Freedom and Law: Pope Leo XIII's Libertas praestantissimum, Part 7

ANOTHER SHIBBOLETH OF MODERN LIBERALISM is the notion of the right to free speech, which includes, in Leo XIII's view, collateral liberties of the press and of teaching. While Leo XIII recognizes liberty of speech and of the press, he also recognizes that such liberty is not absolute, but is one that must be "used in moderation," and is subject to limits, the same "bounds and end of all true liberty." LP, 23. "Right," Leo XIII reminds us, is a "moral power," a facultas moralis, that is not indifferent to "truth and falsehood," to "justice and injustice." LP, 23. Here is the right to free speech recognized by Leo XIII:

Men have a right freely and prudently to propagate throughout the State what things soever are true and honorable, so that as many as possible may possess them. . . . In regard . . . to all matter of opinion which God leaves to man's free discussion, full liberty of thought and of speech is naturally within the right of everyone; for such liberty never leads men to suppress the truth, but often to discover it and make it known.

LP, 23. The liberty of speech, however, does not cover "lying opinions," opinionum mendacia, nor "vices which corrupt the heart and moral life," vitia quae animum moresque corrumpunt. LP, 23.

Here we confront what to moderns and liberals is repulsive, but which is at the heart of modern society's revolution against the reign of God and natural and divine law. It is the notion that our intellectual inquiry is not lawless, but, like all things human, is governed by law, by the natural moral law and by divine law. Lawless thoughts and lawless words are not allowed us, and we are morally responsible for thoughts, ideas, concepts, teachings, speech, and words that violate the natural moral law or divine law. We are doubly answerable for promulgating those errors among our fellows. The natural moral law governs the propagation of such ideas through speech and writing since such pernicious ideas can deeply affect the common good:

The excesses of an unbridled intellect, which unfailingly end in the oppression of the untutored multitude, are no less rightly controlled by the authority of the law than are the injuries inflicted by violence upon the weak. And this all the more surely, because by far the greater part of the community is either absolutely unable, or able only with great difficulty, to escape from illusions and deceitful subtleties, especially such as flatter the passions.

LP, 23. What we say, and what we write, falls under the natural moral law and its prescriptions. We are not simply morally free to say and publish what we want.

If unbridled license of speech and of writing be granted to all, nothing will remain sacred and inviolate; even the highest and truest mandates of natures, justly held to be the common and noblest heritage of the human race, will not be spared.

LP, 23.

We have, of course, heard of the alleged statement of Voltaire: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." It is one of those hackneyed phrases on everyone's lips which is really stupid and banal. It is, of course, wrongly ascribed to Voltaire.* Be that as it may, it is an absurdity. One would be a fool or a scoundrel indeed if one would defend to death the right of a Larry Flint to peddle his Hustler or of Tony Alamo to peddle his false anti-Catholic leaflets. This sort of "right" to publish error or promote vice is what Leo XIII will not entertain as existing.

It is another thing entirely, however, to have defended to death the right of the Christian priest Perfectus, who, according to the Memoriale sanctorum of Eulogius, was asked by some Muslims in the 8th century in Cordoba, Spain, then under Islamic rule, what he thought of Jesus and Muhammad. Prudently, Perfectus responded that he thought Christ divine, but did not dare say what he thought of Muhammad for fear of angering his questioners. Upon their assurance that he had nothing to fear, Perfectus stated that he thought Muhammad was one of the false Christs and false prophets predicted by the Gospel, and that he thought him and his law lascivious. Ultimately, it led to his death for blasphemy. Perfectus had a right to free speech that was denied him, and the Islamic qadis or judges did him wrong and violated both the natural law and divine law in putting him to death for speaking truth. (Whether they did so in ignorance is another question.)

We have no moral obligation to give air space or publication rights to error, in particular error as it relates to things relating to the natural and divine law. Since the end of communication is to advance the true and the good, it follows that any person who engages in communication that advances error or evil has, from a strictly moral standpoint, no rights to do so; rather, such propagation should be counted as vicious.

