Ignorance of the Wrong-Innate Reason v. Propositional Reason

WE CANNOT APPROACH THE QUESTIONS we have posed in our prior posting about the invincible ignorance of the natural law without some sort of distinctions being made as a preliminary to addressing the answers.

We are wont to say that the natural law is innate, that it is impressed upon the very nature of man, and in a manner of speaking it is. But in a manner of speaking it is not. The natural law is not innate in the sense that Plato or Descartes understood innate knowledge to be, as knowledge preexisting in the mind of man. Like all human knowledge, we come to the knowledge of the natural law largely by observation, by experience, though the observation and experience includes both internal assessments (e.g., conscience) as well as external assessments (e.g., bodily needs, needs of the social good) and the use of reason. Our senses must look both inward and outward, be informed by the realities of life, and then we must apply reason to these observations to obtain knowledge of this law. It is, moreover, a law that can be taught intellectually, learned through character or behavior (that is by culture, or individual virtue), which suggests that it is a work of reason, not of mere innate disposition.

There is, however, a certain innateness regarding the law, but this innateness is tendential, inclinatory, not fully intellectual, though it certainly is not irrational. It means, simply, that "man, like all other creatures, must tend to his end according to laws bound up with his very nature." Bertke, 15.* When we say that the natural law is innate, we mean only that "man, like every other creature, tends to his end according to laws which agree with his nature." Bertke, 15. These inclinations, of course, would involve man as body-and-rational-soul.

But the natural law, though it is this innate tendency, is also more than this innate tendency of man-wanting-to-reach-his-end, this entelechy. The natural law is, as St. Thomas puts it, aliquid rationis, "something of reason," or aliquid pertinens ad rationem, "something pertaining to reason.** It is, as he further clarifies, something "established by reason," in fact a "work of reason," an opus rationis, "just as the proposition is a work of reason."*** The natural law, then, is clearly something more than innate tendency, disposition, or inclination though it is also includes this tendency, disposition, or inclination. The natural law is not solely a proposition of reason without tie to the tendencies, dispositions, or inclinations in man that are part of his innate nature. "A careful reading of St. Thomas reveals that the essence of the natural law may be understood in a sense that protects both its innate character in the strict sense of the word, and at the same time does not sacrifice the relation of the intellect to being." Bertke, 16.

Several commentators of St. Thomas have tried to understand the innatism in natural law with the realism in natural law by distinguishing three elements in the essence of natural law. They observe that St. Thomas Aquinas appears sometimes to refer to the natural law as innate, at other times he seems to see it as something relating to the application of practical reason and propositional, and though natural, not innate. Sometimes he seems to see it both natural an innate.† As a consequence, they distinguish three elements of the Thomistic teaching of the natural law, all of which combine to be part of the natural law in its essence:

1. the natural inclinations;
2. the faculty of reason; and
   
3. the proposition of reason.

The first two elements are naturally innate. The third element is natural in man but not innate, though it presupposes the innate elements. All three elements combine in man as part of the natural law, the most important relatively and the most distinctive of man (relative to the brute animals) is the third element. Therefore man has a certain autonomy relative to the brute animals. "Animals are ruled [by inclinations]; man participates formally in the Eternal Law by taking part in the ruling of himself." Bertke, 18-19. In fact, it is the second two elements, and especially the third, that allow man to freely participate rationally in the eternal law, something brute animals cannot do, since their participation is limited to their natural inclinations (lacking the faculty of reason essential for the exercise of the moral faculty). Nevertheless, inclinations are not to be maligned or considered inferior:

[T]he superiority of the proposition of reason does not obviate the necessity of the natural inclinations and the light of reason, for the proposition depends for its all-important right ordaining of actions to the end on its conformity with the inclinations. Thought the correct aligning of the inclinations in relation to the means depends on the practical intellect, "the relation to the natural inclination is the measure of truth in the practical reason."

Bertke, 19 (quoting from St. Thomas's Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Book VI, Lecture 2, n. 8 (rectitudo appetitus per respectum ad finem est mensura veritatis in ratione practica).

Bertke sums up the three elements in the essence of the natural law thus:

Summing up this doctrine on the essence of the natural law it can be said that the proposition of reason [the third element] pertains to the essence in "actu secundo,"† or as presupposing the other two elements [the natural inclinations and the faculty of reason], while the inclinations and the light of reason pertain to the essence in "actu primo,"† or as necessarily presupposed by the proposition of reason.

Bertke, 19 (citing to Merkelbach, 227).


