On Friendship and Political Philosophy

THE REDOUBTABLE DANTE WRITES in his Divine Comedy about the "bond of love which nature makes," lo vinco d’amor che fa natura. In this phrase, Dante invokes the whole tradition of classical philosophy and Catholic social teaching on the natural basis for social and civil life among men: friendship. To the idea of natural friendship, the Christian adds his ideal of supernatural love.

Aristotle observed long ago that friendship was both an important individual trait as well as a public trait. The happiness for the individual, that is, his end, Aristotle insisted, is the same as that of the city, the polis, the larger political society in which he lived. Indeed, Aristotle conceives of the citizens of a polis as a body or network of friends, or, perhaps more accurately, of a network of groups of friends, friends who share a common life, friends in which there is no opposition, but rather a commonality of interests. This has to be so since a friend is "another self." In the polity, there "arise . . . family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means to it." Politics 1280b35. Friendship and justice are all tied to a community: "To the same extent that a community exists, friendship also exists, and likewise justice." Some degree of friendship must exist for there to be justice. Politics, 1159b29-31 and 1160a7-8. Friends are a practical necessity, since man being neither a god nor a beast, but a "political creature and one whose nature is to live with others." Nicomachean Ethics, 1169b18; Politics 1253a2.

This is also the theme of St. Thomas Aquinas, who, of course, relied on Aristotle and conformed him to a Christian ethos. In his explanation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, St. Thomas has the following to say:

There is also a natural friendship between people of the same race who have common customs and social life. There is above all that natural friendship of all men for one another by reason of their likeness in specific nature. . . . . He [Aristotle] offers the fourth reason, pointing out that cities seem to be preserved by friendship. Hence legislators have greater zeal for maintaining friendship among citizens than even justice itself which is sometimes omitted, for example, in the infliction of punishment, lest dissension be stirred up. This is clear from the fact that concord and friendship are similar. Certainly lawmakers especially want this harmony and eliminate from the citizenry as much as possible contention inimical to the security of the city. Because the whole of ethics seems to be ordered to the good of the state, as was said at the beginning, it pertains to ethics to treat friendship.*

There is, then, a natural bond between men, a natural affection, what we call a civil friendship. This is the foundation of social life, and it must pre-exist the organs and institutions of the state. "The profound meaning of all civil and political life does not arise immediately from the list of personal rights and duties." (Compendium, No. 390) Rather, these personal rights and duties are founded upon lo vinco d’amor che fa natura, the chain of love or friendship that is found in the nature of man. "Life in society takes on all of its significance when it is based on civil friendship and on fraternity." (Compendium, No. 390) Neither Aristotle nor the Church entertain the Hobbesian theory that in a state of nature every man is an enemy to every man.

The motto of the State of Texas is "Friendship"
(The word Texas comes from the Caddo Indian word
"teyshas" which means "friends" or "allies")

The Compendium therefore distinguishes between the "sphere of friendship" and the "sphere of rights." The "sphere of rights," which is built upon either individualistic or collectivist ideologies, is concerned with extrinsic rights. It is a world of "safeguarded interests, external respect, the protection of material goods and their distribution according to established rules." The "sphere of friendship" on the other hand is based upon "selflessness, detachment from material goods, giving freely, and [the] inner acceptance of the needs of others." (Compendium, No. 390)

The "sphere of friendship" is more basic and more fundamental that the "sphere of rights." Anyone who tries to build a civil polity based upon a "sphere of rights" alone, as the liberal West seems to be inclined to doing in its hankering after multiculturalism and pluralism, is doomed to failure. There has to be something more viscous, a little "blood," i.e., friendship, to thicken the cement of civil and political union. An insipid and thin "water," i.e., rights, especially positive rights, simply will not serve to form a people, and much less a people into a polity.