The same sort of reasoning follows from what liberals called "liberty of teaching," docendi libertatem. Since the whole purpose of education is to remove ignorance and to imbue men's minds with truth, the teacher has the duty "to banish error from the mind, and by sure safeguards to close the entry to all false convictions." LP, 24. There is no right of teaching whatever one pleases, and such a claim of right is "greatly opposed to reason, and tends absolutely to pervert men's minds." LP, 24. There is, to be sure, a liberty of teaching, but such liberty of teaching is linked to the duty to teach truth. The liberty of teaching goes to two areas of truth: natural and supernatural. Leo XIII explains:

Now, truth, which should be the only subject matter of those who teach, is of two kinds: natural and supernatural. Of natural truths, such as the principles of nature and whatever is derived from them immediately by our reason, there is a kind of common patrimony in the human race. On this, as on a firm basis, morality, justice, religion, and the very bonds of human society rest: and to allow people to go unharmed who violate or destroy it would be most impious, most foolish, and most inhuman.

Veri autem, in quo unice versari praecipientium doctrina debet, unum est naturale genus, supernaturale alterum. Ex veritatibus naturalibus, cuiusmodi sunt principia naturae, et ea quae ex illis proxime ratione ducuntur, existit humani generis velut commune patrimonium: in quo, tamquam fundamento firmissimo, cum mores et iustitia et religio, atque ipsa coniunctio societatis humanae nitatur, nihil tam impium esset tamque stolide inhumanum, quam illud violari ac diripi impune sinere.

LP, 25. It follows that no one has the right to teach others matters that contradict the natural moral law. For example, homosexuals do not have a moral right, and they shall never have a moral right, to insist that school children be taught that homosexuality is a legitimate life option. No one can insist on a moral right to advance an activity that is repugnant to the natural moral law.

The same may be said for the divinely revealed truths, including those relating to the Incarnation and Christ's founding of the Church. The Church herself has a role in teaching. She is both Mater and Magistra, Mother and Teacher:

In faith and in the teaching of morality, God Himself made the Church a partaker of His divine authority, and through His heavenly gift she cannot be deceived. She is therefore the greatest and most reliable teacher of mankind, and in her swells an inviolable right to teach them. Sustained by the truth received from her divine Founder, the Church has ever sought to fulfill holily the mission entrusted to her by God; unconquered by the difficulties on all sides surrounding her, she has never ceased to assert her liberty of teaching, and in this way the wretched superstition of paganism being dispelled, the wide world was renewed unto Christian wisdom. Now, reason itself clearly teaches that the truths of divine revelation and those of nature cannot really be opposed to one another, and that whatever is at variance with them must necessarily be false. Therefore, the divine teaching of the Church, so far from being an obstacle to the pursuit of learning and the progress of science, or in any way retarding the advance of civilization, in reality brings to them the sure guidance of shining light. And for the same reason it is of no small advantage for the perfecting of human liberty, since our Saviour Jesus Christ has said that by truth is man made free: "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." (John 8:32)

LP, 27.

Neither science nor advocates of civil rights ought to be "indignant" or "feel aggrieved" at the thought that law, in particular the natural moral law, should provide just and necessary restraints on speech and teaching. It is not a violation of human liberty, but a great boon to human liberty, to insist that human knowledge, human communication, and human teaching should be consonant with the moral law and with revealed truth. LP, 27. Historically, the Church has been a promoter and patron of human learning. "For learning is in itself good, and praiseworthy, and desirable." And the constraints of morality and of truth are not confining from a practical perspective since, "we must not forget that a vast field lies freely open to man's industry and genius, containing all those things which have no necessary connection with Christian faith and morals, or as to which the Church, exercising no authority, leaves the judgment of the learned free and unconstrained." LP, 28.