______________________________________
*Rev. Stanley Bertke, The Possibility of Invincible Ignorance of the Natural Law (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1941) (hereinafter "Bertke").
**S.T. IaIIae, q. 90, art. 1, s. c. & c.
***S.T. IaIIae, q. 93, art. 1. (lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis).
†Bertke cites to the work of Walter Farrell, The Natural Moral Law (Ditchling: St. Dominic's Press, 1930), 82-103 and Henricus Benedictus Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis (Paris: Desclee), T.1, 227. For examples where St. Thomas treats the natural law as something innate, Bertke (pp. 16-18) quotes the following:

Wherefore it (human nature) has a share in the Eternal Reason whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.

Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur.

[Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co.]

As an example of natural law in the second sense, the following example is given:

Thus implying that the light of natural reason whereby we discern what is good and what is evil which is the function of the natural law is nothing else than the imprint of the divine light [being the faculty of reason].

[Q]uasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis.

[Id.]

As an example of natural law in the third sense:

Hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

[I]deo est invenire aliquid in ratione practica quod ita se habeat ad operationes, sicut se habet propositio in ratione speculativa ad conclusiones. Et huiusmodi propositiones universales rationis practicae ordinatae ad actiones, habent rationem legis. Quae quidem propositiones aliquando actualiter considerantur, aliquando vero habitualiter a ratione tenentur.

[Iª-IIae q. 90 a. 1 ad 2]

Finally, as an example of all three elements together, Bertke cites the following passage from St. Thomas Aquinas:

[L]aw, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (Article 1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations [element 1] to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others [element 3, as it requires propositional reason]. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end [element 1]: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Psalm 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason [element 2], whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

[L]ex, cum sit regula et mensura, dupliciter potest esse in aliquo, uno modo, sicut in regulante et mensurante; alio modo, sicut in regulato et mensurato, quia inquantum participat aliquid de regula vel mensura, sic regulatur vel mensuratur. Unde cum omnia quae divinae providentiae subduntur, a lege aeterna regulentur et mensurentur, ut ex dictis patet; manifestum est quod omnia participant aliqualiter legem aeternam, inquantum scilicet ex impressione eius habent inclinationes in proprios actus et fines. Inter cetera autem rationalis creatura excellentiori quodam modo divinae providentiae subiacet, inquantum et ipsa fit providentiae particeps, sibi ipsi et aliis providens. Unde et in ipsa participatur ratio aeterna, per quam habet naturalem inclinationem ad debitum actum et finem. Et talis participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura lex naturalis dicitur. Unde cum Psalmista dixisset, sacrificate sacrificium iustitiae, quasi quibusdam quaerentibus quae sunt iustitiae opera, subiungit, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui quaestioni respondens, dicit, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.

[Iª-IIae q. 91 a. 2 co.]
†The terms "actus primus" and "actus secundus," literally prime actuality and secondary actuality, respectively, are scholastic terms in Latin. The term actus means a determination, complement, perfection, an actuality. The actus primus, then, is the first such actuality that begins another actuality or series of actualities or upon which a subsequent actuality or series of further actualities is founded. These second actualities are the acta secunda (singular, "actus secundus"). Since the actus secundus does not come into play until after the actus primus, the actus secundus may be said to be in potentiality relative to the actus primus. As the conclusion to C. A. Dubray's treatment of it in the Catholic Encyclopedia (1913, s.v. "actus primus") notes:

And this is the most frequent application of the terms actus primus and actus secundus. The former is the faculty; the latter, the exercise, or function. To see in actu primo simply means to have the sense of vision; to see in actu secundo is to actually perform acts of vision. The modern distinction of potential and kinetic energy might serve as another illustration: the loaded gun, or the engine with steam up represent first actualities; the bullet speeding to the mark, the engine flying over the rails, represent second actualities.

Long on Porter: Natural Law as Capacity

THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW ADVANCED by Professor Jean Porter* in her book Nature as Reason is given significant approbation by Professor Steven A. Long. He lists in a sort of litany the many things that in his view she has got right in her extensive treatment on the subject:

• the importance of "pre-rational nature" within moral theology and philosophy;
• a non-dualist account of human nature;
• a posteriori (realist) reasoning which relies and abstracts from sensory experience;
• acceptance of the priority of the speculative to the practical, with an understanding that the speculative extends into the practical;
• an appreciation of how there is a hierarchy of natural ends that are objective, that is, that do not depend upon and are prior to choice, that are ethically significant;
• nature, prescinded from grace, has a certain relative integrity and autonomy.
  