In fact, relying only upon a "sphere of rights" to build a state, and ignoring the "sphere of friendship" is a recipe for tyranny. As St. Thomas writes in his book On Kingship to the King of Cyprus:

Now all friendship is concluded upon the basis of something common among those who are to be friends, for we see that those are united in friendship who have in common either their natural origin, or some similarity in habits of life, or any kind of social interests. Consequently there can be little or no friendship between tyrants and their subjects.**

If friendship exits stage left, tyranny enters stage right.

In the same vein, the Compendium states that civil friendship--and not mere reliance upon civil rights--is what will preserve freedom and proper equality among citizens.

Civil friendship . . . is the most genuine actualization of the principle of fraternity, which is inseparable from that of freedom and equality. In large part, this principle has not been put into practice in the concrete circumstances of modern political society, above all because of the influence of individualistic and collectivistic ideologies.***

(Compendium, No. 390)

Those whose political philosophy is limited to the "sphere of rights" see each man as an atom, an individual, unattached by ties to others except as they may obtain advantage of it. Those of a collectivist bent, seek to have all these atomistic individuals compressed into a collective. In either case, those whose vision is limited to the "sphere of rights" have an inadequate notion of human nature and an inadequate philosophy of the human as a person.

Those who, without denying the reality of the "sphere of rights," recognize that there must be something deeper, a "sphere of friendship" to support the "sphere of rights," understand man not as an individual, but as a person. "No man is an island entire of itself," says the poet John Donne. Man does not live in the "sphere of rights." No, "every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main," the main which is the "sphere of friendship."

A person has an intrinsic dignity which arises from his freedom, his reason, and the end to which he is called. The Compendium explains:

The human being is a person, not just an individual. The term "person" indicates "a nature endowed with intelligence and free will": he is therefore a reality that is far superior to that of a subject defined by the needs arising solely from his material dimension. The human person, in fact, although participating actively in projects designed to satisfy his needs within the family and within civil and political society, does not find complete self-fulfillment until he moves beyond the mentality of needs and enters into that of gratuitousness and gift, which fully corresponds to his essence and community vocation.

(Compendium, No. 391)

Civil society and its political institutions must therefore view things not solely from an individualistic or collectivistic "sphere of rights" point of vantage. Their vision, like Moses' view from Mount Pisgah, must be aimed at the "sphere of friendship," which will allow for a political philosophy which is integrally and substantially personal:

A community has solid foundations when it tends toward the integral promotion of the person and of the common good. In such cases, law is defined, respected and lived according to the manner of solidarity and dedication towards one's neighbor.

(Compendium, No. 391)

If we move from the "sphere of rights" to the "sphere of friendship," we realize how limited "justice" is at preserving a polity. We realize ultimately that justice is the bare minimum, the lowest boundary, the least common denominator of social life. There is something much greater than justice which is required for a flourishing polis: friendship, even love.

Justice requires that everyone should be able to enjoy their own goods and rights; this can be considered the minimum measure of love. Social life becomes more human the more it is characterized by efforts to bring about a more mature awareness of the ideal towards which it should be oriented, which is the "civilization of love."

(Compendium, No. 391)

If friendship, a natural form of love, is admitted into political philosophy, then it becomes open to the possibility of the Gospel. A polity based upon a narrow political philosophy of "rights," will speak "rights talk." There will be no "friendship talk," and much less "love talk." This is the great social contribution of the Gospel:

The gospel precept of charity enlightens Christians as to the deepest meaning of political life. In order to make it truly human, "no better way exists . . . than by fostering an inner sense of justice, benevolence and service for the common good, and by strengthening basic beliefs about the true nature of the political community and about the proper exercise and limits of public authority." [VII, GS, 73] The goal which believers must put before themselves is that of establishing community relationships among people. The Christian vision of political society places paramount importance on the value of community, both as a model for organizing life in society and as a style of everyday living.