In concluding the section on liberty of speech, the press, and teaching, Leo XIII notes that the liberals have a double standard: one the one hand, they maintain a virtually unconstrained right to promote their liberalism, but on the other hand, they are quick to deny such ample rights to the Church, which they call intolerant:

From all this may be understood the nature and character of that liberty which the followers of liberalism so eagerly advocate and proclaim. On the one hand, they demand for themselves and for the State a license which opens the way to every perversity of opinion; and on the other, they hamper the Church in divers ways, restricting her liberty within narrowest limits, although from her teaching not only is there nothing to be feared, but in every respect very much to be gained.

LP, 29.

Leo XIII next turns to the liberty of conscience, to which we will also turn in our next blog posting.

(continued)

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*The quotation represents a synopsis of Voltaire's doctrine on free speech and his attitude toward Helvetius, and is found in the book Friends of Voltaire (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1906), 199, a book published by Evelyn Beatrice Hall under the pseudonym S. G. Tallentyre.

Cardinal Mercier and the Natural Law, Part 16: Individual Right to Opinion and Expression

FREEDOM OF OPINION AND OF EXPRESSION OF THAT OPINION is Mercier's next topic under the category of individual right. Mercier distinguishes between the holding of an opinion, and the free choice and liberty relating to that, and the external expression of that opinion, through speech, writing, or action. Moderns appear to hold to a law of anarchy in the area of opinion (Mercier calls his age an "age of intellectual anarchy"), holding as sacrosanct the right to anyone to hold whatever opinion he wants on any matter.

In a manner of speaking, of course, there is absolute ability to think whatever we "Man does not escape the law which binds every thinking being of searching for the truth."
--Cardinal Mercier wish free of physical restraint. Since thought takes place in the inner consciousness of man, it is hidden from others, and so generally free of external compulsion. But it would be error to believe that one is free to think whatever thoughts he wishes with impunity, as if the faculty of thought is not subject to the moral order.

Man does not escape the law which binds every thinking being of searching for the truth. His fancies, his interests, his passions have no claim where there is a question of the higher rights of truth. . . . Freedom of opinion, then does not mean the right to be indifferent to religious and moral questions. As in other fields, so even more emphatically here, eagerness for the truth must be the ruling principle in the whole of man's mental progress.

[275-76(80)] Thus the inner freedom of thought is given us, not for whim, but to allow the untrammeled search for truth. Freedom of thought is ordered to acquisition or pursuit of truth.

Given the intellectual anarchy of the modern age, we must exercise prudence and tolerance informed by charity in the treatment of others, without thereby lapsing into indifferentism, or losing sight of our obligation, in charity, to exercise the spiritual works of mercy of instructing the ignorant, counseling the doubtful, and admonishing the sinner.

We say that it is undoubtedly the duty of every intelligent being to assent to the truth according to his opportunities of knowing it. But it is quite possible that under the prejudices of education or by other influences a man may in good faith adopt what is false. The assent of the mind to doctrine is not always determined by mere evidence. It is generally the highly complex resultant of subjective conditions that entirely escape the observation of others. The tribunal of a man's conscience is a sanctuary into which no one may enter. To form an estimate of the sincerity of another's opinion is matter of the utmost delicacy. God alone searches the reins and the heart. We have no right, therefore, to condemn anyone as soon as he thinks differently from ourselves. Still less may be we use coercive measures. To resort to persecution would be not only odious but absurd. Not by force but by persuasion are ideas propagated. Christ did not send His disciples to conquer the world by the sword, as did Mohammed; His only injunction to them was to go and teach.

[276-77(80)] Thus, Mercier recommends that we presume good faith on the part of one in error, and reject any temptation at using constraints to force a man to repudiate what he believes to be true, or to accept that which he believes to be false. Nevertheless, such respect for another's erroneous opinion does not in any way translate to accepting that error and truth have the same metaphysical value, or that truth and error are to be regarded as in the eye of the beholder, and therefore a matter of indifference. The duty to search for truth is absolutely and unequivocally moral. It is between the individual conscience and God. It is not a matter of competency for the secular or public authority.

