacher of Epictetus, Gaius Musonius Rufus (1st century A.D.), was not a Christian, but his view on marriage came, as John Finnis expressed it, "particularly close to articulating" a view on marriage attuned to the natural law. Finnis, "Natural Law Theory and Limited Government," in Robert P. George, ed., Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). An excerpt of his discourse on marriage was preserved by his student, a certain "Lucius," who also preserved in twenty other reasonably lengthy extracts (as far as extracts go), and which were included in Stobaeus (Floril. xxix. 78, lvi. 18).

Here is a translation of Discourse 13A by Cora E. Lutz, Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942):

The husband and wife, he [Musonius] used to say, should come together for the purpose of making a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a union is to be sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the case of animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect companionship and mutual love of husband and wife, both in health and in sickness and under all conditions, since it was with desire for this as well as for having children that both entered upon marriage. Where, then, this love for each other is perfect and the two share it completely, each striving to outdo the other in devotion, the marriage is ideal and worthy of envy, for such a union is beautiful. But where each looks only to his own interests and neglects the other, or, what is worse, when one is so minded and lives in the same house but fixes his attention elsewhere and is not willing to pull together with his yoke-mate nor to agree, then the union is doomed to disaster and though they live together, yet their common interests fare badly; eventually they separate entirely or they remain together and suffer what is worse than loneliness.