(Compendium, No. 392)

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*Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Sententiae Octavi Libri Ethicorum, VIII, lect. 1: Ed. Leon. 47, 443: "Est enim naturalis amicitia inter eos qui sunt unius gentis ad invicem, inquantum communicant in moribus et convictu. . . . . Quartam rationem ponit ibi: Videtur autem et civitates continere amicitia. Et dicit quod per amicitiam videntur conservari civitates. Unde legislatores magis student ad amicitiam conservandam inter cives quam etiam ad iustitiam, quam quandoque intermittunt, puta in poenis inferendis, ne dissensio oriatur. Et hoc patet per hoc quod concordia assimulatur amicitiae, quam quidem, scilicet concordiam, legislatores maxime appetunt, contentionem autem civium maxime expellunt, quasi inimicam salutis civitatis. Et quia tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile, ut in principio dictum est, pertinet ad moralem considerare de amicitia." For English translation see http://josephkenny.joyeurs.com/CDtexts/Ethics8.htm.
**Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, De Regno. Ad Regem Cypri, I, 10: Ed. Leon. 42, 461: "Omnis autem amicitia super aliqua communione firmatur: eos enim qui conveniunt uel per nature originem uel per morum similitudinem vel per cuiuscumque communionem, videmus amicitia coniungi... Non enim conservatur amore, cum parva vel nulla sit amicitia subiecte multitudinis ad tyrannum, ut prehabitis patet." For English translation see http://dhspriory.org/thomas/DeRegno.htm#10
***That is the great defect behind the French Revolution's motto: Liberté, égalité, fraternité, "Liberty, equality, fraternity." Unless built upon a "sphere of friendship" perfected by the love of the Gospel, a state will not flourish. In vanum laboraverunt qui aedificant eam nisi Dominus custodierit civitatem. Frustra vigilat qui custodit eam. (Psalm 127(126):1) "Unless the LORD build the house, they labor in vain who build. [Unless the LORD guard the city,] in vain does the guard keep watch." That is why Pope John Paul insisted in his first visit to France (Homily at Le Bourget (June 1, 1980): "In the final analysis, these [words, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity] are Christian ideas." A civil polity based upon the "rights of man" is a corruption of the Christian ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity understood within the context of friendship and of Christian love of God and love of neighbor as self.

Natural Law's Modern Cousin Germain: The Common Good and Friendship

MAN IS A SOCIAL ANIMAL, a ζῷον πολιτικόν or homo politicus. It follows that the requirements of practical reasonableness will take this reality into consideration. Practical reasonableness is not solely focused on self-constitution, self-realization, self-fulfillment to the point of self-centeredness or selfishness. Practical reasonableness recognizes that there must be a balance between self-regard and regard for others. (This part of the natural law is entrenched in Scripture: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." (Luke 6:31) or "Love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18; Mark 12:31 )).

Indeed, regard for others sometimes leads to significant self-sacrifice, even the sacrifice of oneself. Greater love no man has than to give his life for his friends. (John 15:13) We hold those who give their lives for others--e.g., the firemen, policemen, caregivers, and even the priest at 9/11 who gave their lives helping others, St. Maximilian Kolbe at Auschwitz who trade his life for the life of a married man, the soldier receiving the Medal of Honor posthumously in defending his fellows and his country--in such high honor surely not irrationally?

Finnis finds humans always aggregated in communities. He looks at communities as the product of relationships between human beings, and identifies four irreducible "orders" of such communities or sets of unifying relationships: a physical or biological order (relationships in the physical realm), an intellectual order (relationships of common thinking), a cultural order (community of shared language, technology, techniques, etc.), and a voluntary or psychological order (relationships of corroboration, co-ordination, cooperation arising from common action or a common pursuit or interest). It is this last order with which Finnis is most concerned and with which the requirements of practical reasonableness have most to do.