The liberty given to thought or opinion is therefore to be free of interference by the law of civil authorities. However, the freedom of expression of thought or opinion, from a moral perspective, may be considered to be less broad. In his constitutional jurisprudence, Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black was an absolutist in the right of free speech. Whether the U.S. Constitution guarantees an absolute right to free speech or not, in Mercier's mind there are both moral as well as legitimate legal grounds for controlling speech, "but only in the measure that this is necessary for the public good." [277(80)] The State is limited in its authority to restrain speech.

First of all, unlike the Church, the State is not the repository of truth. "As it is not the depositary of absolute truth, it has not the sovereign power of silencing discussion. The supreme direction of man's mind does not belong to the State." [277(80)] Because the right of teaching the young is another form of expressing one's ideas, it follows that the State "cannot claim a monopoly of teaching." [278(80)]

The State has no right to mould all its citizens in one type, or to oblige them all to think alike, on the pretext of bringing about perfect unity in the body politic. . . . The right of teaching, like that of thinking, is derive from human personality and has no direct connexion to the mission of the State.

[278(80)]

Secondly, true and even doubtful opinion ought to be allowed free expression. Attempting to influence expression invariably leads to an effort to control thought. Moreover, allowing the free expression of even erroneous opinions allows such views to be criticized, checked, and corrected by others. "Private enterprise is a great factor in progress, alike in the intellectual as in the economic sphere." [278(80)]

Nevertheless, the State does have some authority to limit or restrict the right of diffusing one's opinions.

In the public Authority, which is the interpreter of the natural law and the guardian of social order, must be recognized the right to repress the diffusion of opinions which are clearly inimical to the general peace. Intervention in the matters of opinions has been allowed as a final resource by even the most liberal legislation. Examples of abuse are not wanting; but this only means that liberty requires serious safeguards. However, between a [secular] dogmatism or a sectarianism that is intolerant and persecuting, and a liberalism that authorizes the diffusion of the most subversive ideas, there is surely a just mean.

[278(80)]

The last liberty right that Mercier addresses is liberty of conscience. "By liberty of conscience we mean the right every man possesses of acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience." [278(81)] The right to freedom of conscience may be infringed in three ways:

• By inciting or persuading another to do wrong by example, by counsel, or by threat;
• By forcing another to do something which he believes is forbidden;
• By preventing another from doing what he believes is required to be done.

The right to act in accordance with one's conscience is an absolute right if the voice of conscience is "clear and right." However, a "false" conscience may be interfered with to the limited extent that public authority may "oppose any of its manifestations which would damage lawful rights and interests or would be directly subversive of public order." [278-79(81)] Hence, the public authorities could prevent an anti-abortionist zealot from acting in accordance with his conscience which (falsely) directs him that he has a duty to murder abortionists to prevent the slaughter of innocents. Such activity, however sincerely held as required by conscience, is manifestly subversive of public order. Similarly, in spite of liberty of conscience, the State could obviously interfere to proscribe human sacrifices or other immoral practices even if sincerely held by the religious believers of some errant sect. Manifestly, "liberty of conscience may be restricted in the case of a false conscience." [279(81)] (emphasis added). However, this negative and limited power upon public authority to prevent someone from acting in accord with a false conscience should be distinguished from public authority compelling someone to act against his conscience as, for example, requiring him to externally adhere to a doctrine to which internally does not assent or to abjure a belief which his conscience bids him to hold as true.*

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*Mercier has a footnote that merits mention. "When it is said that St. Thomas Aquinas maintains the repression of heresy to be lawful, it must be added that he looked upon the heretic as a rebel not only against God but also against society, based as it was at that time entirely on Christianity. To him the heretic was one who committed a sin which had anti-social effects. In this fact alone lies his reason for justifying civil measures of repression; for he expressly recognizes that some of our obligations are matters for the individual conscience alone, notably such as duties to God. Moreover, he proscribes every measure of constraint of those who are strangers to the truth faith, on the ground that no one is bound to give an enforced assent to dogma." [279 n. 38] In this regard, it may also be mentioned that the Inquisition had no jurisdiction over Jew or Muslim, but its jurisdiction was only over the baptized, that is to say, the Catholic Christian.