These are solid, expectable features of a classically-based natural law theory. Indeed, her book is heartily recommended, as its merits, which are legion, fully outweigh any deficiencies:

[I]n this book Dr. Porter has achieved a penetrating and profound treatment of the natural law, one that does great justice to its speculative and metaphysical character as well as to its practical importance and unfolding. With respect to her skepticism regarding the "naturalistic fallacy" or dichotomy of nature and good; her diagnosis of the errors of dualism; her account of the essentially speculative component of natural moral knowledge; her treatment of the nature of the object of the human act; her distinction of natural and supernatural; and her sense of the essentially theological foundation of the belief in a minimum quotient of human dignity and the claim for equal regard of each human person, Dr. Porter is again and again not only correct, but eloquently and rigorously so.

Porter, 158.

Dr. Jean Porter

And yet there are parts of Dr. Porter's theory that are geared to sympathize with pluralism and with the modern notion of subjective rights that Long finds troubling or at least worthy of particular exploration and criticism. Dr. Porter actually moves beyond the mere idea of minimal practical consensus espoused by Maritain** to "an overt admission of 'plural' socially embedded natural law perspectives open to one another in dialogue." Long, 156. She also embraces the notion of subjective rights, but tries to tether them to an objective notion of the subject. To Long, it seems like a sort of Maritain redivivus. In fact, he states that "not since Maritain has a mind so rich in scholastic preoccupation attempt to marry Thomism with subjective right and modernity (and now, postmodernity)." Long, 158.

Long finds five areas of in Porter's work that merit further exploration in the context of whether the concept of natura pura, pure nature, implies a secularist minimalism.

1. Porter's view of natural law as a "capacity" for moral judgment, instead of an actual ordering to judgment;
2. Porter's discomfort with "close-in" teleologies as being morally significant which is tied to a fear of "biologism";
3. Porter's overemphasis of "the social embeddedness of our knowledge of the natural law."
4. Porter's account of subjective right; and
5. Porter's view of the role that earthly happiness apart from supernatural beatitude has in the area of achieving social and political consensus.

Our next postings shall focus on Long's analysis of these five areas. We shall focus on the presentation by Porter of the natural law as a capacity rather than an actual inclinational ordering, a distinction that Long thinks is important when the natural law interacts with society and with what Long calls "close-in" teleologies.

Long addresses Porter's tendency to view natural law merely as a sort of mere power or capacity rather than an "actual motion or teleological ordering with respect to judgment." Long, 158. The natural law must not be seen as a sort of static ability to make a judgment. It should more properly be seen as "actual inclinational ordering," an "actual impress of the divine ordering passively received, whereby every creature receives it being, nature, powers, ordering to acts, objects and the hierarchy of ends, from God, and on the basis of which he have genuinely natural reason to do or not to do." Long, 159. The problem with seeing the natural law as a mere capacity or power is that it makes the natural law into something that is in potency only, and not something that is already in act. It makes natural law into a pond concept, rather than a stream concept. It is as if Porter would put man on a summit without any dynamic predisposition or inclination, neutral with respect to gravity, rather on some sort of incline where we have the inclination already to go a certain way, where gravity is already tugging down upon us.

The emphasis upon capacity or power seems to place in a status of pure potency what is an actual ordering, articulated in the inclinations of human nature toward the connatural good for man. . . . [T]he stress upon power and capacity can be misleading, as it may seem to subtract from the actual teleological ordering of nature any genuine act that is at root inexpungeable.

Long, 160. The difference is subtle, nuanced, perhaps, but important. The difference between seeing natural law as a power or capacity only on the one hand, and not as an inclination or actual inclinational ordering shows itself when addressing issues arising out of "pre-moral" natural orderings (particularly in the "close-in" teleologies), and the effect and role of social mediatory structures in the formulation or formation of natural law.

These are the topics we will handle in our next two blog postings.

____________________________
*Dr. Jean Porter is the John A. O'Brien Professor of Theology at the University of Notre Dame.
**In the public realm, Jacques Maritain's advocated an accommodation by religious believers to modernity's concept of "human rights," a project, which in Long's view, was ill-conceived since "rights" are derivative concepts and without a hierarchical order of ends and a basis for the exercise of prudence (which are external to rights) the only result is endless bickering. See Avoiding Secularist Minimalism: Jacques Maritain, Part 1 and Avoiding Secularist Minimalism: Jacques Maritain, Part 2.