"Friendship" by Picasso

This relationships of corroboration, co-ordination, and cooperation give rise to common enterprises and therefore bring forth the concepts of common good. This order of community may be further subdivided (using largely Aristotelian insights) into communities that relate to utility ("business" communities), communities that relate to pleasure ("play" communities). Also to be distinguished are those communities that go beyond mere utility or pleasure, those that deal with amity, with friendship. In these kinds of relationships, the good of the other is, at least in part, defining of the relationship or community. In this sort of relationship of corroboration, "there is a community . . . not only in that there is a common interest in the condition [of that corroboration], and common pursuit of the means, whereby each will get what he wants for himself [as there is in those relationships of utility and/or pleasure], but also in that what A wants for himself he wants (at least in part) under the description 'that-which-B-wants-for-himself', and vice versa." NLNR, 141. One is clearly outside the ideas of self-fulfillment, self-constitution, self-realization--that self-fulfillment, self-constitution, self-realization includes the self-fulfillment, self-constitution, self-realization of another or of others. A father is miserable if he cannot provide for the needs of his wife and his children. His self-fulfillment comes, in great part, from the self-fulfillment of those under his care. More generically, a friend regards the good of his friend as part of his well-being. He relishes in the successes of his friend, and grieves at his friend's suffering.

So we leave the area of relationships of utility and of pleasure into the area of relationships of friendship (with the concept of friendship broadly understood). The notion of friendship is essential to the classical understanding of natural law which is not the individualistic self-regarding state of nature envisioned by Hobbes or Rousseau.

[C]ertainly there is no possibility of understanding the classical tradition of 'natural law' theorizing . . . without first appropriating the analysis of friendship in its full sense.

NLNR, 141. The "dialectic" of the core of friendship is a requirement of practical reasonableness because it participates in the basic value, the self-evident value of friendship: A has B's interest and not his own in view; reciprocally, B has A's interest and not his own in view; such "reciprocity of love does not come to rest at either pole." NLNR, 142-43.

Thus self-love (the desire to participate fully, oneself, in the basic aspects of human flourishing) requires that one go beyond self-love (self-interest, self-preference, the imperfect rationality of egoism . . . ). This requirement is not only in its content a component of the requirement of practical reasonableness; in its form, too, it is a parallel or analogue, for the requirement in both cases is that one's inclinations to self-preference be subject to a critique in thought and a subordination in deed.

NLNR, 143.

Friendship, then, is a sort of governor or a sort of counter to self-interest, and, in an almost paradoxical way, it is one's self interest which requires one to disregard one's self-interest as a fundamental sine qua non for participating in the good of friendship. If we focus on self-interest to the exclusion of friendship, we harm our self-interest. Our self-interest, then, requires us to have due regard for others. Friendship allows us to step outside ourselves.

Strict friendship is "the most communal though not the most extended or elaborated form of human community." NLNR, 143. There are friendships, attenuating in character, that extend and elaborate further out, rippling out of friendship in the strict sense and family to one's greater community, including one's neighborhood, city, state, country, nation, and even the global community.* But even in its greatest expanse, some sense, however attenuated, of the common good exists. That is why, when we see the plight of the Japanese after the tragic earthquake we have the felt need to provide them with help though we are "friends" with them in only the most weak of ways. There is a certain "friendship" that we have with the entirety of the human race.

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*However, "communism in friendship," one that seeks "the widest sharing in friendship" to the detriment of intermediate familial and other communities, frequently seen in Utopian schemes, such as those suggested by Plato in his Republic are to be disdained as a travesty of friendship. It is fatal to real friendship which must be other-regarding and personal, since it requires commitment to the other and an ability to give of one's self or one's own to the other. NLNR, 144-46. If one does not have something of one's own to give, it follows that there can be no friendship. The more an individual has (and the less the state or the commonality has), the more he can give in friendship. Friendship cannot exist if one is nothing more "than a cog in big wheels turned by others." NLNR, 147. Subsidiarity must exist in friendship as in the allocation of other aspects of community (power, decisions to allocate resources, etc.).